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
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
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






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# A P P E N D I X

TO THE

## HISTORY

OF

## GREAT BRITAIN,

FROM THE REVOLUTION, 1688,

TO

THE TREATY OF AMIENS,

A. D. 1802.

---

BY WILLIAM BELSHAM.

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CONSISTING OF

*A SELECTION OF STATE PAPERS,*

ACCOMPANIED BY

REMARKS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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# APPENDIX

TO THE

FIRST VOLUME

OF

BELSHAM'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND :

CONTAINING

*STATE PAPERS AND AUTHORITIES.*

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PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO THE ACT OF UNIFORMITY, *A. D.* 1660-2.

THE convention-parliament met April 25, 1660. One of the best and wisest men who ever sat in that or any other public assembly, sir Matthew Hale, moved for the appointment of a committee to review the propositions tendered to king Charles I. during his residence in the Isle of Wight, that the invitation to the present sovereign might be founded on the basis of his late majesty's concessions. Had the question been fairly discussed, there can be no doubt that the motion of sir Matthew Hale, or something analogous to it, must have been carried; but general Monk, who had acted from the commencement of this business with a degree of deceit which it would be difficult to excuse, even if his motives had been much more free from suspicion, now throwing off the mask, stood up and declared himself against all conditions, making those who proposed them responsible for all the mischiefs that might follow.

General Fleetwood, who acted as the head of the in-

dependents, though an honest and brave man, and a sincere friend to the liberties of his country, shewed himself upon this great occasion, as indeed upon every other, utterly unequal to the arduous situation in which he was placed. Monk being determined to restore the king, a determination certainly just and laudable, resolved at the same time to effect his purpose, not in the mode most beneficial to the country, but most agreeable to the monarch, and most advantageous to himself.\*

A sort of infatuation seems to have seized the leaders of the presbyterians, who constituted by far the majority of the convention. Many of them relying upon their merit in accomplishing the Restoration, and cajoled by the court party, entertained great expectations of favor and reward. Some who were less sanguine depended on such a liberty as the protestants enjoyed in France; but others, who were better acquainted with the principles and tempers of the prelates, declared, "that they expected to be silenced, imprisoned, and banished; but yet they would do their parts to restore the king, because no foreseen ill consequence ought to hinder them from doing their duty,"† so that the most zealous churchman could scarcely carry his ideas of loyalty to a more extravagant or pernicious height. They would neither hear, nor see, nor be persuaded, till it was too late. Of this number was the celebrated Baxter, who, in speaking of the letters of several preachers of the reformed churches abroad, to himself and others, in favor of the king, thus expresses his sentiments: "These divines know nothing of the state of affairs in England; they know not those men who are to be restored with the king. They pray for the success of my labours, when they are persuading

\* Ludlow's Memoirs.

† Baxter's Ecclesiastical History.

me to put an end to my labours by setting up those prelates who will silence me and many hundreds more. They persuade me to that which will separate me from my flock, and then pray that I may be a blessing to them; and yet I am for restoring the king, that when we are silenced, and our ministry at an end, and some of us lie in prisons, we may there and in that condition have peace of conscience in the discharge of our duty, and the exercise of faith, patience, and charity, in our sufferings.\*?

In a very short time after the return of the king, viz. about the middle of June 1660, a committee of presbyterian ministers, consisting of the great leaders, Calamy, Manton, Baxter, &c. waited upon the king, being introduced by the Earl of Manchester, to crave his Majesty's interposition for reconciling the differences in the church. They met with a gracious reception, and the king desired them to draw up such proposals as they thought fit for an agreement about church government, promising them a conference in his own presence, with some episcopal divines, when the proposals were ready.

Upon the ground of this promise a general meeting of the presbyterian clergy was summoned to be held at Sion College, and after much consultation they presented an address to the king, in which they allow and recognize "a firm agreement between them and their episcopal brethren in the doctrinal truths of the reformed religion, and in the substantial parts of the divine worship." Then they proceed to say, "that for the matters in difference, church government, liturgy, and ceremonies; first, They do not renounce the true antient primitive episcopacy, and they merely and humbly de-

\* Baxter's Life, Part II. p. 216.

sire the existing constitution of the church to be modified and reformed in certain specified particulars. Secondly, They profess themselves satisfied in their judgments respecting the lawfulness of a liturgy or formulary of worship, but that the book of common prayer is in some things justly offensive, and very much needs amendment. Thirdly, With regard to the ceremonies, they declare the worship of God to be pure and perfect without them; and they expressly except against kneeling at the Lord's supper, the use of the surplice and cross, and bowing at the name of Jesus."

This address was nevertheless, upon the whole, drawn with much good sense, and in a manner very prudent and conciliatory. The king received the divines who presented it very favourably, "and expressed," says the historian Neale,\* "a satisfaction in hearing they were disposed to a liturgy and forms of prayer; and that they were willing to yield to the essence of episcopacy, and therefore doubted not of procuring an accommodation."

In a short time the bishops, to whom the address, and a paper accompanying it, was transmitted, drew up a reply which was communicated to the presbyterian clergy July 8, 1660. Being assured of the protection and support of the minister Clarendon, their lordships assumed a very high and haughty tone of language, and taking advantage of the concession of their opponents, that they agree with the episcopalians in the substantial of doctrine and worship, infer from thence, "that their particular exceptions ought not to be stiffly insisted on to the disturbance of the peace of the church."

A rejoinder to this paper, chiefly drawn by the angry

\* History of the Puritans.

and acrimonious pen of Baxter, set far distant the prospect of conciliation. The king however, agreeably to that refined and cautious policy which appears to have regulated his conduct at the commencement, and which, during the varied course of his reign, never wholly forsook him, renewed his efforts for this purpose. On the 22d October 1660, a conference took place between several of the bishops and presbyterian divines, at the chancellor's, in the presence of the sovereign, and of the lords Clarendon, Albemarle, Ormond, on the one part, and Manchester, Anglesey, and Hollis, on the other. The king himself acted as moderator, displaying on this occasion his natural good sense and temper. And a declaration expressive of his royal sentiments and intentions was ordered to be framed by the bishops Morley and HENCHMAN, in conjunction with the doctors Reynolds and Calamy: and if they disagreed, the earl of Anglesey and lord Hollis to decide—a strong presumptive evidence of the sincere co-operation of the king.

On the 25th October the royal declaration, excellently drawn, was published, containing large and ample concessions. In particular, the king promised to appoint an equal number of divines of each side to review the liturgy of the church, and to make such alterations as shall be thought necessary; and to dispense with the use of such ceremonies as were offensive to tender consciences. His majesty concluded with “conjuring all his loving subjects to acquiesce and submit to this declaration concerning the differences that have so much disquieted the nation at home, and given offence to the protestant churches abroad.”

Had the presbyterians universally acquiesced in this



declaration, sanctioned by the leaders of their own party, all might yet have ended well. But in a second address to the king of most insufferable length, many of the presbyterian clergy, with the metaphysical and disputatious Baxter at their head, renewed their complaints in a manner which shewed they were little disposed to make concessions themselves, or to accept them on the part of their opponents. Others indeed joined in an address of thanks to the throne, "begging with all humility on their knees," as they express it, "that re-ordination and the surplice in colleges might not be imposed." The king received this address also with complacency, and returned for answer, "that he would endeavour to give them all satisfaction, and to make them as happy as himself."

This was the decisive moment. The king appears to have been sincerely disposed to make good his promise, and upon the terms of the royal declaration, Reynolds, Baxter, and Calamy, were offered bishopricks, Bates and Manton, &c. other high preferments, the first of whom only accepted. Upon this all hope of reconciliation was at an end; and a sudden and fatal resolution was taken to adopt a system of rigour. The lords and commons had concurred in an unanimous address of thanks to the king upon the royal declaration, and a bill founded upon it was ordered to be brought into the lower house, but was negatived by the courtiers on the second reading. The high-church party perceiving their power, resolved to carry matters to extremity, and the king was prevailed upon to dissolve the convention-parliament after it had sat about eight months only.

Upon a general review of these proceedings, it most evidently appears that the secession of the presbyterians



was founded upon slight and trivial grounds; that their ecclesiastical leaders, however unimpeachable their characters, or profound their theological acquirements, were men of narrow and limited minds. After weakly surrendering the political authority of which they were in actual possession, they had the imprudence to irritate their potent and malignant adversaries, the high-churchmen, by a petulant and pertinacious opposition to trifles which religious contention only could have magnified into importance. The famous conference of the Savoy was held, pursuant to the declaration of the king, March 1661; but it produced nothing but frivolous and scholastic disputation, carried on in the true spirit of theological rancour. As upon innumerable other occasions, the truly wise and enlightened were compelled to sigh in secret over the follies and frailties of mankind, and a scene of persecution soon ensued, which, under colour of law, gave full scope to those religious barbarities which exhibit human nature in its most odious and disgraceful form.

It may be subjoined by way of historical illustration, that the term "presbyterian" was throughout these disputations indiscriminately and reproachfully applied to all those, as Baxter himself observes, "who *were* for episcopacy, and a liturgy, *if* they conformed not so far as to subscribe or swear to the English diocesan frame, and all their impositions. The earl of Manchester, the earl of Anglesey, and the lord Hollis, were called presbyterians, when I have heard them," says the historian, "plead for moderate episcopacy and liturgy myself, and they would have drawn us to yield farther than we did." The king himself, in his justly applaud-

ed declaration of the 25th October (1660), says, " We must, for the honour of all those of either persuasion with whom we have conferred, declare that the professions and desires of all for the advancement of piety and true godliness are the same ; their professions of zeal for the peace of the church are the same ; they ALL approve episcopacy, they ALL approve a set form of liturgy."

What chiefly contributed in all probability to disgust the king, and to cause him finally to acquiesce in the measures of violence urged by the bishops and the chancellor, was the inflexible resolution of the presbyterians, or the party so denominated, not to give any countenance to the toleration of the catholics, which the king had extremely at heart. During the conference at Clarendon-house, the chancellor, by order of the king, read a clause as an addition to the declaration, viz. " that *others* also be permitted to meet for religious worship, so it be they do it not to the disturbance of the peace." This request, made to men who were themselves soliciting favours, and made in behalf of men like themselves, exposed to the fury of religious persecution, might surely have been deemed reasonable, even if it had not been the personal request of the monarch.

After a pause, Baxter, the most popular leader, as well as the most admired orator of the party, said, " we distinguish the *tolerable* parties from the *intolerable*, such as the papists and socinians : for the former we crave just lenity and favour, but for the latter we cannot make their toleration our request." The king chagrined, replied, " there are laws enow against papists ;" upon which Baxter made answer, " we understand that the question is, whether those laws shall be executed ?"

Such is the fascination of bigotry and prejudice, and such, in innumerable instances, the intolerant spirit of those who have every thing to dread from the intolerance of others!

The act of uniformity passed by a vast majority of voices in the new parliament, with circumstances of even wanton cruelty and aggravation ; and the non-conformists for a long series of years suffered under every species of persecution short of burning at the stake ; and, indeed, to perish slowly and silently in prison, as hundreds and probably thousands of them did in the course of this profligate reign, is the worst and most detestable mode of torture.

## R E M A R K S

ON THE CHARACTER OF

## THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

A. D. 1688.

THOUGH no direct or positive evidence can perhaps be produced in proof of the earl of Sunderland's treachery to king James, and of the correspondence mediate or immediate which he maintained with the prince of Orange, yet the presumptions against him are so numerous, and so strong, as to have excited an almost universal belief of his systematic deceit and hypocrisy.

The political character of this nobleman appears indeed to have been, from his first entrance into public life, very profligate. From a violent exclusionist he had suddenly become a most servile and obsequious courtier; and at the very commencement of the reign of James II. he was found the most willing and able instrument in carrying on the schemes and projects of the court. So early as the month of July 1685, M. Barillon wrote to Louis XIV. that lord Sunderland had avowed to him the king's design of "establishing the catholic religion; and that he could not, consistently with good sense and right reason, have any other end in view:" adding, "that another thing was equally certain, namely, that this project could not succeed but by maintaining the strictest confidence and connection with France."\*

\* July 16, 1685. "Milord Sunderland m'a dit, je ne sçais pas si on voit en France les choses comme elles sont ici, mais je défie ceux qui les voyent de près, de ne pas connoitre que le roi mon maître n'a rien dans le cœur si avant que d'établir la religion catho-

Conformably to this declaration, M. Barillon informs his sovereign that lord Sunderland held frequent conferences at his own house with the earl of Powis and other catholic lords, in relation to this subject. The king of France was convinced, by the representations of his ambassador, that Sunderland was really attached to his interest, as inseparably combined with that of his own sovereign, and in consequence of his good services he allowed him a very considerable pension.

It appears indeed probable, that for the first two years of the reign of king James, lord Sunderland, foreseeing no likelihood of a change in affairs, was faithful to his trust, and it will easily be admitted, that from his superior political sagacity he would use his influence for the most part to moderate the violence of those counsels by which the king was habitually guided. It is certain, however, that if his opinions were adverse to the system of violence, his practices were conformable to it; and that he was an active and principal agent in carrying into execution, so long as he remained in power, the most obnoxious measures of the court. A remarkable anecdote related by lord Dartmouth, in his notes on bishop Burnet's history, seems to indicate at one period a degree of elation on the part of the earl of Sunderland which could result only from the firmest confidence in the ultimate success of the court projects. After the open violence practised on the corporate boroughs with

lique; qu'il ne peut même selon le bon sens et la droite raison avoir d'autre but. Il y a une autre chose certaine, c'est que ce plan là ne peut réussir que par un concert et une liaison étroite avec le roi votre maitre."

*Dalrymple's Appendix, part I.*



a view to secure the majority of votes in the new parliament, lord Sunderland declared publicly at his own table that they were now sure of their game, for it would be an easy matter to have a house of commons to their minds, and there was nothing else to resist them. Lord Bradford asked him if they were as sure of the house of lords, for he believed they would meet with more opposition there than they expected? Lord Sunderland turning to lord Churchill, who sat next him, in a ludicrously contemptuous tone, exclaimed, "O Silly! why your troop of guards shall be called to the house of lords."

The suspicion of insincerity, and much less of absolute treachery, does not seem to attach to this nobleman till the spring of the year 1687, when the nation was thrown into a high ferment by the declaration of indulgence published April 4th; the same gazette also containing a prorogation of parliament to a distant period. The test laws being virtually abolished by the declaration, the mask was thrown off, and the design of introducing popery almost openly avowed. This was a situation of affairs which might well awaken the apprehensions of a minister much less wary than Sunderland for his own safety. At this crisis, Dykvelt, a man of great capacity and address, and high in the confidence of the prince of Orange, was sent as envoy to England, entrusted with the secret sentiments of the prince, and he entered, as appears, into an immediate and unreserved intercourse with persons of the most distinguished rank and reputation; many of whom, as the earls of Danby, Nottingham, Shrewsbury, &c. wrote letters to the prince, expressive of their reliance upon his efforts to



rescue the nation from the dangers, civil and religious, which impended over it. Among the rest, M. Dykvelt was admitted to a confidential intercourse with the earl of Sunderland, and that minister wrote as the result of it (May 23, 1687) a short letter to the prince of Orange, in which much more appears to be meant than at first meets the ear. "I received," says his lordship, "the honor your highness was pleased to do me by M. Dykvelt, with all the respect I owe and will ever pay to your commands, which I shall on all occasions exactly obey. He is too well informed of every thing here to pretend to give you any account of what has passed since his coming, and if he does me right, as I doubt not he will, he must assure your highness that no man in the world is with more respect and submission," &c.

Without straining the inferences deducible from this letter too far, it seems sufficiently clear, notwithstanding the very guarded manner in which it is expressed, 1st, That lord Sunderland had, at the suggestion of the prince, opened his mind very freely to M. Dykvelt. 2dly, That he was well aware of the purpose for which Dykvelt was sent into England, and of the accurate information which he was qualified to give to the prince. And 3dly, That lord Sunderland had made such avowals and declarations to the Dutch ambassador, as he was confident would be satisfactory to the prince. Had lord Sunderland determined at all events to maintain his fidelity to the king, knowing the very ill terms on which the king and the prince at this time were, he never could have chosen to express himself in language of such high and unnecessary compliment, as to assure the prince, "that he would on *all occasions exactly* obey

his commands." From this period the earl of Sunderland seems to have acted with a duplicity which gradually, and in consequence of the pressure of circumstances, rose to the most artful and refined treachery. The presumptions upon which this opinion is founded are as follow. In June, (1687) lady Sunderland wrote a letter to the prince of Orange, earnestly exhorting him not to consent to the repeal of the test laws, which lord Sunderland at the very same time was avowedly employing every effort to accomplish. It appears also that lady Sunderland had for some time past kept up a correspondence with Henry Sidney, uncle to lord Sunderland, who resided in Holland, and was in high favor with the prince. Upon all the late political questions she had indeed affected to appear as a zealot in the cause of protestantism, and wholly adverse to the designs in which her husband took so great a part. But her character was that of a political intriguer, and a very good understanding under this artful vein, as there is strong reason to believe, subsisted between her and her lord. Had not lady Sunderland's letter been written at the suggestion, and with the concurrence of that wily statesman, it must have appeared to the prince as mere impertinence, and lady Sunderland herself, who possessed a great share of sense and shrewdness, knew the prince's character too well to doubt of this. The pretended misunderstanding between lord and lady Sunderland seems to have obtained little or no credit in the world. The princess of Denmark, writing to her sister the princess of Orange, March 1688, says, "You may remember I have once before ventured to tell you that I thought lord Sunderland a very ill man, and am more confirmed every

day in that opinion. Every body knows how often this man turned backwards and forwards in the late king's time, and now to complete all his virtues, he is working with all his might to bring in popery. This worthy lord does not go publicly to mass, but hears it privately at a priest's chamber, and never lets any body be there but a servant of his." Lady Sunderland she styles "a flattering, dissembling, false woman. To hear her talk you would think she were a very good protestant. It is certain that her lord does nothing without her." And in a following letter she says, "Lady Sunderland runs from church to church after the famousest preachers, and keeps such a clatter with her devotions, that she really turns one's stomach. Sure there never was a couple so well matched as she and her good husband, for she is throughout in her actions the greatest jade that ever was, so he is the subtlest workingest villain that is on the face of the earth."

Lord Clarendon in his diary declares without reserve, "that lord Sunderland imparted the king's secrets to his uncle, Henry Sidney, who resided with the prince, and lady Sunderland to the princess of Orange." Dalrymple, vol. i. About the close of the year 1687, Skelton, envoy at Paris, suggested to the French court his suspicions that lord Sunderland was secretly in the interest of the prince of Orange; upon which Barillon received orders to watch him narrowly. In his dispatches to Louis XIV., particularly that of January 5, 1688, this minister, indeed, absolves Sunderland from the imputation of treachery; but it seems evident that Barillon was completely duped by him. "It remains for me," says the ambassador, "to give your majesty an account

of what relates to the suspicions, which M. Skelton thinks may fall upon lord Sunderland, of a secret connection with the prince of Orange. I have discovered nothing that can make it believed: on the contrary, I see that this minister engages himself every day more in whatever can be most opposite to the interest of the prince of Orange, and that he holds a conduct inconsistent with the design which it is pretended he has to keep measures with him. He is the person who, for a long time past, has ardently pressed all the resolutions which have been taken in favour of the catholics. He pursues with firmness whatever can lead to the abolishing the penal laws and test, which is what the prince of Orange fears the most. *I know* that he is resolved to declare himself a catholic whenever the king, his master, will have him." So satisfactory was this account to the French court, that a large pecuniary gratification, in addition to his pension, was bestowed by Lewis on the English minister. In his dispatch of July 8th, following, M. Barillon says, "My lord Sunderland has declared himself openly a catholic. The king of England has testified much joy at this. There has been for these two days past great talk at court respecting what lord Sunderland has done, and it is believed that his Britannic majesty will avail himself of it for the purpose of urging other persons who are attached to him to do the same thing. My lord Sunderland has made no new abjuration of heresy, having done this more than a year ago in the presence of father Petre."\*

\* "Milord Sunderland s'est déclaré ouvertement catholique. Le Roi d'Angleterre en a témoigné beaucoup de joie. On parle fort à la cour depuis deux jours de ce qu'a fait milord Sunderland,

The suspicions of Skelton were by no means abated in consequence of the credulity of Barillon ; and they were strongly corroborated by the concurring opinion of M. D'Avaux the French ambassador at the Hague, a man of talents far superior to Skelton, and whose advices to England respecting the danger impending from Holland were, as he complains, treated by Sunderland as altogether visionary. King James himself, in his diary, tells us " that it was not till the middle of September that he began to give any credit to the advices from Abbeville of the prince of Orange's design. Sunderland persuaded him it was impossible, and turned any body to ridicule that seemed to believe it."

That monarch even affirms lord Sunderland to have received a pension from the prince of Orange at the very time he was allowed another from the king of France. M. D'Avaux's famous memorial to the States General of the 30th August (1688), was represented by lord Sunderland to the king " as a French stratagem. He had still credit," says the monarch, " to arraign this step as affording the Dutch a pretence to arm and alarm England with a French alliance against their religion." The king in consequence disavowed the memorial, and Skelton, who had suggested it, was, in reward of his zeal, recalled and sent as a prisoner to the Tower.

The court of Versailles frequently expressed its astonishment to Skelton, at the obstinate refusal of James to

et on croit que sa majesté Britannique s'en servira pour presser d'autres gens qui sont attachés à lui de faire la même chose. Milord Sunderland n'a point fait de nouvelle abjuration de hérésie, l'ayant faite il y a plus d'un an entre les mains du pere Petres."

*Dalrymple's Appendix, part 2, p. 288.*



accept of any aid from France, and there is reason to believe that Louis XIV. was himself for some time previous to the invasion of England by the prince of Orange, fully convinced of the treachery of Sunderland. Skelton had transmitted repeated advices to lord Sunderland of the preparations making in Holland, and of the designs of the prince, but no notice was taken of them. On the 18th of September Barillon writes to his sovereign that he had been a long time in conference with lord Sunderland; but that this minister retained, in common with the king his master, their former opinion, that the prince of Orange had no design upon England, and that if he attempted a descent, no person of property would join him.\* It is easy to conceive that the king's presumption and folly might render him an easy dupe to the artifices of Sunderland; but that the minister himself, a man of unquestionable ability, should be so deceived, even had the nature of Dykvelt's commission been unknown to him, seems scarcely within the limits of credibility.

Lord Dartmouth relates in his notes on bishop Burnet's History, "that the duke of Chandos told him, as a

\* "Sept. 2, (1688.) Ce ministre (Sunderland) paroît persuadé que le prince d'Orange n'osera entreprendre une descente. Septembre 6, sa majesté Britannique et ses principaux ministres ne croyent point que M. le prince d'Orange ose faire une descente en Angleterre. Septembre 18, J'ai eu un long entretien avec milord Sunderland; son sentiment est semblable à celui du roi son maître. Ils ne croient ni l'un ni l'autre, que M. le prince d'Orange ait dessein de faire une descente en Angleterre; et ils s'imaginent que s'il la fait, aucun homme qui ait quelque bien ne se déclarera pour lui."



thing he knew to be true, that the king of France wrote to king James to let him know he had certain intelligence that the design was upon England, and that he would immediately besiege Maestricht, which would hinder the states from parting with any of their force for such an expedition ; but the secret must be kept inviolable from any of the ministers. Soon afterwards, the States ordered 6000 men to be sent to Maestricht, upon which the king of France desired to know of the king of England if he had revealed it to any body, for he himself had to none but Louvois, and if he had betrayed him, he should treat him accordingly. King James's answer was, ' that he never told it to any but lord Sunderland, who, he was very sure, was too much in his interest to have discovered it.' Upon which the king of France said, he saw plainly that king James was a man cut out for destruction, and there was no possibility of helping him."\* The same anecdote is related with little variation on the same authority, by Mr. Carte.†

The earl of Middleton, a man of sense and probity, and possessing the best means of information, declares of lord Sunderland at a subsequent period, " that he had always been the first to deceive, and the first to betray."‡ Lord Sunderland himself, in his traitorous correspondence with the court of St. Germaine's, after the Revolution, virtually acknowledges the justice of the opinion entertained of him ; for he declines entering into particulars, because " he fears that his majesty does not confide suffi-

\* Dalrymple's Appendix, part ii. p. 288.

† Macpherson's Papers, vol. i. p. 268.

‡ Letter to the Marquis de Croissy, March, 1695. Macpherson, vol. i. p. 528.

ciently in his advice. But when he is assured that the king is satisfied with his fidelity, he promises to send good intelligence, and to contribute as much as he can to his majesty's service."\* The meaning of this evidently is, that he is desirous to compensate for his past perfidy, which he attempts not to deny, by his future services. Not that his sincerity could be more depended upon at this than at any former period; on the contrary, his real sentiments were probably at all times favorable to the prince and adverse to James: but his own interest, and his own safety, were ever uppermost in his mind, and incited him to the systematic practice of all the base and degrading arts of deceit and dissimulation.

At length king James himself, upon what specific evidence does not appear, became perfectly convinced of the perfidy of lord Sunderland, and on the 28th of October, (1688) he was suddenly dismissed from his offices with such marks of the royal resentment, that, as he himself acknowledges in his *Vindication*, he thought his head to be in danger; an apprehension he never could have entertained, had he not been conscious of his own guilt and treachery. M. Rapin intimates that he was supposed to have concealed several of Skelton's letters from the king, and that this being discovered was the immediate cause of his disgrace. He said in his excuse, "if he gave no account of these letters to the king, it was because Skelton never wrote but second-hand news."†

Upon the success of the prince, lord Sunderland retired into Holland, and being arrested in that country,

\* Letter to the Marquis de Croissy, March 1695. Macpherson, vol. i. p. 474.

† Rapin, vol. ii. folio, page 771.

was released by the express order of the prince. On the 8th of March, 1699, he wrote from Amsterdam a letter to the prince, now king, congratulating him upon his accession to the throne. "If I had not," said the ex-minister, "followed the advice of my friends, rather than my own sense, I should not have been out of England at this time, for I thought I had served the public so importantly in contributing what in me lay to the advancing of your glorious undertaking, that having been in an odious ministry ought not to have obliged me to be absent. But nothing makes me repine so much at it, as that I could not give my vote for placing your majesty on the throne." In a subsequent letter to the king, dated March 11th, this nobleman says, "however unfortunate my present circumstances are, I have this to support me, that my thoughts as well as actions have been, are, and I dare say ever will be, what they ought to be to your majesty. Long before your glorious undertaking, I cannot but hope, you remember how devoted I was to your service."

In what mode lord Sunderland could have contributed to the success of the prince's undertaking, or have displayed his devotion to the prince's service, excepting by his artful efforts to dupe and deceive the late monarch in regard to the reality of the design of invasion, and consequently to prevent his taking those timely and necessary precautions which common sense pointed out, in order to counteract the danger, seems impossible to conjecture, and it is what no historical investigation has hitherto been able in any degree to ascertain.

Upon the whole it is too clearly manifest, that the earl of Sunderland was a man utterly destitute of moral

or political principle. So long as he conceived that the nefarious designs of the monarch, whom he served, were likely to prove ultimately successful, he appeared zealous and active in his endeavours to promote them; and if he occasionally inculcated milder and more moderate counsels, he never scrupled to acquiesce in the most violent measures, or to assist in carrying them into execution. When the folly of the king became at length so egregious as to induce a suspicion, and by degrees an expectation of some calamitous catastrophe, he entered into secret intrigues with his enemies, with a view merely to his own eventual security: for there exists not the slightest proof or presumption, that in case of the relinquishment or failure of the prince of Orange's design, he would have changed, in any degree, the tenure of his conduct, or have ceased to enforce the most exceptionable measures by the most exceptionable means. Thinking it probable that the invasion would succeed, but possible that it might not, he gave his secret assistance to the prince, while he cajoled the credulous monarch by the most plausible professions, and all the subtile artifices of courtly dissimulation; thus dexterously contriving to preserve his credit with them both, and providing not only for his safety, but even for his future views of interest and ambition, whatever might be the result of the great and hazardous projects at this crisis in contemplation.

## BILL OF RIGHTS.

A. D. 1689.

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ON the 13th of February 1688-9, the two houses of convention went in state to the palace of Whitehall, where the prince and princess of Orange being seated under a canopy at the upper end of the Banqueting-house, and the members being admitted and properly disposed, the clerk of the crown, with a loud voice, read the declaration previously agreed upon, which subsequently receiving the royal assent, and becoming a fundamental law of the realm, has long been known and celebrated under the appellation of the BILL OF RIGHTS. It is as follows :

WHEREAS the late king JAMES II. by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges, and ministers, employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of this kingdom, by assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with, and suspending of laws, and the execution of laws without consent of parliament; by committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates, for humbly petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed power; by issuing, and causing to be executed, a commission under the great seal for erecting a court called the court of commissioners for ecclesiastical causes; by levying money for and to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative for other time, and in other manner, than the same was granted by parliament; by raising and keeping a standing army



within this kingdom, in time of peace, without consent of parliament ; and quartering soldiers contrary to law ; by causing several good subjects, being protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time when papists were both armed and employed contrary to law ; by violating the freedom of election of members to serve in parliament ; by prosecution in the court of King's Bench, for matters and causes cognizable only in parliament, and by divers other illegal and arbitrary courses :—

And whereas of late years partial, corrupt, and unqualified persons, have been returned and served on juries in trials, and particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason, which were not freeholders ; and excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal causes, to elude the benefit of the laws for the liberty of the subject, and expensive fines have been imposed, and illegal and cruel punishments inflicted, and several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures, before any conviction or judgment, against whom the same was to be levied ; all which are utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes and freedom of this realm : And whereas the late king, James II., having abdicated the government, and the throne being thereby vacant, his highness the prince of Orange, whom it hath pleased Almighty God to make the glorious instrument of delivering this kingdom from popery and arbitrary power, did, by the advice of the lords spiritual and temporal, and divers principal persons of the commons, cause letters to be written to the lords spiritual and temporal, being protestants, and other letters to the several counties, cities, universities, boroughs, and cinque ports, for the choosing of such persons to represent them as were of



right to be sent to parliament, to meet and sit at Westminster, January 22, 1689, in order to such an establishment, as that their religion, laws, and liberties, might not again be in danger of being subverted; upon which letters, elections have been accordingly made: And thereupon the said lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, pursuant to their respective letters and elections, being now assembled in a full and free representation of this nation, taking into their most serious consideration the best means for attaining the ends aforesaid, do in the first place, as their ancestors in like cases have usually done, for the vindicating their ancient rights and liberties, DECLARE

That the pretended power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, without consent of parliament, is illegal.

That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the executing of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal.

That the commission for erecting the late court of commissioners for ecclesiastical causes, and all other commissions and courts of the like nature, are illegal and pernicious.

That the levying money to or for the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament, for longer time, or in any other manner than the same is, or shall be, granted, is illegal.

That it is the right of the subject to petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.

That the raising and keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be by consent of parliament, is against law.

That the subjects being protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their condition, and as allowed by law.

That the election of members of parliament ought to be free.

That the freedom of speech, or debates, and proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached, or questioned in any court or place out of parliament.

That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

That jurors ought to be duly impannelled and returned; and jurors which pass upon men in trials for high treason ought to be freeholders.

That all grants and promises of fines, and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction, are illegal and void; and,

That for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving of the laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently.

AND they do claim, demand, and insist upon, all and singular the premises, as their undoubted rights and privileges, and that no declarations, judgments, doings, or proceedings, to the prejudice of the people, in any of the said premises, ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter in consequence or example.

To which demand of their rights they are particularly encouraged by the declaration of his highness the prince of Orange, as being the only means for obtaining a full redress and remedy therein.

Having therefore an entire confidence that his said highness the prince of Orange will perfect the deliverance so far advanced by him, and will still preserve

them from the violation of their rights which they have here asserted, and from all other attempts upon their religious rights and liberties ;

The said lords, spiritual and temporal, and commons, assembled at Westminster, do RESOLVE,

That WILLIAM and MARY, prince and princess of Orange, be, and be declared, king and queen of England, France, and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging, to hold the crown and royal dignity of the said kingdoms and dominions to them the said prince and princess during their lives, and the life of the survivor of them ; and that the sole and full exercise of the royal power be only in, and executed by, the said prince of Orange, in the names of the prince and princess, during their lives, and after their deceases the said crown and royal dignity of the said kingdoms and dominions to the heirs of the body of the said princess ; and for default of such issue, to the princess Anne of Denmark, and the heirs of her body ; and for default of such issue, to the heirs of the body of the said prince of Orange.

And the said lords, spiritual and temporal, and commons, do pray the said prince and princess of Orange to accept the same accordingly.

And that the oaths hereafter mentioned be taken by all persons of whom the oaths of allegiance and supremacy might be required by law instead of them ; and that the said oaths of allegiance and supremacy be abrogated.

N. B. Here followed the oaths appointed to be taken. In the oath of allegiance, as formerly expressed, a previous and inherent title seemed to be asserted, the sovereign being sworn to as rightful and lawful king. And

great stress was placed in debate upon the consideration that these words could not apply to a king who had not a precedent right, but was elected by the voice, and reigned by the will, of the nation. In order to obviate this legal scruple, the oath was reduced to its ancient simplicity of swearing, to bear true allegiance to the king, which, by the famous statute of Henry VII., was unquestionably agreeable to law. The new oath of supremacy consisted; 1st, of a renunciation of the damnable doctrine, that princes excommunicated by the pope might be deposed or murdered, &c.; and 2dly, a declaration that no foreign prince or power had, or ought to have, any jurisdiction here.

The marquis of Halifax, as speaker of the House of Lords, as soon as the clerk of the crown had finished reading the declaration of rights, made, in the name of the people of England, a solemn tender of the crown to their highnesses, the entire executive power residing and remaining in the prince, to which he replied in the following words:

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

This certainly is the greatest proof of the trust you have in me that can be given, which is the thing that makes me value it the more; and as I had no other intention in coming hither than to preserve your religion, laws, and liberties, so you may be sure that I shall endeavour to support them, and shall be willing to concur in any thing that shall be for the good of the kingdom, and to do all that is in my power to advance the welfare and glory of the nation.

## AFFAIRS OF IRELAND.

A. D. 1689.

THE two acts of general attainder, and repeal of the act of settlement and explanation, passed in the reign of Charles II., enacted by the parliament, convened and held by king James in person, May 1689, at the castle of Dublin, are certainly to be ranked amongst the most atrocious violations of right, and of the first principles of civil society, to be found on historic record. By the former of these, two archbishops, seven bishops, one duke, seventeen earls, eighteen viscounts, and about thirty barons, with about two thousand four hundred persons of inferior note, were expressly designated and attainted by name; but it virtually included multitudes unnamed. The act itself was so carefully concealed, that no protestant was permitted even to see, much less to take a copy of it, till the time limited for pardons was past; but this precaution was unnecessary, for the seeming indulgence of allowing the delinquents a certain time to come in, archbishop King tells us, was *a mere nothing*, the embargo in both kingdoms being so strict, that neither could those in Ireland correspond with their friends abroad, nor those abroad return home, on any consideration whatsoever; nor, indeed, durst any body in Ireland have sent any such advices had the ports been open; for by the clause in the act of repeal, which made it treason to correspond with any rebel, they would have been liable to such prosecutions as might have ruined them, only for endeavouring to prevent the ruin of



others. As to the clause limiting the power of pardon in the crown, it is not easy to ascertain how far it was conformable to the real inclination of the king. For though archbishop King affirms this parliament to be a slave to the king's will, we know that they ventured upon several measures by no measures agreeable to him, insomuch, that he exclaimed with much passion, in resentment at their opposition, "I find all commons are the same:" and the archbishop himself informs us, "that when the act of attainder was under consideration, they would not hear of a clause to enable the king to dispense with it in any instance whatever." On the other hand, he hesitated not resolutely to oppose the repeal of Poyning's act, which, though a primary object with this assembly, was given up in consequence of the king's avowed disapprobation. And James himself declares, in his memoirs, that he "foreclosed himself in the act of attainder from the power of pardon, from unwillingness to disgust his only friends." This bloody sacrifice seems, upon the whole, to have been made by him with much apathy, and if he really felt any reluctance on this occasion, it proceeded not from motives of humanity, but pride and resentment, that the parliament should presume to fix any bounds and limits to the exercise of his prerogative. The whole tenor of his conduct respecting the repeal of the acts of settlement, discovers a mind steeled against every feeling of compassion, every sentiment of honour. "What is become," exclaimed the unhappy sufferers in the representation of their case, drawn up by the chief justice Keating, and presented to the king by the earl of Granard, "of the frequent declarations made by the earl of Clarendon, and the earl, now



duke, of Tyrconnel, of his majesty's fixed resolution never to lay aside the acts of settlement and explanation? Why did the judges, in their several circuits, declare, in all places where they sat, unto the counties there assembled, that your majesty was resolved to preserve the acts of settlement and explanation? and that they were appointed, by the then chief governor here, to declare the same unto them; from whence they took confidence to proceed in their purchases and improvements; and, with submission be it spoken, if this bill pass are deluded." The repeal nevertheless took place, and was carried into effect with every circumstance of cruelty and aggravation, the orders of restitution being issued, with scarcely any previous notice, by the lords lieutenants of counties, and executed by troops of horse and dragoons. A specimen of these terrific mandates is preserved in the appendix to Archbishop King's State of Protestants in Ireland, and is as follows :

SIR,

*Naas the 8th April 1690.*

This is to let you understand that I am authorized to give the proprietor possession of the lands of Ballysannan, &c, according to the act of parliament, and that you may not be surprised therein, I give you this notice from,

SIR,

Your loving friend and servant,

CHARLES WHITE.

*For John Annesley, Esq. or in his  
absence to Francis Annesley, Esq. these.*

*Second order for Ballysannan.*

WHEREAS Luke Fitzgerald, Esq. has proved himself before me, to be the ancient proprietor of the town and lands of Ballysannan, and that his ancestors were possessed of their Mansion-house there in the year 1641, I do therefore in pursuance of his majesty's orders unto me, appoint the under-named persons to give possession of the Mansion-house there to Luke Fitzgerald, Esq. and for so doing this shall be your warrant. Given under my hand and seal this 6th day of May 1690.

CHARLES WHITE.

I do hereby appoint captain Walter Archbold, or captain John Dillon, of Athy, to give possession of the Mansion-house of Ballysannan, to Luke Fitzgerald, Esq.

PROCEEDINGS  
RESPECTING  
A COMPREHENSION.

A. D. 1689.

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DURING the reign of king James II. and particularly in the latter part of it, when the dissenters were much courted by that monarch, the necessity of a union amongst protestants, and the advantage and propriety of a comprehension, by admitting of a farther reformation in the church, and by relaxing the terms of conformity, was a prevailing topic of discussion and consultation amongst the leading members of the establishment. And even the seven bishops, the venerable champions of the church, in their famous petition to the king, had declared their readiness, in relation to the dissenters, to come to such a temper as should be thought fit, when the matter should be considered and settled in parliament and convocation. The prince of Orange in his declaration had, in consequence, announced it to be one of the purposes of his undertaking, to enable the two houses of parliament, freely and lawfully assembled, to prepare such laws as they should think necessary for establishing a good agreement between the church of England and all protestant dissenters; as also for the securing of all such who would live peaceably under the government from all persecution on account of their religion; referring, in the first place, evidently to the project of a comprehension, and next to the subsidiary design of a toleration.

Scarcely was the new king fixed upon the throne than the earl of Nottingham, secretary of state, a nobleman whose attachment to the church was above and beyond all question, moved for a bill of comprehension and indulgence similar to one formerly prepared in the reign of king Charles II. during the debates on the exclusion. This was received with so much favour, even by those who were adverse to the repeal of the test, that the earl had the thanks of the house of peers voted him; and such of the bishops as forsook their seats in parliament to avoid taking the oaths, recommended it before they did so.\* Very formidable obstacles, however, soon arose in the way of its accomplishment. "The clergy," says the bishop of Salisbury, "began now to shew an implacable hatred to the non-conformists, and seemed to wish for an occasion to renew old severities against them." On the other hand it was shrewdly and strongly suspected that the professed advocates of the bill in parliament, and even very many of those for whose benefit the bill was avowedly designed, were secretly averse to its success. The earl of Nottingham himself, indeed, appears to have behaved with honour and sincerity throughout the whole of this business: but there were those of the high-church party, who, according to bishop Burnet, "acted a very disingenuous part; for while they studied to recommend themselves by this shew of moderation, they set on their friends to oppose it, and such as were very sincerely and cordially for it were represented as the enemies of the church." But a more remarkable circumstance is, that the leaders of the low-church

\* Ralph, vol. ii. p. 72.

party were no less unfavourably disposed to the bill. "They set it up," says the same prelate, "for a maxim, that it was fit to keep up a strong faction both in church and state. And they thought it was not agreeable to that, to suffer so great a body as the presbyterians to be made more-easy or more inclinable to unite to the church. They also thought that the toleration would be best maintained when great numbers should need it and be concerned to preserve it."\* That the heads of the presbyterian party themselves were also adverse to the bill appeared from the intemperate tenor of their writings at this time, respecting the establishment, though it was remarked "that during the late reign, none of their ministers, *not even their musti Baxter*, had engaged in the controversy against popery."†

Sir John Resesby tells us that the marquis of Halifax, in a conference with the bishop of Salisbury and himself, acknowledged "that the church people hated the presbyterians, and would rather turn papists than receive these sectaries among them. But he added, that the presbyterians were to the full as rank and inveterate against the church, and he complained that their conduct at this very time in relation to the bills pending in their favour was such as must disgust those from whom they looked for indulgence."

Certainly the wise and beneficent plan of comprehension could not have been introduced under more unfavourable auspices. But there are at all times those who, rising superior to vulgar follies and prejudices, are ever ready and anxious to promote the genuine and

\* Burnet, vol. iii. p. 14, 15.

† Ralph, vol. ii. p. 72.



permanent interests of mankind in opposition to that invincible weakness and blindness usually predominant; and which excites in minds imbued with the genuine spirit of philosophy and humanity, not resentment but compassion. Of this description it should seem were those enlightened friends of the bill in question, who knowing how easily the passions of a popular assembly were inflamed by entering into discussions of this nature, offered a proviso that, in imitation of acts passed in king Henry VIII. and king Henry the Sixth's time, "a number of persons, both of clergy and laity, might be empowered to prepare such a reformation of things relating to the church as might be offered to king and parliament, in order to the healing our divisions and the correcting what might be amiss or defective in our ecclesiastical constitution." This proposition was vehemently opposed both by the insidious enemies and the undiscerning friends of the bill, amongst the latter of whom must be classed the bishop of Sarum, who attributes the final rejection of the proviso to the influence of a speech which he made against it. He was credulous enough, as he himself confesses, to imagine that "the clergy would have come into this design of reformation with zeal and unanimity; and he feared that the appointment of laymen as joint commissioners, would be looked upon by them as taking the matter out of their hands."

On this occasion the following incomparable protest was entered on the journals by the lords Winchester, Mordaunt, Lovelace and Stamford :



## DISSENTIENT,

1st. Because the act itself being, as the preamble sets forth, designed for the peace of the state, the putting the clergy into the commission, with a total exclusion of the laity, lays this humiliation on the laity, as if the clergy of the church of England were alone friends to the peace of the state, and the laity less able or less concerned to provide for it.

2dly. Because the matters to be considered being barely of human constitution, viz. the liturgy and ceremonies of the church of England, which had their establishment from the king; lords spiritual and temporal, and commons assembled in parliament; there can be no reason why the commissioners for altering any thing in the civil constitution should consist only of men of one sort of them, unless it be supposed that human reason is to be quitted in this affair; and the inspiration of spiritual men to be alone depended on.

3dly. Because though upon Romish principles the clergymen have a title alone to meddle in matters of religion, yet with us they cannot, where the church is acknowledged and defined to consist of clergy and laity; and so those matters of religion which fall under human determination being properly the business of the church belong equally to both; for in what is of divine institution neither clergy nor laity can make any alteration at all.

4thly. Because the pretending that differences and delays may arise by mixing laymen with ecclesiastics to the frustrating the design of the commission is vain and out of doors; unless those that make use of this pretence

suppose the clergy-part of the church have distinct interests or designs from the lay part of the same church; and this *will* be a reason, if good, *why one or other of them* should quit the house for fear of obstructing the business of it.

5thly. Because the commission being intended for the satisfaction of dissenters, it would be convenient that laymen of different ranks, nay, perhaps, of different opinions too, should be mixed in it the better to find expedients for that end, rather than clergymen alone of our church who are generally observed to have very much the same way of reasoning and thinking.

6thly. Because it is the most ready way to facilitate the passing the alterations into a law, that lay-lords and commons should be joined in the commission who may be able to satisfy both houses of the reasons upon which they were made, and thereby remove all fears and jealousies *ill men* may raise against the clergy of their endeavouring to keep up, without grounds, a distinct interest from that of the laity, whom they so carefully exclude from being joined with them in consultations of common concernment, that they will not have those have any part in the declaration who must have the greatest in determining.

7thly. Because such a restrained commission lies liable to this great objection, that it might be made use of to elude repeated promises, and the present general expectation of compliance with tender consciences, when the providing for it is taken out of the ordinary course of parliament to be put into the hands of those alone who were latest in admitting any need of it, and who may be thought the more unfit to be the sole composers.

of our differences when they are looked upon by some as parties.

Lastly: Because after all, this carries a dangerous supposition with it, as if the laity were not a part of the church, nor had any power to meddle in matters of religion; a supposition directly opposite to the constitution both of church and state, which will make all alterations utterly impossible, unless the clergy alone be allowed to have power to make laws in matters of religion; since what is established by law cannot be taken away or changed but by consent of laymen in parliament, the clergy themselves having no authority to meddle in this very case in which the laity are excluded by this vote but what they derive from lay-hands.

The proposal of appointing a commission being overruled by a very small majority,\* the bill was sent down to the commons, where it was suffered to lie neglected on the table, and an address was moved and carried, humbly beseeching his majesty “that according to the antient usage and practice of the kingdom in time of parliament, his majesty would be graciously pleased to issue forth his writs for calling a convocation of the clergy to be advised in ecclesiastical matters.” To this address the concurrence of the lords was, though not without great debate and opposition, obtained: and thus under the joint sanction of both houses it came before

\* This is the account of bishop Burnet, who was himself present at the division; but Ralph, a much more accurate writer, affirms, that the numbers were equal on the division, in which case, according to the rules of the house, the question was decided in the negative.

the throne. The king returned an answer suitable to his high character for wisdom, concluding with an earnest recommendation "that the occasions of differences and mutual animosities might be removed, and that as soon as might be, he would summon a convocation." Nothing further being done during the course of the session respecting the business of comprehension, the king resolved, as the last expedient, to summon a convocation, which met early the ensuing winter, 1689-90, when the parliament was again convened.

That no precaution which prudence could dictate might be wanting to facilitate the favourable reception of this design, a special commission was issued under the great seal to ten bishops and twenty dignitaries of the church, impartially selected, "to prepare," in the words of the commission, "such alteration of the liturgy and the canons, and such proposals for the reformation of ecclesiastical courts, and to consider of such other matters as in their judgments might most conduce to the ends proposed." But it immediately appeared how different was the spirit now prevalent amongst the clergy from that which actuated them in the last reign, when the aid of the dissenters was supposed to be wanting to rescue the church from the dangers which then impended over her. In the famous address from archbishop Sancroft to the bishops of his diocese, containing heads of advice and instruction to their lordships, adapted to those difficult and distressing times, the primate thus, in conclusion, summed up his sentiments. "And in the last place that they," i. e. the clergy of the different dioceses, "warmly and most effectually exhort them," i. e. the protestant dissenters, "to join with us in daily fervent prayers

to the God of peace for an universal blessed union of all reformed churches, both at home and abroad, against our common enemies; and that all they who do confess the name of our dear Lord, and do agree in the truth of his holy word, may also meet in ONE HOLY COMMUNION, and live in perfect unity and godly love." And the bishop of Salisbury affirms, that the bishops, with their metropolitan at their head, had actually agreed on the project of a comprehension previous to the landing of the Prince of Orange.

But the idea of danger had now completely vanished; and a new scene of things was opening. Scarcely would the lower house of convocation concur with the bishops in an address of the most general nature, acknowledging "the pious zeal and care of his majesty for the interests of the church, and assuring him that they would consider whatsoever should be offered to them from his majesty without prejudice, and with all calmness and impartiality."

As might be with certainty expected from an assembly of this complexion, all the propositions of reform, digested by the commissioners, were rejected with the utmost haughtiness and contempt, and the king soon found it necessary, by a prorogation, to put a stop to the violence of their proceedings.



A T T E M P T  
TO ABOLISH  
T H E T E S T L A W S.

A. D. 1689.

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ON the 16th March, 1689, king William came in person to the house of peers to give the royal assent to the bill for suspending the habeas-corpus act, &c. on which occasion he delivered the following short, but ever-memorable speech :

“ MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN,

“ Now I have the occasion of coming hither to pass these bills, I shall put you in mind of one thing which will conduce as much to our settlement, as a settlement will to the disappointment of our enemies. I am, with all the expedition I can, filling up the vacancies that are in offices and places of trust by this revolution. I hope you are sensible there is a necessity of some law to settle the oaths to be taken by all persons to be admitted to such places. I recommend it to your care to make a speedy provision for it. And as I doubt not but you will sufficiently provide against papists, so I hope you will leave room for the admission of ALL PROTESTANTS that are willing and able to serve. This conjunction in my service will tend to the better uniting you among yourselves, and the strengthening you against your common adversaries.”



On the 14th March a bill had been introduced under the sanction of the court for abrogating the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, and for appointing other oaths in their stead, deemed more simple and comprehensive. In the progress of this bill a clause was brought forward in the upper house, in conformity with the truly wise and patriotic sentiment expressed by the king, to remove the necessity of taking the sacrament as a qualification for an office, which was unhappily rejected. But a protest framed in terms very animated and forcible, was immediately entered upon the journals by the lords De-la-mere, Stamford, North and Grey, Chesterfield, Whar-ton, Lovelace, and Vaughan, expressive of their dissent from the majority of the house:—

“ BECAUSE they conceived that a hearty union among protestants was a greater security to the church and state than any test that could be invented.

“ That this obligation to receive the sacrament was a test on the protestants rather than on the papists.

“ That as long as it was continued there could not be that hearty and thorough union among protestants as had always been wished, and was at this time indispensably necessary.

“ And Lastly, That a greater caution ought not to be required from such as were admitted into offices than from the members of the two houses of parliament, who are not obliged to receive the sacrament to enable them to sit in either house.”

On a negative being put upon the first clause, a second was moved, that the producing a certificate under the

hand of a minister not conforming to the established church and two other credible witnesses, that the party therein specified had received the sacrament, should be deemed a sufficient qualification. This being also rejected, the following excellent protest was signed by the lords Oxford, Mordaunt, Lovelace, Montague, Whar-ton and Paget.

#### DISSENTIENT.

BECAUSE it gives great part of the protestant freemen of England reason to complain of inequality and hard usage, when they are excluded from public employments, by a law depriving the king and kingdom of divers men fit and capable to serve the public in several cases; and that for a mere scruple of conscience, which could by no means render them suspected, much less disaffected to the government.

That his majesty, as the common indulgent father of his people, having expressed an earnest desire of liberty to tender consciences, and to his protestant subjects, and the bishops having divers of them, on several occasions, expressed an inclination to, and owned the reasonableness of, such a christian temper, they apprehended it would raise suspicions in men's minds of something different from the case of religion or the public, or a design to heal our breaches, when they should find that by confining secular employments to ecclesiastical conformity, those were struck out from civil affairs whose doctrine and worship might be tolerated by authority of parliament, there being a bill before them, by order of the house, to that purpose; especially when without this

exclusive rigour the church is secured in all its privileges and preferments, nobody being hereby let into them who is not strictly conformable.

That to set marks of distinction and humiliation on any sorts of men who have not rendered themselves justly suspected to the government, as it is at all times to be avoided by the making just and equitable laws, so might it be of ill effect to the reformed interest at home and abroad, in this present conjuncture, which stood in need of the united hands and hearts of all protestants against the open attempts and secret endeavours of a restless party and a potent neighbour, who was more zealous than Rome itself to plant popery in these kingdoms; and laboured with his utmost force to settle his tyranny upon the ruins of the Reformation all through Europe.

That it turned the edge of a law, they knew not by what fate, upon protestants and friends to the government, which was intended against papists; to exclude them from places of trust, as men avowedly dangerous to our religion and government; and the taking the sacrament, which was enjoined only as a means to discover papists, was now made a distinguishing duty amongst protestants to weaken the whole by casting out a part of them.

That mysteries of religion and divine worship are of divine original, and of a nature so wholly distant from the secular affairs of politic society, that they cannot be applied to those ends; and therefore the church by the law and the gospel, as well as common prudence, ought to take care not to offend either tender consciences within

itself, or give offence to those without, by mixing their sacred mysteries with secular interests.

That they could not see how it could consist with the law of God, common equity, or the right of any free-born subject, that any one be punished without a crime.

That if it be a crime not to take the sacrament according to the usage of the church of England, every one ought to be punished for it, which nobody affirms; and if it be no crime, those who were capable, and judged fit for the king's service, ought not to be punished with a law of exclusion for not doing that which is no crime to forbear.

Lastly, That if it be urged still as an effectual test to discover and keep out papists, the taking of the sacrament in those protestant congregations where they are members, and known, would be at least as effectual to that purpose.

## AFFAIRS OF SCOTLAND.

*A. D. 1689.*

THE meeting of the convention of the estates of Scotland, summoned by letter of the Prince of Orange, as in England, was fixed for the 14th March, 1689. Lord Balcarras affirms, that king James allowed his partizans, at the election of the convention, to make all the interest they could that members might be rightfully chosen. The lords and commons being met accordingly in one house, conformably to the custom of that kingdom, the bishop of Edinburgh, a zealous adherent of the dethroned monarch, was appointed chaplain: and in officiating in this capacity, he scrupled not publicly to pray that God would have compassion on king James, and that he would restore him. This was a very unpropitious commencement of the session: but the real sentiments of the convention were soon to be put to a decisive test. The first great point to be settled was the choice of a president. The marquis of Athol was set up by the high, and the duke of Hamilton by the low party. Contrary to the general expectation, the duke carried it by forty voices. "Upon which," says lord Balcarras, "above twenty more who had engaged to us, and voted for us, seeing we were the weakest party, and that the other had both forces and the shew of authority on their side, left us." On the 18th March, a messenger arrived with a letter to the estates, from the king of England. And one Crane having also at the same time a letter to deliver from king James, who still remained king of

Scotland, a warm debate arose which letter should be first read. But the marquis of Lothian remarked, that this compliment was due to the king of England, since the assembly itself was convened at his desire; and the question being put, it was carried in the affirmative, and the said letter was read accordingly as follows;

*To the Meeting of the Estates of SCOTLAND.*

MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN,

WE are very sensible of the kindness and concern that many of your nation have evidenced towards us and our undertaking, for the preservation of religion and liberty; which were in such imminent danger. Neither can we in the least doubt of your confidence in us, after having seen how far so many of your nobility and gentry have owned our declaration, countenancing and concurring with us in our endeavors, and desiring that we should take upon us the administration of affairs, civil and military, and to call a meeting of the estates for securing the protestant religion, the ancient laws and liberties of that kingdom, which accordingly we have done. Now it lies on you to enter upon such consultations as are most probable to settle you on sure and lasting foundations, which we hope you will set about with all convenient speed with regard to the public good, and to the general interest and inclinations of the people, that after so much trouble and great sufferings they may live happily, and in peace, and that you may lay aside all animosities and factions that may impede so good a work. We were glad to find that so many of the nobility and gentry, when here at



London, were so much inclined to an union of both kingdoms, and that they did look upon it as one of the best means for procuring the happiness of those nations, and settling of a lasting peace among them; which would be advantageous to both; they living in the same island, having the same language, and the same common interest of religion and liberty, especially at this juncture, when the enemies of both are so restless, endeavouring to make and encrease jealousies and divisions, which they will be ready to improve to their own advantage and the ruin of Britain. We being of the same opinion as to the usefulness of this union, and having nothing so much before our eyes as the glory of God, the establishing of the reformed religion, and the peace and happiness of these nations, are resolved to use our utmost endeavours in advancing every thing which may conduce to the effectuating the same. So we bid you heartily farewell.

*From our Court at Hampton,  
the 7th day of March, 1689.*

WILLIAM R.

The king of England's letter being read, a committee was forthwith appointed to draw up a respectful answer to it. A motion being then made for reading the letter from king James, it was strongly opposed, on the ground that it might contain some authoritative clause to dissolve the assembly or annul their proceedings. At length it was decided that the letter should be read—the following declaration being previously signed by the members of the convention :

FORASMUCH as there is a letter from king James the Seventh, presented to the meeting of the estates, that

they, before opening thereof, declare and enact that, notwithstanding of any thing that may be contained in that letter for dissolving them or impeding their procedure, yet that they are a free and lawful meeting of the estates, and will continue undissolved until they settle and secure the protestant religion, the government, laws and liberties of the kingdom.

This paper having been signed almost unanimously by those present, the letter brought by Crane was read as follows :

JAMES R.

MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN,

WHEREAS we have been informed that you, the peers and representatives of shires and boroughs of that our ancient kingdom, who are to meet together at our good town of Edinburgh, sometime in this instant March, by the usurped authority of the Prince of Orange, we think fit to let you know that we have at all times relied upon the faithfulness and affection of you our antient people so much, that in our greatest misfortunes heretofore we had recourse to your assistance, and that with good success, to our affairs ; so now again we require of you to support our royal interest ; expecting from you what becomes loyal and faithful subjects, generous and honest men, that will neither suffer yourself to be cajoled nor frightened into any action misbecoming true-hearted Scotchmen. And that to support the honour of the nation, you will contemn the base example of disloyal men, and eternize your names by a loyalty suitable to the many professions you have made

to us, in doing whereof you will chuse the safest part : since thereby you will evite the danger you must needs undergo ; the infamy and disgrace you must bring upon yourselves in this world, and the condemnations due to the rebellious in the next. And you will likewise have the opportunity to secure to yourselves and your posterity the gracious promises we have so oft made of securing your religion, laws, properties, liberties, and rights, which we are still resolved to perform as soon as it is possible to us to meet you safely in a parliament of our antient kingdom.

In the mean time fear not to declare for us your lawful sovereign, who will not fail, on our part, to give you such speedy and powerful assistance as shall not only enable you to defend yourselves from any foreign attempt, but put you in a condition to assert our rights against our enemies, who have depressed the same by the blackest of usurpations, the most unjust, as well as most unnatural of all attempts, which the Almighty God may for a time permit, and let the wicked prosper, yet then must bring confusion upon such workers of iniquity. We farther let you know that we will pardon all such as shall return to their duty before the last day of this month inclusive ; and that we will punish with the rigour of our law all such as shall stand out in rebellion against us or our authority. So, not doubting that you will declare for us, and suppress whatever may oppose our interest, and that you will send some of your number to us with an account of your diligence and the posture of our affairs, we bid you heartily farewell.

*Given on board the St. Michael,  
the 1st March, 1689.*

By his Majesty's command,

MELFORT.

The convention were so far provoked at the insolent though impotent menaces contained in this letter, as to order Crane the messenger into custody, but he was soon released, and no farther notice taken of him or his message. On the other hand, they passed a vote of thanks to William for the great benefit done by him to their nation in delivering them from the near danger which threatened the overthrow of their laws and of their religion, and desiring him to accept the administration of the government. They required, by proclamation, all persons from sixteen to sixty, to be in readiness to take arms when the house should call upon them. They set forth another proclamation for securing all disaffected persons, and they dispatched the following reply by lord Ross, to the letter of the king of England.

*Edinburgh; March 23; 1689.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,

As religion, liberty and law are the dearest concerns of mankind, so the deep sense of the extreme hazards these were exposed to, must produce suitable returns from the kingdom of Scotland to your majesty, whom in all sincerity and gratitude we acknowledge to be, under God, our great and seasonable deliverer. And we heartily congratulate that as God has honoured your majesty to be an eminent instrument for the preservation of his truth, so he has rewarded your undertakings with success in the considerable progress which you have made in delivering us, and in preserving to us the protestant religion.

We return our most dutiful thanks to your majesty

for your accepting the administration of public affairs, and convening the estates of this kingdom, and we shall with all convenient diligence take your gracious letter into our consideration, hoping shortly, by the blessing of God, to fall upon such resolutions as may be acceptable to your majesty, secure the protestant religion, and establish the government, laws and liberties of this kingdom upon solid foundations, most agreeable to the general good and inclinations of the people. As to the proposal of the union, we doubt not your majesty will so dispose that matter that there may be an equal readiness in the kingdom of England to accomplish it, as one of the best means for securing the happiness of these nations, and settling a lasting peace. We have hitherto, and still shall endeavour to avoid animosities or prejudice which might disturb our councils; that as we design the public good, so it may be done with the general concurrence and approbation of the nation. In the mean time we desire the continuance of your majesty's care and protection towards us in all our concerns, whereof the kind expressions in your gracious letter have given us full assurance.

*Signed in the name of us the Estates of the Kingdom of Scotland, by our President. May it please your Majesty, &c.*

HAMILTON.

It is remarkable that, in the consideration of the affairs of Scotland, the idea of an union with England was first, and last, and midst, in the mind of king William. He embraced the earliest opportunity which offered to



recommend this salutary measure to the Scottish convention of estates; he frequently insisted upon it as occasions occurred in the course of his reign, and it was the subject of his latest message to the English parliament, when he had his dissolution in immediate prospect. To the great stress which this penetrating and patriotic monarch placed upon this union must we attribute its final and happy accomplishment in a few years after his death. From the æra of the Revolution it became a grand and leading object of policy. There existed, however, at this period, obstacles to its success not to be surmounted. The majority of the Scottish convention were presbyterians; who were secretly determined upon the abolition of episcopacy. But had a treaty of union been immediately set on foot, neither would the English parliament have consented to the abolition as a condition of the treaty, nor could any hope be entertained that it would be granted in consequence of any application to the united legislature subsequent to the treaty. Thus the union projected soon fell to the ground, but the settlement of the government was prosecuted with all imaginable diligence, and in a very few days the convention passed a vote, with five dissentient voices only, declaring that the late king James VII. had *forfaulted* the right of the crown, and that the throne was become vacant. An act was immediately prepared for settling the crown upon king William and queen Mary, who were, on the 11th April, 1689, which was the day of their coronation in England, proclaimed king and queen of Scotland, at the high cross of Edinburgh, by the lord president in person, assisted by the lord provost and all the magistracy of that

city. This ceremony was followed by another proclamation, “to certify the *lieges* that none should presume to acknowledge the late king James for their king, or obey him, nor accept of, nor assist any commissions from him, nor hold any correspondence with him, and that none, upon their highest peril, by word, writing, sermon, or any other manner of way, impugn or disown the royal authority of king William and queen Mary.”

The conduct of king William, at the commencement of his reign, respecting the affairs of Scotland, taken in a general view, and allowing for the almost insuperable difficulties of his situation, appears to have been very judicious. Totally free from all bigotry and narrowness of mind in whatever related to the externals of religion, he gave no other preference to one or other of the different forms of church government urged upon his acceptance by the opposing factions of that kingdom, than as the choice made by him would influence the peace and happiness of the people; solicitous only, with that superior wisdom and benignity which it is ardently to be wished might ever be found associated with superior rank and power, to secure a free and full toleration to those who could not, or would not, conform to the terms of the national establishment. The king himself appears inclined to favour the continuance of the episcopal form of church government in Scotland, properly modified and limited, as more analogous to the monarchical constitution of the state, and more agreeable to the sentiments of his English subjects. Soon after his arrival at St. James's, the episcopal party in Scotland sent up the dean of Glasgow to London, in or-

der to ascertain his intentions respecting them. The dean was introduced to the presence of the king, then Prince of Orange; who promised "to do all he could for their preservation, provided a full toleration was granted to the presbyterians; but this was in case they concurred in the new settlement of the kingdom. For if they opposed that, and if by a great majority in parliament resolutions should be taken against them, he could not make a war for them." But it very soon appeared that things were taking such a turn in Scotland, as to render it highly impolitic for the king to stand forward as the champion of episcopacy. In the instrument of government and statement of grievances annexed, which was presented to the king by the Scottish commissioners deputed from the convention, with the offer of the crown, it is declared, § 21, "That prelacy and superiority of an office in the church above presbyters is, and has been, a great and insupportable burden to this nation, and contrary to the inclinations of the generality of the people ever since the Reformation, they having reformed popery by presbytery; and ought therefore to be abolished."\* On the other hand, the Scottish prelates, inflamed by the spirit of faction, and relying on the sanguine assurances of lord Dundee, who predicted another speedy revolution in favour of the late sovereign, engaged with great zeal and ardour in the opposition to the new settlement; and the episcopalians in general following their example, and embracing, with decided predilection, the interests of king James, the present monarch was thrown entirely into the hands of the presbyterians. The disaffection of the episcopal

\* Burnet, vol. iii. p. 31.

party was also increased by the spirit of rancor displayed by divers of the ministers appointed by the king. The earl of Melville, secretary of state, who was regarded as the head of the new administration, was indeed himself a man of mildness and moderation, but his talents were unequal to his situation, and he connived at the violence practised by his colleagues, particularly the earl of Crawford, president of the parliament, who distinguished himself in council by his eagerness to deprive such of the clergy of their benefices who had omitted to read the proclamation as enjoined by the convention, in their several churches, by a certain day, declaring the forfeiture of the crown in the person of the late king, and its transmission to the present sovereigns.

On the 1st of July, 1689, an act passed for the abolition of episcopacy—the convention being converted, as in England, into a parliament, and the duke of Hamilton appointed high commissioner. But notwithstanding this great concession, the public business went on very heavily. The demands of the patriots were so numerous, and the compliances of the court so reluctant and tardy, that extreme discontent was excited, strong symptoms of anger and resentment were apparent, and the parliament was hastily adjourned by the lord high commissioner to the 8th of October (1689). Immediately consequent to the adjournment, the majority of the members met, and drew up the following bold and spirited remonstrance or memorial, which was soon afterwards presented to the king at Hampton Court.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,

NOTHING save the great and general surprize of this long distressed, and at present unsettled kingdom, upon the late adjournment of your most loyal parliament for so long a time, and in so critical a season, with the deep concern of your royal interest therein, could possibly have induced us to this so necessary a petition. But the visible consternation and discouragement of thousands of your good subjects delayed in the relief and comfort which at this time they assuredly expected, with the advantages that we apprehend your majesty's enemies, both within and without the kingdom, may think to reap by such an interruption, being our only motives, we cannot, we dare not be silent. And therefore, to prevent these evil consequences, we, in the first place, most solemnly protest and declare, in the presence of God and men, our constant and inviolable fidelity and adherence to your majesty's royal title, right and interest, so frankly and cheerfully recognized by us in this current parliament, wishing and praying for nothing more under the sun than your long and prosperous reign, as that wherein the security of all our lives and liberties, as also of our holy religion, more dear to us than both, is infallibly included. It was the persuasion we had of the justice as well as the necessity of your majesty's heroic undertaking for the delivery of these kingdoms, with the conviction of the divine confirmation that appeared in its glorious success, that moved most, if not all of us, to endeavour and concur most heartily in the late meeting of estates for the advancement and establishment of your majesty upon the



throne, when some discovered their disaffection, and were too open retarders and obstructors of that good design. And it is from the same true affection and zeal that we do now most heartily make the above-mentioned protestation, to obviate all the misconstructions your enemies may make in this juncture.

Nor are we less assured of your majesty's most sincere and gracious intentions to perform for us, to the utmost, all that the estates of the kingdom have either demanded or represented as necessary and expedient for securing the protestant religion, restoring their laws and liberties, and redressing of their grievances, according to your majesty's declaration for this kingdom. Neither can it be imagined that so wise and just a king as your majesty will ever be persuaded that so loyal a parliament as this can be induced either to wish or design any prejudice to, or diminution of, your true interest and prerogative. But such as have slavishly served and flattered arbitrary power and tyranny, will be always studying for their own sinister ends, to state a separate interest betwixt king and people; a practice which we are confident your majesty abhors. But that we may clear ourselves upon this present occasion to your majesty's full satisfaction, and the refuting of all misrepresentations we can incur on any hand, we shall briefly rehearse to your majesty the votes passed in this present parliament to which the royal assent is not given, with such short reflections as we hope may tend to the better vindication of all concerned.

The first act upon which the vote of parliament has passed, is that declaring the privileges of the estates of parliament to nominate and appoint committees as they

shall think fit: and excluding therefrom the officers of state unless they be chosen. And omitting what the parliament hath already represented to your majesty as reasons of their vote, it is humbly conceived that this act is exactly framed to the extent of that grievance which, together with the rest, is desired in the instrument of government to be redressed unto us in parliament.

The second was an act abrogating the act of parliament, 1669, asserting the king's supremacy over all persons, and in all causes ecclesiastical: and this act is so exactly conform to the second article of the above-mentioned grievances, and the foresaid act of supremacy in itself is so dangerous to the protestant religion, as well as inconsistent with the establishment of any church government, that we doubt not your majesty will ever approve all that voted to it.

The third is an act ament persons not to be employed in public trusts. And all the ruins and distresses of this kingdom have so certainly flowed from the persons therein noted, especially such as by their contriving of, and concurring in, the dispensing power, have thereby imminently endangered our religion, and overturned all the fences of our liberties and properties; which we have good ground to believe the parliament would have extended but to few persons. And your majesty, in your declaration, hath so justly charged the same upon evil and wicked counsellors—the only persons pointed at in this act, that we are persuaded that you will find it absolutely necessary for attaining all the ends of your majesty's glorious undertaking for our relief.

The fourth is an act concerning the nomination of

the ordinary lords of session, and the election of the president, *to wit*, that in a total vacation they be tried and admitted or rejected by parliament, and in a particular vacation they be tried and admitted or rejected by the other lords; and that the president be chosen by the lords themselves, conform to our old practice and express statute. And this act is so agreeable to practice, laws, and acts of parliament, and so necessary for the true and equal administration of justice, the great security of all kingdoms, that your majesty will unquestionably approve it.

The fifth and last is an act ordaining the presbyterian ministers yet alive, who were thrust out since the 1st January, 1661, for not conforming to prelaey, and not complying with the courses of the time, to be restored. And this act is in itself so just, and so consequential from the claim of right, and agreeable to your majesty's declaration, that less in common equity could not be done. And here your majesty may be pleased to consider that, though prelaey be now by law abolished, yet these few ministers, not exceeding sixty, though restored as they are not for want of the royal assent to the foresaid act, would be all the presbyterian ministers legally established and provided for in Scotland.

It is not unknown to your majesty what have been the sad confusions and disorders of this distressed country under prelaey, and for want of its ancient presbyterian government, and how the whole west, and many other parts of Scotland, are at present desolate and destitute, having only ministers called by the people upon the late liberty, without any benefice or living, or convenient place to preach in. It is also certain that there

are many hundreds of forefaulted, or fined persons, who are yet waiting to be restored and refounded according to the claim of right and your majesty's gracious instructions thereanent.

It is true the last thing proposed by your majesty's commissioner in parliament was a supply of money for maintenance of the forces so necessary for our present defence; and we should have proven ourselves ungrateful to your majesty, and false to our own interest and security, if we had refused it. But there being a sufficient and certain fund to maintain *all the forces*, and support all other incident charges of the government for some months, all that we demanded was that some things visibly necessary for the satisfaction of the country, and the better enabling and disposing them to pay the said supply, might be first expedited. We are confident that the vote of parliament, which was only for a short delay, will not give your majesty the least ground of offence.

And now having presumed to lay these things before your majesty, with all humble submission, purely out of duty, for preventing the evil constructions of your majesty's enemies, and for our own just vindication, we most humbly beseech your sacred majesty graciously to consider what is here represented; and in prosecution of your majesty's acceptance of the claim of right, and the declaration omitted for this kingdom to take such courses as you in your royal wisdom shall think fit, for passing the foresaid acts of parliament, and redressing all our other grievances. And we your ma

esty's most humble petitioners and faithful subjects shall, as in duty bound, ever pray for your long and prosperous reign over us.

Far from showing any marks of resentment at the strong language of this petition, the king, sensibly touched at the reproaches implied in it, caused his instructions to the lord high commissioner to be published, by which it appeared that his grace might have gone farther in his compliances than he had done, though not so far as the demands of the remonstrants extended. By repeated adjournments and prorogations the parliament did not meet again, for the dispatch of business, till the month of April in the ensuing year, 1690, previous to which time considerable changes were made in the Scottish ministry. The earl of Melville succeeded the duke of Hamilton as high commissioner. The earls of Argyle and Tweeddale were appointed to high offices, and effectual methods taken to soften the asperity of opposition. Agreeably likewise to the instructions transmitted to the new commissioner, the system of policy adopted in this session was entirely conciliatory. Lord Melville opened the parliament with a gracious speech, and the earl of Crawford, president of the parliament, seconded the commissioner in an harangue suited to the taste of the times, giving plain intimations of the approaching triumph of presbytery, and comparing the affair of resettling the church to the re-building of the temple under Ezra and Nehemiah; illustrating and adorning his subject with many scriptural and prophetic quotations. A bill was immediately brought in for abolishing that great parliamentary grievance the



committee, so long known and reprobated under the name of the lords of the articles. And on the very day on which the royal assent was given to it, a committee was appointed to consider of a bill for settling the government of the church. This was framed in such a manner as to give complete satisfaction to the most rigid and bigoted of the presbyterians. Those ancient ministers, who had been deprived when episcopacy was established at the restoration of king Charles II., in the lapse of thirty years, reduced to about sixty in number, were now re-instated, and regarded as the only true representatives of the national church. They were authorized and empowered to associate with themselves in the government of the church, such as they should deem duly qualified. These were for the most part men of furious tempers. At least such was the character of those persons who, during this season of conflict and violence, when the mild and the timid sought the shades of obscurity, assumed the chief direction of affairs. "Such," says bishop Burnet, "who were disposed to more moderate counsels had now put it out of their power to pursue them." The fanatics had long waited for an opportunity of avenging themselves upon their enemies, whom they abused and defamed in all the appropriate phraseology of religious malignity; and a new storm of persecution was raised against such of the episcopal clergy as had in some degree escaped the rage of the former year. Accusations were brought against some for heresy, and against others for immorality; and if they condescended to adopt any forms of trial, they were such as became inquisitors rather than judges. The act of supremacy, highly exceptionable in various

respects, was in the course of this session also repealed without reserve; so that it was difficult for the executive power to impose any restraint upon these excesses and enormities. But as the duke of Hamilton had not gone far enough in his concessions, the king thought that the earl of Melville had gone much too far. "He did not understand," says the bishop of Salisbury, "that his instructions could warrant what lord Melville did. And the king was so offended with him for it that he lost all the credit he had with him; though the king did not think fit to disown him, or to call him to an account, for going beyond his instructions."

P R O T E S T  
RELATIVE TO THE  
ACT OF RECOGNITION.

A. D. 1690.

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IN the first session of the new parliament, convened March, 1690, in which the tory interest predominated, a bill was brought into the house of lords for recognizing their majesties as the rightful and lawful sovereigns of these realms, and for declaring all the acts of the last parliament to be good and valid. In the progress of the bill, and by way of accommodation to the prejudices of the tory peers, the words rightful and lawful were dropped, and it was styled simply an act for recognizing king William and queen Mary, &c. By an important clause of this act it was declared and enacted, that all and singular the acts made in the last parliament *were* laws and statutes of the realm. To this the tories strongly, and, viewing the subject in a contracted light, plausibly objected. They argued that it was one of the fundamentals of our constitution that no assembly could be called a parliament unless it was called and chosen upon the king's writ. And they inferred that the acts passed by the convention were not, and could not be regarded as valid in themselves, and for time past, but they were ready to enact that they should be held good and valid, by the authority of the present parliament, in time to come. This was deemed by the whigs a point of too much moment to be tamely con-

ceeded. And a vehement debate arising whether the clause in question should be suffered to stand, it was carried in the committee by a small majority in the affirmative. But on the report it was lost by six voices. This gave occasion to one of the most vigorous and alarming protests recorded on the journals of the house, to which were affixed the signatures of the following peers: Bolton, Macclesfield, Stamford, Newport, Bedford, Herbert, Suffolk, Monmouth, Delamere, and Oxford—founded on the following reasons:

#### DISSENTIENT,

1st. Because there appears to us no reason to doubt of the validity of the last parliament; the great objection insisted upon being the want of writs of summons, which we take to be fully answered by the state the nation was in at that time, which made that form impossible, such exigencies of affairs having been always looked upon by our ancestors, however careful of parliamentary forms, to be a sufficient reason to allow the authority of parliament, notwithstanding the same or other defects in point of form; as the parliament which set Henry I. and king Stephen on the throne; the parliament held, 28th Edward I.; the parliament summoned by the Prince of Wales, 20th Edward II.; the parliament summoned, 23d Richard II.; the parliament held, 1st Henry VI.; and the parliament held, 28th Henry VI.; the acts of which parliaments have been held for law.

2d. Because the rejecting this clause must necessarily disturb the minds of the greatest part of the kingdom; for if those be not good laws, all commissioners, assessors, collectors and receivers of the late taxes, are not only

subject to private actions, but to be criminally prosecuted for one of the highest offences against the constitution of the English government, viz. the levying money on the subject without lawful authority; all persons who have lent money upon the credit of those laws will be in dread of their security, and impatient to get in their money; all persons concerned in levying the present taxes will be fearful to proceed; all persons who have accepted any offices or employments, ecclesiastical, civil, or military, will be under the apprehension of having incurred all the terrible forfeitures and disabilities of the act of 25th Charles II. cap. 2.; and all who have any way concurred to the condemnation or execution of any person upon any act of the late parliament, will think themselves in danger of being called to an account for murder.

3d. Because to leave a doubt touching the validity of the last parliament, is to shake all the judgments and decrees given in the house of peers, or in Westminster-hall, during this reign, and to bring a question upon the whole course of judicial proceedings.

4th. Because if the authority of the last parliament be not put out of the question, the authority of the present parliament can never be defended; for the statute of 5 Elizabeth, cap. 1. makes the election of every member of the house of commons absolutely void, if he enters into the house without taking the oaths of supremacy, which no one person having done there is an end of this house of commons. And by the statute made 30 Charles II. if any peer, or member of the house of commons, presume to sit and vote without first taking the oaths of allegiance and supremacy before the speaker of the respective houses, he does not only forfeit 500



pounds, and become a popish recusant, and disabled to take a legacy, to hold any office or place of trust, to prosecute any suit, to be a guardian, executor, or administrator, but is made for ever incapable to sit and vote in either house of parliament. And consequently this can be no parliament, nor any who have sat in either house be capable of sitting in parliament hereafter.

5th. Because to leave room to doubt of the authority of the last parliament is to shake the succession of the crown established by it, and the credit and authority of all treaties made with foreign princes and states by king William, as the undoubted king of these realms. So that if the last was no parliament, and their acts no law, this is our case: The nation is engaged in a war without the consent of parliament, the old oaths of supremacy and allegiance remain in force, and the nation forced, under colour of law, to swear fidelity to king William, though they can never act as a lawful parliament without taking the oaths of allegiance to king James. All judgments and decrees in the house of lords during the late parliament are of no force, great sums of money have been levied without consent of parliament, and men have been put to death not only without, but against law, which is the worst sort of murder.

Lastly, the king upon the throne, the peerage of England, and the commons, freely elected by the people, have been parties to all this. The peers and commons now assembled are under a perpetual disability; and the nation is involved in endless doubts and confusions, without any legal settlement or possibility to arrive at it, unless a parliament be summoned by king James's writ, and the oaths of allegiance taken to him.

In consequence of this seasonable and confounding protest, the clause in question was ultimately restored, the whole weight of the crown being exerted in favour of it. And the tories in their turn entered, on the third reading of the bill, their protest against it as follows :

1st. Because we conceive that saying “ It is enacted by the authority of the present parliament that all and singular the acts made in the last parliament *were* laws,” is neither good English nor good sense.

2d. Because if it were good sense to enact for the time past, it must be understood on this subject to be the declaring of laws to be good which were passed in a parliament not called by writ in due form of law, which is destructive of the legal constitution of this monarchy, and may be of evil and pernicious consequence to our present government under this king and queen.

The house of peers were now fully awakened to a sense of the dangers which must flow from the admission of this principle, or even of a bare acquiescence in the speculative assertion of it. And after another long and fierce debate, the protest of the tory lords was ordered to be expunged from the journals of the house. This gave rise to a second protest of the same, or nearly the same lords, declaratory of their resentment at this extraordinary and unprecedented procedure ; signed by the lords Nottingham, Jermyn, H. London, Thomas Menev. Ed. Wigorn, P. Winchester, H. Bangor, Westmorland, Chandos, Abington, W. Asaph. To the first protest were also affixed the signatures of, the duke of Somerset, the earls of Rochester, Huntingdon,

Feversham, and Dartmouth, with the lords Scarsdale and Weymouth, and six bishops.

The subject having been so thoroughly investigated in the house of peers, and the insidious cavils of the tories irrefragably exposed, the bill passed through the house of commons silently, or with very trifling opposition, in the short space of two days.

C O N S P I R A C Y  
 AGAINST  
 THE GOVERNMENT.

A. D. 1691.

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THE conspiracy discovered January 1691, in which lord Preston was the most distinguished actor, and of which Mr. Ashton was the sole unfortunate victim, remained, after all, like that of Montgomery in Scotland, to which it was a sort of counter-part, enveloped in a cloud of mystery. Either the government did not know, or which is more probable, did not chuse to disclose all the particulars of these dark and dangerous designs. The most interesting and important of the papers found in the possession of lord Preston, was indorsed “ Heads of a remarkable conference *said to have passed* among certain lords and gentlemen, both whigs and tories, tending to shew that if the most christian king intended to impose king James upon the nation as a conqueror, he would find the bloodiest resistance imaginable; but that if he would be prevailed upon to assist him and his friends on the principles, and by the means therein specified, many lords and gentlemen would shew themselves to his satisfaction.”

I. *The Result of the Conference.*

1st. F. (France) must either oblige or conquer us. If the last, he will find no helps here but a bloodier resistance than ever the Romans, Saxons or Normans

found, it being incredible how unanimous and obstinate that very thought renders the people; so that it may make us a heap of ruin, but no nation that can ever help or import any thing to F.

2d. If K. L. (King Louis) desires to oblige us, and make the work easy, that he may be at leisure to ply the empire or Italy, or to have an advantageous peace, he must take off the frightful character we have of him, and shew us he has no such design as returning our offended K. a conqueror upon us, but that he can and will be our friend and mediator, upon which terms he will find that many lords and gentlemen will speedily show themselves to his satisfaction, especially if he makes haste and loses no approaching opportunity.

3d. If he incline to this sort of sense, he must over-rule the bigotry of St. Germaine's, and dispose their minds to think of those methods that are more likely to gain the nation. For there is one silly thing or other daily done there that comes to our notice here, which prolongs what they so passionately desire.

*The Methods thought upon are these :*

*First.* To prevent dangerous and foolish intelligence, by forbidding all in that court to write any news hither, and that king James only have his correspondents by whom to hear from, and speak to, people here; since letters so often miscarry, and are filled with nothing but what we should not hear, and what we have are arguments for the most part against the king's restoration.

*Secondly.* Since there is a great body of protestants that never defected, and that many thousands are re-



turning, and that they are the natural weight and power of these kingdoms, by having the heads, hands, and wealth of their side, to the odds and advantage of at least two hundred protestants to one catholic, the king may think of nothing short of a protestant administration, nor of nothing more for the catholics than a legal liberty of conscience; for *much e mult* is against all other notions, to which all private passions and artificial frames in government must yield or break. He may reign a catholic in devotion, but he must reign a protestant in government. Cromwell could not, yet on a broader bottom, with a victorious army, subsist or keep what he had got.

*Thirdly.* He must give us a model of this at St. G. by preferring the protestants that are with him above the catholics; one being loyal upon less ties of interest, and to tell the nation here what they are to hope for when he comes.

*Fourthly.* He must give encouragement to lords and gentlemen here to come to him, at least seven or nine, for a standing council, which will make us here think that he is in some degree ours again, and that we have a relation to him, and some interest and share in him by the men of quality of our own religion that are with him. This will incomparably facilitate the matter here, nor will they, when they come, come empty and in their own names, which is still better, and will be more satisfactory there.

*Fifthly.* To induce this, English protestants should be encouraged, by an edict of liberty from the king of France, to have chapels at their own costs, in which to worship God after their respective ways, by which that

king will make us reflect upon his conduct towards his Huguenots rather to flow from the hazard he thought himself in by their anti-monarchical and resisting principles than a desire of persecution.

*Lastly.* All other requisite measures depending upon the acceptance which this finds, an answer hereunto is impatiently desired by those that have discoursed the king's business to this maturity. So ended with an unanimous consent, both tories and whigs, upon this occasion, that are in a way of closing in his interest.

## II. *The Heads of the Declaration.*

That the king will return with a design of making an entire conquest of his people is so ridiculous, as well as difficult, that it needs not be spoken to.

That the king's declaration be worded in general terms that he will govern by the laws; that they shall be the rule of his actions; that he will endeavour to settle liberty of conscience by law; that whatsoever things were formerly done by him which occasioned jealousies in the minds of his people, shall be left to the determination of a parliament, to be formally and regularly called as soon as is possible.

That he has given sufficient evidence of his unwillingness to bring an army of strangers into his kingdom, by refusing the succours of France offered him, and which were even ready to be embarked upon the first notice of the Prince of Orange's intended invasion.

That he brings with him such an army only as is necessary for his own defence, and for the security of his loyal subjects who shall resort to him; that he will dismiss them as soon as he shall have rid the nation of those

foreigners who have invaded it, and trampled upon the laws and liberties of his people.

The king's large exercising his dispensing power gave the great alarm to his people, and contributed most of all toward a general defection. Yet when that power came to be debated in the last convention, there appeared so many difficulties in the limiting of it, every body, even the present judges, believing it necessary that a dispensing power should be in the king, that it was let fall, and that point remains as it was. And without mentioning that or any other particular, the king can be in no danger by leaving all things which have been the occasions of jealousies to the determination of a parliament where, besides the king's professed friends and servants, there will not want others who will be glad of opportunity to ingratiate themselves.

DECLARATIONS  
OF  
K I N G J A M E S II.

*A. D. 1692-3.*

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THE contrast between the two declarations of king James, published in the years 1692 and 1693, the one previous and the other subsequent to the decisive victory of La Hogue, is very obvious and striking. That of 1692, composed under the influence of the earl of Melfort, and in the high and sanguine hope of success, is harsh and imperious; that of 1693, framed according to the sage advice of the earl of Middleton, and in the hour of humiliation and disappointment, is full of condescension and generosity. The promises and professions contained in the first were vague and illusory, in the second clear and explicit; the latter was indeed, in all respects, the best declaration ever promulgated by the abdicated monarch; but it most certainly spoke not the sentiments of his heart; for it was belied by the whole tenor of his actions and conduct. Fortunately for the kingdom it did not appear till the prospect of a counter-revolution became hopeless and desperate. It will serve as a gratification of political curiosity, and it may also answer the higher purpose of affording serious and useful matter of reflection, to make some considerable extracts from both.

*1st Declaration of King James.*

Though an affair of this importance spoke for itself, and though he did not think himself obliged to say any thing more than that he came to assert his just right, and to deliver his people from the oppressions they lay under, yet when he considered how miserably many of his subjects had been cheated into the late revolution by the arts of ill men, and particularly by the Prince of Orange's declaration, he had thought fit to do what lay in his power to open the eyes of his subjects. That when he, the prince, had thrown off the mask—when his majesty was universally deserted and betrayed by his army, his ministers, his favourites, and his very children, and at last rudely forced by a guard of foreigners from his own palace, it was high time for him to provide for his own security, which he could no otherwise do than by taking refuge in France.—That how this escape of his came to be treated as an abdication, and what a strange superstructure had been raised upon it by a Company of men illegally met, who, without power to alter the property of the meanest subject, had taken upon them to destroy the whole constitution, and to make an hereditary monarchy become elective, &c. were transactions too well known to need repetition. That when the nation considered the temper and complexion, the methods and maxims of the present usurper, they would find all the reason in the world to believe that the beginning of his tyranny, like the five first years of Nero, was like to prove the mildest part of it.—That if it should please God, as one of his severest judg-



ments upon these kingdoms for the many rebellions and perjuries they had been guilty of, to continue the usurpation during his life-time, an indisputable title would survive in his issue.—That since he came with so good purposes, and so good a cause, he hoped he should meet with little opposition; and that none might be forced to continue in rebellion by despair of mercy, he promised and declared, by the word of a king, that, *except* certain persons there enumerated,\* all *who, by an early return to their duty, and giving any signal mark of it,* should manifest the sincerity of their repentance, should not only have their respective pardons under the great seal, but be farther considered and rewarded. That it should be his great care, by the advice and assistance of parliament, to repair the breaches and heal the wounds of the late distractions; and that generally it

\* Namely, the duke of Ormond, the marquis of Winchester, the earls of Sunderland, Bath, Danby and Nottingham, the lords Newport, Delamere, Wiltshire, Colchester, Cornbury, Dunblain, and Churchill, the bishops of London and St. Asaph, Sir Robert Howard, Sir John Worden, Sir Samuel Grimston, Sir Stephen Fox, Sir George Treby, Sir Basil Dixwell, Sir James Oxenden, Dr. Tillotson, Dr. Burnet, Francis Russel, Richard Levison, John Trenchard, esqrs. Charles Duncomb of London, Edwards, Napleton, and Hunt, fishermen, and all those who offered him personal indignities at Faversham; also all persons who as judges, jurymen, &c. had a hand in the *barbarous murder* of Ashton and Cross, (convicted of high treason for going on board the French fleet to give intelligence, in the summer of 1690) &c. and all spies. But in fact it was of little importance who were included in the long and black catalogue of exceptions, for by limiting the promise of pardon to those only who came in *early*, and who should afterwards give *any signal mark of the sincerity of their repentance*, the whole kingdom was completely at his mercy.

should be his delight to spend the remainder of his reign as he had always designed, since his coming to the crown, in studying to do every thing that might contribute to the re-establishment of the greatness of the English monarchy, &c. "Thus, says the abdicated monarch in conclusion, having endeavoured to answer all objections, and to give all the satisfaction we can think of to all parties and degrees of men, we cannot want ourselves the satisfaction of having done all that can be done on our part, whatever the event shall be. And, as on the other side, if any of our subjects, after all this, shall remain so obstinate as to appear in arms against us, they must needs fall unpitied under the severity of our justice, after having refused such gracious offers of mercy, so they must be answerable to Almighty God for all the blood that shall be spilt, and all the miseries and confusions in which these kingdoms may happen to be involved by their desperate and unreasonable opposition."

\* \* \* \*

This is a genuine picture of pride, bigotry, and revenge, and happily also of the most consummate folly. Such a declaration had the most direct tendency to unite all hands and all hearts against its author. Never were monarch and minister actuated by more congenial spirits than James, and his favourite adviser the earl of Melfort. But the sagacity and moderation of the earl of Middleton, whom he could not but know that a vast majority of his partizans regarded with an affection and veneration equal to the detestation and contempt they entertained for Melfort, prevailed so far as to induce him to issue, at a time when it could produce little comparative effect, the following :

*2d Declaration,*

In the preamble to which he expressed his desire to give the fullest satisfaction to all men, and to be beholden to the love of his subjects rather than to any other expedient whatsoever, for his restoration. He then declared, "That when he reflected upon the calamities of his kingdom he was willing to leave nothing unattempted that might reconcile his subjects to their duty; that though he would not enter into all the particulars of grace and goodness which he was willing to grant, yet he did assure them they might depend upon every thing that their own representatives should offer to make them happy; it being his noblest aim to do more for the constitution than the most renowned of his ancestors: and in his opinion his chiefest interest to leave no umbrage for jealousy in relation to religion, liberty and property. That for his part he was ready and willing to lay aside all thoughts of animosity and resentment for what was past, and desired nothing more than that it should be buried in perpetual oblivion. That he did by this his declaration, under the great seal, solemnly promise his free pardon and indemnity to all who should not oppose him and his adherents in a certain number of days after his landing; that he would with all speed call together the representative body of the kingdom; that from them he would inform himself what were the united interests and inclinations of his people, and that with their concurrence he would be ready to redress all their grievances, and give all those securitics of which they should stand in need; that he

would protect and defend the church of England as it was then established by law ; that he would with all earnestness recommend to that parliament such an impartial liberty of conscience as *they* should think necessary for the happiness of these nations ; that he would not dispense with, nor violate the test ; that for the dispensing power in other matters, he would leave it to be explained and limited by parliament ; that he would also give the royal assent to all such bills as were necessary for the frequent calling and holding of parliaments, the free election and fair returns of members, and to provide for impartial trials ; and that he would ratify and confirm all such laws made under the present usurpation, as should be tendered to him by that parliament ; that in the same parliament he would also consent to every thing that they should think necessary to re-establish the late act of settlement in Ireland, made in the reign of his dearest brother ; that if any part of the crown revenue had been burdensome to his subjects, he was willing to exchange it for any other assessment which should be thought more easy ; that in all these several concessions he had followed the advice, and conformed to the intimations which he had received from great numbers of his loving subjects, of all ranks and degrees, who had adjusted the manner of his coming to regain his own right, and relieve his people from oppression and slavery. That whereas his enemies had endeavoured to affright his subjects with the apprehension of great sums to be repaid to France, he did positively assure them that his dearest brother, the most christian king, expected no other compensation for what

he had done for him, than merely the glory of having succoured an injured prince; and that he besought God to give him success in the prosecution of his right, as he sincerely intended to confirm the liberties of his people.

OVERTURE  
OF  
FRANCE FOR PEACE.

*A. D. 1693.*

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THE war in which France had been engaged for several years past, in consequence of the league formed against her at Augsburg, though carried on with a flow of success not great or rapid indeed, but almost uninterrupted on her part, was by no means consonant either to the interest or inclinations of her sovereign. The dreams of conquest once indulged by Louis XIV. had now passed away, the illusions of glory by which he had been so long deceived were in a great measure dissolved, and he began at length to know the value of peace. Though France still retained her ascendant in the field, under the auspices of Luxemburg and Catinat, the efforts she made were much more than proportionate to the advantages gained. The contest was in fact unequal, and the superiority she affected was attended with hatred and envy, and preserved with pain and difficulty. Impressed with these considerations, the French monarch had already made various secret, but ineffectual advances towards obtaining a peace. So early as in the year 1691, overtures had been made to the court of Vienna, without success. At the commencement of the present year (1693), was discovered an artful and insidious intrigue of the court of Versailles in Holland, for the same purpose. M. Hal-



Iewyn, senior burgo-master of Dordt, was accused of going into Switzerland, and there entering into a concert with M. Amelot, the French minister to the cantons, for setting on foot an unauthorized and clandestine negotiation for peace, in contempt of the several edicts prohibiting all correspondence with France. On the examination of this magistrate, king William himself attending in person, it appeared that he had received at his house an emissary from France, named M. Roberti du Plesis, who was empowered to promise him the payment of 20,000 crowns, in case he could prevail upon the city of Dordt to declare for peace, and that the example of Dordt should be followed by other cities, so as to come under the cognizance of the states general. The whole intrigue being clearly proved, the burgo-master was sentenced to imprisonment for life, and the confiscation of property. The French monarch perceiving the necessity of a more public disclosure of his sentiments; commissioned the Dauphin, who accompanied M. de L'Orges, in the summer of 1693, into Germany, to publish a manifesto, containing proposals of accommodation, on the basis of the treaties of Westphalia and Nimeguen, offering Montroyal and Traerbach as an equivalent for Strasburg, an annual revenue to the duke of Lorraine in lieu of his dutchy, and expressing his willingness to submit the questions arising from the reunions to the arbitration of the republic of Venice.

Memorials having been presented from the court of Versailles to the kings of Sweden and Denmark, conformable to this manifesto, and requesting their good offices, the ministers of those powers communicated the contents of them in form to the imperial diet assembled

at Ratisbon, by whom the conditions proposed were treated with much contempt, and it was declared that no satisfaction would be accepted short of a restitution of all that France had usurped or acquired since the treaty of the Pyrences. Not discouraged by these disappointments, the king of France, at the end of the year, made new overtures of peace to the court of Copenhagen, in which were included various new concessions. And the Danish minister resident in London, presented, in consequence, to the king of England, by orders of his sovereign, the following memorial, dated December 11th (O.S.) 1693 :

SIR,

THE desolation this present war carries into most parts of Europe, together with the duty incumbent on a christian king to apply all the remedies that lie in his power to so general a calamity, oblige the king of Denmark, my master, to impart to your majesty those proposals of peace which the most christian king has communicated to him. My master might have reason to decline his offices towards the peace of Europe, and taking upon him so important a negotiation, since the advances he has already made, as well as the king of Sweden, have not only proved ineffectual, but likewise have been so misconstrued as to render them suspected. Nevertheless it is most evident that, without any prospect of private interest (the union of the northern crowns, for the security of the trade of their respective subjects, being so well established, and enjoying the privileges of neutrality, that the continuation of the war might very much encrease the riches of their majesties' dominions)

the public welfare of Europe, and the desire to see a just and lasting peace restored, have prevailed above all other considerations. Wherefore the king, my master, has represented to the most christian king, that the proposals which he has made hitherto towards a general peace have been looked upon by the confederates rather as a means to disunite them. and to crush and subdue them one after another, than as a mark of his sincere intentions of settling the public repose. But his most christian majesty, to remove all manner of distrust, has not only by repeated protestations assured the king, my master, of the sincerity of his sentiments in this affair, but has likewise delivered a project of general peace, and added to the conditions that concern the empire, and which are already known to your majesty, some others relating to the rest of the allies, which are comprehended in the following heads:

I. That, notwithstanding the advantages his arms have gained this campaign, no alterations shall be made in the conditions his most christian majesty has already offered to the emperor, the princes and states of the empire, and the dukes of Lorraine and Savoy.

II. His majesty shall restore to the catholic king the important place of Roses, that of Belvers, and whatever has been conquered in Catalonia during the present war.

III. Towards the forming a barrier in the Low-countries, which may remove all manner of jealousy and uneasiness from the states of Holland, his most christian majesty shall, upon that consideration, restore the places of Mons and Namur to the king of Spain, and cause Charleroy to be razed.

“ IV. His said majesty shall restore to the bishop of Liege the town and castle of Huy, and recompense him for Dinant and Bouillon, by annexing, upon that account, to his bishopric such a portion of the country of Luxemburg as shall be most convenient to that bishop, and judged equivalent by arbitrators.

“ V. His majesty consents that the treaty of commerce made at Nimeguen, with the states, be renewed without any alteration.

“ VI. His majesty thinks the states of Holland will be glad to obtain such important restitutions, and to put an end to the war by a peace so advantageous both to Spain and all the allies; especially after the prosperous campaigns of France, which may still be attended with others no less successful. But that neither Holland nor any other state of Europe may have any ground of apprehension that, upon pretence of new rights, his majesty will extend the boundaries of his dominions in the Low-countries beyond what shall be regulated by the treaty, his majesty declares, that in case the king of Spain dies without issue, he consents that the Low-countries fall to the share of the duke of Bavaria, upon condition that the emperor makes the same declaration. And his majesty shall as well for himself, as for the Dauphin, his son, confirm the said renunciation by all the formalities necessary for that purpose in behalf of his electoral highness.

“ His most christian majesty hopes that this last engagement will more than any thing besides secure to the confederates the firmness of the peace he shall make with him. And he thinks that after such advantageous proposals the world will soon know whether Europe

may hope to see the public tranquillity restored ; or whether the preparations of war are to be renewed.

“ This, sir, is what the most christian king has communicated to the king, my master, and which his majesty has commanded me to impart to you. He does in no manner pretend to prescribe rules to your majesty, since your prudence will best judge what is most for your glory and interest ; but however he thinks these proposals deserve a serious consideration. And, because there is no mention made of England, the king, my master, has made it already his business to incline the most christian king not to insist upon that which might put a stop to the general peace. In the mean time, the king, my master, thinks it necessary that, in order to advance a work so profitable and beneficial to all Europe, a negotiation be set on foot ; and his majesty is the more confirmed in this opinion by reason the winter will soon be over ; and that it is to be feared, lest by delaying till the next campaign, an opportunity be given to France either of enlarging her conquests, or by a powerful irruption into Germany, and the superiority of her forces, to divide the confederacy ; which would give a just pretence to that crown of recalling the offers she has already made, and render a peace very difficult, if not altogether impossible. The king, my master, does not only offer to become guarantee with all the princes and potentates that will concur with him, but likewise to unite himself, in particular, with your majesty, by a most strict and indissoluble alliance.

“ Upon the whole matter, the king, my master, is persuaded that nobody has more reason to contribute to this peace than your majesty, since it will confirm to



you the glory and advantages you have gained during the war ; and will besides make Europe to be eternally beholden to your majesty for the peace she groans after. If your majesty thinks that there is any thing defective in relation to the security of the peace, or that wants to be either altered or explained, the king, my master, engages to procure to your majesty all the satisfaction imaginable : and if you are pleased to confide in his mediation, he will manage it to your majesty's entire satisfaction. Lastly, the king, my master, has commanded me to assure your majesty, that being upon several accounts concerned in the prosperity of your royal family, he will, to the utmost of his power, promote its interest and advantage ; and desires your majesty to be persuaded that all the advances he has made in this affair have no other aim, and are grounded on no other principle.

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Had the mediation of the king of Denmark, thus handsomely and liberally offered, been fortunately accepted, the war might probably have been shortened some years in its duration ; as there is every reason to believe that peace might have been at this time obtained, upon as good, or better terms than those it was afterwards concluded upon at Ryswick, A. D. 1697. But the confederacy had not yet relinquished the hope of humbling the pride and power of France ; and experience only could teach them the necessity of lowering the tone of their demands, as they became gradually and reluctantly convinced of the vanity of their too sanguine expectations. From this era, however, France seemed anxious not to inflame the resentment of the



confederate powers, by aiming at new conquests; and during the remaining years of the war, she stood merely upon the defensive, in the grand scene of action in the Low-countries: and her efforts were chiefly exerted in Spain and Italy, with a view to compel the courts of Madrid and Turin to acquiesce in her propositions for peace; without entertaining any wish or design to retain her conquests beyond the Alps or the Pyrenees.

MANIFESTOES  
 OF  
 KING JAMES,  
 RELATIVE TO  
 THE PEACE OF RYSWICK.  
*A. D. 1697.*

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DURING the negotiations at Ryswick, king James published two manifestoes; the first addressed to the catholic, the second to the protestant powers of Europe, filled with extravagant assertions and querulous complaints, to which no sort of regard was paid by either. They were, however, for a time viewed in a serious light by the court of London, and a very able and excellent answer was, in consequence, drawn up under the immediate inspection and special direction of king William himself. But upon being apprized that to answer the manifestoes in question, would be only to give them that sort of credit which they did not at present possess, the design was dropped. In order that the pains bestowed upon the answer might not, however, be wholly lost, it was thrown into a new form and published, after a considerable interval, not in the name of the king, but as the reply of a private individual.\* The manifestoes of James are very long and tedious, but a few extracts

\* Ralph, vol. ii. p. 730.

from them may be of use, as well to exhibit a specimen of the spirit in which they are written, as to introduce with propriety and effect the answer of William.

The abdicated monarch begins his FIRST memorial with acknowledging his apprehensions that truth itself might not prevail against the prejudices of the times, but he could no longer conceal the reasons which ought to induce the catholic powers to contribute to his re-establishment, without failing in his duty to God, to himself, his son, and his people. He ascribes all his sufferings to his religion, which was no sooner discovered, says he, but it gave rise to the persecution against him. His government he declares to have been so just and moderate as to procure him the affection and esteem of all good men. Yet no sooner did the prince of Orange set foot in England, than the greatest part of the nation revolted; and he was abandoned and betrayed by his officers, his domestics, and even his own children. And the princes, his confederates, drove his ministers from their courts, and treated his majesty as a declared enemy. Every body knew that, by the fundamental laws of England, the kings of England were answerable for their actions to none but God alone; that, however, his majesty had done nothing but what had the sanction of those laws, and the approbation of the twelve judges.

That there was a defensive alliance subsisting between him and the states general, which he had never violated; whereas the states, instead of assisting him against every invader, had enabled the prince of Orange to invade their dominions, while Van Citters, their minister

at London, all the while assured his majesty, his masters would religiously maintain a good correspondence with him. He expressed his astonishment that princes so zealous for religion and justice as the emperor and the king of Spain had always appeared, should become the confederates of an heretical usurper in so enormous an action as the dethroning a lawful king, a catholic, his uncle, and his father-in-law. That if his enemies should avail themselves of the necessity which they had brought him under, to abandon his dominions in order to save his life, and urge it as a reasonable plea for depriving him of his crown, no doubt that very plea would convince all reasonable persons of their unjust procedure; for no such person could help seeing that this was making a jest of sovereignty—that the confederate princes knowing the eyes of all Europe were now upon them, and beginning to be already convinced of the misrepresentations and falsehood which had surprized them into such prejudices against his majesty, would act as their safety, their honour, their consciences, and the good faith of the catholic religion required, in contributing all in their power to his re-establishment—that for the said princes to adhere to the interests of the prince of Orange, merely because they looked upon him as an irreconcilable enemy to France, was to act in a manner irreconcilable to the dictates of their holy religion, and to render themselves unworthy of God's blessing—and that, upon the whole, he could not, without indignation, listen to the expedients which had been talked of by some to accommodate his affairs, namely, of leaving the prince of Orange in possession of the crown for life, on condition it should be secured, on

his death, to the prince of Wales ; as if it was possible for his majesty, with a safe conscience, to abandon the justice of his cause, together with his duty to God, to his posterity, and to his subjects, by authorizing and legitimizing what a tumultuous assembly, without authority, had enacted in favour of an usurper, and against the religion, &c.

In the SECOND memorial or manifesto, addressed to the protestant powers, he declares that the observance of oaths, the obedience due to lawful sovereigns, and to the laws of society, were equally binding to all who called themselves christians, and even to nations the most barbarous. Neither could any of the said protestant princes and states deny that they had complimented the said king on his accession to the throne, and on the birth of the prince of Wales ; that they had entered into treaties with him, &c. How then could they excuse themselves for having broke their faith to his majesty, and united with his enemies against him, without any previous declaration of war, without the least cause of complaint, or, as it should seem, the shadow of any, seeing that, since the Revolution, they had assigned none, &c.

The ANSWER to the first memorial begins with observing, “ that the king of Great Britain does not wonder to see a prince, who has for so long a time sought to take away his life in the blackest methods, endeavour now, likewise, to attack his honour even in the indecentest expressions, of which the late memorial is full. The late king, while he was in Ireland, did himself concert with one Jones, the way of murdering the king. But so tender was his majesty of the honour of a person so nearly related to him, that he gave order to suppress that

matter, though the authentical proofs of it are yet extant in letters and other papers taken in the late earl of Tyrconnel's cabinet.\* Grandval's confession is well known; and sir John Fenwick did lately claim merit, by his diverting another design to murder the king, pur-

\* The account given by bishop Burnet, from whom alone we have any particulars of this nefarious design, is as follows: "Among the earl of Tyrconnel's papers there was one letter writ to queen Mary, at St. Germaine's, the night before the battle, *i. e.* of the Boyne. But it was not sent. In it he said he looked on all as lost, and ended it thus: 'I have now no hope in any thing but in Jones's business.' The marquis of Carmarthen told me, that some weeks before the king went to Ireland, he had received an advertisement that one named Jones, an Irishman, who had served so long in France and Holland, that he spoke both languages well, was to be sent over to murder the king. And sir Robert Southwell told me that he, as secretary of state for Ireland, had looked into all Tyrconnel's papers, and the copies of the letters he wrote to queen Mary, which he had still in his possession. And he gave me the copies of two of them. In one of these he writes that Jones was come; that his proposition was more probable and liker to succeed *than any yet made*. His demands were high, but he added—if any thing can be high for such a service. In another he writes, that Jones had been with the king, who did not like the thing at first: but, he added, we have now so satisfied him both in conscience and honour, that every thing is done that Jones desires. Southwell farther told me, that Neagle, the attorney-general, had furnished him with money, and a poignard of a particular construction. He was for some time delayed in Dublin, and the king had passed over to Ireland before he could reach him. We could never hear of him more: so it is likely he went away with his money. A paper was drawn of all this matter, and designed to be published; but upon second thoughts, the king and queen had that tenderness for king James, that they stopped the publishing to the world so shameful a practice. The king said upon this to himself, that God had preserved him out of many dangers, and he trusted he would still preserve him."—Burnet, vol. iii. p. 76.



suant to a commission, that though it was not come over, yet was affirmed to be signed by the late king. His having laid the design of murdering the king a year ago, and his having sent over persons, and a commission to that effect, have been so undeniably proved, that all Europe is still full of horror at it. At such practices heathens would be ashamed. The pursuing them year after year deserves severer words than the king thinks fit to use, even after such a provocation; such regard is had to the high birth and the rank which that prince once held in the world. The king had the less reason to expect such practices from the late king, because, though he had him so long in his power he did him no hurt nor put him under any restraint. He refused to hearken to the advices that many gave him of securing his person till a general peace should be made; or at least till Ireland should be reduced. Some who offered those advices are now in the late king's interest; and can, if they please, inform him of the truth of this matter. The late king himself desired to be attended by some of the Dutch guards when he went to Rochester, and sent to the count de Solmes to that effect; who immediately ordered it, without any direction of the king, who was not then come to London. When the king knew of it, he sent orders to those guards to wait about the late king in what manner he himself should command. His majesty did not come to England on design to dethrone the late king, but declaring a full purpose to leave the care and settlement of the nation to the parliament. And when some lords were sent to him by the late king, to ask him what it was that he proposed, his answer was, that he desired that the administration of the govern-

ment might be brought into a state conformable to the laws then in being; so that no persons who were under legal incapacities might continue in public offices or trust, and that a parliament might be called and sit in full freedom, both armies being at an equal distance from it: that so proper remedies might be applied to all the distempers into which those violent counsels had thrown the nation. By this it appeared how firmly the king had adhered to his declaration. During this negotiation, and after the late king had notice given him what the king's demands were, he, upon reasons best known to himself, threw up all, and abandoned the government: and left his army loose upon the nation, and the rabble upon the city of London, and withdrew himself; by which he did all that in him lay to cast these kingdoms into most violent convulsions, and exposed even his own friends to all the hardships that might have been apprehended from enraged multitudes. For if the providence of God, and the natural gentleness of the people of England, had not proved effectual restraints, this nation had become a scene of fire and blood, which the enemies of this kingdom persuaded the late king to venture on, rather than to stay and suffer a parliament to inquire into the causes of the miseries the nation was fallen under, and to secure their religion and property. Upon this, that part of the nation, which had till then adhered to the late king, finding themselves abandoned by him, desired that the king would assume the administration of his forsaken government; which he consented to do till a convention of the states should be brought together to give it a full and legal sanction. He did take a most particular care that the

elections should be carried on with all possible freedom; not only without violence and threatenings, but even without recommendations or any sort of practice, how usual and how innocent soever. The like care secured their liberty when they met. Every man argued and voted in the great deliberations then on foot, both with freedom and safety. Nor did the king speak to any person, or suffer any to speak in his name to persuade, much less to threaten, those who seemed still to adhere to the late king's interest: so strict was he in observing the promises he had made in his declaration. It was thought a remissness and a hazarding the public too much to interpose or move so little in those matters as he then did. The convention came to a full resolution, and judged that the late king had broke the *original contract* upon which this government was at first founded, and after that had abandoned it; so that it was necessary for them, being thus forsaken by him, to see to their own security. And as they judged that the late king's right to govern them was sunk, so they did not think it was necessary or incumbent on them to examine that which the whole nation in general, as well as the king in particular, had just reason to call in question, concerning the birth of the pretended prince of Wales. When the late king had quite dissolved the tie of the nation to himself, they thought they had no farther concern upon them to inquire into that matter; and therefore they thought fit to let it remain in that just doubtfulness under which the late king's own method of proceedings had brought it. Besides that, a particular care had been taken by the late king to cause all those who had been in the management of that matter, or

were suspected of having a share in the artifices about it, to be carried over into France, so that it was not possible to come at those persons, by the interrogating of whom, truth might have been found out. The king expressed no ambitious desires of mounting the throne. The addresses of both houses, and the state of Europe, which seemed desperate without a mighty support from England, determined him in that matter. But as he can appeal to God of the sincerity of his intentions, who alone knows them, so he has an infinite number of witnesses who saw, and can justify, his whole conduct in the progress of that revolution, if it were fit for him to appeal to them."

In the answer to the second memorial of king James, it is observed in justification of the Revolution, "that nothing was done in the progress of it but that which he made inevitable by some act or other of his own. It went not upon false suggestions, nor barely upon the pretences of redressing particular grievances or some doubtful oppressions, much less on the ambitious designs of his majesty, that are so often and so maliciously represented as the true causes of the Revolution. It was the late king's open throwing off the restraint of law, and his setting about a total subversion of the constitution, that drove the nation to extreme courses. The oaths of allegiance can be understood only in the sense limited by law, and so they cannot be conceived to bind subjects to a king who would not govern them any longer unless he might be allowed to do it against law. A revolution so brought about carries in it no precedent against the security of government or the peace of man-

kind. That which an absolute necessity enforced at one time, can be no warrant for irregular proceedings at any other time, unless it be where the like necessity shall require the like remedies. . . But since the late king thinks fit to reflect on the oaths of subjects, he ought also to remember the oath which he himself swore at his coronation, to defend the church of England, and to maintain the laws; to neither of which he shewed any regard in his whole government, but set himself to overturn both. The many alterations that have been made in the succession to the crown of England upon occasions that were neither so pressing nor so important as those of late were, should have obliged those who penned this memorial to be more reserved and less positive in affirming things so contrary to the known history of this kingdom. These revolutions were confirmed by laws which were not afterwards, upon succeeding changes, repealed; for they continue still in force. Nor was the crown of England ever reckoned to be such a property to those who held it, that they might use it or dispose of it at pleasure, as the memorial seems to suppose."

A third manifesto or protest against the peace about to be concluded, "without his participation," dated June 8, 1687, and addressed to ALL the princes and powers of Europe, was afterwards published by king James, of which no sort of notice was taken in any mode whatever, by any of the parties concerned.



## CONFERENCES OF HALLE.

A. D. 1697.

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THERE can be no doubt, from the positive testimony of king James's memoirs, corroborated by those of the duke of Berwick, that in the famous conferences held at Halle, between marshal Boufflers and the earl of Portland, pending the negotiations at Ryswick, overtures on the part of the king of France were made by the former in favour of the infant son of James, which were not wholly rejected by William : but the folly and bigotry of the abdicated monarch rendered all such projects impracticable.

We have, from two very high authorities, narratives somewhat vague and general indeed of what passed at these conferences ; but neither bishop Burnet, who received his account from the earl of Portland, or M. de Torcy, who had his information, in all probability, from M. Boufflers, make the least mention of the overtures above alluded to ; both the negotiators being, no doubt, under strong injunctions of secrecy as to this point. The statement of Dr. Burnet is as follows :

“ While they were negotiating, by exchanging papers, which was a slow method, subject to much delay, and too many exceptions and evasions, the marshal Boufflers desired a conference with the earl of Portland, and by the order of their masters they met four times, and were long alone. That lord told me himself that the subject of these conferences was concerning king



James. The king desired to know how the king of France intended to dispose of him, and how he could own him and yet support the other. The king of France would not renounce the protecting him by any article of the treaty; but it was agreed between them that the king of France should give him no assistance, nor give the king any disturbance on his account, and that he should retire from the court of France, either to Avignon or Italy. On the other hand, his queen should have 50,000*l.* a year, which was her jointure settled after his death; and that should now be paid her, he being reckoned as dead to the nation; and in this the king very readily acquiesced. These meetings made the treaty go on with more dispatch, this tender point being once settled.”—*Bishop Burnet's History*, vol. iii. p. 277.

It is obvious to remark on this account, that the bishop erroneously supposed the object of the conferences to have been merely the satisfaction of king William, in relation to the disposal of the person of king James: although, had this been the fact, the first overture must doubtless have proceeded from the king of England, and not from the king of France, contrary to the bishop's own statement. The narrative of the marquis de Torcy is more full and satisfactory.

“Vers la fin de l'été, 1697, les traités de la paix générale étant prêts à signer à Ryswick, & les armées encore en campagne, le maréchal de Boufflers eut à la vue de l'une et de l'autre armée, quatre conférences avec le comte de Portland, né Hollandois, confident intime du roi d'Angleterre dont il avoit été page. On a fausement publié que le partage de la succession d'Espagne

avoit été réglé dans les conférences ; il n'en fut pas question, elles roulerent sur trois articles.

“ Le roi Guillaume demandoit par le premier, que ses ennemis ne reçussent ni secours ni assistance de la part de la France. Il spécifioit particulièrement le roi Jaques II. son beau-père : et pour plus grande sûreté, Portland insistoit à faire sortir de France ce Prince infortuné, et à l'obliger à porter ses malheurs, soit à Rome, soit en tel autre lieu de l'univers qu'il lui plairoit de choisir.

“ Le maréchal de Boufflers demandoit de la part du roi, d'insérer dans le traité de paix qu'il seroit accordé une amnésie générale aux Anglois qui avoient suivi le roi Jaques en France, & de plus, la restitution de leurs biens, condition que le comte de Portland rejetta, sous prétexte que le roi son maître ne seroit pas en sûreté en Angleterre s'il consentoit à l'accorder.

“ Le troisième article agité dans ces conférences regardoit la ville d'Orange. Le maréchal de Boufflers demandoit que l'entrée & toute habitation dans cette ville fussent interdites aux sujets du roi, qui prévoyoit que les nouveaux convertis attachés encore à leurs premières erreurs, accoureroient des provinces dont Orange est environnée, & s'établiroient dans cette ville, s'ils en avoient la liberté.

“ Portland soutint que l'interdiction demandée seroit contraire à la prétendue souveraineté d'Orange ; toutefois il convint que le roi son maître donneroit secrètement parole d'empêcher tout sujet du roi de s'établir à Orange sans la permission de sa majesté.

“ Les conférences roulerent sur ces différens articles.”

*Memoires de M. de Torcy, vol. i. p. 24-5.*

## P A P E R S

RELATIVE TO THE

## FIRST PARTITION TREATY.

*A. D.* 1698.

## S E C T. I.

EXTRACT FROM TORCY'S MEMOIRS.

AFTER the peace (i. e. of Ryswick) the earl of Portland, by birth a Hollander, came to France in quality of ambassador extraordinary from the king his master. He protested that, in conformity to the intentions of his sovereign, he ardently desired to contribute to the establishment of that perfect intelligence which the king of England wished to form, and to entertain with his majesty, persuaded that this union, absolutely necessary to the welfare of Europe, was in consequence no less so to the permanency of the peace.

The event most likely to disturb the peace of Europe was the death of the king of Spain. There was every reason to expect that this catastrophe must soon take place; the maladies of that prince being frequent, and his weakness of constitution such, that each relapse threatened to be fatal. King William, a prince able and enlightened, could not be blind to the commotion which this great event would produce in Europe. He knew, of consequence, the necessity of taking just measures, and timely ones, in order to prevent the renewal of a general war. His ambassador affirmed that this prince

wished to merit the friendship of the king; and being himself in possession of his master's confidence, there was ground to believe that he had been destined to this important mission in preference to an Englishman whose fidelity might have been less tried, and more liable to suspicion.

These circumstances, joined to the sincere desire of maintaining the peace, determined the king to propose to the king of England, a PARTITION of the SPANISH MONARCHY, nearly in the spirit of that which his majesty had made with the emperor Leopold in the year 1668.

The Prince of Orange, become king of England under the name of William III. had been the oracle of the league formed against France during the last war. He disposed with sovereign power all the resolutions of the republic of Holland, and although thwarted in England, to which country he had been invited and received ten years before as the deliverer of the nation, he might be certain that he would not be opposed in the measures he might take to maintain the peace, the power of making which, as well as of declaring war, is included in the prerogative of the kings of England, notwithstanding the limits which the laws of the country prescribe to the royal authority.

The two ministers whom the king ordered to confer with the earl of Portland, had it in charge to propose a treaty between his majesty and the king of Great Britain, to regulate the partition of the monarchy of Spain, upon the model of the eventual treaty made between the king and the emperor, in 1668. As he was ignorant of the intentions of the king his master, re-

lative to a proposition entirely new to him, and of such importance, he desired time to dispatch a messenger, and to receive orders from his court; persuaded, however, that his sovereign would receive the project confided to him by his majesty as a certain proof of the desire which the king had already testified of preserving the peace inviolate.

It was then the month of March, 1698. The count de Tallard, since marechal and peer of France, whom the king had named ambassador extraordinary to the king of England, departed for London, apprized of the proposition made to the earl of Portland, and charged to inform his majesty of the answer of the king of Great Britain.—Vol. i. p. 252-8.

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## SECT. II.

LETTERS FROM KING WILLIAM TO PENSIONARY  
HEINSIUS.

*Kensington, January 3, 1698, N. S.*

SINCE my last I have received your letters of 27th and 31st December. What the French ambassadors have said to you, that something must be done by the Republic, France and me, towards maintaining the peace, surprizes me much: and I am of opinion, with you, that it relates to the guarantee between the emperor, the empire and us. The earl of Portland will readily be able to get to the bottom of this affair in France; and this is a further reason for hastening his departure as much as possible.

WILLIAM R.

*Windsor, March 18, 1698.*

I SEND you herewith a letter I received yesterday evening, by a courier, from the earl of Portland; you will judge of the great importance of the affair. I have writ to him to keep this important negotiation on foot, and to try to bring the French to particulars, that one may then be the better able to judge what is possible to be done in this business. I beg you will write your sentiments on this important affair to the earl of Portland, by a courier, that it may be done with secrecy, for you know of what consequence it is. You will recollect the discourse we had on this subject at Loo, and I believe also at the Hague. It will be necessary you should write rather amply to the earl of Portland, and send me a copy of the letter for my information, and also return his to me, for you see I have not a copy of it.

WILLIAM R.

#### INCLOSURE.

HIER Messrs. de Pomponne & de Torcy me vinrent voir, et me dirent, que c'étoit par ordre du Roi Tres-Chrétien pour me dire qu'il vouloit bien se servir de moi dans une chose de la plus grande importance, et qui demandoit le plus grand secret: qu'il me temoignoit avoir une entiere confiance en moi. Après que j'avois répondu comme je devois, Mons. de Pomponne dit que comme les sentimens du Roi son maître étoient sincères pour le maintien de la paix, et que l'on étoit entierement persuadé que ceux de V. M. étoient de même, il falloit songer à ce qui en pourroit causer l'interruption, pour s'entendre à la prévenir; que la mort du Roi d'Es-



pagne, qui pourroit survenir inopinément, et laquelle rameneroit les mêmes troubles, dont nous venions de sortir, étoit de cette nature que le Roi T. Chr. souhaitoit d'entrer avec V. M. dans les liaisons qui pourroient prévenir de si grands maux ; que l'Espagne tombant entre les mains de l'empereur il se pourroit rendre maître de toute l'Italie, et si absolu dans l'empire que nous avons tout lieu de craindre sa trop grande force ; que pour cet effet le Roi T. Chr. souhaitoit d'entrer en concert avec V. M. touchant la dite succession, & souhaitoit de savoir si elle inclinoit, et quelles conditions & sûretés elle voudroit pour entrer. Je lui repondis que j'étois surpris de la proposition qu'il me faisoit, quoique je ne pouvois pas manquer de considérer la mort du Roi d'Espagne comme une chose que nous rejettoit indubitablement dans la guerre. Que cependant l'on regardoit cela comme un mal inévitable, et que l'on espéroit seulement que cela n'arriveroit pas sitôt ; que je voyois l'intérêt de l'Angleterre et de la Hollande de s'opposer à un accommodement, tant à l'égard de la force de mer, que du commerce par tout le monde ; que je ne voyois pas comment il étoit possible que V. M. peut faire aucune réponse, qu'en général, sur une telle proposition, à moins que l'on ne me dit les sentimens du Roi T. Chr. à l'égard des particularités de ce qu'il vouloit proposer. Il me répondit qu'il ne pouvoit pas entrer dans des particularités, tant que l'on ne savoit pas vos sentimens en général, et qu'alors même il falloit savoir d'elle ce qu'elle jugeroit convenable pour l'intérêt & la sûreté des deux nations. Je dis que j'étois sur quand j'écrivois à V. M. dans les termes généraux dans lesquels il me parloit, que je ne pouvois attendre tout au mieux d'autre réponse, sinon qu'elle vouloit bien écou-

ter ce qu'on lui proposoit. Et comme je vis enfin que je ne pouvois pas en tirer davantage, je lui dis comme par discours mes sentimens particuliers, et tout ce que je croirois qui pourroit être contre notre intérêt; ce que je ne répéterai pas pour éviter la longueur de ma lettre. A quoi il me répondit que pour ce qui étoit des Pais-bas, l'on en conviendroit aisément, de maniere que l'on en seroit satisfait comme V. M. le souhaiteroit; que pour l'Espagne même, l'on donneroit des sûretés suffisantes qu'elle ne viendroit jamais sous la domination d'un même Roi avec la France; mais pour les Indes, ni la sûreté du commerce de la Méditerranée, sur lesquelles deux choses je touchai beaucoup, il ne me répondit rien, demandant seulement que je voulusse rendre compte à V. M. de ce qu'il m'avoit proposé, et déclaré des sentimens du Roi son maître et d'être informé des vôtres, Sire. Je n'ai pas voulu dire rien qui pouvoit aucunement faire juger que ce fussent les intentions de V. M. particulièrement quand on ne sauroit que si peu ou point. C'est pourquoi j'attendrai pour savoir la volonté de V. M. sur la chose même, et la conduite qu'elle veut que je tienne; et cependant si j'en ai l'occasion, je parlerai encore en discours à Mons. de Pomponne pour l'engager à lui faire découvrir ses sentimens un peu plus. Je supplie V. M. de pardonner les fautes de ma lettre, qui n'est pas d'une nature à la faire voir à ame qui vive de mes gens, et que j'ai à peine le tems de relire, bien moins d'en tirer les minutes, parceque M. le Dauphin m'a envoyé chercher pour aller toute presentement à la chasse avec lui, ce que je n'ai pas voulu excuser, ni ne puis remettre plus tard. Je m'en vais monter en carrosse pour aller à Meudon. Le comte de Tallard part aujourd'hui: je crois que l'on a attendu exprès si long-

tems à me parler de ceci, pour se pouvoir servir de lui dans cette affaire, en cas que l'on ne se trouve pas satisfait de moi; quoique la roideur que j'ai marqué sur toutes les difficultés que l'on m'a faites, soit approuvée de tout le monde à la cour, et que l'on rejette toute la faute sur les introducteurs que M. même traite d'ignorans et d'impertinens, l'on juge peut-être de moi, que je ne me laisserai pas mener dans les choses où mon peu de tems me peut faire voir, que je ne trouverai pas le service de V. M. ni l'intérêts des deux nations. Je la supplie de croire que je suis toujours à elle avec le même zèle et respect,

PORTLAND.

*Paris, le 15 Mars, 1698.*

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM KING WILLIAM TO  
PENSIONARY HEINSIUS.

*Kensington, April 11, 1698.*

COUNT Tallard has had a private audience of me to-day, and made the same propositions Pomponne and Torcy have done to the earl of Portland.

W. R.

The above documents decide, beyond all controversy, a question once regarded as extremely problematic, viz. whether the project of the celebrated treaty of partition originated with the king of France or the king of Great Britain? Before king William left London, July 1698, he imparted to lord Somers, and so far as appears, to him alone, and in very general terms, that some such design was in agitation. On the king's arrival at Loo, accompanied by M. Tallard, the negotiation advanced

rapidly to maturity; and in the month of August the king wrote, with his own hand, a letter to lord Somers, acquainting him with the particulars provisionally agreed upon, and desiring his opinion and advice upon this momentous subject. To which lord Somers returned an answer which involved him in the greatest difficulty, and exposed him to the heaviest censure he ever experienced,

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### S E C T. III.

KING WILLIAM TO LORD SOMERS, AND LORD SOMERS'S  
REPLY.

*Loe, August 15-25, 1698.*

I IMPARTED to you, before I left England, that in France there was expressed to my lord Portland some inclination to come to an agreement with us concerning the succession of the king of Spain, since which count Tallard has mentioned it to me, and has made such propositions: the particulars of which my lord Portland will write to Vernon, to whom I have given orders not to communicate them to any other besides yourself, and to leave to your judgment to whom else you would think proper to impart them, to the end that I might know your opinion upon so important an affair, and which requires the greatest secrecy. *If it be fit this negotiation should be carried on*, there is no time to be lost, and you will send me the full powers under the great seal, with the names *in blank* to treat with count Tallard. I believe this may be done so secretly that none but you and Vernon, and those to whom you shall

have communicated it, may have knowledge of it; so that the clerks who are to write the warrant, and the full powers, may not know what it is. According to all intelligence the king of Spain cannot outlive the month of October, and the least accident may carry him off every day. I received yesterday your letter of the 9th. Since my lord Wharton cannot at this time leave England, I must think of some other to send ambassador to Spain. If you can think of any one proper, let me know it, and be always assured of my friendship.

WILLIAM R.

LORD SOMERS TO KING WILLIAM.

*Tunbridge Wells, 28th Aug. 1692, O. S.*

SIR,

HAVING your majesty's permission to try if the waters would contribute to the re-establishment of my health, I was just got to this place when I had the honour of your commands. I thought the best way of executing them would be to communicate to my lord Orford, Mr. Montague, and the duke of Shrewsbury, (who before I left London had agreed upon a meeting about that time) the subject of my lord Portland's letter; at the same time letting them know how strictly your majesty required that it should remain an absolute secret. Since that time Mr. Montague and Mr. Secretary are come down hither, and upon the whole discourse, three things have principally occurred to be humbly suggested to your majesty:

*First,* That the entertaining a proposal of this nature seems to be attended with very many ill consequences if the French did not act a sincere part; but we were soon

at ease as to any apprehension of this sort, being fully assured your majesty would not act but with the utmost nicety in an affair wherein the glory and safety of Europe were so highly concerned:

The *Second* thing considered was the very ill prospect of what was like to happen upon the death of the king of Spain, in case nothing was done previously towards the providing against that accident, which seemed probably to be very near. The king of France having so great a force in such a readiness, that he was in condition to take possession of Spain before any other prince could be able to make a stand. Your majesty is the best judge whether this be the case who are so perfectly informed of the circumstances of parts abroad. But so far as relates to England, it would be want of duty not to give your majesty this clear account, that there is a deadness and want of spirit in the nation universally, so as not at all to be disposed to the thought of entering into a new war, and that they seem to be tired out with taxes to a degree beyond what was discerned till it appeared upon occasion of the late elections. This is the truth of the fact, upon which your majesty will determine what resolutions are proper to be taken.

That which remained was the consideration what would be the condition of Europe if the proposal took place. Of this we thought ourselves little capable of judging. But it *seemed* that if Sicily was in the French hands they will be entirely masters of the Levant trade; that if they were possessed of Final, and those other sea-ports on that side, whereby Milan would be entirely shut out from relief by sea, or any other commerce, that dutchy would be of little signification in the hands of any prince. And that if the king of France had poss-



cession of that part of Guipuscoa, which is mentioned in the proposal, besides the ports he would have in the ocean, it does seem he would have as easy a way of invading Spain on that side as he now has on the side of Catalonia.

But it is not to be hoped that France will quit its pretences to so great a succession without considerable advantages; and we are all assured your majesty will reduce the terms as low as can be done, and make them, as far as is possible in the present circumstances of things, such as may be some foundation for the future quiet of Christendom; which all your subjects cannot but be convinced is your true aim. If it could be brought to pass that England might be some way a gainer by this transaction, whether it was by the elector of Bavaria, who is the gainer by your majesty's interposition in this treaty, his coming to an agreement to let us into some trade to the Spanish plantations, or in any other manner, it would wonderfully endear your majesty to your English subjects.

It does not appear, in case this negotiation should proceed, what is to be done on your part in order to make it take place. Whether any more be required than that the English and Dutch should sit still, and France itself to see it executed. If that be so, what security ought we to expect that if, by our being neuter, the French be successful, they will *confine* themselves to the terms of the treaty, and not attempt to make farther advantages of their success?

I humbly beg your majesty's pardon that these thoughts are so ill put together. These waters are known to discompose and disturb the head, so as almost totally to disable one from writing. I should be extremely

troubled if my absence from London has delayed the dispatch of the commission one day. You will be pleased to observe that two persons, as the commission is drawn, must be named in it, but the powers may be executed by either of them. I suppose your majesty will not think it proper to name commissioners that are not English, or naturalized, in an affair of this nature.

I pray God give your majesty honour and success in all your undertakings. I am, with the utmost duty and respect,

Sir,

Your Majesty's

Most dutiful, and most

Obedient Subject and Servant,

SOMERS.

P. S. The commission is wrote by Mr. Secretary, and I have had it sealed in such a manner that no creature has the least knowledge of the thing besides the persons named.

END OF VOL. I.

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APPENDIX.

VOL. II.

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# APPENDIX

TO THE

SECOND VOLUME

OF

BELSHAM'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND:

CONTAINING

STATE PAPERS AND AUTHORITIES.

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VICTORY OF LA HOGUE, A. D. 1692.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL RUSSEL TO THE EARL OF NOTTINGHAM.

*Cape Barfleur S. W. distance 7 leagues, May 20, 1692.*

“ YESTERDAY about 3 in the morning, Cape Barfleur bearing S. W. and S. distance seven leagues, my scouts made the signal for seeing the enemy. The wind westerly, the French bore down upon me, and at eleven engaged me, but at some distance. We continued fighting till half an hour past five in the evening, at which time the enemy towed away with all their boats, and we after them. It was calm all day. About six there was an engagement to the westward of me, which I supposed to be the blue. It continued calm all night. I can give no particular account of things but that the French were beaten, and I am now steering away for Conquet Road, having a fresh gale easterly, but extremely foggy. I suppose that is the place they design for. If it please God to send us a little clear weather, I doubt not we shall beat their whole fleet. I saw in the night three or four ships blow up, but I know not what they were. So soon as I am able to give a more particular relation, I will not be wanting.”

Subsequent accounts affirm that five French ships of the line were lost by the engagement, including M. Gabaret's, admiral of the blue squadron, of ninety guns. No ship struck her colours, but they appear to have been evacuated by the enemy, and destroyed during the night. Very glorious supplements to the account of Admiral Russel were furnished by the vice admirals De-laval and Rooke: the first of whom burnt, off Cherburg, the *Soleil Royal*, M. Tourville's own ship, with the *Admirable* of 100 guns, and the *Conquerant* of 80, with three smaller vessels—"Greater zeal and greater bravery," says this gallant commander in his official dispatch, "I never saw." Admiral Rooke met with still more splendid success, burning and destroying no less than thirteen of the enemy's great ships, stranded at La Hogue, by extraordinary exertions of naval skill and valor; besides store-ships and transports. Mr. Rooke in person commanded the boats, being, as was observed of him on this occasion, "not only first in command but first also in danger." And the chief glory of this ever-memorable action, which has rendered the name of La Hogue famous in naval history, the concurring voice of posterity has justly awarded to admiral sir George Rooke; that officer receiving from the king the well-earned reward of a knighthood and a pension for this great service.



NEGOTIATIONS  
RELATIVE TO THE  
SECOND TREATY OF PARTITION.

*A. D.* 1700.

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THE first treaty of partition between Great Britain, France, and Holland—conformably to which Spain and the Indies, with the Low Countries, were allotted to the electoral prince of Bavaria, and the kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, were annexed to the monarchy of France, was signed at Loo, October 11, 1698. But the king of Spain, previously apprized of the negotiations carried on by the kings of France and England, and in the highest degree offended at the presumption of these foreign potentates, had made a will in the preceding month of June, by which he appointed the prince of Bavaria sole heir of his vast dominions.

In this disposition it is probable, notwithstanding the existing treaty, that the contending powers of Austria and France might have ultimately, however reluctantly, acquiesced; but unfortunately, the prince, an infant of seven years of age, died in the month of February 1699. A second treaty was then set on foot and concluded March 13th, 1700, by the former high contracting parties, agreeably to which Spain and the Indies, with the Low Countries and Sardinia, were consigned to the archduke Charles, second son of the emperor, and the Sicilies, &c. ceded in full right to the dauphin. But in the month of June in the same year, his catholic ma-

jesty, highly indignant at this new insult, signed a second will in favor of the archduke, constituting him his universal heir. This will was transmitted to Vienna, and it immediately determined the emperor to resist the solicitations of France and the maritime powers to accede to the treaty of partition. On the 30th July 1700, count Harrach, in the name of his imperial majesty, informed M. de Villars, "that the emperor, considering the king of Spain to be in good health, and of such an age that he might very well, with the blessing of God, hope for issue of his own, did not think it becoming, especially for him that was his uncle, to make a division of his succession. That he hoped this answer would not interrupt the good intelligence between himself and his most christian majesty, and that he would not proceed to the nomination of a third, which would but embroil matters the more. That when the succession happened to fail, he, the emperor, thought it justly belonged to him, and that after the extinction of the male line of the house of Austria it belonged to the house of Savoy." A similar declaration was made to Mr. Sutton and Mr. Hope, the English and Dutch ministers at the court of Vienna.

Notwithstanding the settlement, which the partiality of the king of Spain to the house of Austria had thus induced him to make, the views of the nation at large, and of the leading persons concerned in the administration of affairs, were manifestly fixed upon the duke of Anjou, second son of the dauphin, as successor to the reigning monarch. Various causes concurred to produce this unexpected and extraordinary preference. The chief of these was the dread, approaching to horror, universally entertained by the Spaniards of all ranks,

from the grandee to the peasant, of a dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy, and the opinion almost as universally prevalent that the power of France alone could avert this fatal catastrophe\*. A second cause was the apprehension that the catholic religion would be endangered should the archduke be compelled to solicit the protection of the heretical powers of England and Holland. The third cause of the rising ascendancy of the French interest originated in the secret intrigues, bribes, promises, and caresses of the marquis de Harcourt, the ambassador of France at Madrid, a negotiator of the most consummate art and address.

In the result a third will was made, and signed October 2, 1700, by which the king of Spain constituted the duke of Anjou his sole and universal heir: and on the 1st November following that monarch breathed his last. No sooner was this interesting intelligence announced at the court of Versailles than a grand council was held, and a resolution finally taken to accept the will in derogation of the treaty of partition actually existing between the most christian king and the maritime powers. The grounds on which France rested her vindication of

\* “ Le marquis de Balbasez de la maison de Spinola, conseiller d'état, parla le premier (A. D. 1698) au marquis d'Harcourt. Peu à peu d'autres grands officiers principaux virent Harcourt, & chacun d'eux fit quelque confiance pour succéder au Roi leur maître, espérant qu'il maintiendrait la monarchie d'Espagne en son entier, sans souffrir le moindre démembrement des états dont elle étoit composée. Elle étoit alors incapable de les conserver & de se défendre par elle-même épuisée d'argent, dénuée de troupes & de vaisseaux; c'étoit un corps sans ame que la France devoit animer & soutenir à ses dépens dans l'ancien & le nouveau monde.”—*Mémoires de M. de Torcy*, vol. i. p. 20--22.

## APPENDIX.

this flagrant violation of public faith are thus related in a letter from the earl of Manchester, ambassador at Paris, to lord Jersey, secretary of state :

*Paris, November 12th, 1700.*

THIS morning I was with M. de Torcy, who began with saying, that he did not doubt but I was sensible that, since they had an account of the king of Spain's death, and the disposition he had made by his will, great difficulties must have arisen ; that the king had well considered the occasion and the intent of the late treaty with England, &c. which was to prevent a war in Europe ; that the emperor not having signed, and the duke of Savoy actually refusing to accept of Naples and Sicily\* ; that there having appeared discontent both in England and Holland against the French being masters of those two kingdoms in relation to the trade of the Levant, besides that none of the princes that the treaty had been communicated to had promised more than a neutrality, the king could not but think there was a necessity of accepting what the king of Spain declared in favour of the duke of Anjou. Then he read me the motives which he had drawn up, that I might the better

\* The duke of Savoy being by the will of Philip IV. declared next in succession to the house of Austria, refused to accede to the treaty of partition without an indemnification for his eventual claim to the crown of Spain. As it was of the last importance to secure the assent of this prince, several expedients were proposed for this purpose. And at length the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily were offered him in lieu of Savoy and Piedmont, to be thenceforth united to the monarchy of France. But this splendid temptation was rejected, the duke insisting upon the cession of the dutchy of Milan in addition to the dominions he already possessed.

inform his majesty. I desired he would let me take the copy which I send your lordships, and most that passed is contained in it. You may easily imagine I had little to say when he told me the resolution the king had taken. It is certain the proceedings of the emperor have put them in some measure on this necessity. For M. de Torey observed to me, that if the king had refused, the archduke had then a double title, viz. that of Philip IV. and that of the late king's will: and he could not tell but the Spanish ambassador had orders to send word to Vienna—that the moment the emperor consented to the treaty, the duke of Savoy had a good title, and his humour is so well known that we are sure he would not slip such an opportunity; and then there must have been a war not likely to be soon ended whatever the success would be; that whole kingdoms must be conquered, the Spaniards being entirely against dividing their monarchy; that the ships we and Holland were to furnish, fifteen, that is to say, would not be sufficient for such a war; that it was very doubtful whether England and Holland would engage themselves in a greater expence, which must necessarily be the consequence; that it was certain that the treaty was more advantageous to France, and was what the king could have wished. He then ended, saying that the king hoped that the strength of these reasons would so far prevail with the king our master, that there might still be the same good understanding as ever, which was so necessary for the good and quiet of Europe. I made no other answer than that I would faithfully acquaint the king with what he had said to me by order.—I cannot tell what resolution the king will take, and I am far from giving my opinion;

though if your Lordship will permit me, I cannot see but we must acquiesce. You are sensible of the posture of our affairs and of the discontent there was in England against the treaty: insomuch that my lord Portland and all that were concerned in it, were the next session to be sacrificed if possible.



## NEGOTIATION

OF

## M. DE VILLARS AT VIENNA.

*A. D.* 1700.

THE king of France wrote to M. de Villars that he had at last agreed with Great Britain (March 1700) upon a treaty of partition with regard to the Spanish succession, and that the States General were to join in it. The court of Madrid was at this time in a great ferment: and their ambassador at Vienna, who concealed nothing from M. Villars, declared often to him that the Spaniards were now not so desirous of any thing as to be governed by a grandson of France; that they perhaps would have wished rather for the archduke, but that as they were sensible the empire was not able to support them, the report of a partition of their empire was an inexpressible grief to the whole kingdom. Count Kaunitz and count Harrach being come to Vienna, appointed M. de Villars a meeting, and read two memorials to him. The first was filled with the emperor's complaints, that in the life-time of his catholic majesty a treaty of partition had been made of the Spanish monarchy in opposition to the regard which ought to have been shewn so august a king, and the venerable heirs of so great a monarchy; that neither equality nor decency had been observed in the treaty; since if the emperor did not agree to the treaty in three months, he who was next

heir should not have any part of this monarchy when the succession should be vacant; that moreover it was but just for the emperor to concert with the king, *i. e.* of France, on these matters, but that he would not take one step till the courier he had sent to Spain was returned; religion, honesty, and decency, requiring that he should first know what the king of Spain thought with regard to this partition of his dominions. The second memorial stated that the emperor was greatly surprized that his most christian majesty would treat of the Spanish succession with foreign powers, though they had no right to any share of this monarchy, of which the king and the emperor were the only heirs. It declared, secondly, that a union being entirely settled between those two princes, who only were concerned in the succession, the emperor did not desire any thing so much as to correspond directly with his majesty without the participation of the mediators who had merely set themselves up as such. "Is not the court of France," said the German ministers in the ensuing conference, "sensible that the cause of God, as well as the interest of our masters, call upon them to unite? Though the king of Spain is in so very ill a state of health, there is yet room to hope that he will outlive king William: and should this happen, the king will have the glory to restore the king of Great Britain to his dominions, and establish the catholic religion in them." June 16th, the marquis de Villars received a letter from the king, declaring expressly that it was his majesty's opinion the emperor did not act sincerely with him: that the proposals of treating directly were owing to a secret design of making the king averse to the measures taken by him

with Great Britain and Holland rather than to a sincere desire of sharing the Spanish monarchy with the king; that the emperor's design was to make an advantage of the resolution which he supposed was taken by the king of Spain, viz. to declare the archduke his universal heir; and that he endeavoured to draw over the duke of Savoy, whose troops he wanted to facilitate the execution of this design. The delays made by the imperial ministers, who always refused to come to an explanation, increased also the suspicions of his most christian majesty, and enforced the resolution he had made to adhere to the treaty of partition. The houses of France and Austria had been irreconcilable enemies for many ages. Though the war was concluded, it had not put an end to suspicions, and those reciprocal disquietudes prevented the real union which nevertheless, in the opinion of M. de Villars, was more sincerely desired by the emperor than the French imagined. His majesty informed M. de Villars of another great piece of news, viz. that all the counsellors of state but one in Madrid had declared their opinion that it would be proper to invite one of the king's grandsons to succeed the king of Spain; they looking upon this as the only expedient to prevent the division of their monarchy.

The duke de Mole's, ambassador from Spain, arrived at Vienna the 10th of July, and was immediately admitted to audience by the emperor. He brought with him the order of the golden fleece for the younger prince de Vaudemont; also, as was said, the will made by his catholic majesty in favour of the archduke. The imperial court determined to spend the month of August at Neustadt. It was now believed that the emperor

would not sign the treaty of partition. The three months allowed him to declare himself, expired the 18th August, so that but a few days were left for him to come to a final resolution.

On the 18th count Harrach gave M. de Villars the emperor's answer, declaring "that his imperial majesty seeing the king of Spain not in danger, notwithstanding the report which prevailed, being moreover his uncle and nearest heir, he should think it the greatest breach of good manners, if, during the life-time of that prince, and whilst he was still capable of having children, he should join in a treaty of partition of his dominions; that he hoped the king would not take this resolution amiss; that nevertheless in case the succession should be vacant, he would gladly agree to any expedient which might contribute to their still maintaining the good understanding, which he always desired to preserve with his majesty: that with respect to the nomination of a third prince, it was his opinion this was not feasible, and that the king would not desire it, since no one could pretend to dispose of the king of Spain's dominions in his life-time. Nevertheless, that in case a third person should be fixed upon before his death, they were resolved and prepared to prevent his taking possession. Such was the emperor's answer. Count Harrach added, that the menace of bestowing the monarchy upon one single prince was the most astonishing thing in the world; that the liberty of giving away monarchies would be setting a dreadful example, and that this mysterious third prince must certainly be the duke of Savoy. However, M. de Villars fancied he saw very plain that the imperial ministers were under

no apprehensions from the duke. A courier arrived at this time from count Harrach at Madrid, whose letters confirmed the report which had lately prevailed of his catholic majesty's recovery. They also declared that the king and queen of Spain had brought over most of the counsellors of state to their opinion; the said counsellors having before been desirous, as was observed above, of offering the Spanish monarchy to one of the dauphin's sons. These several advices confirmed the emperor in his resolution not to enter into the treaty of partition. He had indeed a great number of troops, but the affairs of his treasury were in the utmost confusion, and the weakness of Spain might be compared to the ill health of its monarch. Cardinal Portocarrero; archbishop of Toledo, had prevailed upon most of the grandees, ministers, and counsellors of state, not to suffer a division of the monarchy of Spain. Every one of them in particular offered to give up the income of his employment, and to tax his whole estate, in order to effect so glorious as well as advantageous a design. In the mean time a courier from count Harrach, who left Madrid the 1st of October, brought word that there were little hopes that the king of Spain could survive much longer.

It is certain that the court of Vienna, surprized at first by the news, did not know how to determine. Their abhorrence of the treaty of partition seemed as if it would ultimately have yielded to the necessity of their submitting to it. Scarce a day passed but couriers arrived from Madrid, some of whom confirmed the probability of his catholic majesty's approaching exit, whilst others seemed to hope he might live a little



longer. The court of Vienna began again to flatter themselves with the hopes of some more favourable juncture hereafter. The birth of an archduke revived their courage, and they no longer doubted of what was called "the miracle of the house of Austria;" that is, of meeting again with unforeseen resources in the various dangers to which it was exposed.

The 18th November 1700, marquis de Villars received a letter from the king, which informed him of the king of Spain's death. The like advice was brought to the emperor by a courier dispatched from count Zinzendorf. The 18th a council was held for above four hours at the emperor's palace; the day after moneys were given out for remounting and recruiting all the forces. In this council the emperor delivered himself with such a spirit and fire, as was not usually seen in him, charging his ministers with an irresolution of which he himself was more guilty than those he blamed.

The day after news was brought that his catholic majesty had made a will in favour of the duke of Anjou, whom he had appointed his universal heir. M. de Villars was informed, at the same time, that the king had acquainted Great Britain and the United Provinces with his having accepted of the donation; and was ordered to acquaint the court of Vienna, that the duke of Anjou had already been treated as king of Spain, and in consequence thereof would set out the 1st of December to take possession of his kingdom.

Immediately a resolution was taken at Vienna to send 30,000 of the best troops into Italy. Count Wrattislau was then nominated to go for England. He was the ablest minister in the imperial court for carrying on



great negotiations. M. de Villars soon after received a letter from the king, which informed him that prince de Vaudemont, governor of the Milanese, had already prevailed with the inhabitants of it, to recognise the new king; that the governors of the Low Countries had done the same, and therefore that it was probable all the rest of the monarchy would pay the same deference to the last will of the king of Spain. This news dejected the court of Vienna very much, and the generals, who ever since advice had been brought of the treaty of partition, were of opinion that it would be proper to send an army into Italy, declared, with a great shew of reason, that in case the ministers of his late catholic majesty, who had determined him to deprive the princes of his house of the entire succession, had seen part of the monarchy in the emperor's hands, they perhaps would not have been pleased to give the rest to France; but prince Eugene was never consulted. The artifice by which M. de Villars had prevented the emperor from possessing himself of the Milanese when the king of Spain would have admitted his troops into it, had determined the Spanish ministers, who were most afraid of the monarchy's being divided, to bequeath the whole to one of the king's grandsons. The final resolution of the emperor depended on the succour he was to expect from the maritime powers, and the princes of the empire, the most powerful of whom, as the electors of Brandenburg and Hanover, would engage in his quarrel. The imperial court had already nominated prince Eugene as commander in chief of the army destined for Italy. When the emperor heard that the prince of Vaudemont, governor of the Milanese, had submitted to the regency

of Spain with the viceroys of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, and that every country in the different parts of Europe, subordinate to that monarchy, recognised the will, he resolved to prepare in a solid manner for war ; a destructive war that shook the two great houses of France and Austria, and which might have proved of the most fatal consequence to one of them.

*Memoirs of M. de Villars.*

## STATE OF POLITICS.

*A. D. 1701.*

THE power of France having been predominant for more than half a century since the famous battle of Rocroy, the terror of Europe was excited in a very extraordinary degree by the accession of a prince of the house of Bourbon to the crown of Spain, and it was not sufficiently adverted to that the ties of kindred are a very feeble bond of connection when set in competition with the opposing views and interests of monarchs and kingdoms. England and Holland seemed to consider Louis XIV. as the sovereign of both countries, and the Dutch nation, conceiving Flanders and Brabant as already subjected, beheld in imagination the armies of France once more preparing to invade and overwhelm them. The French monarch, aware of the strength of these apprehensions on this head, discovered an extreme solicitude to dissipate their fears; and it is evident from the tenor of his dispatches at this period to M. Briord, his minister at the Hague, that he was far from entertaining any designs inimical to the liberties of Europe in general, or to those of Holland in particular. He appeared satiated with the glory he had acquired in the course of a long and triumphant reign, and desirous only to spend the remnant of his days in peace.

“The resident of Sweden\*,” says this monarch in his letter to M. Briord of December 11th, 1700, “has gi-

\* M. Palmquist, resident at Paris.

ven me to understand that M. Lillieroot\* has signified to him that the States General are aware of all the mischievous consequences to be apprehended from a new war—that they shall never think of rushing into one till they are convinced I shall take advantage of the new union between my crown and that of Spain to introduce my troops into the Flemish towns; and that their fear of such an event is in truth strong enough to prompt them to the most desperate measures, I have already observed to you. Hence I think it for the good of my service to re-assure the Hollanders on that head; you are therefore on all occasions to enforce the sincerity of my intentions to preserve the peace; in order to convince them that having desired to preserve it with the late king of Spain, it was not to be supposed for the future I would break it for the sake of making conquests in the dominions of the king my grandson—that they may depend upon it my forces shall never enter into them, unless he should be obliged to demand my assistance to repel the enterprizes of his neighbours.”

And in a subsequent dispatch, dated Dec. 15, this monarch declares his firm persuasion that the States would not rush on a measure so contrary to their interests in case they were convinced he had no other intention than to maintain the peace: and that the orders he had given, and was then giving, would dissipate their fears. “I would have you then”, continues he, “take every opportunity to re-assure them on this head; and in particular to let the pensionary know that I have not the least design on any of the places belonging to Spain.

\* The Swedish minister at the Hague.

You may assure him I do not seek for any pretence to introduce my troops into those places. I will even enter into any reasonable engagements which the States General can demand on that head, provided they will at the same time withdraw their troops which at present are of no use there."

His most christian majesty then notices the orders issued by the emperor for the march of an army of 30,000 men into Italy, and he instructs M. Briord to inform himself with exactness of the desigus and engagements of the Hollanders, of which he expresses a strong secret jealousy. "I observe," says he, "by the account you give me, that the alacrity which appears at present in the negotiations carrying on with the princes of the empire differs widely from the dilatoriness of the pensionary when negotiating with the same princes to bring them into the partition treaty."

In a third letter, Dec. 24, he observes, "it is certain that as to England the greatest part of the nation dread a war. Hence they are led to prefer the measure of the will to that of the partition treaty; consequently the king of Great Britain will find great opposition in his parliament in case he is disposed to carry things to a rupture, as well because he can neither shew the necessity of it, nor answer for the event, unless furnished with a sufficient cause for undertaking it. But it would be giving him a pretext specious enough to inflame the spirits of the English, and smoothing the way to all his desigus, if we should oblige the Hollanders by force to abandon the Spanish towns. I am therefore convinced that force must be deferred as long as possible, and that nevertheless all other means must be used to dislodge the

Hollanders, and to leave the Spaniards in the sole possession of their own towns. M. Lillieroot's proposal affords a natural opening for a proposition to the States to that effect. As I have no intention to revive the war, and as, on the contrary, I have no aversion to the alliance proposed by that minister for the maintenance of the peace, I have already caused M. Palmquist to be informed that if the king of England and the States General are in a disposition to open a treaty for that end against all such as would trouble it, I shall enter into it with pleasure."

The Swedish proposal here referred to was communicated by the earl of Manchester to Mr. secretary Vernon, Dec. 29th; but it was received at the court of London with great coldness, or rather contempt: and Mr. Vernon, in his answer, declares, that the king does not know upon what grounds this project is proposed by M. Lillieroot, but supposes it arises from him or M. Palmquist without any directions from the king of Sweden, and he approves of the intimation given by the ambassador to M. de Torey, that the removal of the Dutch troops in garrison would not be assented to.

Jealousies thus running high on both sides, matters were soon brought to a crisis. For though both England and Holland came at length to the resolution of opening conferences with the most christian king, so little credit was given by that monarch to the sincerity of these late and reluctant advances, that on the very day that the earl of Manchester presented his memorial to the French court, the Dutch garrisons, by a previous order of the king of France, were superseded in the command of all the barrier towns from Luxemburg to



Ostend and Nieupoort, by the unexpected introduction of French troops, February 6, 1701, (N. S.) And in vindication of this bold and decisive measure, the Spanish resident at the Hague, don Bernard de Quiros, delivered on the following day a memorial to the States, in which he enlarged upon the sincere and ardent desire manifested by his most christian majesty to maintain the union established by the last treaty of peace; that his majesty was even disposed to enter into new ties of friendship. "It was asked," says the memorialist, "in his name, of your lordships, what assurances you desired for the future, promising to give them to you provided they were just and reasonable—that if your lordships feared that he would introduce his troops in the Spanish places, he engaged himself never to let them enter into them: and that he would be contented that the care of them should be entrusted with the Spanish troops, who alone have a right to keep them for the king my master, who at the same time gave notice to your lordships of his accession to the crown, by a letter which I delivered myself to M. de Lier, then president of the week. Far from answering to the advances made by his most christian majesty, your lordships did not cease to negotiate with foreign courts. In Holland nothing is talked of but preparations for war, of arming ships, and raising money to augment the troops. The officers of those your lordships have in the catholic Low Countries raise actually their recruits, as well in the towns as in the countries belonging to the king my master. In short, all things here seem disposed for war, at the same time that the emperor causes his troops to march as well for Italy as for the Rhine; which he

would in all likelihood not do if he was not assured that your lordships would support his interest by making a diversion in the Low Countries; and asserting the pretensions of the emperor on some of the places of that country.—That his most christian majesty did very well know at first the importance of making the Dutch troops quit those fortresses, but being persuaded that your lordships desired peace, he thought till now that the public good required that he should suspend it. But that at last it was no longer possible to leave those troops in the places of a king whom they did not own. So he found it necessary to write to his electoral highness of Bavaria to let a detachment of his troops march on the 6th of this month into all the principal places; charging very particularly his said electoral highness to order the governors of the places in which these troops are to enter, that the moment they shall enter they are to give notice to the troops of your lordships not to be at all uneasy at it, whilst the French troops enter only as auxiliary troops, and to support those of the king my master, who had every thing to fear from a body of troops, very much superior to his, in the places whereof they will not own him to be the sovereign. These, my lords, are the motives and the reasons which his most christian majesty has had to cause his troops to enter into the places of the king my master, and which I have orders to communicate to you; assuring you, nevertheless, that their majesties are still in the same disposition to entertain the good correspondence and friendship with your lordships, and to enter, for that end, into all just and reasonable expedients as if the troops of France had not entered into the places of the Spanish Netherlands.”

The resolute manner in which the French king had thus taken possession of the barrier fortresses, threw for a time the courts of London and the Hague into a state of great confusion and perplexity. Anterior to that event, the views of the king of England, and still more so of the states, appear to have been on the whole pacific; and a project was in agitation, of which the courts of Versailles and Madrid were not uninformed, to propose to the latter a cession of the Low Countries to the archduke, on which condition it was understood that Philip of Anjou would have been left by them, and the acquiescence of the emperor followed of course in the undisturbed possession of the rest of the Spanish monarchy.

Early in the month of February 1701, M. D'Avaux was sent to the Hague invested with full powers, in conjunction with M. Briord, to enter into new engagements for the preservation of the peace, declaring that the king his master was ready to give all the assurances on this head which could be reasonably demanded of him. But it appeared manifest that no proposition, tending to the dismemberment of the Spanish empire, would be listened to; and the earl of Manchester, in his dispatch of February 15, to Mr. Vernon, in allusion to the recent seizure of the barrier fortresses, says, "When I took notice to M. de Torcy that I thought they would have deferred any thing of this nature till they had seen what success M. D'Avaux might have had, he owned to me that they would have done it had they not had notice that endeavours would be used to procure Flanders for the archduke; and it was necessary to prevent such a proceeding, since the accepting the

will of the late king was in order to keep the whole monarchy entire, and the dividing of any part would never be consented to." The count de Tallard, at an audience of the king of England, repeating verbally the same general assurances of his master's earnest desire to maintain peace and friendship with the maritime powers, which the count D'Avaux had given more formally in his memorial to the States, his Britannic majesty demanded of him if he had nothing *in particular* to propose in relation to the public security; to which he answered in the negative; but added, that if his majesty had any proposal of that nature to make, and thought fit to communicate it to him, he would transfer it to his master; to which the king replied, "that when he had he would direct the secretary of state to communicate it to him." But from the time that the fate of the barrier towns was decided, the king of England appears to have taken his final resolution. From that period the overtures of count Wratislau, the imperial ambassador in London, which since his arrival in December (1700), had been coldly received, or rather repressed, were hearkened to with attention; and king William, clearly convinced that the sword must now ultimately decide, engaged with all that ardor and activity of mind which formed a distinguishing feature of his character, in new schemes and projects of opposition to France; and by his extraordinary exertions during the short but interesting and important term of life which remained to him, and in spite of obstacles apparently insurmountable, he revived with wonderful increase of energy and effect that confederacy which France had found it difficult in the former instance to

resist, and which in the sequel, actuated by the magnanimous spirit originally infused into the nations of Europe by the British monarch, and which he seemed to bequeath to them as a sacred legacy, made the throne of Lous XIV. to tremble under him. The step taken by the king of France, though fatal in its consequences, seemed nevertheless at the time to answer every purpose expected from it. A second memorial was presented to the States General by M. D'Avaux a few days after the first, in which he urged their high mightinesses in very forcible language to explain their real intentions; they are reminded "that the memorials of don B. de Quiros, and even the letter of the king of Spain himself notifying his accession, remain unanswered, and they are adjured not to furnish the least cause to surmise, that under the specious pretence of negotiation, their real purpose was to procrastinate matters till they were in a condition to make war." An immediate and formal recognition of his catholic majesty was the result of this memorial. At the same time an apologetical letter was written by the States to the king of England, alleging the necessity they were under of acknowledging the duke of Anjou *without any condition*, reserving to themselves to stipulate in the negotiation, ready to begin, the necessary conditions to secure the peace of Europe; and representing the danger of a sudden attack, they desire that the succours due to them by treaty may be in readiness, that they may rely on them if occasion required. This letter or memorial was forthwith laid before the house of commons. "As to the first part of it," said the king in the royal message accompanying this communication, "I think it necessary to ask your advice; as to



the latter, to desire your assistance." So spirited an address was returned by the house to this message, that Mr. Vernon, in his dispatch of February 20 (1701), to the earl of Manchester, declares "it has fully answered his majesty's desires. I hope," says the secretary, "it will have that good effect on your side as to produce a fair disposition to treat upon reasonable terms, that a war may be prevented which I see we shall not decline if we are forced into it by necessity."

From this time the king of England assumed a much more firm and elevated tone in treating with France, insisting not only upon the immediate evacuation of the barrier fortresses by the French troops, but on the absolute delivery of the principal of them as cautionary towns into the hands of England and Holland, a proposition which was rejected by the court of Versailles with indignation. Nevertheless the professed object of king William being merely to obtain satisfaction to the emperor, and security to the rest of Europe, he hesitated not to write with his own hand a letter to the king of Spain (April 17), felicitating him on his accession to the throne. But the French monarch could not be so deceived. The king of England had already declared to his parliament, that negotiation seemed to be at an end; and such measures had in consequence been adopted by France, as justly excited the highest degree of alarm in the Dutch nation; and a second letter, dated May 13, was written by the States General to the king of England, expressive of their extreme solicitude and apprehension of the event, critically as they now found themselves situated.

Speaking of the refusal of the count D'Avaux to treat



jointly with the deputies of their high mightinesses and English resident Mr. Stanhope, they say, " We could draw no other conclusion from this procedure but that on the side of France there was a design to end the conferences, and to consent to none of the securities demanded which are so necessary to the preservation of the kingdoms of your majesty and our republic. We are obliged to give your majesty notice of all this. We protest that our interests being the same with those of your majesty in this negotiation, and inseparable one from the other, we shall not suffer them to be divided in any manner. In the meanwhile, sir, we cannot but represent to your majesty the pressing occasion we have to be assisted without loss of time, if we will prevent the ruin we are threatened with, and the apparent danger in which we are. You know to the bottom the state of our affairs, and you can easily judge, if it be possible in the situation in which we are, to resist forces so much superior as those of France are. It is that which makes us desire with so much earnestness the execution of the treaty which received the approbation of the parliament in the year 1678, betwixt king Charles II. of glorious memory, and this state. We repeat now our most earnest instances to have quickly the stipulated succours, and the entire execution of the said treaty. We flatter ourselves that your majesty will make a serious reflection on the condition in which we are, particularly after the positive assurances which you have given us, that the resolutions of the parliament were to interest themselves vigorously in our preservation, and to assist us in the necessity in which we are, by furnishing the

succours we are agreed about. We will tell you, sir, in what condition France puts itself, and your majesty will judge by that if our fear which re-animates our demands be ill-founded. France, not contented with having taken possession of all the places in the Netherlands that remained to Spain, has thrown into them, and causes actually every day formidable forces to march thither. They draw a line from the Scheld, near Antwerp, to the Maese: they are going to begin to draw such a line according to our advices from Antwerp to Ostend: they send a numerous artillery into the places that are nearest to our frontiers: they make with great diligence many magazines in Flanders, in Brabant, in Guelderland, and at Namur, which they fill up with all sorts of ammunition for war and subsistence, besides the great stores for forage which they gather from all parts: they build forts under the cannon of our places: besides they have worked, and work still continually, to draw the princes that are our friends from our interest to make them enter into their alliance, or to engage them to a neutrality at least. In short, by intrigues and divisions in the empire, they make our friends useless, and increase those of France. Thus we are almost surrounded on all sides, except on the side of the sea. See here, sir, without any disguise, the true situation to which we find ourselves reduced, without adding any thing to what is fact. This makes us hope, that as your majesty understands our affairs perfectly well, you will agree with us that at present our condition is worse than it was during the late war, and worse than if we were actually at war; whilst they make forts under the

cannon of our strong places, and lines along our frontiers, without our being able to hinder it, as we might do if we were at war."

The reading of this pathetic representation could not fail to make a powerful impression upon a popular assembly, adverse as the minds of the generality of the members were from motives of policy and of party, to divers of the sentiments contained in it: and a vote immediately and unanimously passed, "That the house would effectually assist his majesty to support his allies in maintaining the *liberty* of Europe, and would immediately provide succours for the States General, according to the treaty of 1677." This was a considerable advance on the part of the commons, though the king well understood what was meant by confining him to the defensive treaty of 1677. But the house of peers went so far as to address the king "to enter into a strict league offensive and defensive with the states for our common preservation, and to invite into it all princes and states who are concerned in the present visible danger arising from the union of France and Spain." Towards the conclusion of the session, the commons, in reply to a speech from the throne, recommending to them the adoption of such measures as were requisite "for the encouragement of our allies, and the perfecting of such alliances as may be most effectual for the common interest, yielding," as the historian Ralph expresses it, "to the current of the times," presented an address to the king, assuring him that upon all occasions the house would be ready to assist his majesty in supporting those alliances his majesty should think fit to make, in conjunction with the emperor and the States

General, for the preservation of the liberties of Europe, the prosperity and peace of England, and for reducing the exorbitant power of France." Early in July (1701), the king arrived in Holland, where on taking his seat in the assembly of the States General, he was addressed by their high mightinesses in a speech overflowing with joy and gratitude. They declared "that they would leave nothing undone for the preservation of their country. The laudable disposition," say they, "of the English nation in our favour, and in favour of the common cause, deserves the most sincere acknowledgments; convinced as we are how much we may rely on their courage and valour, which have attained so high a character in the world. And we are in debt to your majesty for a new obligation in exciting this favourable disposition in your subjects, more especially as it is accompanied with such proofs as the promised succours." The king of Great Britain having now determined on his future measures, Mr. Stanhope was ordered to acquaint M. D'Avaux "that a provision having been made in the partition treaty for the satisfaction of the emperor, he had instructions from his master not to proceed in the conferences unless such satisfaction was given." This communication was made to M. D'Avaux when on a visit at the house of don B. de Quiros, the Spanish minister, whither the English envoy followed him. M. D'Avaux, surprised and somewhat disconcerted, said that was not the place for such a declaration. To which Mr. Stanhope briskly replied, that his orders were to make it wherever he should find him. All this M. D'Avaux reported to his court, "which," to adopt the words of the earl of

Manchester, “ appeared to be extremely incensed both at the matter and manner.” “ I had yesterday,” says his lordship in a letter to Mr. Vernon, July 28, “ a conference with M. de Torcy, and I found him not satisfied with the proceedings at the Hague. He said that M. D’Avaux was sent only to treat with England and Holland, in relation to their securities, and that he had nothing to do with the pretensions of the emperor. It is certain that this court will not consent to any thing concerning the emperor, since that must tend to the dismembering the Spanish monarchy : and I am fully satisfied that whatever the emperor is to have, he must gain it by main force.”

In consequence of the turn things had now taken, M. D’Avaux received his letters of revocation, which he presented to the States July 26, accompanying it with a long memorial, in which the ambassador expressed his hope that their high mightinesses would have avoided the dangerous embarrassments they exposed themselves to in intermixing foreign interests with their own. “ That his most christian majesty was too clear-sighted to be so imposed upon as to expect success from the continuance of the conferences, after the declaration the envoy of England had made in the name of the king his master : that their lordships were informed of the manner in which that declaration had been made ; that the engagements of their lordships with the king of England were too close ; that it was too well known they submitted themselves blindly to his sentiments ; and that they took what measures were most agreeable to him to leave any doubt that they had not already resolved to make the same declaration ; that if he had not the satisfaction



of accomplishing the intentions of his majesty in leaving the peace established between him and the united provinces, he had had the satisfaction at least of having made it appear that it was not his majesty's fault if a rupture followed. As also that his majesty was armed only for the defence of the king his grandson, and that if it had been his purpose to make conquests, it had been an easy task for him when his forces first came upon their frontiers, and they were not in a condition to defend themselves: that this was what they had made public themselves, and the truth of the fact so warranted by their own testimony, ought to have convinced them that it was always in their own power to obtain that security from his majesty which they believed they had lost when the king's grandson succeeded to the crown of Spain, &c."

In their answer to this memorial, their high mightinesses observed that their recognition of the king of Spain did not prevent reasonable satisfaction being given to the emperor: and that the king of France ought to be convinced that they would do nothing to the detriment of their provinces, commerce, or riches, but what was absolutely necessary to their preservation: that they had done nothing that could be construed "a breach of the treaties which confirmed and sealed their sovereignty;" that their provinces were always free and sovereign; that their ancestors had spent their lives and fortunes to assert their freedom, and they were resolved to do the like; that they were sorry to hear the count D'Avaux expected no success from the conferences, because of the English envoy's declaring that satisfaction must be given to the emperor. That they owned with



the king of Great Britain they thought it reasonable to treat of satisfaction to that prince; and that the emperor should, in order thereto, be invited into the negotiation. That the states did not blindly follow the king of Great Britain's sentiments, but had a great deference for his advice, because they were persuaded he was wholly inclined to preserve the peace, and convinced he sought nothing but the welfare of their republic: that they had been obliged indeed to arm, but did not begin to do it till they saw their barrier in the Spanish Netherlands, which had cost them so much blood and treasure, possessed by French troops, and great preparations of war made there; that their jealousy was besides considerably increased by the strict union which appeared every day between France and Spain; that they had endeavoured by all possible means to preserve his majesty's friendship; but if they must, contrary to their own inclination, enter into a war, they should have no cause to blame themselves for it, and therefore hoped the Almighty would protect them, &c.

Though the general strain of this reply was somewhat haughty, it is evident from the concluding paragraph, that some hopes were yet cherished, at least by the more cool and dispassionate members of the assembly, that an accommodation might yet take place, and that no urgent or absolute necessity existed, which could warrant them in plunging the nation whom they represented and governed into the perils and horrors of war. They profess "it would be a singular pleasure to them if the said count would postpone his departure for some time, in hope some occasion would offer to resume the conferences, and conduct them to a happy issue for

the establishment of the general peace, and their own particular security. In confirmation of which they had caused this resolution to be delivered to him as an answer to his memorial, before he had his audience of leave, and received his re-credential letters upon it." A copy of this memorial being transmitted to the Dutch resident at Paris, and laid before M. de Torcy, that minister by the direction of the most christian king, replied, that it was well understood; that a due respect was observed in it to the king; but that for the rest it was considered only as an expedient to gain time in order to prepare for a war.

Agreeably to this answer, M. D'Avaux on the 8th of August received his final orders to return. When it was certain that the negotiation would not be resumed, and not till then, the plan of an offensive alliance was finally adjusted between the maritime powers and the emperor. Hitherto it would have sufficed for the purpose of accommodation to have reinstated the Dutch in the full and exclusive possession of the barrier fortresses, and to have ceded the duchy of Milan to the emperor. But in the treaty of alliance signed September 7, 1701, and which in consequence of the accession of the empire, Savoy, Prussia, Portugal, and various other powers, acquired the appellation of the Grand Alliance: the views of the high contracting powers were extended much farther. By the third article, satisfaction is to be procured to the emperor in the Spanish succession, and sufficient security for the dominions and commerce of the allies. By the fifth and sixth, which are the essential articles of the treaty, the confederates engage to endeavour to recover the Spanish Netherlands, to be a

barrier between Holland and France, without distinctly specifying to whom they shall be ultimately allotted; likewise the duchy of Milan and the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, with the demesnes belonging to the crown of Spain on the coast of Tuscany, for the security of the emperor; and it is farther stipulated that his majesty and the states may seize what lands and cities they can belonging to the Spaniards in the Indies and keep them. By the 7th and 8th articles the confederates engage faithfully to communicate their designs to one another; and that no party shall treat of peace, truce, &c. but jointly with the rest; a stipulation in the sequel flagrantly violated on the part of the crown of England.

On the 17th of September an edict was published in France, prohibiting, with a few exceptions, the importation of British manufactures and merchandize. But nearly at the same period a much greater injury and insult was offered to the English crown and nation, by the public recognition, on the part of Louis, of the pretended prince of Wales as king of Great Britain, on the death of the old abdicated monarch king James, at St. Germaine's, in the course of the present month. The earl of Manchester was ordered immediately to leave Paris; and the people of England, being struck with amazement and indignation at this open violation of the treaty of Ryswick, by which Louis had formally recognized the title of William as king of Great Britain, sent up addresses from all parts, expressive of loyalty and attachment to their sovereign, and abhorrence of the perfidy and ambition of France. The whole nation was now inflamed with the rage of war and revenge. In this

disposition of the public mind the king (Nov. 11.) dissolved the parliament, in which the tory interest had so strongly predominated, and convened by the advice chiefly of the lords Somers and Sunderland, a new parliament to meet December 30, previous to which the principal offices of government were put into the hands of the whigs. On the day appointed the king opened the parliament with a speech much admired and celebrated both at home and abroad. And though the state of the king's health was not such as to cause any general apprehension of danger at this period, it proved to be the last and indeed almost the dying speech of this justly renowned monarch.

SPEECH OF KING WILLIAM TO BOTH HOUSES OF  
PARLIAMENT.

*December 30, 1701.*

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

I PROMISE myself you are met together full of the just sense of the common danger of Europe, and that resentment of the late proceedings of the French king, which has been so fully and universally expressed in the loyal and seasonable addresses of my people.

The owning and setting up the pretended prince of Wales for king of England is not only the highest indignity offered to me and the whole nation, but does so nearly concern every man who has a regard for the protestant religion, or the present and future quiet and happiness of your country, that I need not press you to lay it seriously to heart, and to consider what farther ef-

fectual means may be used for securing the succession of the crown in the protestant line, and extinguishing the hopes of all pretenders and their open or secret abettors. By the French king's placing his grandson on the throne of Spain, he is in a condition to oppress the rest of Europe, unless speedy and effectual measures be taken. Under this pretence he is become the real master of the whole Spanish monarchy; he has made it to be entirely depending on France, and disposes of it as of his own dominions; and by that means he has surrounded his neighbours in such a manner, that though the name of peace may be said to continue, yet they are put to the expence and inconveniences of war. This must affect England in the nearest and most sensible manner in respect to our trade, which will soon become precarious in all the valuable branches of it; in respect to our peace and safety at home, which we cannot hope should long continue; and in respect to that part which England ought to take in the preservation of the liberty of Europe.

In order to obviate the general calamity with which the rest of Europe is threatened by this exorbitant power of France, I have concluded several alliances according to the encouragement given me by both houses of parliament; which I will direct shall be laid before you, and which I do not doubt you will enable me to make good.

There are some other treaties still depending that shall be likewise communicated to you as soon as they are perfected.

It is fit I should tell you the eyes of all Europe are upon this parliament. All matters are at a stand till your resolutions are known, and therefore no time ought



to be lost. You have yet an opportunity, by God's blessing, to secure to you and your posterity the quiet enjoyment of your religion and liberties, if you are not wanting to yourselves, but will exert the antient vigour of the English nation. But I tell you plainly my opinion is, if you do not lay hold on this occasion you have no reason to hope for another.

In order to do your part, it will be necessary to have a great strength at sea, and to provide for the security of our ships in harbour; and also that there be such a force at land as is expected in proportion to the forces of our allies.

GENTLEMEN OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

I do recommend these matters to you with that concern and earnestness which their importance requires. At the same time I cannot but press you to take care of the public credit, which cannot be preserved but by keeping sacred that maxim that they shall never be losers who trust to a parliamentary security. It is always with regret when I do ask aids of my people: but you will observe that I desire nothing which relates to any personal expence of mine. I am only pressing you to do all you can for your own safety and honour at so critical and dangerous a time; and am willing that what is given shall be wholly appropriated to the purposes for which it is intended. And since I am speaking on this head I think it proper to put you in mind that, during the late war, I ordered the accounts to be laid yearly before the parliament, and also gave my assent to several bills for taking the public accounts, that my subjects might have satisfaction how the money given for



the war was applied. And I am willing that matter may be put in any farther way of examination: that it may appear whether there were any misapplications and mismanagements, or whether the debt that remains upon us has really arisen from the shortness of the supplies or the deficiency of the funds. I have already told you how necessary dispatch will be for carrying on that great public business whereon our safety and all that is valuable to us depends. I hope what time can be spared will be employed about those other very desirable things which I have so often recommended from the throne; I mean the forming some good bills for employing the poor, for encouraging trade, and the farther suppressing of vice.

MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN,

I HOPE you are come together determined to avoid all manner of disputes and differences, and resolved to act with a general and hearty concurrence for promoting the common cause; which alone can make this a happy session. I should think it as great a blessing as could befall England, if I could observe you as much inclined to lay aside those unhappy fatal animosities which divide and weaken you, as I am disposed to make all my subjects safe and easy as to any, even the highest, offences committed against me. Let me conjure you to disappoint the only hopes of our enemies by your unanimity. I have shewn, and will always shew, how desirous I am to be the common father of all my people. Do you in like manner lay aside parties and divisions. Let there be no other distinction heard of among us for the future but of those who are for the protestant reli-

gion and the present establishment, and of those who mean a popish prince and a French government. I will only add this; if you do in good earnest desire to see England hold the balance of Europe, and to be indeed at the head of the protestant interest, it will appear by your right improving the present opportunity.

ADDRESS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,

WE your majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the commons of England in parliament assembled, do return our most humble and hearty thanks to your majesty for your most gracious speech from the throne, and humbly crave leave to assure your majesty that this house will support and defend your majesty's lawful and rightful title to the crown of these realms, against the pretended prince of Wales, and all his open and secret abettors and adherents, and all other your majesty's enemies whatsoever. And we will enable your majesty to shew your just resentment of the affront and indignity offered to your majesty and this nation by the French king, in taking upon him to declare the pretended prince of Wales king of England, Scotland, and Ireland. And we are firmly and unanimously resolved to maintain and support the succession to the imperial crown of this realm, and the dominions and territories thereunto belonging, in the protestant line, as the same is settled by an act, declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown, and farther provided for by an act of the last parliament, entitled "An act for the farther limitation of

the crown, and better securing the rights and liberties of the subject." And for the better effecting the same, we will to the utmost of our power enable your majesty to make good all those alliances your majesty has made, or shall make, pursuant to the addresses and advice of your most dutiful and loyal commons of the last parliament, for the preserving the liberties of Europe and reducing the exorbitant power of France.

The above address was presented January 5, 1702, by the whole house, and his majesty returned the following answer :

GENTLEMEN,

I GIVE you my hearty thanks for this address, which I look upon as a good omen for the session. The unanimity with which it passed adds greatly to the satisfaction I receive from it. So good a step at your first entrance upon business cannot but raise the hopes of all who wish well to England, and to the common cause. I can desire no more of you than to proceed as you have begun, and I depend upon it. For when I consider how cheerfully and universally you concurred in this address, I cannot doubt but every one of you will sincerely endeavour to make it effectual in all the parts of it.

The first session of the new parliament thus opening in a manner unusually auspicious, the king having fully recovered his popularity, and the two houses appearing disposed to hearken with respect and attention to any proposition relating to the public welfare which

should be made to them on the part of the crown, the king deemed it a favorable opportunity, ill as he then was, and incapable as the generality of persons in his situation would have been to turn their thoughts to public affairs, to send, February 28, 1702, the following message, on a subject ever near to his heart, to both houses of parliament, being the last they ever received from him :

### WILLIAM R.

His majesty being at present hindered by an unhappy accident from coming in person to his parliament, is pleased to signify to the house of peers (commons) by message, what he designed to have spoken to both houses from the throne. His majesty in the first year of his reign did acquaint the parliament that commissioners were authorized in Scotland to treat with such commissioners as should be appointed in England, of proper terms for uniting the two kingdoms, and at the same time expressed his great desire of such an union. His majesty is fully satisfied that nothing can more contribute to the present and future security and happiness of England and Scotland, than a firm and entire union between them ; and he cannot but hope that, upon a due consideration of our present circumstances, there will be found a general disposition to this union. His majesty would esteem it a peculiar felicity if, during his reign, some happy expedient for making both kingdoms one might take place, and is therefore extremely desirous that a treaty for that purpose might be set on foot, and does in the most earnest manner recommend this affair to the consideration of the house.

On the 17th March the king gave the royal assent by commission, using a stamp for the purpose of signature, to the famous abjuration bill. So that the three last public acts of his life were very memorable. His last speech, his last message, and his last exercise of legislative authority, testifying, as it were, to his latest moments, and with his departing breath, his ardent wishes for the advancement of the general happiness, and his detestation of tyranny in every form, political, civil, and religious. He died March 8, 1702, in the height of his reputation, and in the meridian of his life—a life distinguished beyond all others by a series of great and heroic actions, the invariable object of which was, not like that of other heroes, the ruin or destruction, but the real, essential, and permanent welfare, of mankind.

## ON THE STATE OF PARTIES.

*A. D. 1703.*

QUEEN ANNE, a woman of an excellent heart, but of a very narrow understanding, had imbibed from early education a strong predilection for high-church and tory principles. These principles had necessarily undergone some modification from the great and recent event of the Revolution, in which the tories cordially concurred, in spite of former animosities, with their political adversaries the whigs. The antient dogmas of passive obedience and non-resistance could not therefore, in present circumstances, be maintained in their full extent, and the doctrine of religious toleration, established by an act which was regarded as forming part of the basis of the new settlement, was no longer called in question. But the spirit and temper of the two state factions, when the danger which united them was dissipated, remained as inimical and irreconcilable as ever. The systems of government which they respectively adopted were indeed wholly opposite in their nature and tendency. The principles of the whigs, with which their practices were by no means always in unison, were directed to the advancement and security of liberty civil and religious. The prerogatives of the crown, whenever carried beyond the just limits of political utility, appeared to them as encroachments and usurpations upon the rights of the people, and they regarded, or professed to regard, with a jealous eye, every extension of the monarchical



authority. Their maxims of government were mild and conciliatory; measures of coercion and violence being resorted to by them with reluctance, and from a clear conviction only of their necessity.

The spirit of the tory system seemed on the contrary calculated for the advantage of the governors rather than of the governed. Though the adherents of this system could not now deny the lawfulness of resistance in extreme cases, they deprecated the discussion of so dangerous a truth, and made in effect all political virtues and duties to centre in submission to the supreme power of the state. Conceiving that the slightest tendency to disobedience could not be too severely repressed, they were most pleased and gratified when the sovereign authority was exercised with harshness and haughtiness, on the avowed principle that mankind were to be ruled chiefly by fear, and persuaded that those lawless passions which led to sedition and rebellion were to be restrained only by a high and imperious domination, ultimately tending, as they conceived, to the general security and happiness. From this delineation of the opposite parties, it is evident that the principles of the whigs were very liable to be abused by the factious, and perverted to the purposes of anarchy and licentiousness. But as all governments and all individuals possessed of power are naturally prone to exceed the limits of moderation in the exercise of it, the far greater danger lay on the other side; namely, that the principles of toryism would habitually predominate, and that the spirit of domination would terminate in the spirit of oppression.

In the important sense now stated and explained, the two parties of whigs and tories will ever subsist under

every form, and more especially under every free form, of government, and there is no reason for discarding fastidiously the use of the terms. In both parties individuals may doubtless be found of the highest respectability; and amongst the most enlightened of those who are chiefly solicitous on the one hand to maintain the just and constitutional prerogatives of the crown, and on the other to preserve entire the rights and liberties of the subject, very faint shades of difference would probably be discovered on a dispassionate examination and comparison of sentiments.

On the 27th February, 1703, terminated the first session of the first parliament elected in the present reign, in the course of which manifest proofs appeared of the decided ascendancy of the tories; although much of the rage of party was restrained and moderated by the political sagacity of the great leaders, Godolphin and Marlborough, men who possessed an intimate knowledge of human nature, and indubitable talents for government. The speech of the queen to the two houses, previous to the prorogation, contained the following remarkable and characteristic paragraph;

MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN,

I DESIRE and expect from you that you make it your business in your several counties to continue and preserve the quiet and satisfaction of my subjects. I hope such of them as have the misfortune to dissent from the church of England will rest secure and satisfied in the act of toleration, which I am resolved to maintain; and that all those who have the happiness and advantage to be of the church of England, will consider

that I have had my education in it, and that I have been willing to run great hazards for its preservation ; and therefore they may be very sure I shall always make it my own particular care to encourage and maintain this church as by law established, and every the least member of it, in all their just rights and privileges.

It is highly probable that to the solicitude of this good and pious princess for the preservation of the church, and not to any attachment which she felt for the interests of civil liberty, may be ascribed the part she took in the late revolution, which she never conceived to be capable of vindication upon the principles avowed by the great body of the whigs.

But for the queen's own comment upon this passage, we may refer to a letter written by her at this period to the duchess of Marlborough—the correspondence between the two friends being carried on under the affected names of Morley and Freeman. It may be transiently remarked that the queen had been accustomed to style herself “ the unfortunate Morley ” from the æra of the death of her only and darling child, the duke of Gloucester, a prince of the greatest hopes ; and the loss of whom was ill compensated to his disconsolate mother by the acquisition of a crown. Such is the insufficiency of human grandeur to confer happiness!

\* \* \* \* \*

I am very glad to find by my dear Mrs. Freeman's that I was blessed with yesterday, that she liked my speech ; but I cannot help being extremely concerned you are so partial to the whigs ; because I would not have you and your poor unfortunate faithful Morley

differ in opinion in the least thing. What I said when I writ last upon this subject does not proceed from any insinuations of the other party ; but I know the principles of the church of England, and I know those of the whigs, and that it is that and no other reason which makes me think as I do of the last.

And upon my word, my dear Mrs. Freeman, you are mightily mistaken in your notion of a true whig ; for the character you give of them does not in the least belong to them but to the church. But I will say no more on this subject, only beg, for my poor sake, that you would not shew more countenance to those you seem to have so much inclination for than to the church party.

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In two years after this the tories having highly offended the queen, by moving for an invitation to the electress dowager of Hanover to reside in England, and the whigs having paid their court to her majesty by opposing it, she expressed her change of opinion relative to the two parties—a change sudden and transient, in the following terms :

“ I believe, dear Mrs. Freeman and I shall not disagree as we have formerly done, for I am sensible of the services those people have done me that you have a good opinion of, and will countenance them, and am thoroughly convinced of the malice and insolence of them that you have always been speaking against.”

LETTER OF QUEEN ANNE  
TO THE  
PARLIAMENT OF SCOTLAND.

*A. D. 1704.*

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NOTWITHSTANDING the secret predilection of lord Godolphin for the interests of the exiled family, and the real wish probably entertained by him for their restoration on terms compatible with the liberties of the kingdom, civil and religious, there appears not the least evidence that he at any period imagined such an event likely or practicable.

On the contrary, from his first entrance into administration, he adopted such measures as were directly calculated to frustrate their projects and extinguish their hopes; particularly in what related to the settlement of the Scottish crown. In the first parliament held at Edinburgh, June 9th, 1702, subsequent to the queen's accession, the duke of Queensbury, high commissioner, recommended to them the consideration of an union between the kingdoms, and commissioners were actually appointed for the purpose of treating with those nominated by the English parliament. And though the overture of the earl of Marchmont for settling the succession was discountenanced by the high commissioner, no offence was taken at his conduct in this instance by the friends of the house of Brunswick, the overture itself being evidently premature, and very ill-timed, in conse-



quence of the doubts entertained by a large proportion of the nation of the regularity, and even validity, of the acts passed in this session.

The second parliament met on the 6th May, 1703, the duke of Queensbury acting a second time as high commissioner. But though the Tories were now in power, the queen's advocate, sir James Stuart, offered, at an early period, "an act for rescinding an act of the third parliament of king Charles II., establishing the succession of the crown in the next blood in the royal line of whatsoever religion,—so far as the same was inconsistent with the claim of right and the present settlement made in king William's time." This would have amounted to a virtual settlement of the crown on the house of Brunswick as the nearest protestants of the royal blood. Notwithstanding, however, that the ministry exerted themselves strongly in support of this overture, the Scottish parliament, which had other objects in view, would not suffer it even to be read, and it was carried by a considerable majority that it should lie upon the table. The third parliament was convened at Edinburgh, July 6th, 1704, the marquis of Tweeddale being high commissioner. This nobleman, five days after the opening of the session, presented to the Estates a remarkable letter from the queen, recommending, in very energetic terms, the settlement of the succession in the protestant line. In lieu of which the famous act of security passed, to the extreme chagrin of lord Godolphin, who, from this period, justly regarding the situation of affairs as most alarming and critical, exerted himself vigorously to effect an union of the two countries, which by efforts of great ability and perseverance he at last happily accomplished.



## ANNE R.

MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN,

NOTHING has troubled us more since our accession to the crown of these realms than the unsettled state of affairs in that our antient kingdom. We hoped that the foundations of differences and animosities that, to our great regret, we discovered among you, did not lie so deep but that, by the methods we have proceeded in, they might have been removed. But instead of success in our endeavours, the rent is become wider; nay, divisions have proceeded to such a height, as to prove matter of encouragement to our enemies beyond sea to employ their emissaries among you, in order to debauch our good subjects from their allegiance, and to render that our antient kingdom a scene of blood and disorder, merely, as they speak, to make you serve as a diversion. But we are willing to hope that none of our subjects, but such as were obnoxious to the laws for their crimes, or men of low and desperate fortunes, or that are otherwise inconsiderable, have given ear to such pernicious contrivances. And we have no reason to doubt of the assurances given us by those now entrusted with our authority, that they will use their utmost endeavours to convince our people of the advantage and necessity of the present measures. For we have always been inclined to believe that the late mistakes did not proceed from any want of duty and respect to us, but only from different opinions as to measures of government. This being the case, we are resolved, for the full contentment and satisfaction of our people, to grant whatever can in rea-

son be demanded for rectifying of abuses and quieting the minds of all our good subjects. In order to this we have named the marquis of Tweeddale our high commissioner, he being a person of whose capacity and probity, or qualifications and dispositions to serve us and the country, neither we nor you can have any doubt. And we have fully empowered him to give you unquestionable proofs of our resolution to maintain the government both in church and state as by law established in that our kingdom; and to consent to such laws as shall be found wanting for the further security of both, and preventing all encroachments on the same for the future. Thus having done our part, we are persuaded that you will not fail to do yours, but will lay hold on this opportunity to shew the world the sincerity of the professions made to us, and that it was the true love of your country, and the sense of your duty to it, and therefore not the want of duty to us, for we shall always reckon these two inconsistent, that was at the bottom of the late misunderstandings. The main thing that we recommend to you, and which we recommend to you with all the earnestness we are capable of, is the settling of the succession in the protestant line, as that which is absolutely necessary for your own peace and happiness, as well as our quiet and security in all our dominions, and for the reputation of our affairs abroad; and consequently for the strengthening the protestant interest every where. This has been our fixed judgment and resolution ever since we came to the crown; and though hitherto opportunities have not answered our intentions, matters are now come to that pass, by the undoubted evidence of the designs of our enemies, that a longer de-

lay of settling the succession in the protestant line may have very dangerous consequences, and a disappointment of it would infallibly make that our kingdom the seat of war, and expose it to devastation and ruin. As to the terms and conditions of government with regard to the successor, we have empowered our commissioner to give the royal assent to whatever can in reason be demanded, and is in our power to grant, for securing the sovereignty and liberties of that our antient kingdom.

We are now in a war which makes it necessary to provide for the defence of the kingdom ; the time of the funds that were lately given for the maintenance of the land forces being expired, and the said funds exhausted, provision ought also to be made for supplying the magazines with arms and ammunition, and repairing the forts and castles, and for the charge of the frigates that prove so useful for guarding the coasts. We earnestly recommend to you whatever may contribute to the advancement of true piety and discouragement of vice and immorality ; and we doubt not but you will take care to encourage trade and improve the product and manufactories of the nation ; in all which, and every thing else that can be for the good and happiness of our people, you shall have our hearty and ready concurrence. We shall only add, that unanimity and moderation in all your proceedings will be of great use for bringing to a happy issue the important affairs that we have laid before you, and will be also most acceptable to us. So we bid you heartily farewell.

*Given at our Court at Windsor Castle, the 25th day of June,  
1704, and of our Reign the 3d Year.*

## BATTLE OF BLENHEIM.

A. D. 1698.

DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH TO MR. SECRETARY  
HARLEY.

*Camp at Hochstet, August 14, 1704.*

SIR,

I GAVE you an account on Sunday of the situation we were then in, and that we expected to hear the enemy would pass the Danube at Lawingen, in order to attack prince Eugene. At eleven that night we had an express from him that the enemy were come over, and desiring that he might be reinforced as soon as possible : whereupon I ordered my brother Churchill to advance at one o'clock in the morning with his twenty battalions, and by three the whole army was in motion. For the greater expedition I ordered part of the troops to pass over the Danube, and follow the march of the twenty battalions ; and with most of the horse and the foot of the first line I passed the Lech at Rain, and came over the Danube at Donawert ; so that we all joined the prince that night, intending to advance and take this camp of Hochstedt. In order whereto we went out on Tuesday early in the morning, with forty squadrons, to view the ground, but found the enemy had already possessed themselves of it : whereupon we resolved to attack them, and accordingly we marched between three and four yesterday morning from the camp at Munster,

leaving all our tents standing. About six we came in view of the enemy, who, we found, did not expect so early a visit. The cannon began to play about half an hour after eight. They formed themselves in two bodies; the elector, with M. Marsin and their troops on our right, and M. de Tallard with all his own on our left, which last fell to my share. They had two little rivulets, besides a morass, before them, which we were obliged to pass over in their view; and prince Eugene was forced to take a great compass to come to the enemy, so that it was one o'clock before the battle began. It lasted with great vigour till sunset, when the enemy were obliged to retire, and by the blessing of God, we obtained a complete victory. We have cut off great numbers of them, as well in the action as in the retreat, besides upwards of thirty squadrons of the French, which I pushed into the Danube, where we saw the greatest part of them perish; monsieur de Tallard, with several of his general officers, being taken prisoners at the same time. And in the village of Blenheim, which the enemy had intrenched and fortified, and where they made the greatest opposition, I obliged twenty-six entire battalions, and twelve squadrons of dragoons, to surrender themselves prisoners at discretion. We took likewise all their tents standing, with their cannon and ammunition, as also a great number of standards, kettle drums, and colours, in the action; so that I reckon the greatest part of M. Tallard's army is taken or destroyed. The bravery of all our troops on this occasion cannot be expressed: the generals, as well as the officers and soldiers, behaving themselves with the greatest courage and resolution, the horse and dragoons having been obliged to charge four or five several times.



The elector and M. de Marsin were so advantageously posted, that prince Eugene could make no impression till the third attack, at near seven at night, when he made a great slaughter of them; but being near a wood-side, a good body of Bavarians retired into it, and the rest of that army retreated towards Lawingen, it being too late, and the troops too much tired, to pursue them far. I cannot say too much in praise of the prince's good conduct, and the bravery of his troops, on this occasion. You will please to lay this before her majesty and his royal highness, to whom I send my lord Tunbridge with the good news. I pray you will likewise inform yourself, and let me know her majesty's pleasure, as well relating to M. Tallard and the other general officers, as for the disposal of near twelve hundred other officers, and between eight and nine thousand common soldiers, who being all made prisoners by her majesty's troops, are entirely at her disposal: but as the charge of subsisting these officers and men must be very great, I presume her majesty will be inclined that they be changed for any other prisoners that offer. I should likewise be glad to receive her majesty's directions for the dispatch of the standards and colours, whereof I have not yet the number. but guess there cannot be less than one hundred, which is more than has been taken in any battle these many years. You will easily believe that in so long and vigorous an action, the English, who had so great a share in it, must have suffered as well in officers as men, but I have not yet the particulars.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

MARLBOROUGH.



LETTERS  
 FROM THE  
 DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH  
 TO THE  
 DUKE OF SHREWSBURY.

*A. D. 1705.*

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THE *first* of the two following letters, from the duke of Marlborough to the duke of Shrewsbury, displays in strong colours the chagrin of that great commander, in being obliged, from a total failure of the promised co-operation on the part of prince Louis of Baden, to retreat from the Moselle to the Meuse. The *second* exhibits no less resentment and indignation at the conduct of the Dutch field-deputies, in compelling him to desist from an attack upon the French army under M. Villeroy, which he had concerted with M. D'Auverquerque with every prospect of success.

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DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH TO THE DUKE OF SHREWS-  
 BURY.

*Maestricht, June 20, 1705:*

MY LORD,

BY the failure of our friends in all they promised me on the Moselle, I have been obliged to march

back to the Meuse. I was fifteen days together in the camp of Elft, without being joined by any troops but what were in the English and Dutch pay, though I was to have been considerably reinforced by the Germans immediately upon my taking the field; and finding already a scarcity of forage by the unseasonable cold weather, which had destroyed all the grass and oats, with no manner of hopes of being supplied in any reasonable time with horses and carriages, promised for bringing up our great artillery for the siege of Saar Louis, where, if we had been once posted, we should have been plentifully supplied with subsistence out of Lorraine: all these disappointments obliged me to yield to the pressing instances of the States and their generals to come hither to their relief. M. de Villeroy had already taken Huy, and was come before Liege, where he had begun to raise his batteries, and was threatening Limburg and Cologne by detachments at the same time; but upon our approach he drew off his cannon, and sent it back to Namur, retiring with his army to Tongres, where it was resolved to have marched directly to him to-morrow, but I have just now advice that he is marched this morning to Montenac towards their lines, so that the first thing we shall do will be to retake Huy. When I marched from Treves, I left there sixteen battalions of foot, and fifteen squadrons of horse for the security of that place, in hopes I might have been able to have returned to the Moselle in five or six weeks, but I have received advice that those troops have already abandoned the place, without being attacked. When I have the satisfaction of seeing your grace, I shall tell

you a great deal more of the usage I have met with : in the mean time I heartily wish you a good journey, and am with the greatest truth and sincerity,

My lord, &c. &c.

DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH TO THE DUKE OF SHREWS-  
BURY.

*Camp at Corbais, August 21, 1705.*

MY LORD,

I WAS flattering myself with the hopes of the long-expected happiness of seeing your grace in these parts, when I received the honour of your letter of the 10th inst. with an account of your being laid up with a fit of the gout. I assure you I take great share in whatever you suffer ; and am the more concerned at your present illness, because it deprives me of the sole satisfaction I had proposed to myself for the rest of the campaign ; for which loss, however, I should think myself sufficiently recompensed, if for a transient fit you should at length get rid of your old distemper. Our army is in a manner laid up too by a disease, for which I see no cure, otherwise there is great reason to believe we might have made a considerable progress in the enemy's country, in order to which I had at the camp at Meldert, with great difficulty, got together a provision of about ten days bread, and having marched four days together, through several defiles and part of the Bois de Loignies, the army came the 18th inst. into a spacious plain with only the Ysche between us and the enemy. About noon we were formed in order of battle, and having visited the posts with M. D'Auverquerque,

we resolved to attack, thinking there was no more to do but to order the troops to advance ; when the deputies of the States, having consulted their other generals, would not give their consent, so that I was with great regret obliged to quit the enterprize, which promised all imaginable success, and to march back, with the melancholy prospect of being able to do nothing more this campaign, whereof so much still remains behind, than make the siege of Leeuwe, and demolish the lines. This disappointment, at a time when our expectations are so little answered elsewhere, makes me very uneasy, and since all my remaining consolation is in your good company, I hope as soon as you have your health, nothing will hinder you from hastening this way.

I am, &c. &c.

MARLBOROUGH.

P. S. The last disappointment vexes me so much, that I am dead with the head-ach, which I hope will prevail with you to pardon my making use of Mr. Cardonnel's hand.

## SPEECH OF QUEEN ANNE

TO BOTH

## HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT.

*October 25, 1705.*

MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN,

I HAVE been very desirous to meet you as early as I thought you might be called together without inconvenience to yourselves, and it is with much satisfaction I observe so full an appearance at the opening of the parliament, because it is a ground for me to conclude you are all convinced of the necessity of prosecuting the just war in which we are engaged, and therefore are truly sensible that it is of the greatest importance to us to be timely in our preparations.

Nothing can be more evident than that if the French king continues master of the Spanish monarchy, the balance of power in Europe is utterly destroyed, and he will be able in a short time to ingross the trade and the wealth of the world. No good Englishman could at any time be content to sit still and acquiesce in such a prospect; and at this time we have great grounds to hope, that by the blessing of God upon our arms, and those of our allies, a good foundation is laid for restoring the monarchy of Spain to the house of Austria; the consequences of which will not only be safe and advan-

tageous, but glorious for England. I may add we have learned by our own experience, that no peace with France will last longer than the first opportunity of their dividing the allies, and of attacking some of them with advantage. All our allies must needs be so sensible this is the true state of the case, that I make no doubt but measures will soon be so concerted as that, if we be not wanting to ourselves, we shall see the next campaign begin offensively on all sides against our enemies in a most vigorous manner. I must therefore desire you, GENTLEMEN of the HOUSE of COMMONS, to grant me the supplies which will be requisite for carrying on the next year's service, both by sea and land, and at the same time to consider, that the giving with all possible dispatch will make the supply itself much more effectual. The firmness and conduct which the duke of Savoy has shewn amidst extreme difficulties, is beyond example. I have not been wanting to do all that was possible for me in order to his being supported. I ought to take notice to you, that the king of Prussia's troops have been very useful to this end. Your approbation of that treaty last session, and the encouragement you gave upon it, leave me no doubt of being able to renew it for another year. I take this occasion to assure you, that not only whatever shall be granted by parliament for bearing the charge of the war, shall be laid out for that purpose with the greatest faithfulness and management, but that I will continue to add, out of my own revenue, all I can reasonably spare beyond the necessary expences for the honour of the government.



MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN,

BY an act passed the last winter, I was enabled to appoint commissioners for this kingdom, to treat with commissioners to be empowered by authority of parliament in Scotland, concerning a nearer and more complete union between the two kingdoms, as soon as an act should be made there for that purpose. I think it proper for me to acquaint you, that such an act is passed there; and I intend in a short time to cause commissions to be made out, in order to put the treaty on foot, which I heartily desire may prove successful, because I am persuaded that an union of the two kingdoms will not only prevent many inconveniences which may otherwise happen, but must conduce to the peace and happiness of both nations: and therefore I hope I shall have your assistance in bringing this great work to a good conclusion. There is another union I think myself obliged to recommend to you in the most earnest and affectionate manner; I mean an union of minds and affections amongst ourselves. It is that which would, above all things, disappoint and defeat the hopes and designs of our enemies.

I cannot but with grief observe there are some amongst us who endeavour to foment animosities; but I persuade myself they will be found to be very few, when you appear to assist me in discountenancing and defeating such practices. I mention this with a little more warmth, because there have not been wanting some so very malicious as even in print to suggest the church of England as by law established to be in danger at this time.

I am willing to hope not one of my subjects can really entertain a doubt of my affection to the church, or so much as suspect that it will not be my chief care to support it, and leave it secure after me; and therefore we may be certain that they who go about to insinuate things of this nature, must be mine and the kingdom's enemies, and can only mean to cover designs which they dare not publicly own, by endeavouring to distract us with unreasonable and groundless distrusts and jealousies. I must be so plain as to tell you, the best proofs we can all give at present of our zeal for the preservation of the church, will be to join heartily in prosecuting the war against the enemy, who is certainly engaged to extirpate our religion, as well as to reduce this kingdom to slavery. I am fully resolved, by God's assistance, to do my part; I will always affectionately support and countenance the church of England, as by law established; I will inviolably maintain the toleration; I will do all I can to prevail with my subjects to lay aside their divisions, and will study to make them all safe and easy; I will endeavour to promote religion and virtue amongst them, and to encourage trade and every thing else that may make them a flourishing and happy people; and they who shall concur zealously with me in carrying on these good designs, shall be sure of my kindness and favour.

This was by far the most admired and celebrated speech delivered from the throne since the era of the Revolution, the last of king William excepted; and it breathes throughout the same ardent and magnanimous spirit. As a composition, it affords no unfavourable

specimen of the talents of the lord keeper Cowper, to whom it was universally ascribed, and who, immediately previous to the meeting of parliament, had superseded sir Nathan Wright in the possession of the great seal. The domestic policy inculcated in this speech; the union of minds and affections; the mutual forbearance, toleration, candour, generosity, and public spirit, so earnestly recommended in it; are maxims founded on the basis of eternal wisdom, and they constitute what may properly be denominated the system of whiggism, contrasted with the animosity, the rancour, the violence, bigotry, and spirit of persecution, which characterise the genuine system of toryism. The queen herself was as much a tory as her natural goodness of heart, and her deference to the advice and opinions of individuals of more discernment than herself, would suffer her to be. The tories most grievously offended her notwithstanding, by their impolitic motion in the present session of parliament, for inviting over the princess Sophia: from which time she adopted cordially the resolution of throwing herself and her affairs into the hands of the whigs, who enjoyed the royal favour exclusively till the autumn of the succeeding year 1706, when the violence practised upon her in the rude and indecent importunity with which the dismissal of sir Charles Hedges was urged and enforced, revived her disgust to the whig party, and disposed her to seek a reconciliation with her ancient friends the tories, the pernicious effects of which the nation soon experienced, and had long reason to lament. The foreign politics of this speech are liable to great exception. For, first, The policy of the war itself appears extremely questionable;

Spain in its present state of debility being rather an incumbrance to France than bringing any addition of strength to her ally; not to mention that after the death of the reigning monarch Louis the XIVth, now far advanced in years, the political connection of the two kingdoms must be of very precarious duration. But secondly, Admitting the war to be originally just and necessary, the object of it was now totally changed; and instead of the conquest of the Low Countries, in order to obtain a secure barrier for Holland and the Spanish dominions in Italy, as an equivalent or satisfaction for the claims of the emperor, an open avowal was now made that hostilities were to be prosecuted for the glorious purpose of restoring the monarchy of Spain to the house of Austria; a chimerical and romantic project, in the effort to accomplish which, seas of human blood must undoubtedly be shed, and in all probability shed in vain. The inconsistency of the speech is remarkable in asserting, in the same breath, "that the balance of power in Europe is destroyed by the political union of the French and Spanish crowns," and "that the success of the confederacy against those two crowns was such as to threaten the utter dissolution of that connection." The blessing of God is, however, invoked as usual in support of a war, the justice and necessity of which boldly to impeach, or even mildly and modestly to question, those whose interest it prompted, and whose ambition it gratified, considered as an indubitable symptom of disaffection and disloyalty.

## LETTER OF SIR ROWLAND GWYNNE

TO THE

## EARL OF STAMFORD.

*A. D. 1705.*

THE numerous and zealous adherents of the protestant succession in the house of Hanover were by no means pleased with the opposition made by the whig ministers in the house of lords to the celebrated motion of lord Haversham for inviting the electress Sophia to take up her residence in England. The princess herself was extremely dissatisfied with the rejection of the motion, till she received from lord Halifax, who repaired to the court of Herenhausen at the end of the session, invested with a public character, a clear explanation of the whole business. And the regency act, which the whigs brought forward, being negatived, fully demonstrated the sincerity of their attachment to the electoral family.

During the height of the ferment occasioned by what was regarded by many as the inconsistent and even treacherous conduct of the whig ministers, appeared divers publications on the subject, abounding with exclamations and reproaches. Amongst the most remarkable of these was a letter addressed to the earl of Stamford, from sir Rowland Gwynne, a flaming zealot of the whig party, who had been for some years resident at the court of Hanover, and who was known to enjoy a great share of the favour and confidence of the electress dowager,

whose sentiments he was, not without good reason, supposed to echo, though that princess thought proper subsequently to disavow for herself, and her son, all participation in this imprudent letter; which was dated January 1, 1706, from Hanover, and imported in substance, “ that the princess Sophia being informed that her good intentions to the queen and nation were misrepresented, some having reported that she might give rise to intrigues against the queen and the public if she came thither, she thought herself therefore obliged to inform the lord archbishop of Canterbury and others to whom she wrote, and also to tell the duke of Marlborough and the earl of Sunderland, when they were at Hanover, that she would always most sincerely maintain a true friendship with the queen, and also be ready to comply with the desires of the nation in whatever depended upon her, though she should hazard her person in passing the seas if they thought it necessary towards the establishment of the protestant succession, and for the good of the kingdom. But that in the mean time she lived in great quiet and content there, without meddling with parties or cabals, and left it to the queen and parliament to do whatever they should think fit. That none but jacobites can have the malice to invent and insinuate to others that the presence of the successor was dangerous; that we had been proud to say that the house of Hanover, the people of England, and our posterity, were most obliged to the whigs, next to the king, for settling the succession of that most serene house; and how much should we be to be blamed if we should lose this merit by parting with our principles that were so well grounded upon honour and the public good, and



by destroying the work of our own hands for a base and uncertain interest, or for a blind obedience to those who led others where they pleased, and yet were led themselves by their passions or imaginary prospects, of which they might yet be disappointed! For if they hoped to get into favor by such methods, they could not be long serviceable, nor preserve the favor they sought, for they would soon be cast off when it was found that they had lost the esteem and affection of the people by their weak and mercenary conduct. That they could not do any thing that would better please their enemies, for while they thought to keep down the tories by a majority, and oppose them even in things so reasonable and just, they would raise the reputation of that party instead of lessening it. That he was sorry for those who suffered themselves to be imposed upon; but they who had wicked designs might one day repent of them, for they must either plunge the nation into the greatest confusion to make it unable to punish them, or be answerable for the dangers into which they were like to bring it. That he could not conceive what colour any body could have for so base an insinuation as that the coming of the electress into England would set up two courts that would oppose each other, for the electress declared that she would be entirely united with the queen, and that all those who imagined she would countenance any intrigue against her majesty would be very much deceived in their expectations. That, supposing, contrary to all appearance, that discontented ill men might impose upon the electress's good nature, and incline her to do such things as might displease the queen, what hurt could that do, since her royal highness's court

could have no power in England, and must be subject to the queen's court? so that it was most absurd to make people believe that this pretended opposition of the two courts could bring the nation into so great dangers as those they might avoid by having the protestant heir in the kingdom. That the keeping the protestant heir at a distance must be grounded upon two suppositions equally wicked and criminal—1st, that the queen was against the electress's coming over—and 2dly, that her being in England during the queen's life was a thing ill in itself. That, in short, to oppose the further securing of the protestant succession was to act directly for the jacobites; and to hinder the successor's coming into England was to oppose the further securing of the succession."

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This letter giving great and just offence to the ministry, a formal complaint was made of it in the house of commons, who thereupon came to a resolution "that it was a scandalous, false, and malicious libel, tending to create a misunderstanding between her majesty and the princess Sophia, and highly reflecting upon her majesty, upon the princess Sophia, and upon the proceedings of both houses of parliament; that an address be presented to her majesty that she would be pleased to give orders for the discovery and prosecuting the author, printer, and publishers, of the said pamphlet, and that the said resolutions be communicated to the lords at a conference, and their concurrence desired thereunto." The lords readily concurred with the commons, and upon the two houses presenting the address on the 12th March (1706), pursuant to the said resolu-

tions, the queen told them “that nothing could be more acceptable to her than so reasonable an instance of their concern to preserve a good understanding between her and the princess Sophia, and of their care to defeat the artifices of designing and malicious men. That she was fully sensible of the very ill designs of the paper which they had so justly censured, and she would not fail to give the necessary directions for complying, in the most effectual manner, with all they desired in their address.” Accordingly Mr. Charles Gildon, the publisher of Sir Rowland Gwynne’s letter, was tried for this offence at Guildhall, and being found guilty, was fined by the Court of Queen’s Bench in the sum of one hundred pounds, which was afterwards remitted: and in this, as well as in other instances, the good sense and moderation which governed the domestic policy of the kingdom at the present period were very conspicuous; and the councils of the queen, at the head of which the lords Godolphin, Somers, Halifax, and Cowper presided, were deservedly attended with the highest reputation and success.

L O R D H A L I F A X  
T O  
M R . S E C R E T A R Y H A R L E Y .

A. D. 1706.

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IT appears manifest, from a variety of circumstances, that the ideas of the electress Sophia, and those of her son, the reigning duke of Hanover, relative to the affairs of England, did by no means invariably concur. The electress being the immediate successor to the crown, occasionally shewed, and perhaps chose to shew, her superior consequence, by acting without the participation, and even, in some instances, contrary to the openly avowed opinion of the elector. This was remarkably the case with respect to the celebrated motion of lord Haversham, supported by the whole force of the Tories, for inviting the princess Sophia to England. By their determined opposition to the motion, the Whigs incurred the risque of displeasing the electress, who wrote a letter upon the occasion to the archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Tennison, one of the few Whigs who voted in favour of it, expressing strong suspicions of the integrity of some who had been numbered among the friends of her family; and declared her readiness to comply with the desire of the parliament if they thought it for the good of the kingdom to invite her to reside in England; and that she wished her sentiments to be com-

municated in order to prevent any idea of her being indifferent to the honour that had been intended for her.

In order to re-establish their credit as firm friends to the protestant succession, the whigs subsequently brought in a bill containing provisions of great importance, by vesting the government of the kingdom, in the event of the queen's demise, in the hands of a regency, consisting of the great officers of state, together with such other persons as should be previously nominated by the successor. This act was transmitted to Hanover by the medium of lord Halifax, a well known and zealous friend of the Hanoverian succession. In the following letter that nobleman relates to Mr. secretary Harley some interesting particulars of his mission. In addition to the regency act, lord Halifax was commissioned to present to the electoral family the act for naturalizing the princess Sophia and her issue; and to the elector personally the insignia of the order of the garter, conferred upon him by the queen.

LORD HALIFAX TO MR. SECRETARY HARLEY.

*Hanover, 8 May, 1706.*

SIR,

I HAVE received this morning the honour of your letter of the 17:28th May, by which I hear the glorious success of the duke of Marlborough has reached England; I am confident you are all in raptures. I look upon the war at an end; that France will be obliged to make peace on what terms the queen pleases to demand, and that my message to this place will quickly be made more certain by the prince of Wales's journey

to Rome. In obedience to my instructions, I have had private audiences of the elector, the electress, the prince and princess electoral, and of duke Ernest. I repeated to them all the assurances I had before given them of the esteem, affection, and friendship that the queen has for them; and they have ordered me to assure her majesty that they have all the duty and respect imaginable for her. When I waited on the electress I carried to her printed copies of the acts in English. She gave me leave to read them to her, and I endeavoured to explain to her highness the necessity and use of all the parts of them. I gave the elector a translation of the act in French, and gave him a short account of the proceedings upon it in parliament, and the motives and grounds that the houses had for preferring such an establishment to the motion of the invitation, which he assured me he never approved. He desired the ministers might have a conference with me upon the last act, and accordingly the count Platte, count Bernsdorf, M. Gusitz, M. Buleau, M. Oberg, and M. Else, came to my house on Saturday. I had Mr. How with me, and they brought Mons. Robethon, who was interpreter betwixt us. I explained to them all the clauses in the act, as it seemed, to their satisfaction. They made a report of what had passed, to the elector and electress, and I am told they are now fully satisfied of the care and prudence of the queen and parliament in making such an establishment, and will omit nothing, on their part, to shew their approbation of it, and to make it more effectual. The electress will suddenly send over three instruments, whereby she will nominate some persons to be lords justices pursuant to the act.



I hope I have now fully executed the queen's commands in this particular, and when the ceremony of the garter is over, I shall take leave of this court, and return for England. Lord Marlborough's conquests will make my stay on this side the water much longer than I thought. I promised to bring him an account of this court, and my negotiation, when I thought I should find him in the neighbourhood of Liege or Maestricht. But where shall I now follow him? The king of Prussia will be here next week: and though I would not have gone far out of the way to meet him, I think I must not run away from him now he is coming. They expect he will propose a match between the princess of Hanover and his son, which are both nearly related to the crown of England. I wish you much joy of all this good success, and hope, in a short time, I shall have the honour of kissing your hands.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

## BATTLE OF RAMILLIES.

A. D. 1706.

DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH TO MR. SECRETARY  
HARLEY.

*Camp at Grimberg, May 28, 1706, N. S.*

SIR,

I HOPE colonel Richards will be with you in a day or two, with the good news of our victory\* over the enemy, which, by the event, appears to be much greater than we could have expected. For, on Monday night, while we were making our disposition to force the passage of the Drule, by break of day the next morning, we had advice that the enemy, having abandoned Louvain, were retired towards Brussels, so that we made our bridges, and passed the river without any opposition. We encamped that day at Bethlem, and continued our march next morning early. About ten o'clock I received the inclosed letter, by a trumpet, from the marquis de Deynse, governor of that place; whereupon I sent colonel Panton, one of my aids-de-camp, with a compliment to him, and the States, to let them know I should be glad to see them in the afternoon. About four o'clock they came to Digham, with two other deputations, one from the sovereign council of Brabant, and the other from the burgomasters and

\* On Whitsunday, May 23.

city of Brussels. They all shewed great satisfaction at their being delivered from the French yoke, and expressed, with a very becoming respect, the obligation they owe to her majesty on this occasion. As soon as they were gone, I writ a letter, in conjunction with the deputies of the army, to the States, whereof you have here a copy. I was advised to it as necessary not only to enable them to assemble, but likewise to prompt them to declare immediately for king Charles before the enemy came to make a stand. We wrote two other letters of the like tenor to the sovereign council, and to the city, which have all the good effect we could wish. For yesterday, in the afternoon, the three deputations returned with the letters, whereof you have likewise copies, owning his catholic majesty in form. They repeated again the great sense they have of her majesty's goodness in relieving them from the oppression of the French government; and I can assure you there seems to be an universal joy among all sorts of people. The magistrates of Mechlin, and those of Alost, have likewise been with me, and made their submission. The enemy have abandoned Liere, and carried all their artillery and stores to Antwerp, which I reckon is now the only place in Brabant we are not masters of. The army passed the canal of Brussels yesterday, and came and encamped at this place, where we halt to-day, and to-morrow, to refresh the troops, who have marched six days together without any rest. Nothing could excuse the giving them so great a fatigue, especially after a battle, but the necessity of pursuing the enemy, and getting hither. However, I shall send a detachment to-morrow to possess themselves of Alost. I leave my bro-

ther Churchill to command at Brussels, with four battalions of foot, and two squadrons. Our hasty pursuit of the enemy obliged them to leave a great number of wounded officers there, who are made prisoners of war, among others, the count de Horn, a lieutenant-general, and the earl of Clare, a major-general; but the latter died on Wednesday, of his wounds. There are likewise great numbers in other places.

On Sunday we shall continue our march to Alost, and so on towards Ghent, to press the enemy, whilst the consternation continues among them. I cannot help saying that I think a victory was never more compleat, nor greater advantages made of the success in so short a time. I hope God will continue to bless her majesty's arms till the enemy be reduced to a firm and solid peace. Besides the great slaughter that was made in the battle, of their best troops, we have an account, from all parts, of great numbers of deserters that are gone to Liege, Maestricht, and other frontier places, since the action, whereby their army must be much weakened.

I am, &c.

MARLBOROUGH.

## OVERTURE

FROM

THE KING OF FRANCE

FOR

A GENERAL PACIFICATION.

*A. D. 1706.*  

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WE learn from Lamberti, that during the residence of the king of Sweden in Saxony, he was strongly pressed by the court of Versailles to offer his mediation to effect a general peace. No application could be more rational or seasonable. The mediation of Sweden could not have been refused by any of the belligerent powers. Charles the XIIth, at this period, might unquestionably have dictated the terms of the peace, and have rendered himself the arbiter of Europe. The czar of Muscovy, whose power he afterwards so fatally experienced, was ready to make such concessions as ought to have satisfied the king of Sweden, and would have satisfied perhaps any other man. But elated, or rather intoxicated by prosperity, he rejected the propositions made by France, the cordial acceptance of which would have established his power and reputation on a permanent basis, upon the slight ground that similar applications had not been made by the adverse parties, and fixed his attention wholly on the extravagant and chimerical project of

dethroning the czar. In consequence of this disappointment, the king of France determined upon making a direct overture to England and Holland, for the purpose of opening a negotiation; and by his direction the elector of Bavaria, in the month of October 1706, wrote the following letter to the duke of Marlborough, another of the same tenor and date being addressed to the field deputies of the States.

*Mons, October 21, 1706.*

SIR,

THE most christian king, finding that some overtures of peace which he had caused to be made in a private manner, instead of producing the effect of making known his dispositions towards procuring a general peace, have been looked upon by ill-designing persons, as an artifice to disguise the allies and make an advantage of the misunderstanding that might be created among them, has resolved to shew the sincerity of his intentions, by renouncing all secret negotiations, and openly proposing conferences in which means may be found for the re-establishing the tranquillity of Europe. The most christian king is pleased to charge me to inform you of this, and to desire you to acquaint the queen of England with it. I give the like notification on the part of the most christian king to the States General, by a letter that I have written to the field deputies, and he would do the like with regard to the other potentates that are at war with him, had they ministers near at hand as you are to receive the like intimation, he having no design to exclude any of the said potentates from the negotiation that shall be begun in the conferences he



proposes. Moreover, for advancing a good so great and necessary to Europe, which has too long suffered the inevitable calamities of war, he consents that a place may forthwith be chosen between the two armies, and after their being separated, between Mons and Brussels, in which you, sir, with whom the interests of England are so safely entrusted, the deputies which the States shall please to nominate, and the persons whom the king of France shall empower, may begin to treat upon so important an affair. I am extremely pleased, sir, to have such an occasion to write you this letter, being persuaded it will leave no room to doubt of the sentiments of his most christian majesty, which may be so beneficial to all Europe.

You will be glad to give an account of it to the queen of England without loss of time, and to whomsoever else you shall think fit. I shall expect your answer, sir, to acquaint the most christian king of it, and shall be always ready, sir, to do you service.

TO THIS LETTER THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH  
RETURNED THE FOLLOWING ANSWER.

*Hague, November 20, 1706.*

SIR,

HAVING communicated to the queen, my mistress, what your electoral highness did me the honour to write to me in your letter of the 21st of last month, of the intentions of the most christian king, to endeavour to re-establish the tranquillity of Europe, by conferences to be held for that purpose between deputies on both sides, her majesty has commanded me to answer

your electoral highness, that as she has received with pleasure the notice of the king's inclination to agree to the making of a solid and lasting peace with all the allies, being the sole end that obliged her majesty to continue this war till now, so she will be very glad to conclude it in concert with all her allies, on such conditions as may secure them from all apprehensions of being forced to take up arms again after a short interval, as has so lately happened. Her majesty is also willing I should declare, that she is ready to enter jointly with all the high allies into just and necessary measures for attaining such a peace; her majesty being resolved not to enter upon any negotiation, without the participation of her said allies. But the way of conferences that is proposed, without more particular declarations on the part of his most christian majesty, does not seem to her to be proper for obtaining a truly solid and lasting peace. The States General are of the same opinion. Wherefore your electoral highness will rightly judge, that other more solid means must be thought on to obtain so great an end, to which her majesty will contribute with all the sincerity that can be wished, having nothing so much at heart as the relief of her subjects, and the tranquillity of Europe. Your electoral highness will always do me the justice to be persuaded of the respect with which I have the honour to be, &c.

On the day succeeding the date of this letter, and previous to its transmission, the States General convened an extraordinary meeting of the ministers of the allies resident at the Hague, at which the duke of Marlborough himself being present, their high mightinesses,

by the medium of an official deputation, thought proper to notify to this assembly, “ that France had formerly, by some private persons, made general intimations of their willingness to treat of peace; and that last winter the marquis D’Aligre had presented to the States a formal memorial on the same subject, the substance of which was read to the congress; but they had given no ear to those advances, nor communicated them to the allies, because they did not judge them worth imparting to them. But that in October last the elector of Bavaria had written a letter to the duke of Marlborough, and another to the field deputies of the States, which letters, with the draughts of the answers, were then communicated to the congress. This notification was followed by formal speeches from the duke of Marlborough and the pensionary Heinsius, recommending the rejection of the overture and the continuance of the war. The ministers of the allied powers entering warmly into these sentiments, the letters addressed to the elector were dispatched under the sanction of their unanimous approbation.

Foiled in all his pacificatory attempts both secret and public, the king of France, as the last resource, condescended to make a submissive and humiliating application to the Roman pontiff Clement XI. to interpose his good offices in order to restore the peace of Christendom, in the following remarkable and moving terms:

*Versailles, February 15, 1707.*

THE care which your holiness continues to take for procuring the peace of Europe, is always equally agree-

able to us. We have nothing more at heart than to second your endeavours, and we would even prevent you in any thing we could do to make them effectual. As it was not our fault that the war was begun, so we shall seek occasions to end it by the most ready and easy methods. Your holiness has been informed that we have already made frequent advances to come to so wholesome an end. It can be attributed only to the misfortune of the times, that catholic princes, struck with fear of displeasing the allies, should yet refuse to hear the holy exhortations of the vicar of Jesus Christ. When we left it to the arbitration of your holiness to satisfy the rights and demands of the emperor, by a valuable compensation upon some parts of the Spanish monarchy, the ministry of your holiness were charged with the care of making the proposal of it to that prince. But with what haughtiness did he reject it; having said things exorbitant, and insolently demanded that our grandson should be recalled! Who could have thought, most holy father, that he would have made so arrogant a return to an insulted king, to a minister of your holiness, and to our love of peace? For the conjuncture, far from being favourable to the house of Austria, seemed then to threaten it by the superiority of our forces, and by our gaining the battle of Cassano. But God, who is the master of events, changed the posture of our affairs. Yet though we were employed with the cares of repairing our losses, we had still in our minds the idea we had conceived of peace, at the time even of our greatest prosperity. We renewed to Holland the offer of a barrier for their state, and of the security demanded for their trade; reserv-

ing it still to ourselves to treat with the emperor about a compensation. Propositions so reasonable were again rejected by the intrigues of that party, which had shewed itself averse to the advancement of our grandson. And then we employed all our thoughts to increase our preparations for a war, which had been violently and unjustly declared against us.

Nevertheless, as it becomes us to be obedient to the pious exhortations of your holiness, and to the end that our enemies may have no pretence to impute to us the loss of so much christian blood as is already spilt, and now going to be shed, we will give your holiness a plain and frank account of the disposition we are in for peace. We will therefore acquaint your holiness, that the king, our grandson, has intrusted us with full power to convey to the archduke a part of those estates that compose the Spanish monarchy. The catholic king has the hearts of the true Spaniards, and is content to reign over them. It only depends, therefore, on the emperor to explain himself at this time, who may have, if he pleases, for ever re-united to his family, the Milanese, Naples, and Sicily, with the other islands belonging to Spain, that are situated in the Mediterranean sea. We should easily agree about a barrier for the republic of the United Provinces : and the two pretences of the war being thus removed, it would not be difficult to put an end to these misfortunes, which Europe has been so long oppressed with. We pray God that he will preserve your holiness a great many years in the government of his church.

Your devoted son  
the king of France and Navarre,  
LOUIS.

These great and ample offers of the kings of France and Spain being ultimately rejected, it would be the grossest partiality not to acknowledge that the guilt of continuing a most bloody and desolating war without any justifiable object, or any adequate necessity, supposing by a large and doubtful concession such necessity to have originally existed, rests from *this* period at least entirely with the allied powers, who cherished exorbitant projects of ambition, and were actuated also too evidently by the sanguinary spirit of revenge.



## CONQUEST OF NAPLES.

*A. D. 1707.*  

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AFTER the evacuation of Lombardy by the French in the spring of 1707, the court of Vienna, according to a very natural and obvious policy, indicated a strong desire to effect the farther acquisition of Naples and Sicily, and great preparations were made for this purpose. But a project having been formed by the courts of London, Turin, and the Hague, for an invasion of France on the side of Provence, and the consequent siege of Toulon, they joined in an obstinate opposition to the expedition to Naples, as necessarily subversive of the success of that which they considered as of infinitely greater moment. And the earl of Manchester was dispatched to the imperial court, with instructions to represent in her majesty's name, "how destructive any such design would be to the carrying on the war in Dauphiné and Provence, which is," says lord Sunderland, "the only way by which France can be affected, or a diversion made in favour of king Charles." In return the earl of Manchester informed the secretary of state, in a letter dated Vienna April 25, that notwithstanding its being holy week, he had, immediately on his arrival, seen the imperial ministers Zinzendorf and Wrattislau, and acquainted them with the orders he had received from her majesty. "As for count Zinzendorf," says the earl, "he was not so positive as the latter, but they both agreed in this, that it would not in

the least prejudice that undertaking; for since the French were entirely out of Italy, there were troops sufficient for both, that prince Eugene was to stay, though his presence would have been of very great consequence. On the next day the earl had an audience of the emperor, to whom he stated, "that the expedition into France was of the last consequence, not only in relation to the common cause, but also to the securing the crown of Spain to the king; that her majesty did hope that he had given the necessary directions in order to support it as far as it is possible." "His imperial majesty answered," says the ambassador, "with all the acknowledgment imaginable, and declared that he would do all that remained for him in relation both to the duke of Savoy and the queen." In his dispatch of May 4th, the earl of Manchester writes, that "they are still zealous for the expedition of Naples. I take all occasions to dissuade them from it, but their answer is always that there will be more troops left than can be employed. The emperor will have 35,000 men in Italy, and in our pay 20,000; the duke of Savoy has 13,000, so that the army will consist of about 68,000 men, sufficient for garrisons, and a very great army for the expedition, and more than can be subsisted. These are the arguments they make use of both to the envoy of Holland and myself. We still persist to persuade them to lay aside this expedition for the present. May 11th the ambassador writes, I believe you will have received, before this comes to your lordship, the certainty of the detachments going to Naples. It consists of five regiments of foot, and five of horse, which though not complete, will amount to ten thousand men. They are

at present in the Modonese, and about the 16th inst. they begin their march to Naples. I have done all I could to persuade them to defer it. Their arguments are still the same. Only they say farther, that prince Eugene has wrote to England to satisfy the queen, that it will not prejudice the great design against France. They have all often repeated, and do still promise, that there shall not be a man more sent, let the success be what it will, till they see the event of the other expedition, which, as I can perceive, they have no great opinion of, though they agree that it ought to be attempted."

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It should seem that the continued and pertinacious opposition of the allied courts to the Neapolitan expedition, was somewhat invidious and unreasonable; and it is sufficiently evident from the expressions used by the earl of Manchester, that he did by no means approve of the warmth with which he was compelled to urge a matter so disagreeable to the court of Vienna. "They are very much surprized," says the ambassador (May 7th), "at our being so much against this expedition. I must confess, that by all the informations I can get, I cannot see but there will be 70,000 men in Italy; and if the detachment to Naples should amount to 10,000 men, and the garrisons in Lombardy to 10,000 more, there will still remain a very great army." But the aversion of the British cabinet to this project, appears to have been insurmountable.

On the 6th of May the earl of Sunderland writes to the earl of Manchester, that he is very glad to find the ambassador has some hopes that the court of Vienna

will lay aside their thoughts of the expedition to Naples. "It was always," says his lordship, "very unseasonable, but particularly so now, since our great misfortune in Spain. Upon these accounts her majesty would have your lordship insist, in the strongest manner possible, against this expedition." And, in a subsequent dispatch from Mr. secretary Harley to the earl of Manchester, May 17th, it is said,—“I am heartily glad your excellency has had so much success as to shake that court from their *speculative expedition* against Naples. But I am very sorry that the misfortune of our army in Spain is an irresistible argument to lay aside wholly that project. The queen has done all that is possible on the sudden event, and in this great uncertainty. Orders are gone this night to encourage the king of Portugal to keep firm to the alliance; and likewise to Holland to consult with them the best way to recover the blow. But all will be to no purpose, unless the emperor will exert himself upon this occasion, not only to lay aside the expedition to Naples, to push vigorously into France, but also to act offensively upon the Rhine. These are points which the queen hath so much at heart, that her majesty hath wrote to the emperor with her own hand, which I inclose herewith. Your excellency will enforce it with such arguments as you will find, according to your great sagacity, may best incline his imperial majesty to comply with so reasonable a desire.”

## THE QUEEN TO THE EMPEROR.

*Kensington, May 6, 1707.*

SIR, MY BROTHER,

THE advantage which the enemy has now obtained in Spain might have such dismal consequences, that I could not forbear to tell you, that it is of the utmost importance that all your troops that are in Italy should be employed to make an invasion in France; and that at the same time the army in the empire should act with vigor on the Rhine. Spain is so far from the countries in which my troops and those of the States General are, that there is no remedy so quick nor so powerful as that of making this invasion: your majesty is too well informed to amuse yourself with a little expedition for some member or dependency of that kingdom, when the noble and principal parts of the monarchy in question, the honor and welfare of my brother the catholic king, and in his person the dignity of the august house of Austria, are concerned. I promise myself, therefore, from your prudence, that you will think only on the re-establishment of the affairs of that prince, by obliging his enemies to recall their troops for the defence of their own dominions. I am,

your majesty's affectionate sister,

ANNE R.

These pressing instances and representations proved, however, ultimately ineffectual; the court of Vienna constantly insisting that the forces of the allies were sufficient to carry on both these enterprizes at once. Count Thaun, with a strong body of imperialists,

marched from Lombardy through the ecclesiastical states, and struck no small terror into the court of Rome as they passed near it. The hatred which the Neapolitans bore the French, together with the severities of their government, had put that whole kingdom into such a disposition to revolt, that the small party which adhered to king Philip found it not advisable to offer any resistance, and had only time to convey their treasure and most valuable effects to Gaeta, and to retire thither. The imperialists were received into the metropolis with great rejoicings; and Gaeta being besieged in form, was carried by assault, and plundered: the garrison, retiring into the castle, were soon after forced to surrender, and were all made prisoners of war. It was proposed to follow this success, with an attempt upon Sicily; but the English fleet not being at liberty to assist them, the scheme was abandoned, though not without great reluctance, as the Sicilians were no less eager to exchange the tyranny of Spain for that of Austria, than the neighbouring and kindred nation in whose destiny theirs was naturally involved.



## BATTLE OF ALMANZA.

*A. D. 1707.*

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THE battle of Almanza, fought April 14, 1707, between the confederate army, commanded by the earl of Galway, and that of Philip V. under the duke of Berwick, was so decisive in favour of that monarch, that the farther prosecution of the war for the purpose of reducing the kingdom of Spain to the dominion of his competitor, the archduke, became, in the view of all intelligent persons, romantic and hopeless. During the session of parliament which succeeded this fatal disaster, infinite pains were taken by the tories to fix a stigma on the character of the earl of Galway, who had distinguished himself by his personal exertions on that unfortunate day, and to extol the superior sagacity of the earl of Peterborough, whose opinion had been given in favour of a plan of defensive operations. Much time and trouble were wasted in a most perplexing and tedious investigation of the question in the house of lords, who at last found themselves incompetent to pass any judgment upon it.

In the session of 1710-11, the tories being now in power, the discussion of this intricate and obsolete business was revived by the peers, with a pre-determination to throw all possible obloquy on lord Galway. For this purpose, certain queries were addressed by the house to his rival and enemy, the earl of Peterborough, who, in

his reply, gave vent to very bitter effusions of personal and party rancor. Having disgusted his friends, the whigs, by the indiscretion and extravagance of his conduct, that nobleman had now thrown himself into the arms of the tories, who equally hating him, and hated by him, were eager to render his caprice, his jealousy, and eccentricity instrumental in gratifying their spleen and revenge. On the other hand, and impelled by circumstances, the accused general vindicated his character, and the whole tenor of his proceedings, as commander of the allied forces in Spain, by a narrative drawn up in a manner singularly candid, perspicuous, and dispassionate. Few individuals were more obnoxious to the tory faction than the earl of Galway, which, from the blameless tenor of his life, might be accounted strange, were it not ascertained, by melancholy experience, that the rage of party, reversing the moral order of things, can make even the purity and perfection of an illustrious character an additional incentive to malevolence. The earl had also been distinguished by the cordial esteem and friendship of the late king William, and the political persecution of a man dear to that monarch, was assiduously urged by many, for the sake of offering an affront and insult to his glorious memory.

The earl of Peterborough had asserted in the debate, when the question came originally before the house, that the conclusive council for the operations of the ensuing campaign was held on the 15th January, (1707); and he offered to depose, on oath, that in that very council no person whatever was of opinion for making an offensive war, and against dividing the troops, but lord

Galway, lord Tyrawley, and general Stanhope. But in the paper delivered by lord Peterborough, in reply to the *queries*, he contented himself with saying, “ that several councils of war were held in the month of January, 1706-7, at Valencia, in order to adjust the measures for the ensuing campaign ; that the lords Galway, Tyrawley, and Mr. Stanhope, with the Portuguese general, were for marching towards Madrid, and seeking the enemy : and that the king, the count de Noyelles, the Spanish ministers and generals, with himself, argued against offensive operations, as highly dangerous and impracticable.” According to the earl of Peterborough’s last account, therefore, the marquis das Minas was adverse to the plan of a defensive war : and the evidence of lord Tyrawley was express, that count Oropeza, one of the Spanish ministers, and also count D’Assumar, the Portuguese ambassador, and M. Freisheim, envoy of the States, were decidedly of the same opinion. “ I do take upon me to aver,” says lord Galway himself, “ that nothing was ever transacted, during the time I had the honour to command the queen’s troops, contrary to the positive resolution of any general council, or council of war, unless that resolution was afterwards repealed by some subsequent council.”

On the present occasion the determination of the council was highly approved by the queen and her ministers. The earl of Sunderland, in his dispatch of February 14, 1706-7, declared to Mr. Stanhope, “ that nothing but interest could incline any to a contrary opinion ; and that, as to the earl of Peterborough’s projects in Italy, the less attention he (Mr. S.) gave to them the better.” “ In order to execute the resolutions of those councils

of war," continues the earl of Galway, "where it was agreed we should march to Madrid by the way of Arragon, but first to destroy the enemy's magazines on the frontiers of Valencia, I went with the marquis das Minas, in the beginning of April, to Yecla, and from thence to Villena, where we had advice of their troops being assembled at Almanza. Upon this advice, a council of war was held, where it was unanimously resolved to fight the enemy, which we were the rather induced to, because it was judged impossible to subsist upon the defensive in the kingdom of Valencia; for the country had already been so much exhausted by our winter quarters, that there was not two days provision to be found for the army, and we could not have been able to have subsisted there so long as we did, but for the supply we found in the enemy's magazines in Yecla. Nor did we think it proper to pursue the once intended march through that kingdom and Arragon, lest provisions should be wanting, leaving the enemy so near, and in a condition to follow us. For, though commissaries had been employed, there was reason to apprehend the towns we were to pass through would shut the gates against us, whilst we were closely followed by the enemy, and persecuted by the peasants of the country, who, grown desperate by seeing themselves abandoned, would naturally be up in arms in the mountains. Besides, we had certain advice that there was already a body of French troops, consisting of 8,000 men, in Spain, and upon their march to reinforce the enemy. Thus, as the army must inevitably have perished without fighting, it was thought reasonable to run the hazard of a battle, wherein we had an equal chance to come off victors."

Such was the dangerous situation of an army upon which the archduke Charles depended for the dethronement of his rival, and for placing the crown of Spain upon his head. Notwithstanding the able defence of lord Galway, and the detection of many random and false assertions in the paper delivered in by the earl of Peterborough, the house resolved that the latter had given a very faithful, just and honorable account of the councils of war in Valencia, and that the earl of Galway, lord Tyrawley, and general Stanhope, insisting, in a conference held at Valencia, some time in January, 1706-7, in the presence of the king of Spain, and the queen's name being used in maintenance of their opinions for an offensive war, contrary to the king of Spain's opinion, and that of all the general officers, and public ministers, except the marquis das Minas; and the opinion of the earl of Galway, lord Tyrawley, and general Stanhope being pursued in the operations of the following campaign, was the unhappy occasion of the battle of Almanza, and one great cause of our misfortunes in Spain, and of the duke of Savoy's expedition before Toulon, concerted with her majesty."

The object of the earl of Galway's commission, therefore, was avowedly the conquest of Spain, and his crime, according to the judgment of their lordships, that he fought a battle in order to obtain it!—"Never," says bishop Burnet, "was any thing carried on in the house of lords so little to their honor as this was. Some who voted with the rest seemed ashamed of it. The duke of Buckingham said, in plain words, that they had the majority, and would make use of it. They loaded, singly, the earl of Galway with the loss of the battle of

Almanza, though it was resolved on, in a council of war, that he had behaved himself in it with all the bravery and conduct that could be expected from a great general."—*Barnet's History of his own Times*, vol. iv. p. 311.



## CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

MR. HARLEY AND LORD GODOLPHIN.

A. D. 1707.

THE following letters exhibit the commencement and progress of that disagreement which took place, during the years 1706-7, between lord Godolphin and Mr. Harley. Marlborough and Godolphin had now relinquished their connection with the tory party, and were anxiously courting the friendship and support of the whigs. Mr. Harley, from a variety of causes, disapproved of this total change of system, and ventured, though in language the most obsequious and submissive, to remonstrate against it.

The temper and policy of this minister, dark, subtle, and indecisive, had always led him to *trim* between the two parties: and to endeavour to cultivate the favor of each, valuing himself upon his address in poising the political balance. He had now also begun, in concert with Mrs. Masham, to establish a separate interest with the queen, and he knew that she dreaded being thrown entirely into the hands of the whigs. In fine, he was aware that one of the schemes in agitation was the dismissal of sir Charles Hedges, joint secretary of state, a man much inferior to himself in political consequence, and to transfer the possession of the seals to lord Sunderland, who had married one of the daughters of the duke

of Marlborough, and whose connections, rank, fortune, and talents, would render the jealous and aspiring Harley comparatively insignificant. Impressed with these considerations, he insinuates to lord Godolphin the impolicy of entirely breaking with the tories; he expresses his dislike of the gross partiality with which the controverted elections were decided by the house of commons in favour of the whigs, under the auspices of the present ministers; and he represents, in that cloudy and obscure mode of writing which he usually adopted, and perhaps affected, the inveterate dislike and animosity of the zealous adherents of that party to the lords Marlborough and Godolphin.

That Mr. Harley entertained any views, at this early period, of supplanting those great leaders, is very improbable. He was now gradually ascending the dangerous steps of ambition, but without fixing his eye on any distinct or determinate object; and his conduct may be easily accounted for from obvious causes, without supposing him to have carried his arts of refinement and dissimulation to strange and extravagant lengths.

LORD GODOLPHIN TO MR. SECRETARY HARLEY.

*August 10th, 1706.*

SIR,

I HEREWITH return you the letters and papers you sent me, with many thanks for the favor of your letter, and your being so particular in the matter upon which I desired your thoughts, though I differ in opinion. I think the matter of elections was but a pretext taken in the last session: there was an averseness at

bottom to do any thing that they thought would give merit to the whigs ; though it was, and is, a demonstration that without them, and *their being entire*, the queen cannot be served ; but the leaning to what I take to be an impossibility, will, I doubt, make them jealous and uneasy, and at best but passive ; the consequence of which is, that the majority will be against us upon every occasion of consequence. I hope, however, the queen's service will go on, and, for myself, I am as little concerned as one need to be upon such an occasion, but I am not blind or asleep. The topics you mention would not hurt us alone, if there were not a preparation to make them uneasy and jealous from whom only we can have or hope for any friendship.

GODOLPHIN.

MR. SECRETARY MARLEY TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

*Brampton, 15 August, 1706.*

As to home affairs, what I wrote to your lordship was in the sincerity of my heart, and what I could collect from my conversation with both parties, and of which I am at any time ready to give your lordship the particulars : but far be it from me to espouse any opinion of my own, or to differ from your lordship's judgment. I shall always be ready when required, and never but then, to give my poor thoughts, and such reasons as I have, and when I have done that I know myself too well to be fond of any notions of my own, with that attachment to your lordship and lord Marlborough, which I shall always preserve.

The reason I mentioned elections in my letter was ;

because the occasion of stumbling is in a great measure removed, and from the little experience I have had, the attempting to bend every body in one measure in the affair hath proved one of the greatest means of ruining the expectation of that party which hath attempted it ; and I have often seen the foundation laid of blowing up each of the factions by that very method ; and the reason is plain, for those very gentlemen who think themselves to be independent, and would be thought to be so, but yet would support the queen, and serve her ministers, expect their compliance therein should be accepted, and that they should be left to themselves in personal friendships and matters which I will always think remote from government observation, and that if they vote for the public service of the government, and support the ministers, more ought not to be expected of them. Indeed, I have not been able to answer them when they have said “ why should not every body’s services be accepted as far as they will go ? ” and it is not impossible but one step may draw on another. This I am certain, that many of the most staunch whigs, not whimsical, have, and do frequently lament the fury of their leaders, and have rejoiced when their presumption was humbled ; and, to use an expression of one of them, that if they were gratified in all they desire they would immediately be undone. I am very far from making them jealous ; I did not mean their places should be given to others ; but I was humbly of opinion, that whoever would come in a volunteer to the service should be accepted as far as he would go : and I am the more confirmed in the opinion, because those who call themselves whigs, if united, are the inferior numbers, and that they

will not follow those who make themselves their leaders, but yet may be united in the queen's service by her ministers; and yet at the same time they would make every one else desperate. Nay, to use the words of one of themselves, they have at present a great many who never differed yet from them, and as to those who came unto them, some whereof have surrendered themselves, and gave elections to them, and laid themselves at their feet, and yet they will not be contented with them, and every one who have helped to rescue them from the malice and rage of their adversaries, and to make them a majority, have been made sensible that all that went for nothing, and they were told, more than once or twice, expressly, that they hoped in a little time to cast them off, and do without them. I have, with grief, observed that the leaders, or zealots rather, of both parties are frequent, even now, in their reflections on the queen's ministers, I mean your lordship, and my lord Marlborough. I cannot but apprehend danger, from both sides, in the extreme, and therefore am humbly of opinion, to increase the number of those who would devote themselves to the queen's, and your service, would be the best; and I rather mention this, because so many have been lately obliged to pay their acknowledgments to, and real dependence on, other people. As to myself, I have made all the application imaginable to those who would be thought the chiefs of their faction; and there is nothing I will not do for the queen's service and the support of her ministers. Neither would I have troubled your lordship with this long scribble, but that your lordship's indulgence has encouraged me to tell you the truth, and what you may, when you please,



have confirmed from the mouths of those of that very party who have no little interest in both houses. And now I have said this, I believe your lordship will be so just to me as to be assured I have no measures, nor will have any, but what shall be submitted to the test of your better judgment, and that you will have the goodness to impute it to my zeal when I cannot forbear saying, that this ensuing session may be made very easy, or difficult, by either giving or sparing a few good words, without any further engagement than to let those who are not stigmatized by any particular folly know, that they need not be desperate. I have now tired your lordship's patience with my impertinence, and will add nothing more than that having shot my bolt, there remains nothing further for me than to obey your commands, &c. &c.

In this very characteristic letter some gleams of good sense are discernible amidst the heavy mass of confusion, obscurity, and adulation, in which they are enveloped. To be guided by principles of equity and conciliation, undiverted by motives of personal animosity, in the conflict of contending factions, must be acknowledged a policy no less wise than generous. But both the head and heart of Harley were unequal to the task. In attempting, or feigning to attempt it, he entangled himself in an inextricable maze of art, duplicity, and deceit. At this period Godolphin and Marlborough had adopted the more open and obvious policy of keeping no measures with the tories, and of establishing the complete and permanent superiority of the whigs. And had not the pride and folly of the duchess of Marlborough caused the queen eventually to withdraw her favour and confi-



dence, and the ambition of the duke prompted him to continue the war after the nation had, with reason, become weary of it, the present administration might, upon their own system, have unquestionably retained, beyond all hazard of competition, their boundless political authority. It does not appear that lord Godolphin entertained, at this time, any suspicions of Mr. Harley's fidelity and attachment; but, ere many months had elapsed, the mysterious nocturnal interviews of Harley with the queen, in company with Mrs. Masham, could no longer be concealed. Nothing, however, of a public nature transpired to excite the apprehension, that the sovereign was influenced by the secretary, in relation to any public transaction, till the vacant bishoprics of Exeter and Chester were by the queen's express nomination, and contrary to the remonstrances of the minister, filled by Dr. Blackwell and sir William Dawes, whose political principles were notoriously adverse to those of the whigs; an alarming circumstance, to which Mr. Harley alludes in the subsequent correspondence.

## MR. HARLEY TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

(Extract.)

*September 10, 1707.*

As to the last paragraph of your lordship's letter, I crave leave most solemnly to profess to you, that I have made it my study to serve the queen upon an honest principle; that I have no attachment to any other person in the world, but your lordship and the duke of Marlborough. I know of no enemy I have but such as either have expressed themselves with equal bitterness against both your lordships, upon many occasions, or

are so to me because of my adherence to you. I am too well acquainted with the practices of a sort of people, who wound those they don't like in the dark; and, by whispers and secret misrepresentations, would ruin the reputation of any one they do not fancy. I know your lordship is too just to admit of any insinuations of that kind, and I am so little fond of standing in any one's way, that any endeavours of that sort give me no disquiet, because they depend upon your lordship's goodness to let me know when I am thought a burden to the service, or uneasy to any one, and the least hint of that nature shall meet with a very ready compliance in me by a willing retreat.

As to joining in measures, it has been my endeavour to give demonstrations that I have been very far from being pertinacious in my own opinion. I am not fond in giving it, and am no ways concerned if it do not take. I had much rather be directed than not, and shall never be inquisitive to know any thing but how to do my duty. It has always been my temper to go along with the company, and not to give them uneasiness. If they should say Harrow on the Hill, or by Maidenhead, were the nearest way to Windsor, I would go with them, and never dispute it, if that would give content, and that I might not be forced to swear it was so. I am very sincere, and find in what I told your lordships in my former letter upon this subject, that I had been and would be entirely under your direction; and whatever is insinuated to the contrary, I never have acted upon any other foot. I am satisfied to a demonstration, there can be no other centre of union; but the queen, by the ministration of your lordship, and the

duke of Marlborough, and there the bulk of the nation will fix themselves if they may be suffered. All other expedients are very wretched things, and will end but very ill; and I dread the thoughts of running from the extreme of one faction to another, which is the natural consequence of party tyranny, and renders the government like a door which turns both ways upon its hinges, to let in each party as it grows triumphant, and in truth it is the real parent and nurse of our factions here. It is time to relieve your lordship's patience, and beg pardon for this tedious letter; and withal to desire leave to assure your lordship, that you have not a more faithful servant nor a truer or more zealous friend than myself, to the utmost of my capacity, &c.

## MR. HARLEY TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

*September 17, 1707.*

I AM very sensible how much too far my zeal for the service hath carried me formerly to trouble your lordship with tedious letters. I no more will offend in that kind: If you will please to add this fault to my other errors, for I cannot forbear just telling your lordship, how uneasy I am under the charge of doing any thing against your interest. I was provided against any other attack, but this, which strikes me in a most sensible part, is a fault which both friends and enemies will acquit me of. However, I must arm myself with patience; a little time will clear me from this aspersion; and I learn this, that it is no more in a man's power to devise the methods by which he is to be put out, than it is to foresee how he is to come in. I have done nothing; but it is a justice I owe to myself, to let your lordship

know I have told you nothing but truth. I scorn to deny any thing I have done: and if I had ever directly or indirectly, by myself or any other, recommended those two persons, I am not so mean as to deny it, which I most solemnly do. I have no more to add, but most hearty wishes for your lordship's prosperity and success. You can never have a more sincere friend and servant, though I am deemed now unprofitable and useless, &c.

MR. HARLEY TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

*December 5, 1707.*

I HUMRLY beg that I may have leave to wait upon your lordship this evening at your house at eight, having some account to give you, which I think, in duty to your service, I ought to acquaint you with; and I should be very glad my lord duke of Marlborough were present: I hope your lordship will *this once* pardon the trouble I give you, &c. &c.

LORD GODOLPHIN TO MR. HARLEY.

*December 5, 1707, Friday Evening.*

I SHOULD be extremely sorry if I were capable of giving occasion to any body, and much more to you, to write me a letter in so very extraordinary a stile as yours seems to me; however, if you have any commands to me, I will be at home between eight and nine this night to receive them, and send to the duke of Marlborough to meet you there, &c. &c.

MR. HARLEY TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

*January 30, 1707-8.*

LAST night Mr. Attorney acquainted me that I was

fallen into your lordship's displeasure: he would not tell me any particulars. This I could not but receive with the utmost grief, and had it not been so late, I had given your lordship the trouble of a letter, to desire leave to wait upon you to clear myself. This morning my lord of Marlborough gave me permission to attend him upon a like occasion, and his grace was pleased to tell me the particulars. I know it is impossible to ward against misrepresentations or misconstructions, or the application of things said generally to a particular purpose, which was never thought of: for I do solemnly protest I never entertained the least thought derogating from your lordship, or prejudicial to your interest. I am confident in my own innocency, and I know no better way to clear myself than to desire your lordship will let me, by my actions, demonstrate the sincerity of my intentions, and my zeal and duty for your lordship's person and service, &c. &c.

## LORD GODOLPHIN TO MR. HARLEY.

I HAVE received your letter, and am very sorry for what has happened, to lose the good opinion I had so much inclination to have of you; but I cannot help seeing and hearing, nor believing my senses. I am very far from having deserved it from you. God forgive you, &c. &c.

*Correspondence Somerville's Appendix,*

## EXPEDITION OF THE PRETENDER TO SCOTLAND.

*A. D. 1708.*

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EARLY in the spring of the year 1708, great naval and military preparations were made by France for the purpose of transporting the Pretender into Scotland, where discontents, and even disaffection to the government, ran high, in consequence of the recent and unpopular event of the union. The chevalier de St. George, such was the appellation by which the pretended monarch was generally known, set out from St. Germain's, March 7th, in order to join the armament at Dunkirk. Louis the XIVth made him a visit on the day previous to his departure, and presenting to him a sword enriched with diamonds, desired him always to remember that it was a French sword, repeating the compliment he had formerly paid to the late king James on a similar occasion, that he hoped never to see him again. Upon his arrival at the place of embarkation, he found very fine tents, a magnificent set of gold and silver plate, clothing for his future life-guards, &c. The expence attending this expedition was supposed to be in great part defrayed by the pope (Clement XI), to whom at this interesting and critical moment his most christian majesty addressed the following letter :

HOLY FATHER,

THE great zeal which I have always had to re-establish on the throne of England king James Stuart



III. is well known to you, though there was not hitherto a time proper for it, as well by reason of the conjuncture as by the unity of my enemies, which did not give me leave to act in so righteous a cause for our holy faith, the chief object of all our actions. We have now thought good to let him depart from our royal seat on the 7th of March, in order to embark himself on board a fleet, where every thing has been prepared for him, with sufficient forces to establish him on the throne, after he shall have been received on his arrival by the faithful people of Scotland, and proclaimed as their true and lawful king. I have thought it fit not to omit sending you this important news, that by your ardour the union of our holy mother the church may increase in that kingdom, and that God may prosper him whilst the time is favourable. It is now, holy father, your business to accompany him, by your zeal with your holy benedictions, which I also ask for myself, and I remain, holy father,

your most loving son,

*Versailles, March 9, 1708.*

LOUIS.

The British ministry were not wanting in vigour and activity, respecting the measures proper to be adopted, in order to dispel the impending storm. On the 4th of March Mr. secretary Boyle laid before the house of commons the advices received by her majesty, in relation to the intended invasion, upon which the house, with the concurrence of the lords, presented a most loyal address to the queen, expressing their unanimous and determined resolution, with their lives and fortunes, to maintain her majesty's undoubted right and title to the crown of these realms.

The parliament then passed these bills; one for declaring all who refused the abjuration to be in the condition of convict-recusants. By the second the habeas corpus act was suspended till October; and by the last the clans of Scotland were discharged from their vassalage to any rebel chieftains. Ten battalions of British troops were ordered immediately home from Flanders; the earl of Leven, commander in chief in Scotland, began to form an army near the city of Edinburgh; but what was of more importance than all other measures of caution or defence united, a powerful squadron had been fitted out with incredible diligence, under the command of sir George Byng, an officer of great skill and courage, who cast anchor off Mardyke, on the 27th February. M. Fourbin, who commanded the French armament, astonished at the sudden appearance of a force so far superior, represented to the French king that he might indeed get out of Dunkirk harbour, and perhaps land the troops, but that he could not answer for his majesty's ships; but he received in return positive orders to put to sea with the first fair wind. The British fleet being soon after driven from their station by stress of weather, the count sailed March the 17th from Dunkirk, at three in the morning, but sir George Byng having notice of it in a few hours, pursued them so closely, that it was not in the power of M. Fourbin to land the troops he had on board, according to their destination, in the Frith of Forth. A nocturnal engagement took place in the mouth of the Frith, in which one of their largest ships struck to the English, the rest escaping with difficulty under cover of the darkness. They then attempted to make for Inverness, but violent

tempests arising in that northern and boisterous sea, so shattered the French squadron, already damaged by the engagement, that a unanimous resolution was taken to return forthwith to Dunkirk, where they landed in the month of April, after losing above 4000 men in this hopeless and romantic expedition, against which M. Fourbin had, as he himself informs us, remonstrated in the strongest terms. "The night before I set out for Dunkirk," to transcribe the words of this officer in his memoirs, "I went to court to take my leave of the king." "M. le Compté," said his majesty, "you are sensible of the importance of your commission, I hope you will discharge it like yourself." "Sir," replied I, "your majesty does me very great honour, but if you will vouchsafe me a moment's audience, I have several things to represent to you concerning this commission." The king, who had been informed by the minister of the objections I had made to it all along, only said, "Monsieur Fourbin, I wish you a good voyage, I have affairs upon my hands, and cannot hear you now."

On the  $\frac{1}{2}$  March the queen came in person to the house of peers, and in a gracious and popular speech informed the two houses, that she had received advices of the sailing of the French fleet northward, with the PRETENDER on board. On this occasion both houses presented addresses remarkably firm and animated. In these addresses the first symptoms are to be found of any suspicions publicly expressed by the whigs, of the decline of their influence with the queen.

"There can be nothing so dangerous or fatal to the safety of your royal person," say the commons, "and the security of your present happy establishment, as

those persons who endeavour to create divisions and animosities among your faithful subjects, or by any artful methods lessen the just esteem your majesty has for those who have so eminently, and in so distinguishing a manner, commanded your armies and managed your treasure, to the honor and glory of your majesty abroad, and the entire satisfaction of your people at home. We therefore humbly beg leave to beseech your majesty to discountenance all such persons and designs in the most remarkable manner." And the lords adopted language to the same purpose yet more emphatical. "We hope," say their lordships, "your majesty will always have a just detestation of those persons, who, at any time when this hellish attempt was on foot, and so near breaking out, were using their endeavors to misrepresent the actions of your best subjects, and create jealousies in your majesty of those who had always served you most eminently and faithfully: and we beseech your majesty not to give so just a cause of uneasiness to the people, as to suffer any such hereafter to have access to your royal person. We hope for this good effect from so unhappy an occasion, that the universal zeal which will appear for the preservation of your majesty's government, and the protestant succession, will unite us to one another, and cure our mistakes and misapprehensions, which have been so industriously and maliciously improved. But nevertheless we most humbly offer it to your majesty, as our opinion, that your majesty should principally depend upon and encourage those who have been, ever since the Revolution, most steady and firm to the interest of the late king, and of your majesty during your happy reign." To these addresses the queen re-

turned, as far as words could go, very satisfactory answers.

To the commons she said, “ I think all who endeavour to make divisions among my faithful subjects, must be mine and the kingdom’s enemies ; and I shall never countenance any persons who would go about to lessen the just esteem which I have for those who have done and continue to do me the most eminent services.” In terms still more explicit, she thus concluded her reply to the address of the peers : “ As I cannot but wish there were not the least occasion of distinction among my subjects, so I must always place my chief dependence upon those who have given such repeated proofs of the greatest warmth and concern for the support of the Revolution, security of my person, and of the protestant succession.”

Notwithstanding the amplitude of these professions, the chiefs of the whig party well knew that all was false and hollow, and that the heart of the queen was totally alienated from them. But they depended with fatal presumption upon her inability to emancipate herself from what she now visibly regarded as a state of political degradation and bondage.

## STATE OF POLITICS IN ENGLAND.

*A. D.* 1708-9-10.

EVERY circumstance concurs to prove that the impolitic violence practised upon the queen, in compelling her to dismiss sir Charles Hedges, and to appoint the earl of Sunderland secretary of state in his room, gave the first sensible and real shock, to the Marlborough interest. It is indeed asserted that the duchess of Marlborough, after the victory of Blenheim, and her subsequent advancement to the rank of princess of the empire, became visibly more neglectful than formerly of her duty at court, and, in the presence of the queen, her behaviour was remarked to be inattentive, and almost contemptuous to her majesty, who conceived in time a disgust at this, though she was long before she discovered any symptoms of resentment. Her absences also were very frequent, and unusually protracted, and she fondly imagined that the attentions of her kinswoman, Mrs. Hill, afterwards Mrs. Masham, would compensate for her own negligence. But the moment Mrs. Hill perceived that she had superseded the duchess in the queen's affections, she ceased to be a co-adjutor, and became a rival: choosing Mr. Harley as her adviser and confidential friend. In the session of 1705-6, the Tories had given mortal offence to the queen, by bringing forward in parliament the famous motion for inviting over the princess Sophia, and she then declared, to the lords Marlborough and Godolphin, her resolution to put her-



self and her affairs into the hands of the whigs ; who, in fact, were now in possession of all the great offices of government, that held by sir Charles Hedges alone excepted. But the house of Marlborough thinking nothing done while any thing remained undone, resolved, in an evil hour, to procure, by whatever means, this post for the earl of Sunderland, who had married the second daughter of the duke. When this project was mentioned to the queen, she appeared so violently averse to the dismissal of sir Charles Hedges, and persevered so resolutely in her opposition to the appointment of the earl of Sunderland, that the duke of Marlborough himself was wisely inclined to relinquish the design : but it was urged upon him so strongly by the duchess, and the whig party in general, that he seemed at length persuaded his honour and interest were both at stake to accomplish this favourite object.

The queen's excessive dislike to the measures may be accounted for from the concurrent operation of very different causes :—1st. Her long acquaintance with, and personal regard and esteem for, sir Charles Hedges, who had shewn himself much attached to her interest in the late reign—2d. Her desire to maintain and preserve some medium of political intercourse with the tory party, of whose more secret views and sentiments she had an unobserved opportunity of being informed in her confidential conversations with sir Charles Hedges—3d. And chiefly her extreme dread, incited and inflamed to the utmost by Mr. Harley and Mrs. Masham, of being thrown entirely, and beyond all possibility of remedy, into the hands of the whigs, and particularly of the Marlborough family, who had of late treated her with a

degree of arrogance, which she strongly felt, and in secret severely resented.

In the month of October, 1706, the duke of Marlborough wrote, from the camp of Gramez, near Aeth, a letter to the dutchess, apparently designed for the queen's inspection, in the following terms :

WHEN I writ my last I was very full of the spleen, and I think with too much reason. My whole time, to the best of my understanding, has been employed for the public good, as I do assure you I do, in the presence of God, neglecting no opportunity of letting 83 see what I take to be her true interest. It is terrible to go through so much uneasiness. I do not say this to flatter any party, for I will never do it, let the consequence be what it will : for as parties they are both wrong. But it is certain 73 and his adherents are not to be trusted ; so that 83 has no choice but that of employing those who will carry on the war, and support 91, and if any other method is taken I know we shall go into confusion. Now, this being the case, I leave you to judge whether I am dealt kindly with. I do not say this for any other end but to have your justice and kindness, for in that will consist my future happiness. I am sure I would venture a thousand lives, if I had them, to procure ease and happiness to the queen ; and yet no number of men could persuade me to act as a minister in what was not my opinion. So that I shall never fail in speaking my mind very freely ; and, as my opinion is, that the tackers, and all the adherents of 73, are not for carrying on the war, which is for the true interest of the queen and kingdom, you may depend I shall

never join with any but such as I think will serve her, and the true interest of our country, with all their hearts. And if the war continues but one year longer with success, I hope it will not be in any body's power to make the queen's business uneasy; and then I should be glad to live as quietly as possible, and not envy the governing men, who would then, I believe, think better of 90 and 91 than they now do. And I will own frankly to you, that the jealousy some of your friends have that 90 and 91 do not act sincerely makes me so weary, that were it not for my gratitude for 83, and concern for 91, I would now retire and never serve more. For I have had the good luck to deserve better from all Englishmen than to be suspected for not being in the true interest of my country, which I am, and ever will be, without being of a faction. And this principle shall govern me for the little remainder of my life. I must not think of being popular; but I shall have the satisfaction of not going to the grave with the opinion of not having acted as became an honest man. And if I have your esteem and love, I should think myself entirely happy.

Having writ thus far, I have received your two letters of the 20th and 21st, which confirm me in my opinion before. And since the resolution is taken to vex and ruin 91 because 83 has not complied with what was desired for 117, I shall from henceforth despise all mankind, and think there is no such thing as virtue. For I know with what zeal 91 has pressed 83 in that matter. I do pity him, and shall always love him as long as I live, and never be a friend to any that can be his enemy. I have writ my mind very freely to 83 on this occasion, so that whatever misfortunes may happen, I shall have

a quiet mind, having done what I thought my duty. And as for the resolution of making me uneasy, I believe they will not have much pleasure in that, for as I have not set my heart on having justice done me, I shall not be disappointed, nor will I be ill used by any man.

This letter appears well calculated for the purpose for which it was intended ; but on recollecting some parts of his grace's conduct, it forces a smile to observe this nobleman assuming the air of a rigid moralist, and pretending to despise the world for want of virtue. As to the obvious artifice of substituting cyphers for names, it was, no doubt, purposely adapted to the shallow capacity of the queen ; and it is scarcely necessary to explain to any one that 88 means her majesty, 90 and 91 the lords Marlborough and Godolphin, 73 the earl of Rochester, and 117 the earl of Sunderland.

This artful letter might not improbably have produced the desired effect, had it not been accompanied by another from the duchess of Marlborough to the queen, written in a stile of unexampled rudeness and insolence. From this period, the affection and friendship of the queen, which, though of late considerably on the decline, had stood the test of more than twenty years, was extinguished, never again to be re-lumined.

#### DUCHESS OF MARLBOROUGH TO THE QUEEN.

BY the letter I had from your majesty this morning, and the great weight you put upon the difference betwixt the word notion and nation in my letter, I am only made sensible, as by many other things, that

you were in a great disposition to complain of me, since, to this moment, I cannot for my life see any essential difference betwixt these two words, as to the sense of my letter, the true meaning of which was only to let your majesty know, with that faithfulness and concern which I have ever had for your service, that it was not possible for you to carry on your government much longer, with so much partiality to one sort of men, though they lose no opportunity of disserving you, and of shewing the greatest inveteracy against my lord Marlborough, and my lord treasurer, and so much discouragement to others, who even, after great disobligations, have taken several opportunities to shew their firmness to your majesty's interest, and their zeal to support you and your ministers too, only because they had been faithful and useful servants to you and the public. This was all the sense and meaning of my letter; and if you can find fault with this, I am so unhappy as that you must always find fault with me, for I am incapable of thinking otherwise as long as I live, or of acting now but upon the same principle that I served you before you came to the crown, for so many years, when your unlimited favor and kindness to me could never tempt me to make use of it, in one single instance, that was not for your interest and service. I am afraid I have been too long in explaining my thoughts upon the subject of my own letter, which, it seems, has been so great an offence: and how justly I leave you to judge. And I must beg your patience, since I am not very like to trouble you again, to let me say something upon the subject of your letter to my lord treasurer, which he has shewn me to-day, with more concern than I know how



to express. This was indeed the subject of my own letter, and the occasion of it; for I do not only see the un-easiness and the grief he has to leave your service, when you seem so desirous he should continue in it, but I see, as well as he, the impossibility of his being able to support it, or himself, or my lord Marlborough, for it all hangs upon one thread, and when they are forced to leave your service, you will then indeed find yourself in the hands of a violent party, who, I am sure, will have very little mercy, or even humanity for you. Whereas you might prevent all these misfortunes, by giving my lord treasurer, and my lord Marlborough, whom you may so safely trust, leave to propose those things to you which they know, and can judge to be absolutely necessary for your service, which will put it in their power to influence those who have given you proofs both of their being able to serve you, and of their desiring to make you great and happy. But rather than your majesty will employ a party-man, as you are pleased to call lord Sunderland, you will put all things in confusion; and, at the same time that you say this, you employ sir Charles Hedges, who is in one against you; only that he has voted in remarkable things that he might keep his place: and he did the same thing in the late king's time, till at last that every body saw he was just dying, and he could lose nothing by differing with that court. But formerly he voted with these men, the enemies to this government, called whigs; and if he had not been a party-man, how could he have been secretary of state, when all your councils were influenced by my lord Rochester, lord Nottingham, sir Edward Seymour, and about six or seven more just such men, that call them-



selves the heroes for the church. But what church can any man be of that would disturb so just a government as yours? Or how can any body be in the true interest of England that opposes you and your ministers, by whose advice, in four years time, you are very near pulling down the power of France, and making that religion, they only talk of, not only more secure than in any of the late reigns, but putting it upon a better foundation than it has been since the Reformation? You are pleased to say you think it a great hardship to persuade a man to part with a place he is in possession of for one that is not vacant. In some cases that were certainly right, but not in this, for sir Charles Hedges can have the place he desires immediately; and it is much better for him, unless he could be secretary of state for life. He will have two places that are considerable, one of which he can compass no other way; and this is so far from being a hardship, that he and all the world must think it a great kindness done him; and he must be a very weak man if he lost the opportunity of having such a certainty, when he cannot flatter himself that whatever happens he can be supported long in a place of that consequence, for which he is so unfit. He has no capacity, no quality, no interest, nor ever could have been in that post, but that every body knows my lord Rochester cares for nothing so much as a man that he thinks will depend upon him. I beg your majesty's pardon for not waiting upon you, and I persuade myself, that long as my letter is, it will be less troublesome to your majesty.

It does not appear that the lords Marlborough and

Godolphin entertained, at this time, any suspicion that the queen's reluctance to supersede sir Charles Hedges was in the least heightened by the secret artifices of Mr. Harley. On the contrary, the best understanding prevailed between them for many months after this period, and the secretary's professions of attachment seemed to rise in ardor in a very exact proportion to their want of sincerity. In a letter, dated May 24 (1706), he compliments the duke upon uniting the characters of Scipio and Hannibal. In the following month of August, he declares how often he had been provoked to see so much public and private ingratitude exercised towards the duke. March 25, (1707) he returns his grace most hearty and humble thanks for the favorable expressions contained in his letter. In answer, apparently to some secret insinuations to his prejudice, he says, "I beg leave to assure your grace that I serve you by inclination and principle, and a very little time will make that manifest, as well as that I have no views or aims of my own." In a very short time after this, however, the duchess of Marlborough received indubitable information of the clandestine cabals of the secretary, in conjunction with Mrs. Masham. Although the duke, still incredulous as to the extent and magnitude of their object, in a letter to her grace, from the camp at Meldest, June 3, (1707) says, "If you are sure that Mrs. Masham speaks of business to the queen, I should think you might with some caution tell her of it, which would do good, for she certainly must be grateful, and will mind what you say."

Mrs. Masham had been introduced to the queen by the duchess, to whom she was nearly related, and from

whom she had received essential obligations. But gratitude, as the duke of Marlborough might, and must have known, is a virtue of rare growth at courts. Besides, the ingratitude of Mrs. Masham does not appear to have been of a very atrocious kind: and the most rigid morality will scarcely impute it as a crime to her, that she had found means to render herself agreeable in the eyes of her mistress and sovereign, who had been pleased to distinguish her by signal marks of her favor and friendship. That she did not chuse to remain dependent upon the duchess, when it was in her power to become independent, is a sentiment so congenial to human nature as to excite, in the minds of indifferent and impartial persons, very little either of surprize or resentment: and the duchess has no where been able to make it appear that Mrs. Masham had, as yet, exerted her newly acquired influence over the queen to her prejudice. But from the moment that her grace was apprized of the fact that the favor and influence which she herself had so long possessed, was transferred to, or divided with, Mrs. Masham, she was seized with the most violent transports of anger, rage, and jealousy; and in a letter, dated September 23, (1707) she directly charged her kinswoman and quondam *protégée*, with breach of trust and friendship; to which Mrs. Masham returned a very proper answer, requesting to know what was her crime, and who her accuser. “I am sure madam,” said that lady, “your goodness cannot deny me what the meanest may ask the greatest”—and she declares her grace’s displeasure “to be the greatest unhappiness that could befall her.” Apparently, at this period, she was reluctant to risque an open rupture with

the duchess, and would willingly have contented herself with the private and personal advantages she might have derived from the queen's partiality. But the violence of the duchess's temper made it impossible to keep up appearances. The queen herself, nevertheless, made repeated efforts to soothe and conciliate the mind of this imperious woman, even after she had received her insolent letter relative to lord Sunderland, who was put in possession of the seals, December, 1706. In her letter of October 30th, (1707) to the duchess, she says, "I am very sorry you, who have known me so long, can give way to such a thought as that I do not think the parting with my lord Marlborough and my lord treasurer of much consequence, because I did not mention any thing of my lord Marlborough's kind letter concerning me. The reason of this was, I really was in a great hurry when I writ to you, and not having time to write on that subject to both, I thought it was the most necessary to endeavor to let him see he had no reason to have suspicions of any one's having power with me besides himself and my lord treasurer, and I hope they will believe me—I never did, nor never will give them any just reason to forsake me; and they have too much honor, and too sincere a love for their country, to leave me without a cause." And in another letter, written shortly afterwards, she intreats her to banish all unkind and unjust thoughts. "Indeed," says the queen, "I do not deserve them, and if you could see my heart, you would find it as sincere, as tender, and as passionately fond of you as ever, and as truly sensible of your kindness in telling me your mind freely upon all occasions—nothing shall ever alter me." Though it is

impossible to give full credit to these professions, it is plain that the queen at this period dreaded, no less than Mrs. Masham, a rupture with the Marlborough family, and would have conceded and sacrificed much to keep upon fair and decorous terms with the duchess. But she was wearied with her everlasting complaints and remonstrances; and in an interview, which was the last the duchess ever had with Mrs. Masham, and which took place at the express desire and request of the latter, December 1707, she renewed her reproaches in bitter language—declaring the queen's affections to be alienated from her, and ascribing, in expressions full of passion and resentment, this fatal change to the artifices of Mrs. Masham, who finding, doubtless, all hope of conciliation at an end, told her grace, with a provoking coolness, “that she was sure the queen, who *had* loved her extremely, would always be very kind to her.” This extraordinary declaration threw the duchess into a paroxysm of astonishment and indignation. “To see a woman whom I had raised out of the dust,” such are the words of her grace, “put on such a superior air, and to hear her assure me, by way of consolation, that the queen would be always very kind to me!!” After this interview matters verged rapidly to extremity. Early in the following year, 1708, the lords Godolphin and Marlborough, now fully apprized of the secret intrigues of Harley and his co-adjutor Mrs. Masham, stated their causes of dissatisfaction to the queen in person, who positively denied the existence of any secret negotiation with the tories, and refused to listen to any thing that could be urged to Mr. Harley's prejudice. The two lords then, by letter, signified their resolution to resign:



but the queen, after previously using, in vain, mild and soft language to divert them from this design, repaired to a board of council, which was immediately to be held, and apparently unmoved, took her seat, while Mr. Harley began to open the business. But great confusion ensuing, and the lords assembled in council objecting to any discussion in the absence of the general and treasurer, the board broke up, and in two days Mr. Harley resigned.

This gave the finishing blow to any remains of partiality which the queen might have still felt for her former friends and favorites. She now panted for emancipation from the tyrannical yoke of the Marlborough family; and the means of accomplishing this object was, no doubt, the grand topic of the frequent conferences which, by the intervention, and in the presence of Mrs. Masham, she held with Harley after his dismissal. But so firmly fixed was that potent house in the possession of its power, and such the number and strength of its adherents, that it seemed to set all opposition at defiance. The queen herself thought it necessary to temporize, and to act as she knew well occasionally how to do, in a manner certainly very artful, and deceitful. In a letter, addressed by her to the duke of Marlborough, then at the Hague, dated May 6th, she declares that she had not spirits left to open her afflicted heart so freely and fully as she intended, but begs that he would be so just to her as not to let the misrepresentations made of her have any weight with him, adding, that she will live and die most sincerely his. In a subsequent letter, written after the victory at Oudenard, July 6, she expressed her hope that he could not doubt of her esteem and



friendship, nor think that, though she differed from him in some things, it was for want of either.—No, I do assure you; if you were here I am sure you would not think me so much in the wrong in some things as I fear you do now. The duke returned respectful answers to her majesty; but the duchess continued, against every principle of policy, prudence, and even common sense, to harass and persecute the queen with expostulations and reproaches. “No place was sacred, not the church was free.” The duke having mentioned, in a letter to the duchess, the change which was so apparent in the general tenor of the queen’s conduct, her grace thought proper to inclose it in a letter of her own to her majesty, commencing with the following curious sentence. “I cannot help sending your majesty this letter, to shew how exactly lord Marlborough agrees with me in opinion that he has now no interest with you, though, when I said so in the church”—not the church was free!—“on Thursday, August 19, 1708, you were pleased to say it was untrue.” And surely, when all power and patronage was vested in the hands of the duke and of his partizans, so that the queen was become a mere cypher in the government, no common degree of effrontery would have hazarded such an assertion. The despotism of the duchess extended itself equally to the minutest, as to the most momentous objects. Her majesty was not even permitted to wear her jewels as she pleased; for the duchess goes on to say, “and yet I think he, *i. e.* the duke, will be surprised to hear, that when I had taken so much pains to put your jewels in a way that I thought you would like, Mrs. Masham could make you refuse to wear them in so unkind a manner.”

In reply to this impertinent letter, the queen wrote these few lines, well adapted to the occasion. "After the commands you gave me, on the thanksgiving day, of not answering you, I should not have troubled you with these lines, but to return the duke of Marlborough's letter safe into your hands, and for the same reason do not say any thing to that, nor to yours, which inclosed it." It might well be supposed that this would have caused a suspension, at least, of the correspondence between *the two friends*: but, on the contrary, the duchess immediately rejoined, in a second letter, still more insolent than the former, in which she pretends "that she should have thought herself wanting in her duty if, when she saw the queen so much in the wrong, as without prejudice or passion she really thought her, and did not tell her of it." And upon this principle she went on for many succeeding months, teasing and irritating the queen by letters, written, as she phrases it, "with her usual plainness and zeal," but which could produce no other effect than to increase her aversion for the writer. The folly of the duchess, however, did not, unfortunately for herself and the nation, terminate here. The sequel may, perhaps, be best expressed in her own words:

"Finding not only that I could make no impression on her, but that her change, towards me in particular, was every day more and more apparent, I at length went to her, and begged to know what my crime was that had wrought in her so great an alteration. This drew from the queen a letter, dated October 26, 1709, wherein she charges me with inveteracy against poor Masham, and with having nothing so much at heart as the ruin of my

cousin. In speaking of the misunderstandings between her majesty and me, she says, they are for nothing that she knows of, but because she cannot see with my eyes and hear with my ears. And adds, that it is impossible for me to recover her former kindness, but that she shall behave herself to me as the duke of Marlborough's wife, and her groom of the stole." This mortifying declaration, which amounted to a formal renunciation of friendship, and which divested the duchess of all pretence to take any extraordinary liberties with the queen under colour of exercising the privileges of a friend, only incited her to proceed to greater lengths of insolence and absurdity. "Upon the receipt of this letter," says she, "I immediately set myself to draw up a long narrative of a series of faithful services, for about twenty-six years past; of the great sense the queen formerly had of my services; of the great favor I had been honored with on account of them; of the use I had made of that favor, and of my losing it now by the artifice of my enemies, and particularly of one whom I had raised out of the dust! And knowing how great a respect her majesty had for the writings of certain eminent divines, I added to my narrative the directions given by the author of the *Whole Duty of Man*, with relation to friendship, the directions in the *Common Prayer Book* before the communion, with regard to reconciliation, together with the rules laid down by bishop Taylor upon the same head. I sent from St. Alban's this narrative, which she promised to read and answer. Ten days after, writing to me on another occasion, she said she had not leisure yet to read all my papers, but when she had she would send me some answer. But none ever came, nor had

my papers any apparent effect on her majesty, except that, after my coming to town, as she was passing by me in order to receive the communion, she looked with much good nature, and very graciously smiled upon me."

Doubtless, the queen's goodness of heart, and sense of religion, led her to intimate, in this mode, to the duchess that she harboured no anger or malice against her. Thus matters rested till the affair of Sacheverel occurred, in the winter of 1709-10, the result of whose impeachment proved so fatal to the influence and popularity of the whigs; and encouraged the secret and confidential advisers of the queen to adopt openly, and boldly, the measures which they would otherwise scarcely have ventured, but with the utmost caution, to make the subject of their deliberations.

Previous, however, to the great and final catastrophe, of which the whigs as yet entertained no apprehensions, the lords Marlborough and Godolphin were induced, much more, as it seems, from personal than political motives, to exert their authority over the queen in a very harsh and imperious manner, and in a case which touched her feelings very nearly. On the death of the earl of Essex, in the beginning of January, 1710, she wrote to the duke of Marlborough to give his regiment to captain Hill, brother to Mrs. Masham. The duke immediately waited upon the queen to remonstrate against the appointment of this young officer, to the prejudice of so many others of higher rank and longer service; but she persisted in her nomination. Lord Godolphin repeatedly expostulated with her upon the same subject, without effect; upon which, on the 15th

January, being council day, he retired in resentment and discontent to Windsor. And the duke of Marlborough wrote to the queen, complaining of the numerous mortifications and affronts to which he had lately been subject, and begging of her majesty to reflect what the world must think, when they should see that all he had done to serve her for more than twenty years with the utmost zeal and duty, was not sufficient to protect him against the malice of a bed-chamber woman. The queen appeared not so much moved with this letter, as by the information she received, that the business in question would probably become the subject of discussion in the house of commons; and on the 20th January she ordered lord Godolphin to write to the duke, "that he might dispose of the regiment as he himself thought fit;" granting at the same time, by way of compensation to captain Hill, a pension of one thousand pounds per annum.

The tide of popularity now set strongly in favour of the tories; the want of the queen's personal favor and confidence began to be severely felt, and the consequences of her alienation anxiously apprehended by the whigs. Eager to recover the lost affection of the queen in proportion to the impracticability of succeeding in the attempt, the duchess of Marlborough crowned all her former indiscretions by a step which immediately brought matters to the crisis so much wished for by the Harleian faction. "As I knew myself," says the duchess, "to be wholly free from the guilt of this charge," viz. that of rude and disrespectful conduct to the queen, "I waited on her majesty the 3d of April 1710, and begged of her that she would be pleased to give me a



private hour, because I had something which I was desirous of saying to her majesty, before I went out of town. I named three several hours, in which I knew the queen used to be alone, but she refused them all, and at last herself appointed six o'clock the next day, the hour for prayers. But that night she wrote a letter to me, in which she desired me "to lay before her in writing whatever I had to say, and to gratify myself in going into the country as soon as I could." I took the first opportunity of waiting upon the queen again, and used all the arguments I could to obtain a private hour. The queen refused it several times, in a manner hard to be described, but at last appointed the next day after dinner. Yet upon further consideration it was thought advisable to break this appointment, for the next morning she wrote to me to let me know that "she should dine at Kensington, and that she once more desired me to put my thoughts into writing." To this I wrote an answer, begging that her majesty would give me leave to follow her to Kensington, and I assured her majesty that what I had to say *could have no consequence in obliging her majesty to answer, &c.* adding, that if that afternoon was not convenient, I would come every day and wait till her majesty would please to allow me to speak to her. I followed this letter to Kensington, and by that means prevented the queen's writing again to me, 'as she was preparing to do. The page who went in to acquaint the queen that I was come to wait upon her, staid longer than usual; but at last he came out, and told me I might go in. As I was entering, the queen said she was just going to write to me. And when I began to speak, she interrupted me four or five times,



with these repeated words, "Whatever you have to say, you may put it into writing." I said her majesty never did so hard a thing to any as to refuse to hear them. I then went on to speak, though the queen turned away her face from me, and to represent my hard case. I begged I might know the particulars of which I had been accused. The queen replied, she would give me no answer. I protested to her majesty that I had no design in giving her this trouble to solicit the return of her favour, but that my sole view was to clear myself, &c. &c. Upon this the queen offered to go out of the room. I followed her, begging leave to clear myself, and the queen repeating over and over again, "You desired no answer, and you shall have none." When she came to the door, I fell into great disorder; streams of tears flowed down against my will, and prevented my speaking for some time: at length I recovered myself, and appealed to the queen, &c. &c. Still the only return was, "You desired no answer, and you shall have none." This usage was so severe, that I could not conquer myself, but said I was confident her majesty would suffer for such an instance of inhumanity. The queen answered, "That will be to myself." Thus terminated the last conference which the duchess ever had with the queen; and thus a friendship of near thirty years duration, passing through all the gradations of coldness, dislike, and aversion, at length settled in the most inveterate hatred. Had the duchess attended to the admonitions and cautions given her by the duke, she might have avoided this unspeakable mortification and disgrace. "It has always been my observation in disputes," says that excellent judge of

mankind, in a letter to his consort, dated August 26, 1709, "especially in that of kindness and friendship, that all reproaches, though never so just, serve to no end but making the breach wider."

The queen being by this means wrought up to the requisite pitch of anger and resolution, the first decisive step was taken towards effecting the total change of ministry now in contemplation, by the dismissal of the duke of Kent April 14, from the post of chamberlain, and delivering the gold key to the duke of Shrewsbury. An interval, nevertheless, of two months succeeded before any farther alteration took place, occasioned probably by the characteristic slowness, indecision, and timidity of Harley, who secretly wished and perhaps expected, that the lords Marlborough and Godolphin would make overtures of reconciliation to him. In the beginning of June the earl of Sunderland's dismissal began to be confidently talked of. As soon as this report reached the duke of Marlborough, then in Flanders, he wrote to the queen, expressing in the strongest terms the ill consequences such a measure would have upon the state of affairs abroad, and requesting it as a reward of his past services, that she would at least delay her resolution till the campaign was ended. The duchess of Marlborough also fondly and foolishly flattering herself that she still retained some remains of her former unbounded influence over the queen, wrote on the 7th June to her majesty, begging for the duke of Marlborough's sake that her majesty would not give him such a blow, of which she dreaded the consequence; and solemnly assuring the queen that she had not a wish to remove Mrs. Masham. To this the queen wrote a

short and harsh answer, complaining that the duchess had broke her promise of not saying any thing of politics or of Mrs. M. The duchess in her rejoinder—for she never failed to have the last word—assured her majesty that all the politics in her letter was her concern for the duke, making it her last request, that her majesty would only defer the blow till the end of the campaign. This, she added, she begged upon her knees, and left her majesty to judge, whether after such an expression, it was likely that she should ever enter into any thing that could displease her. This meanness only served to add contempt to hatred, and on the 14th June (1710), the seals were taken from lord Sunderland, and given to the earl of Dartmouth. This was considered both at home and abroad, as an open declaration of hostility against the whole Marlborough connection; and if a few weeks elapsed before any farther changes were made, it was merely to settle the necessary arrangements. On the 8th of August ensuing, the earl of Godolphin was ordered to break his staff; and a period was put to his wise, fortunate, and glorious administration.

From this lively picture of human nature, its weaknesses, its prejudices, and its passions, we may learn the inefficacy of violence to influence the will, and the inestimable value, in all circumstances and situations, of a spirit of mildness, equity, and conciliation, when guided and regulated by that superior sagacity, which is necessary to the ultimate success of all human affairs.

*Vide conduct of the Duchess of Marlborough,  
Tindal, Burnet, &c.*

## MARESCHAL DE BOUFFLERS

TO

LOUIS XIV.

*A. D.* 1709.

(Extract.)

*From the Camp at Quesnoy, September 11, 1709.*

IT is a great affliction to me, sire, that I am unfortunately obliged to send you the news of the loss of a new battle: but I can assure your majesty, never was misfortune attended with greater glory. All your majesty's troops have acquired the greatest reputation, as well for their valor as for their firmness and obstinacy, not yielding at last but to the enemy's superiority, having all done perfect wonders. All the marshal de Villars's dispositions were entirely good, and the best that could be made by the most accomplished and experienced general. He behaved himself in the action with all imaginable bravery and activity; and besides his good example, gave all possible good orders; but his valor and want of care of his person occasioned his wound, which was very prejudicial to the affair of this unfortunate day. He did me the honor to entrust me with the right, and himself took care of the left. We repulsed the enemy more than three or four times at both attacks, with incredible bravery on the part of the troops; but the centre being somewhat exposed, we

were forced to carry troops to the left, where they were very much wanted, and the enemy marched so many horse and foot against the centre, where there were none but horse to oppose them, that we were obliged to yield to the infinitely superior number, and prodigious efforts of the enemy, after having charged them, however, at least six times, and with the greatest vigor pushed and broke two or three of the enemy's lines. I can assure your majesty that the enemy's loss is three times greater than ours, and that they can make no other advantage of this unfortunate action, than gaining the field of battle, and that this ill success will not cost you an inch of ground. M. D'Artagnan, who commanded the right of the foot, distinguished himself in a particular manner: the due de Guiche behaved himself likewise with all possible skill and bravery: M. de Gassion did wonders at the head of your majesty's household: the prince de Rohan and monsieur de Vidame did all that could be expected from persons of the greatest valor. The gendarmerie did wonders also: the cavalry behaved themselves very well; all the foot did wonders and distinguished themselves. Never was a retreat, after so long, bloody, and obstinate a fight, made with more order and firmness. The enemy followed us in battalia, and in very good order, as far as the defile of Givri, but with respect, not daring to attack us.

(Extract II.)

*Camp at Quesnoy, September 12, 1709.*

PRINCE Eugene and the duke of Marlborough own that there are, on both sides, above 25 or 26,000 men killed; at least 18 or 20,000 were of theirs, which is



unanimously confirmed to me, not only by all such of our officers, who, being prisoners, have been sent back with much courtesy, but by several expresses I have sent into their army, and even by Mr. Sheldon, a brigadier, who was taken prisoner near Bossu, doing his duty with valor at the head of 400 horse, and who was in their army during the action. Prince Eugene and my lord Marlborough carried him with them all over the field of battle. He tells us it was dreadful to see such a vast number of dead bodies, which he says amounted to 15 or 16,000, though many of them had already been buried. Prince Eugene declares, that of all the actions he has seen, none were so sharp, so bloody, nor so obstinate as this. We cannot but with concern lament the loss of so many brave men of merit; but we must account a great victory the having retrieved and restored the honor of the whole nation.

Some gasconading expressions in these letters of M. Boufflers, gave occasion to a lively parody upon the marechal's narrative, in the then fashionable periodical paper, stiled, *The Tatler*, though the account appears to have been, as to essentials, just and proper. The sarcastic epitome of Steele, the author of this ludicrous *jeu d'esprit*, is as follows :

SIR—This is to let your majesty understand, that to your immortal honour, and the destruction of the confederates, your troops have lost another battle. Artagnan did wonders; Rohan performed miracles; Guiche did wonders; Gassion performed miracles; the whole army distinguished themselves, and every body did wonders. And to conclude the wonders of the day, I



can assure your majesty, that though you have lost the field of battle, you have not lost an inch of ground. The enemy marched behind us with respect, and we ran away from them as bold as lions.

But though the gay and the thoughtless might smile at this sally of wit, the nation at large were deeply impressed with the melancholy reflection, that 25,000 lives had been sacrificed for no visible end or purpose. This fierce and bloody conflict, which could but just be termed a victory, gave the first great shock to the popularity of the war; the professed object of which, the transfer of the Spanish monarchy to the house of Austria, seemed every day to become more extravagant and chimerical. The conduct of the English and imperial generals, in respect to this desperate engagement, was exposed to very severe censure. "In the opinion," says M. Rousset, "of the whole world, our generals were guilty of an irreparable fault in not attacking the ninth, but delaying it in expectation of six-and-twenty battalions and some squadrons, whilst in the mean time, by giving the enemy time to intrench themselves, which was what we had infallibly to expect from a general, so accustomed to it as the *mareschal de Villars*, we weakened ourselves in proportion as the enemy grew more formidable. Besides, we thereby gave him all the time he could wish to penetrate into our disposition, to recall several detachments, which did not join him till the tenth, and in short to render all those places impenetrable, through which only our troops could break into the plain. In the council of war, which was held the ninth, the deputies of the States General were of opinion,

that the siege of Mons should be immediately undertaken, without giving the enemy battle; but that if they should come to attack us, in that case we should retreat from them: and of this opinion were most of the generals. Prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough were of opinion, on the contrary, to attack the enemy before they began the siege, and they brought over the deputies to be of the same mind: but then they, as well as the duke of Marlborough, insisted that the attack ought to be made immediately, not to give the *marechal de Villars* time to fortify his camp. Prince Eugene was not, however, to be dissuaded from the resolution he had taken to wait for the detachment from Tournay: a fatal delay which occasioned the ruin of the whole body of Dutch infantry, which alone lost near 10,000 men, more than 700 of whom were officers, at the attack of the intrenchments.

## BATTLE OF MALPLAQUET

*A. D. 1709.*

LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH TO MR.  
SECRETARY BOYLE.

*Camp at Blarcignies, Sept. 11, N. S. 1709.*

SIR,

As soon as I had dispatched my letter to you on Saturday from Havre, we were alarmed with the enemy's marching to attack the prince of Hesse, upon which the whole army was immediately put in motion, but it was next day at noon before all the troops could come up. In the morning they sent out a detachment of 400 horse to observe our march, which the head of the prince of Hesse's troops attacked, and took the colonel who commanded them, with the lieutenant-colonel and several other officers, and about fifty prisoners. Upon notice of our army's lying on this side the Haisne, the enemy stretched out their line from Quievrain to the right, which they continued to do the next day, and yesterday they possessed themselves of the wood of Dour and Blangies, where they immediately began to entrench. This motion of the enemy kept our army for two nights under their arms; and in the evening, as soon as the twenty-one battalions and four squadrons we were expecting from Tournay were come within reach, it was resolved to attack them, and the necessary dispositions being made, we accordingly began at eight this morning. The fight was maintained with great

obstinacy till near twelve o'clock, before we could force their entrenchments, and drive them out of the wood into the plain, where their horse was all drawn up, and ours advancing upon them, the whole army engaged, and fought with great fury till three in the afternoon, when the enemy's horse began to give way, and to retire towards Maubeuge and Valenciennes, and part of them towards Condé. We pursued them to the defilé by Bavay with great slaughter, all our troops behaving themselves with the greatest courage. We are now encamped on the field of battle. You may believe the loss must have been very great on both sides. We have a good number of officers prisoners, but as I send this express by lieutenant-colonel Graham, who carries a letter to the queen, I must refer you to my next for further particulars. In the mean time I heartily congratulate you upon this great success, and am truly,

Sir,

you most faithful humble servant,

MARLBOROUGH.

P. S. I had almost forgot to tell you that we took St. Guislain yesterday, in the evening, sword in hand, and made the garrison, consisting of 200 men, prisoners of war.

## NEGOTIATION FOR PEACE.

*A. D. 1709-10.*

IT is necessary to have our minds impressed with the clearest recollection of the insufferable haughtiness, the immeasurable and unprincipled ambition, and above all of the shocking barbarity which distinguished the prosperous years of the reign of Louis XIV., in order to avoid feeling a strong emotion of compassion at the state of humiliation to which he was reduced, when approaching the termination of his long career. His violent seizure of the Spanish Netherlands, after the death of Philip IV., his unprovoked invasion of Holland in 1672, his encroachments and usurpations subsequent to the treaty of Nimeguen, and his horrible devastation of the palatinate, and other parts of Germany, together with the execrable cruelties practised by his express authority upon his innocent subjects the Huguenots in France, have for ever marked him in the page of history as a tyrant, and an oppressor. Yet was this monarch by no means destitute of great or amiable qualities. Nature intended him for an accomplished sovereign, but he was corrupted by the indulgence of fortune, and misled by the prejudices of a wretched education. His mind, elated by flattery and hardened by the long and unrestrained enjoyment of power, became at length mellowed and softened by adversity: and at the period when in the view of the world at large he appeared most

degraded, in that of the moral and philosophic observer, he seemed most exalted. And indeed he was in no degree less popular during this calamitous period of his reign, amongst his own subjects, than in the most splendid eras of it. They formerly saw, in this great monarch, the lustre of a conqueror; they now discerned in him the parental affection of a father, willing to sacrifice every thing in which he had once placed his glory, to their welfare, their safety, and their happiness.

The picture drawn by the marquis de Torcy, of the state of the kingdom at the commencement of the year 1709, is truly touching. According to the representation of this able writer and statesman, "France was at this period afflicted with great and various evils. The scourge of famine was added to that of war. An excessive degree of cold succeeding to a general thaw at the beginning of January, had caused the seed thrown into the earth to perish. The spring revolved without being accompanied by any of the appearances usual at that season of the year. Nothing but misfortune presented itself on all sides. The general discourse was as melancholy as the subjects which gave occasion to it. Every day the resources of the country diminished, and the credit of the state vanished with them. The armies of the king, formerly victorious, had been compelled, after a series of bloody conflicts, to abandon the territories which had been in happier days the scene of their triumphs. The enemy threatened to penetrate into the heart of France. At the commencement of the war, the king had issued his orders to his generals on the banks of the Danube, the Tagus, and the Po; and who could then have imagined, that, in a few years, he would be



reduced to the necessity of defending the interior of his kingdom? The course of a long and successive series of years had never been chequered by a single reverse of fortune. What a terrible subject of humiliation for a monarch, accustomed to prescribe laws to his enemies, to be now compelled to receive the law from them, and particularly from that republic, whose principal provinces he had conquered in 1672, and whose submissions he had rejected, when they besought him to grant them peace upon such terms as he himself pleased to dictate!

“The king sustained a change so sensible with the firmness of a hero, and the resignation of a christian, to the will of Providence.”—Vol. I. p. 209-12.

In this disastrous state of things, M. Rouillé, president of the grand council, was secretly dispatched early in the month of March (1709), into Holland, in order to make such overtures of peace to the States General as might prepare the way to a general accommodation. The deputies Buys and Vanderdussen, were nominated to confer with him. They met divers times at the Moerdyke and elsewhere, but the conditions proposed by them were deemed by the president so extravagant, that in despair he wrote to the king, requesting his recall. An extraordinary council, as M. Torcy informs us, was held in order to take his last dispatches into consideration. At this council the duc de Beauvilliers, chief of the council of finances, painted, in pathetic and eloquent language, the extremities to which the king and kingdom would be reduced, in case the present opportunity of making peace should be suffered to escape,

He was seconded by the chancellor Pontchartrain. The other ministers Torcy, Chamillart, and Des Marets, acquiesced in the sad necessity of obtaining a peace upon any terms, and the king finally resolved to transmit orders to Rouillé to resume the conferences. Fuller powers being requisite, the king of France wrote with his own hand, April 29, a letter to M. Rouillé, in which he authorizes that minister to offer Ypres, Menin, Furnes, Condé, Maubeuge, and if it were not possible to save him from so cruel a sacrifice, also Tournay, and even Lisle. "You will," says the monarch in moving terms, "be astonished in reading this dispatch, at the orders it contains, so different from those which I heretofore gave you, and which I then regarded as too extensive. But I submit humbly to the divine will; and the evils with which the Almighty has been pleased to afflict my kingdom, do not permit me to doubt concerning the sacrifice which he demands, of all which can most nearly interest my feelings." He then proceeds to apprise the president, that he will not refuse to assent to the re-establishment of the treaty of Westphalia, in all its parts, and understood in the sense which the empire and not France has been accustomed to put upon the disputed articles. He says that Spain and the Indies shall revert to Austria, and hopes he has accorded advantages sufficient to his enemies, to induce them to leave his grandson in possession of Naples and Sicily; but if essential to the attainment of peace, he also relinquishes his claim to Sicily.

On a sudden the idea struck M. de Torcy that he might render service to his king and country, by undertaking the office of negotiator in person. This being

proposed and approved by the monarch and the council, the letter addressed to M. Rouillé was delivered to the minister, with plenary powers to carry the project it contained into effect.

M. Torcy left Paris on the evening of the 1st of May, and passing through Flanders by the route of Brussels, with great secrecy and expedition, arrived at the Hague on the 6th, and repairing to the house of the pensionary Heinsius, discovered himself to that sagacious statesman, whose astonishment was great to see in his cabinet the first minister of his most christian majesty, vested with a commission of so extraordinary a nature.

The character drawn by the marquis de Torcy of the pensionary, is upon the whole very favourable. He was of consummate skill and long experience in affairs, and possessed the entire confidence of the late king William, to whose influence he was indebted for his advancement. Being now intimately associated with prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough, they formed their projects in conjunction, and concerted together the time, the way, and the means of carrying them into execution. But the pensionary did not lie under the least suspicion of endeavouring to prolong the war, in order to enhance his own political importance, or to make it the medium of promoting his personal interest. His exterior was simple; no appearance of pomp; and his attendance consisting only of a secretary and three servants, did not indicate his great credit and consequence in the state. His address was somewhat cold, but far removed from roughness; his conversation polished, and in debate he rarely shewed himself at all ruffled.

M. de Torcy requested of the pensionary, and ob-

tained with facility that M. Rouillé might be permitted to join him at the Hague. Far from insinuating the slightest censure upon that negotiator for his want of success, M. de Torcy in offering his services to his sovereign bestowed upon the president the highest eulogiums, and appears to have conducted himself towards him in such a manner, as to obviate every degree of jealousy : and he generously acknowledges, that in requesting his assistance, he felt himself perfectly conscious of the advantage he should derive from it. “ He,” says this able politician, “ who conceives his own light sufficient to direct him with certainty, and to point out to him in all situations the path he ought to take, possesses but a very limited comprehension. He frequently sees his presumption punished by the faults which he commits, and which he would have avoided if he had hearkened to the counsel of a wise and faithful adviser : an idea good in itself, when examined and discussed between two persons, united by the same solicitude for success, becomes still better. If one does not discern the defect of any plan he may have devised, it will be discovered by the other ; both in concert will rectify it. The clashing of opinions will strike out truth, when that opposition springs from a real desire of knowing and doing what is right.” Such is the modesty and candour by which the conduct of men, versed in the science of human nature, and above the mean and jealous spirit of competition, is actuated.

Various conferences took place within the eight or ten following days, between M. Torcy and M. Rouillé on the one part, and the pensionary Heinsius and the deputies Buys and Vanderdussen on the other ; in which

the former could gain no ground. It was easy to perceive, however, that the real wish of the pensionary and of the deputy Vanderdussen, was in favour of peace; and the security of their barrier was the great object they had in view. M. Buys was the chief speaker, and seemed much more hostilely disposed. They all concurred, nevertheless, in requiring and insisting that the whole Spanish monarchy should be delivered up to the house of Austria, without any deduction or dismemberment whatever. At length, seeing that Holland would not be induced to act in earnest the part of a pacificator, till perfect satisfaction was given respecting the barrier, M. Torcy, with an aching heart, went to the full extent of his commission on this primary article, and consented to cede Tournay and Lisle, in addition to the other fortresses offered by M. Rouillé. The Dutch deputies then began to soften on the subject of Naples and Sicily; in discussing which, M. Buys somewhat unseasonably asked, whether the king of France had the written consent of the king of Spain, to express his acquiescence in Naples and Sicily, in lieu of Spain and the other dependencies of the Spanish monarchy. The French ministers replied, that his most christian majesty would not apply prematurely to the catholic king for his consent to accept what it did not yet appear would ever be offered to him. This M. Buys however insisted was a *defectuosité* in their commission, and that it was in vain to treat upon the subordinate articles, if they were not agreed upon the principal. In answer to so unexpected an objection, M. Buys and his colleagues were reminded of their repeated declarations, that the king of France had only to speak the word at any time, and the king



his grandson would implicitly obey the mandate, and resign his crown, even without any indemnification—how much more when such indemnification was obtained for him: and they proposed that three months should be allowed for the catholic king to signify his assent; after which, in case of refusal, he should be entitled to no indemnification whatever. And they likewise remarked, that neither had the Dutch commissioners power, to stipulate for, or accept conditions on the part of the emperor and the archduke.

After much disputation on the part of M Buys and the French ministers, the pensionary recapitulated, with much wisdom and gravity, the points which had been agitated. He said that altercation was useless, that neither the one or the other party would be persuaded by it, in opposition to the orders of their masters, or to the injury of their respective interests—that the French plenipotentiaries knew the extent of the engagements by which the republic was bound, and he besought them to examine to what point they had it in their power to relax; as he and his colleagues also, on their part, would make serious reflections on the propositions which had now been offered to their consideration.

“The intentions of the pensionary,” says M. Torcy, “appeared to me good, and his manner of negotiating highly honourable.” He concluded by proposing that any farther discussion should be waved till the arrival of prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough, who were expected at the Hague, and who actually came thither in the course of the present week. But the intervention of these two great men, far from adding new facilities to the negotiation, tended only to multiply ob-



stacles. It was too evident that they were really and truly averse to peace, and sought only to amuse the French ministers by making extravagant and impracticable demands. In a letter from the king of France to M. Torcy, dated from Marli, May 14th, that monarch directs the ambassador to take an occasion of apprizing the duke of Marlborough that he was well informed of the steps which he had taken to break off the conferences; but that he would be very glad to secure his good offices by a suitable recompence. More particularly M. Torcy is empowered to offer him two millions of livres if Naples and Sicily were allotted to the king of Spain; one million of livres more if he should be able to preserve Dunkirk and its port; and another million to prevent the cession of Strasburgh and Landau to the emperor.

It does not appear that these temptations produced the least effect: "Lorsque je parlois," says M. Torcy, "de ses intérêts particuliers il rougissoit & paroissoit vouloir détourner la conversation;" and supposing the duke of Marlborough not inaccessible on this quarter, he was influenced by far more cogent motives, of a personal nature, to continue the war, on the success of which his power and popularity were founded, and which had recently suffered a sensible diminution, than any which could be offered, of a contrary tendency, on the part of France. His conversation and manners, as M. Torcy informs us, were extremely polished. In the first private interview, the duke took frequent occasion, and with much apparent art, to mention the duke of Berwick and the marquis D'Allégre. Upon which M. Torcy scrupled not to acquaint him, that he knew the

particulars of the intercourse which he had held with those noblemen, and that the sentiments of his most christian majesty were in no respect changed in relation to it. The duke reddened, and passed on to other discourse relative to the project of peace. On various subsequent occasions he spoke with high respect to M. Torcy of the king of France, and of the French nation. It was in France, and under M. Turenne, that he had learned the art of war; for which obligation he professed to entertain high sentiments of gratitude. His expressions were accompanied with protestations of sincerity, “belied,” says M. Torcy, “by his actions: of probity, supported by oaths upon his honor and his conscience—oftentimes invoking the name of God, whom he attested as witness to the rectitude of his intentions.—He pretended to cite the wonders which Providence had wrought in favor of the allies, but it was only for the sake of inferring that France had not a moment to lose in making peace, and that her safety depended upon concluding the war upon any terms.”

” The picture drawn by M. Torcy of this great man is by no means flattening. His duplicity and avarice seem to have been considered as notorious, and his professions of attachment to the exiled family to have been dictated by the most refined and selfish cunning.

After a series of unavailing conferences on the part of the pensionary and his colleagues, in conjunction with prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough, on one part, and the French ministers on the other, preliminary articles were at length framed by the former, conformably to which, the king of France acknowledged the archduke as king of Spain, and all the dominions thereto

belonging, engaging that his grandson, the duke of Anjou, should evacuate the whole Spanish monarchy in the space of two months. A suspension of arms for the same space was proposed, at the end of which, if the entire Spanish monarchy was not surrendered, hostilities should immediately re-commence. These articles, as the French ministers predicted, his most christian majesty, with good reason, refused to ratify; for it made the continuance of peace to depend upon a condition, as he truly alleged, not in his power to execute. Although the other articles of the treaty were in the highest degree severe and rigorous, he declared his acquiescence in them all, with the single reserve of the 37th, as above specified—thus abandoning, by a hard necessity, the duke of Anjou to his fate. But, though no provision was expressly made in this treaty for the reigning monarch, Louis was, no doubt, of opinion that he would not tamely resign the Spanisk crown, and that, without his assistance, he would be able to make some sort of compromise for himself. This the allies saw, and upon this ground they pertinaciously insisted that the suspension of arms with France should terminate if Spain was not delivered up in the time limited. But the duke of Anjou being in actual possession, at this time, of the whole of Spain, the province of Catalonia excepted, together with the island of Sicily, &c. it was in the highest degree unreasonable to require an absolute and unconditional resignation of the monarchy to his competitor. Had the principles on which the grand alliance was originally formed been strictly adhered to, the war might now have been terminated with honor and advantage; as the king of Spain would have been happy to

have purchased peace by the cession of his Italian dominions, and the king of France, by granting such a barrier to Holland and the empire, as would have effectually secured them from future attack. But ambition is a monster whose appetite encreases by what it feeds on. On finally breaking off the negotiation, the king of France caused the following letter to be circulated throughout the kingdom, addressed to the governors of provinces, the archbishop of Paris, and other prelates of the realm, stating, in very soothing, as well as impressive terms, the terrible necessity imposed upon him, in consequence of the exorbitant claims insisted on by the allied powers, of persevering in the present destructive war.

COUSIN,

THE hopes of an approaching peace were so generally spread in my kingdom, that out of regard to the loyalty my people have expressed, during the whole course of my reign, I think myself obliged to give them the comfort of acquainting them with the reasons which still hinder their enjoying the repose I designed to procure them.

In order to restore the same, I would have accepted conditions very opposite to the security of my frontier provinces; but the more facility and desire I have shewn to dissipate the umbrages which my enemies affect to entertain of my power and designs, the more they have multiplied their pretensions, insomuch that, by degrees adding new demands to the first, and making use either of the duke of Savoy's name, or of the interest of the princes of the empire, they have at once let me see that

they had no other intention than to increase, at the expence of my crown, the states bordering upon France, and to open to themselves easy ways to penetrate into the heart of my kingdom, as often as it would suit with their interest to begin a new war. Nor would the war I now maintain, and was willing to have ended, have ceased had I consented to the proposals they have made to me. For they fixed within two months the term wherein I was, on my part, to execute the treaty; and during that interval they pretended to oblige me to deliver up to them the places they demanded of me in the Low Countries and Alsace, and to raze those, on the demolishing whereof they insisted; refusing, on their part, to enter into any other engagements than the suspension of all acts of hostility till the first day of August, and reserving to themselves the liberty of acting then by force of arms, in case the king of Spain, my grandson, persisted in the resolution of defending the crown God has given him; and rather to perish than to abandon faithful people who for nine years have acknowledged him as their lawful king.

Such a suspension, more dangerous than war itself, would rather put off than forward peace. For it not only would have been necessary to continue the same expence for the maintaining of my armies, but as soon as the term of the suspension of arms would have expired, my enemies would have attacked me with the new advantages they would have derived from the towns into which I should have introduced them myself; at the same time, that I should have demolished those that are a bulwark to some of my frontier provinces.

I pass over in silence the proposals they have insinu-



ated to me of joining my forces with those of the confederates, and to compel my grandson to descend the throne, if he did not voluntarily consent to live for the future without dominions, and to reduce himself to the condition of a private man. It is against humanity to believe that they had even the thought of engaging me in such an alliance with them; but although the tenderness I have for my people be as hearty as for my own children; although I bear a part in all the ills which the war makes such faithful subjects undergo, and I have shewn to all Europe that I sincerely desired to make them enjoy peace, I am persuaded they would themselves oppose the acceptance of it on conditions equally opposite to justice, and to the honor of the French name.

It is, therefore, my intention that all those who, for so many years past, have given me demonstrations of their zeal, by contributing with their labors, fortunes, and blood, towards the maintaining so heavy a war, may know that the only value my enemies pretended to set on the offers I was willing to make to them, was a suspension of arms, which being stinted to the space of two months, would have procured to them more considerable advantages than they may expect from the confidence they put in their troops. As I repose mine in the protection of God, hoping that the purity of my intentions will draw the divine blessing upon my arms, I write to the archbishops and bishops of my kingdom to excite more and more the fervency of prayer in their respective dioceses; and at the same time, I order you to acquaint my people within the extent of your government, that they should enjoy peace if it had been



in my power, as it was in my will to procure them a good they wish for with reason, but which must be obtained by new efforts, since the immense conditions I would have granted are useless towards the restoring of the public tranquillity. I therefore leave it to your prudence to make my intentions known in such a manner as you shall judge convenient. And so I pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

LOUIS.\*

Notwithstanding the mortifying repulse which the advances of the king of France had met with, he continued, with laudable assiduity, his efforts for peace. The fact is, that the Dutch nation in general, and the pensionary Heinsius in particular, were, as Louis well knew, desirous to terminate the war, and of opinion that the concessions of his most christian majesty formed a solid ground of accommodation. But the courts of Vienna and London were eager for the prosecution of the war, with and for the avowed purpose of wresting the whole Spanish monarchy from the prince, who had now held it for ten years, by the best of titles—the good-will and affection of his subjects. In the month of April, 1709, Mr. secretary Boyle informs the duke of Marlborough, then at the Hague, that his “grace’s letter, of the 6th, was read on Sunday at the cabinet council, where M. Buys’s politics of the dismembering the Spanish monarchy, and continuing the conferences with monsieur Rouillé, were thought very disagreeable.” And on the 15th July ensuing, the conferences being at that time concluded, Mr. Boyle affirms to lord Townshend, oné

\* Lamberti.

of the English plenipotentiaries in Holland, "that her majesty thinks she had reason to expect that de Torcy's letter should not have been answered till her majesty's thoughts upon it had been known, that so the sentiments both of England and Holland might have been expressed at the same time upon so nice a subject, and of so much consequence.—I must own, says he, to your excellency, that her majesty would not have agreed to the pensionary's answer to de Torcy, because it shows too great a desire to treat with the French. Whenever the negotiations shall be renewed, it is most probable that the greatest difficulty will consist in the security to be given for restoring the *whole* Spanish monarchy to the house of Austria, and particularly for evacuating Spain, in which case it will be necessary to insist, among other things, that Cadiz, Alicant, Lerida, Tortosa, Roses, Pampelona, and Badajox, be immediately put into the hands of the allies, which, for the most part, is in the French king's power to do, and will be some mark of the sincerity of his intentions."

No sooner was the campaign in Flanders at an end, than the correspondence between the marquis de Torcy and the pensionary was renewed, through the medium of M. Petkum, resident of Holstein, at the Hague, in order to devise some equivalent, or substitute, for the 37th article of the preliminaries. And the French king at length went so far as to offer, exclusive of his royal promise not to assist his grandson, king Philip, directly or indirectly, three fortified towns on the Flemish frontier, as a security for the performance of it, to be restored to France when Spain should be delivered up to king Charles. But this was treated as a very unsatis-

factory proposition, and Louis was required to surrender forthwith those places in Spain which were actually in his hands. This he peremptorily refused, and likewise the ensuing demand, that the three fortified towns, to be held in pledge, should be Bayonne and Perpignan on the side of Spain, and Thionville on that of the empire. Even on the frontier of Flanders, Douay, Arras, and Cambrai were declared excepted places, and it was plainly asserted that the king of France could not part with the keys of the kingdom. It was therefore evident that, notwithstanding the anxious desire of Louis to withdraw himself from the war, his professions were not altogether sincere—that he was well aware resistance would be made by Spain to the execution of the treaty—that the Spanish monarchy would not, and could not, be surrendered into the hands of the allies at the end of two months, and expecting the towns offered in pledge to be retained, he would not part with such as would lay his kingdom open to invasion. He hoped and believed that the king of Spain would be able, by resistance, to obtain some compensation or provision for himself, though abandoned to his fate by France, and it would have been much better to have made such provision, openly and avowedly, a *sine qua non* of the treaty. But his extreme eagerness to procure peace for himself, made him willing to leave the event of the Spanish war to chance, and gave an air of insincerity to his conduct throughout the whole course of the transaction. After some time, M. Torcy wrote to Petkum to desire, since the point in dispute could not be adjusted by letters, that passes might be granted for some ministers from France to come to Holland, and renew the conferences,

or that Petkum might be permitted to go to France to try if his presence could help to find out an expedient that had hitherto been endeavoured in vain. The first of these alternatives the States General refused in the present crisis of distrust and uncertainty, but consented that the Holstein resident should repair to Paris, where he accordingly arrived late in the month of November, (1709).

While these negotiations were carrying on, the king of Spain published a spirited manifesto, protesting against all that should be transacted at the Hague, or elsewhere, to his prejudice, as null and void, and declaring his resolution to adhere to his faithful Spaniards as long as there was a man of them that would stand by him. After a stay of ten days only at Paris, M. Petkum returned to the Hague, with a paper importing, agreeably to his former declaration, that it would be impossible for the king of France to execute the 37th article of the preliminaries, even though his majesty could resolve to sign it; but that his most christian majesty, suppressing the form of the preliminaries, but preserving the substance, was disposed to treat on the foundation of the conditions to which he had consented for the satisfaction of the allies, although he had declared that those conditions should be void if they were not accepted during the negotiation at the Hague. In reply to this declaration, the States General came to a unanimous resolution "that from this way of proceeding nothing could be inferred, but that the enemy was not sincerely disposed to agree to a safe peace, &c."

The king of France, at length reluctantly convinced of the necessity of making farther, and more explicit

concessions, dispatched M. Ibberville to Madrid with instructions, which he was to communicate only to the king of Spain himself. His visit was short, and he appeared to be ill received, his mission being, in all probability, of a nature very unpleasant, and intended to prepare the king of Spain for that scene of humiliation and disgrace which now seemed awaiting him. In the months of January and February, (1710) new overtures were made by M. Torcy to the States, through the medium of M. Petkum, not materially varying from the former: but a decisive answer was returned (February 13, N. S.) "that the allies required that his most christian majesty should declare, in plain and expressive words, that he consented to all the preliminaries except the seven-and-thirtieth article, which done, the allies would send passports to his ministers to treat of an equivalent for that article." Seeing no remedy, the court of Versailles acceded to this proposition, and the small and remote city of Gertruydenberg was fixed upon as the place of congress, instead of the Hague, which, on account of the advantages which it afforded for facilitating the negotiation, the French court would gladly have preferred.

On the 19th March, the French plenipotentiaries, Messrs. le marechal duc D'Uxelles and l'abbé, afterwards cardinal de Polignac, arrived at Gertruydenberg, where they held divers conferences with M. Buys and M. Vanderdussen, who were again nominated for this purpose by the States. The French ministers declared, in explicit terms, that notwithstanding the inclination of his most christian majesty for peace, he could never be prevailed upon to enter into a war with his grandson, or take any other violent measures against him. They en-



larged on the affection of the Spaniards for that prince, and at last declared they saw no other expedient for procuring the Spanish monarchy to king Charles than to give a share of it to king Philip; to whom they at first proposed to assign Naples and Sicily, then the kingdom of Arragon; and lastly, that he would content himself with Sicily, Sardinia, and the Spanish places on the coast of Tuscany, again offering three or even four fortresses in Flanders as a security for the surrender of Spain in two months. Upon the report made at the Hague, by Buys and Vanderdussen, of the result of the conferences already held, count Zinzendorf, the imperial minister, thought fit to declare, “that the emperor his master could not consent to any partition of the Spanish dominions, and therefore proposed that the French plenipotentiaries should be forthwith dismissed.” M. Petkum was thereupon, and in consequence of a unanimous resolution of the ministers of all the allied courts, convened for that purpose, desired to write to the French plenipotentiaries “that seeing they had nothing further to propose, and the allies nothing more to say than what they had said before, it was no purpose to continue useless conferences.” The important city of Douay was by this time closely invested, and might be considered as in the possession of the confederates, and a grand council being convened at Versailles to take into consideration the state of the kingdom, high debates arose; some insisting upon the necessity of peace, upon any terms, to preserve France from ruin; and others, with more magnanimity, declaring that it was better to put all to the hazard than to submit to terms so unjust and ignominious. The French plenipotentiaries at length



having received another courier from Versailles, declared to M. Buys and M. Vanderdussen, that his most christian majesty had been prevailed upon to recede from the former demand he had made of Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, and the places on the coast of Tuscany, and would content himself with Sicily and Sardinia; and if the king, his grandson, would not acquiesce in this proposal, though he could by no means declare war against him, he would furnish a sum of money towards the charges of a war to be continued against him till he had surrendered Spain and the Indies to the house of Austria; and the French plenipotentiaries were empowered to offer the sum of 500,000 livres per month in the first instance, by way of subsidy for this purpose, which was afterwards increased to one million: Valenciennes, in lieu of all other claims, was likewise added to the Dutch barrier, and even Alsace was yielded to the empire, on condition of the re-establishment of the electors of Bavaria and Cologne. Before the conferences were concluded, the king of Spain signified that he would never consent to relinquish the crown of Spain for any compensation; upon which the king of France, in the agony of anger and despair, instructed his ministers not to insist further upon an equivalent, but to renew the offer of subsidies.—*Torcy*, vol. ii. p. 80.

Even this last and greatest concession was, with equal pride and folly, rejected; and the ministers of France were informed that the allies insisted to have Spain and the Indies delivered up according to the tenor of the preliminaries. At the same time it was insinuated that the allies might, in the way of favor, permit their troops in Portugal and Catalonia to co-operate with those of

France for favoring the conquest of Spain; but even this assistance was to be limited to the space of two months, at the end of which time, if the business was not accomplished, the truce was to terminate, and they were again to prosecute hostilities against France. Lastly, it was intimated to the French plenipotentiaries that they should have permission to continue 15 days at Gertruydenberg to receive a final answer. On the delivery of this haughty and dictatorial message to the king of France, as M. Mesnager relates, p. 25, that monarch exclaimed with astonishment, "Bon Dieu! Good God! will they not be content to have the king of Spain dethroned, but will they have me to do it with my own hands?" He immediately signified to his ministers that he wanted no time to deliberate whether he should engage to perform what he knew it was not in his power to execute. Having now done all that was possible for him to obtain peace in vain, his mind, which had been extremely agitated, grew calm, and his health, which was much injured, became more firm. France had arrived at the ultimate point of depression, and the allies, intoxicated by success, not perceiving, or failing to seize the favorable moment, never again had it in their power even to propose, and much less to impose terms so unfeeling and rigorous. At the breaking up of the conferences, a letter was sent by the plenipotentiaries of France, (July 24, 1710) to the pensionary of Holland, in the king's name, expressed in the following emphatic language:

"His majesty has long since declared that, for the sake of sure and definitive peace, he would grant such

conditions as were in his power to perform; but he will never promise that which he knows is impossible for him to perform. If through the injustice and obstinacy of his enemies he is deprived of all hopes of obtaining a peace; then placing his confidence on the providence of God, who can, when he thinks fit, humble those who are puffed up with unexpected prosperity, and who make no account of the public calamities and the effusion of christian blood, he will leave it to the judgment of all Europe, and even of the people of England and Holland, to find out the true authors of the continuance of such a bloody war." This extraordinary termination of a negotiation, which had been so long pending, and from which so much was expected, gave the highest disgust to all persons capable of reflection, and who were not wholly biassed by the spirit of party, both in England and Holland. By conceding the grand point that Philip should be suffered to remain in possession of Spain and the Indies, from which it was evident he could not be expelled, without a fresh and immense effusion of blood and treasure, and the violation of every principle of political and national right, the archduke being originally the object of general dislike, and now of universal abhorrence in Spain, the allies might have obtained the most perfect satisfaction as to all their just and reasonable demands; and indeed as to many that were neither just or reasonable. From this time a number of publications, for the most part ably written, appeared in succession from the press in England, stating the unreasonableness of carrying on the war for the sake of gratifying the boundless and blood-thirsty ambition of the house of Austria, the insatiable avarice of the

duke of Marlborough, and the implacable resentment of prince Eugene, who was reported to have said that nothing would give him so much pleasure as to enter the Louvre with a lighted torch in his hand. Amongst these publications, by far the most remarkable was SWIFT'S "Conduct of the Allies," of which eleven thousand copies were sold in a few weeks. Such were the strong and striking colours in which truth was exhibited in this justly celebrated pamphlet, and in such broad day-light were the facts upon which the merits of the question rested therein placed, that it seemed to produce an instant and entire conviction. Far from being of the opinion of an admired writer of our own times, "that the understanding was to be instructed through the passions," nothing of declamation, nothing of gaudy tinsel eloquence, nothing of gross and vulgar abuse, is to be found in this almost perfect production of reason. And had it been offered as a pleading before the famous ancient court of Arcopagus, who admitted of no appeal to the passions, it must, by those enlightened judges, have been pronounced worthy of the highest applause, while the gorgeous sophistry of a verbose and florid declaimer, and of such an one this nation has recently been, at a most critical moment, the delighted dupe, would have been rejected with scorn and indignation.

Soon after the conclusion of this negotiation at Gertruydenberg, matters took a turn very favorable to France. For, in consequence of the disaster which befell the English troops serving in Spain, under general Stanhope, at Brihuega, and the ensuing battle of Villa Viciosa, the allies were reduced to take shelter under the walls of Barcelona, and the great and total change

of ministry in England made it as much the interest of the court of London, as it was agreeable to the personal inclination of the queen, to put a speedy end to the war, the continuance of which was so essential to the permanency of the duke of Marlborough's power and greatness. Previous, indeed, to the dismissal of the whig administration, as we are informed, the queen, who was habituated implicitly to acquiesce in such measures as were recommended to her by the ministers, began to hesitate, to enquire into particulars, to dislike, or decline giving her consent, and the like. And when upon one occasion some papers were brought to her relative to the necessary preparations for the ensuing campaign, she was observed, in signing them, to sigh deeply, and to shed tears : exclaiming with emotion, " LORD, when will this spilling of blood be at an end ?" The extreme eagerness of the tory ministers, now in power, to effect a pacification, in a great degree, nevertheless, counteracted their own purpose. For the king of France possessed too much political discernment not to take what indeed could scarcely be called an unfair advantage of it. M. Mesnager relates, " that after he had received the king's directions to repair to England, his majesty altered his intention," saying to him, " there was no need ; for that things would go on as well as he could desire, and the new minister would soon stand in need of his assistance." And he farther observes, " that in the space of a few weeks circumstances were so changed, as to induce the English ministers to seek that of the king, which of all others in the world his majesty was most anxious about, and which the French nation stood in so much necessity of, that two months before the king would have given some millions to have had it brought to pass."



But as the king foresaw now that what he desired so much would soon be asked of him to grant, his majesty was too wise to push his game too fast; but resolved to stand still awhile and see what would be the issue of these great events. It is true this obliged his majesty to run the risque of another campaign, and some were very uneasy at that circumstance, especially when they heard that the duke of Marlborough was continued in the command of the army. However, his majesty was resolved to venture—for though a campaign were to prove unsuccessful, the enemy could not rationally be supposed to penetrate farther than Cambray, and the affairs of England plainly told him that if they did hold together for one campaign, they would certainly break before another; that either the duke of Marlborough would not serve another campaign, or that they would not trust him, and so it proved. As the French army took post wisely on the Scheld, in order to cover Cambray and Arras at the same time, the king ordered marechal Villars, who commanded them, to avoid a battle if possible. The marechal so well discharged himself of this trust, that he not only avoided fighting, but did effectually cover those two places, so that the confederate army, though much superior, never could come near them, and were glad to finish what they called *a glorious campaign*, with the siege and taking of Bouchain.—*Mesnager's Memoirs*, p. 67.—*Vide Mesnager, Torcy, Quincy, Lamberti, Tindal, Somerville, &c. &c.*



## EXTRACTS FROM THE MEMOIRS

OF THE

MARQUIS DE TORCY,

RELATIVE TO

## THE TREATY OF UTRECHT.

*A. D.* 1711-12.

VOL. III. p. 18.—During the embassy of marechal Tallard to king William, a priest named Gaultier, son of a merchant at St. Germain's, passed into England. He said mass in the chapel of the ambassador, and introduced himself to the earl of Jersey, who had been ambassador in France after the peace of Ryswick, and whose lady was a catholic. The chapel of the French minister no longer being occupied, he had officiated in that of the count de Gallas, received in London under the character of ambassador of the archduke as king of Spain.

The earl of Jersey, connected with the new administration, proposed Gaultier as a confidential person, very obscure, and well qualified, in both respects, to be deputed on a mission to France. The proposition was accepted, and Jersey was authorized to instruct Gaultier verbally, and without entrusting him with a single syllable in writing.

The instruction consisted in making known to the king of France, that the new ministers to whom the

queen of Great Britain had confided the care of her affairs wished for peace, and believed it to be necessary for the welfare of the kingdom; that it did not depend upon them to open a particular negotiation with France, being compelled for their own safety to observe great caution; that it was therefore necessary for the king to propose once more to the States General a renewal of the conferences for a general peace; that when they should be opened, the ambassadors named by England to assist therein would have orders so precise, that it would not be practicable for the republic of Holland to prevent a favorable termination.

The abbé Gaultier having reached Nieuport on the 15th January 1711, apprized the secretary of state of his passage. His arrival at Versailles quickly followed upon his message. Repairing to the apartment of the secretary of state, "Will you," said he, "have peace? I come to tell you by what means it may be obtained independent of the Dutch, unworthy as they are of the king's goodness, and of the honor which he has repeatedly done them, to address himself to them as to the pacificators of Europe." To ask at that period a minister of state in France if he wished for peace, was to ask of a sick man, languishing under a long and dangerous malady, if he desired to be restored to health. The overture thus made being discussed in council, Torcy proposed to reply to Gaultier, and to charge him to inform the ministers of the queen of Great Britain, that the king, justly offended at the conduct of the States General, would hear no more of peace by the medium of Holland, but that he would treat with pleasure through the intervention of Great Britain. The king approved

this advice; the abbé took his leave, and a few days after his arrival in London he wrote, that since the king had so just reasons not to renew any negotiation with Holland, nor through the channel of that republic, the British ministers desired that his majesty would please to communicate to them the propositions which he had to make respecting the general peace, which propositions they would transmit to Holland, their design being to commence a negotiation in concert with their allies: but they *hoped* that the offers which his majesty should propose through the medium of England, would not be less advantageous than those which he had ultimately made at the conferences of Gertraydenberg, and that, *for the honor of England*, he would not propose conditions inferior to the preceding ones. It was simply answered on the part of his majesty, that having been repulsed in his application to the Dutch government, he proposed to the queen of Great Britain to convene an assembly of the ministers of all the powers engaged in the war, and to open conferences, before the campaign began, for regulating the conditions of a general and definitive peace.

Gualtier returned in a few days to Versailles. He reported, that the proposition made by order of the king had appeared too general to the council of England. He was charged to insist upon conditions more particular, and digested in such a manner that the English ministers might be enabled to communicate them to Holland, as proper to serve for a basis to the general treaty. The king accordingly caused a memorial to be prepared, such as the English ministers desired. The

abbé Gaultier, who was entrusted with the conveyance of it, set out on the 28th April upon his return to London. The council of England, satisfied with the propositions, lost not a moment in the transmission of them to Holland.

P. 110. Gallas, accustomed to see the whole authority of government in the hands of the whigs, stedfastly believed that their credit was never to be shaken. He could not prevail upon himself to think that the favor of the queen was sufficient to maintain the torics in possession of power. Many whigs, like Gallas, regarded a total change of system as a thing impossible. They were, however, under apprehensions too important to be neglected. It was therefore resolved among them, that, in order to dissipate the storm which seemed continually to increase, the ministers of the allies resident at the court of England should request of their respective masters positive orders to represent boldly to the queen, that she could not change her ministers without extreme injury to the common cause.

Count Maffei was then in London, in quality of envoy from the duke of Savoy. The representative of an able prince, he was no less sagacious and adroit than his master. He had been a long time employed in the same capacity in the reign of the late king. His experience, and the intimate knowledge he had attained of the genius of the English nation, sufficed to convince him that it was not, and could not be, agreeable to the inclination of any sovereign, nor for the service of any prince, or conducive to the well-being of his dominions, that the choice or the dismissal of his ministers should

depend upon the partiality or the dislike, well or ill founded, of a foreign power. Maffei, following his own enlightened ideas, therefore refused to enter into the proposed association.

P. 227. The cessation of hostilities between the troops of France and England in Flanders being published in both armies, it was proposed to lord Bolingbroke to extend the same to the seas as well as the land. On this occasion Bolingbroke made, on the part of the queen, his mistress, a demand till then not even the subject of discussion. He represented that of all the allies whose interests and just pretensions that princess had at heart, there was no one whom she so much desired to favour as the duke of Savoy; that this partiality might even prove the means of inducing that prince to become a party in such engagements as had been already taken, and to convince him that he had nothing to apprehend from the insults of the imperial court, while he was protected by France and England. He then proposed, in the name of the queen, to give the kingdom of Sicily to the duke; adding, “This is a thing from which she cannot recede;—*c’est une chose dont elle ne sauroit se désister.*”

The enemies of her government, and of Bolingbroke personally, published after the death of that princess, and under the reign of the duke of Hanover, that the demand of Sicily for the duke of Savoy, was made without his participation: that he appeared extremely agitated when informed of it by the earl of Peterborough, instantly declaring to him, “that he was not so greedily desirous of the vain title of king, as to sacrifice any real interests to the ill-placed ambition of obtaining this new



dignity. As to the rest, nothing appeared to him *more extraordinary* than to leave to a prince, defeated and beaten, in possession of the prize so long disputed, that prize which the parliament of England had so frequently acknowledged and asserted to be the true and principal motive to the war." This unforeseen demand in favour of the duke of Savoy occasioned new embarrassments in the negotiation for peace. This pretension excited greater chagrin in the breast of the king, inasmuch as the intention of his majesty had always been to engage the king of Spain to cede the kingdom of Sicily to the elector of Bavaria, as an indemnification for the losses which his faithful observance of the engagements he had entered into had caused, and which perhaps he might still be liable to from the treaty of peace, whose conditions were yet doubtful.

P. 232. The successive disasters sustained by the allies, weakened the lofty hopes with which they had been flattered by prince Eugene and the pensionary. The raising of the siege of Landrecy completely destroyed every remainder of confidence in the promises of the general and the minister. Nevertheless, the happy moment so much desired for the return of peace was not arrived. It was destined to suffer new delays, in consequence of the decisive manner in which the queen of Great Britain demanded the cession of Sicily in favour of the duke of Savoy. The last letter of lord Bolingbroke finished with a kind of menace, more calculated to excite asperity in the conduct of the negotiation, than to facilitate the conclusion of it. The king, however, did not chuse that it should appear from his answer that he was offended with the declaration, which



the British minister had made, that the general suspension of hostilities by sea and land could not take place till the king had consented to the condition in question. In answer, therefore, to the instances of Bolingbroke, his majesty commanded information to be given him, "that desiring on his part the indemnification of the elector of Bavaria, he would consent to the demand of the queen of Great Britain in favor of the duke of Savoy, if that princess would endeavour and engage to effect the establishment of the elector, as sovereign of the Low Countries, which territory the king of Spain had actually ceded to him."

The reply of lord Bolingbroke was expected. He wrote word that he should be the bearer of it himself; that the queen, his mistress, had ordered him to pass over to France, which he purposed doing immediately.

The resolution taken by the queen of Great Britain to send one of her principal ministers into France, was proof to her allies that she persisted firmly in her intention of concluding a separate peace, if they persevered in their refusal to concur with her in negotiating a general one. They even suspected that this separate treaty was already signed, as soon as the intelligence of lord Bolingbroke's unexpected journey was conveyed to Holland.

The conclusion of such a treaty would indeed a long time since have preceded and anticipated the commission with which this minister was charged, if his opinion had prevailed. He had counselled the queen, his mistress, to prefer a separate peace to the suspension of arms, and to assure, as soon as possible, to her subjects the enjoyment of all the conditions which the king had

granted in favor of England. This was the way to cut the knot of all the difficulties which the enemies of peace had raised against the simple cessation of hostilities. The example of England would have been soon followed; and it was certain that the kings of Portugal and Prussia, the duke of Savoy, and even Holland itself, would not adopt the pernicious policy of remaining parties in the war, from which England had retired; and that the rest of the allies, without means and without strength to sustain the burden, would not continue it long.

The counsel given by Bolingbroke was opposed by the lord treasurer, too attentive to please the duke of Hanover, and fearing his vengeance when he should attain to the possession of the crown of Great Britain. It was determined therefore to adhere to the project of a suspension. This caused much embarrassment, which would have been avoided by a definitive peace between France and England. The queen of Great Britain, whose infirmities visibly augmented, would have had leisure to provide before her death for the repose of her kingdom, as well as for the safety of those ministers by whom she had been so faithfully served.

P. 248. The convention relative to all the articles under discussion being made and regulated between the two secretaries of state of France and England, they agreed to sign at Fontainebleau, after Bolingbroke had been admitted to an audience of the king, the treaty for a suspension of arms by sea and land during four months between France and Great Britain. They set out together from Paris, in order to present themselves to the king. His majesty wished to mark the satisfaction

which he should take in acting henceforth in concert with the queen of England, and in establishing with that princess a perfectly good understanding, such as was essential to the restoration of the general tranquillity in Europe. Desiring to treat her minister with distinction, the king caused an apartment to be prepared for him in the castle of Fontainebleau, and on the morrow his majesty gave him a private audience in his closet. Lord Bolingbroke acquitted himself of the commission with which he was charged by the queen, his mistress, with as much grace as nobleness, and at the same time in a manner full of respect for the person of the king. He would have acquired from this moment the esteem of his majesty, had he not previously merited and obtained it by the conduct which he had held during the course of the negotiation.

The king, who joined to his rare qualities the talent of expressing himself better than any prince in the world, replied to him in the handsomest terms, devoid of art and replete with courtesy, assuring him of his esteem and of his affection for the queen of Great Britain. He testified the satisfaction which he felt to see the peace approach to a conclusion, through the cares of that princess; as he also on his side had done all in his power to facilitate the same object. He said that he hoped that all the opposition made to its establishment would be vain, and that God would not permit the enemies of the public repose longer to exercise a power fatal to the happiness of so many nations. His majesty assured Bolingbroke, that he would adhere exactly to what he had promised, and that the success of his arms should make no change in the conditions to which he had assented.

The audience being finished, the two secretaries of state again perused and examined the project which they had prepared for a suspension of arms; and the treaty fairly transcribed was signed by them the same day. Lord Bolingbroke was not less agreeable to the courtiers than to the monarch. The court of France was not strange to him; nor did he appear as a stranger there. Every one was eager to pay him honours; and although the example of the king is commonly the model according to which a foreigner is received, Bolingbroke owed no less to his personal accomplishments than to the sentiments which the king discovered in relation to him. He departed a few days afterwards full of zeal and of resolution, to finish happily the work actually begun, and conducted to such a point, that a short time after this the cardinal Polignac wrote from Utrecht—"We now assume the part which the Dutch played at Gertruydenberg, and they occupy ours. It is a complete revenge. Count Zinzendorf feels the decay of his power very sensibly."

## LETTER FROM QUEEN ANNE

TO THE

PRINCESS SOPHIA.

*A. D. 1714.*

THE fixed and insuperable aversion of queen Anne to seeing any branch of the Hanover family in England, strikingly displayed itself on occasion of the demand made by baron Schutz, envoy from Hanover, of a writ for the electoral prince to sit in the house of peers as duke of Cambridge. Having good ground to believe that this application, which could not be legally refused, had the previous sanction of the princess Sophia's approbation, the queen, with the advice of her ministers, wrote to the electress the following letter.

*St. James's, May 19, 1714.*

MADAM, SISTER, AUNT,

SINCE the right of succession to my kingdoms has been declared to belong to you and your family, there have always been disaffected persons, who, by particular views of their own interest, have entered into measures to fix a prince of your blood in my dominions even whilst I am yet living. I never thought till now that this project would have gone so far as to have made the least impression on your mind. But as I have lately perceived by public rumours, which are industriously spread, that your electoral highness is



come into this sentiment, it is of importance with respect to the succession of your family, that I should tell you such a proceeding will infallibly draw along with it some consequences that will be dangerous to that succession itself, which is not secure any other ways than as the prince who actually wears the crown maintains her authority and prerogative.

There are, such are our misfortunes, a great many people that are seditiously disposed. So I leave you to judge what tumults they may be able to raise, if they should have a pretext to begin a commotion. I persuade myself, therefore, you will never consent that the least thing should be done that may disturb the repose of me or my subjects. Open yourself to me with the same freedom I do to you, and propose whatever you think may contribute to the security of the succession. I will come into it with zeal, provided that it do not derogate from my dignity, which I am resolved to maintain. I am, with a great deal of affection, &c.

LETTER OF QUEEN ANNE TO THE DUKE OF CAM-  
BRIDGE.

THE queen, at the same time, wrote a letter to the duke of Cambridge, in the following terms.

COUSIN,

*St. James's, May 19, 1711.*

AN accident which has happened in my lord Paget's family having hindered him from setting forward as soon as he thought to have done, I cannot defer any longer letting you know my thoughts with respect to the design you have of coming into my kingdoms. As the opening of this matter ought to have been first to



me, so I expected you would not have given ear to it without knowing my thoughts about it. However this is what I owe to my own dignity, the friendship I have for you, and the electoral house to which you belong, and the true desire I have that it may succeed to my kingdoms, and this requires of me that I should tell you that nothing can be more dangerous to the tranquillity of my dominions, and the right of succession in your line, and consequently more disagreeable to me than such a proceeding at this juncture. I am, with a great deal of friendship, your very affectionate cousin,

ANNE R.

THE EARL OF OXFORD  
 TO THE  
 ELECTOR OF BRUNSWICK.

A. D. 1714.

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MAY IT PLEASE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS,

THOUGH I expect Mr. Harley every moment in return from your court, and thereby shall have another opportunity of doing myself the honor to present your royal highness with my most humble duty, and the assurance of my utmost service, yet I cannot slip this occasion of the queen's messenger attending your royal highness with her majesty's letter to lay myself at your feet. I have no enemy that knows me, who is not just enough to allow me to be inviolably devoted to your succession, nothing coming in competition with that, because I know I please the queen when I am zealous for the service of your serene house. I hope, therefore, I shall find credit with your royal highness, when I humbly lay my sincere opinion before you. The queen is most heartily for your succession. If there be any thing which may render it more secure, which is consistent with her majesty's safety, it will be accomplished. It is not the eager desires of some, nor what flows from the advice of others, whose discontents perhaps animate their zeal, can balance the security you have in the queen's friendship, and the dutiful affection of all her faithful subjects; for as I am sure your royal

highness's great wisdom would not chuse to rule by a party, so you will not let their narrow measures be the standard of your government. I doubt not but the accident that happened about the writ may be improved to increase the most perfect friendship between the queen and your most serene family. I will study to do every thing to demonstrate the profound veneration and respect wherewith I am, &c.

OXFORD.

## THE EARL OF CLARENDON,

TO

SECRETARY BROMLEY.

*A. D. 1714.*

(Extract.)

SIR,

*Hanover, July 27—Aug. 7, 1714.*

ON Saturday last I had my first audience of the elector at noon at Herenhausen: he received me in a room, where he was alone. A gentieman of the court came to my lodgings here with two of the elector's coaches, and carried me to Herenhausen. I was met at my arrival out of the coach by M. d'Haremburg, marshal of the court, and at the top of the stairs by the chevalier Reden second chamberlain, the count de Plaaten great chamberlain being very sick. He conducted me through three rooms to the room where the elector was, who met me at the door of that room, and being returned three or four steps into that room, he stopped, and the door was shut. I then delivered my credentials to him, and made him a compliment from the queen, to which he answered, "That he had always had the greatest veneration imaginable for the queen, that he was always ready to acknowledge the great obligations he and his family have to her majesty, and that he desired nothing more earnestly than to entertain a good correspondence with her: he asked me whether I left the queen in good health, that he wished her health very heartily. I told him that when I had the honor to take

leave of the queen, I left her in very good health ; that I had received letters from England since my arrival here, by which I was informed that the queen continued to enjoy her health. I told him I was very glad to find his highness so well inclined, and that I desired I might have a private audience as soon as possible, that I might have an opportunity of acquainting him fully with what I had received in command from the queen. To this he answered, that he was very sorry that the king of Prussia's coming had hindered him so long from seeing me ; that he did not desire to delay one minute longer the receiving her majesty's commands, and that I was at liberty to say then all that I had in command from her. I then delivered to him the queen's answer to his memorial and the other letter, and I spoke upon all the heads contained in my instructions, and in the letter of the 22d June, O. S. when I told him that as the queen had already done all that could be done to secure the succession to her crowns, to his family, so she expected that if he has any reason to suspect designs are carrying on to disappoint it, he should speak plainly upon that subject. He interrupted me, and said these words, " Je n'ay jamais crû que la reine eust aucunes desseins contre les intérêts de ma famille, et je ne sçache pas-d'avoir donné aucun sujet de croire que je voulusse rien entreprendre contre les intérêts de sa majesté, ou qui pust lui déplaire ; c'est ce que Je ne ferai jamais. La reine m'a fait l'honneur de m'escire pour scavoir ce que je souhaitois que l'on fist pour assurer d'avantage la succession, surquoy nous avons donné un memoire par escrit a mons. Harley a laquelle il n'y a point encore eu de reponse." I told him I had



just then had the honor to deliver to him an answer to that memorial, and that if when he had perused that answer he desired to have any part of that answer explained, I did believe I should be able to do it to his satisfaction. Then I proceeded to speak upon the other points; and when I came to mention Schutz demanding the writ for the duke of Cambridge, he said these words, “*J’espere que la Reine n’a pas crû que cela s’est fait par mon ordre; Je vous assure que cela a esté fait a mon insceu; la defuncte electrice avoit escrit a Schutz sans que je l’aye sceu pour s’informer pourquoi le prince n’avoit pas eu son writ puisqu’elle croyoit qu’on les envoyoit a tous ceux qui estoient pairs, et lui au lieu de cela alla demander le writ mesme sans l’ordre de l’electrice. Je ne ferai rien qui puisse en aucune façon choquer la reine a qui nous avons tant d’obligations.*”

My speaking to him, and the answers he made me, took up something above an hour, then I had audience of the electoral prince, and duke Ernest the elector’s brother in the same room; then of the electoral princess; after that I had the honor to dine with them all; and after dinner here in town I had audience of the electoral prince’s son and two daughters. At dinner the elector seemed to be in very good humour, talked to me several times, asked several questions about England, and seemed very willing to be informed. It is very plain to me he knows very little of our constitution, and seems to be sensible that he has been imposed upon.

END OF VOL. II.







# APPENDIX :

CONTAINING

*STATE PAPERS AND AUTHORITIES*

TO THE

THIRD VOLUME.

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DANGER OF THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION

DURING THE FOUR YEARS PRECEDING THE  
DEATH OF QUEEN ANNE.

*A. D. 1714.*

**I**T has long been regarded as a problem in English history, whether the protestant succession in the house of Hanover was really endangered under the administration of which the earl of Oxford and lord Bolingbroke were the chief leaders ; who rose to power by courting the favour and cherishing the prejudices of the tory faction, and who maintained themselves in possession of it by a general proscription of the principles, and persecution of the persons, of their political rivals and antagonists the whigs. It is not indeed pretended, that any direct proofs exist of a fixed and settled design to restore the banished family to the throne, but it is alleged that the concurrence of numerous and strong presumptions render it highly probable. In order, therefore, to form a right judgment upon this point, it will be necessary to take into consideration the general state of parties at the

period alluded to, and the characters and views of particular individuals. And,

I. As to the general state of parties, it must be acknowledged by all historical inquirers, that the great body of the tories, as well as of the whigs, were, from the æra of the Revolution, invariably attached to the succession in the protestant line. The act of settlement itself was the act of a tory minister and a tory parliament. They universally expressed, in their addresses to the throne, their indignation, in common with the whigs, at the violation of the treaty of Ryswick, by Louis XIV. in his recognition of the title of the pretended prince of Wales. They projected the design of inviting over the next protestant heir to reside within the realm during the life-time of the queen. They saw for a series of years new sanctions added to facilitate and strengthen the claims of the house of Brunswick; many of these sanctions obtaining their full approbation or acquiescence, and during the prevalence of their power, in no instance did they attempt to abrogate them. If their zeal and ardor in this cause were less conspicuous than those of the whigs, their sincerity was as manifest and as unimpeachable. That many concealed jacobites were blended with the tory party, passing under the same general denomination, must be admitted; but it is evident they constituted comparatively a very small proportion of it, because they were never able, by their utmost efforts, and when the tories were most powerful and popular, to carry a single point in favour of the exiled family. When the famous act of security passed in the Scottish parliament, by which the protestant succession in that kingdom was really endangered, a sudden and universal alarm was excited amongst the tories as well as the whigs throughout England; and when the act of union took place, by which the protestant succession was assured, it diffused as general and complete a satisfaction—the parliamentary op-

position to the union being very feeble, and equally contrary to the sense of tories and whigs, as declared in innumerable addresses of congratulation to the throne. If, therefore, the great leaders of the tory administration, Oxford and Bolingbroke, during the last years of queen Anne, entertained any serious design of repealing the act of settlement, it could not be with the view of recommending themselves to the favour even of their own party, and much less to that of the nation at large; but they must have been incited to this desperate attempt by motives peculiar to themselves as individuals.

II. It is proper, therefore, to consider the proofs or *presumptions* arising from the characters and views of the great leaders in question, upon which the opinion of the danger to which the protestant succession was exposed under their administration, was founded.

1. It is certain that the earl of Oxford gave assurances to the jacobites of his secret attachment to the cause of the pretender, and of his desire to contribute to his restoration. But artifice or cunning was the characteristic feature of Oxford's administration. By deceiving the court of St. Germaine's he obtained the confidence and support of their friends in England, and he was enabled effectually to traverse their schemes and frustrate their designs: and so far his insidious policy, for a time at least, succeeded. "We wrote," says the duke of Berwick, "to all the jacobites to join with the court. This contributed to make the queen's party so superior in the house of commons, that every thing was carried according to her wishes\*." But being by observation and experience perfectly convinced of Oxford's duplicity, he tells us that they exerted themselves, by means of lady Masham, to remove the treasurer, as it was not possible to conduct the affair while he remained in office. 2. It is alleged that the queen herself

\* Vol. ii. p. 183.

was disposed to favour the restoration of the pretender, and gave evident proofs of her partiality for him. But if the queen, when princess of Denmark, concurred in the deposition of her own father, on account of his alienation from the protestant religion, it is in the highest degree improbable that she would engage in measures of the greatest difficulty and danger, in order to reinstate a more distant relative of the same religion; and that there ever existed the remotest hope or prospect of a change of sentiment, is not pretended. The partiality of the queen, therefore, could amount to no more than secret relentings of compassion, and the workings of natural affection, which might sometimes vent themselves, when discoursing freely and confidentially, in tender and fruitless wishes. The queen was politically timid in a remarkable degree; but to attempt a reversal of the act of settlement, corroborated by so many legal sanctions, and confirmed on her part by so many solemn and public declarations, would have required the most daring and determined resolution. 3. But the tory administration, of which Oxford and Bolingbroke were the heads, did not content themselves with mere words and fair professions in relation to the jacobites; they permitted the advocates of the court of St. Germaine's publicly to defend its claims and pretensions in elaborate treatises from the press. The partisans of the pretender, or those who were universally regarded as such, were advanced to offices of trust and dignity; and what was still more alarming, many officers of the army, signalized by their zeal for revolution principles, were deprived of their commissions, and the vacancies in many instances supplied by men whose attachment to the banished family was believed to be their chief recommendation. In answer to this it must be remarked, that the parliamentary support of the jacobites, who were estimated at not less than fifty in number, members of the house of commons, being in the present divided state of parties absolutely essential to



the permanency of the new administration, it was necessary to give some evidence by deeds as well as words, that they were not excluded from the favour, or forbidden to look up to the protection of the court; and their collective strength was far too inconsiderable to justify any real apprehension. As to the dismissal of so many officers distinguished for their resolute adherence to the whig party, and in general respecting the plan said to be in contemplation for new modelling the army, it must be remembered, that there is undoubted evidence of the existence of dangerous machinations among the whigs, for rendering the protestant succession effectual by other means than the securities of law; and though these machinations and cabals proceeded not to any fixed or formed design, they were the subject of great and just alarm to the queen and her ministers. Prince Eugene, when in England, and the duke of Marlborough, themselves, are said to have been present during several of these dark and dangerous consultations; at one of which it was proposed, as there is ground to believe, that the metropolis should be set on fire in different places; that the duke of Marlborough should, in the midst of the confusion, appear at the head of a party in arms, possess himself of the Tower, the Bank, the Exchequer; seize the person of the queen, dissolve the present parliament, and call a new one, for the purpose of investigating and punishing the delinquencies of ministers. These wild and atrocious suggestions, which were probably rejected without hesitation, were reported, no doubt with exaggeration, to the ministers by one Plunket, a wretch in their pay, who had by some means obtained the confidence of count Gallas, the imperial ambassador. From them the accounts were communicated to the courts of Versailles and St. Germain's; but they appeared to M. de Torey, as his mode of expressing himself evinces, little worthy of credit. "If we can depend upon the relations of some people, who perhaps were misinformed."—Again,

“ the ministry received advices of real or fictitious plots,” &c. “ These advices perhaps were groundless.” Amid the great number of persons admitted to the secret consultations of the whigs, it is not to be wondered at that some nefarious projects should be broached, which by a very great majority would be reprobated with horror. In every party, individuals are to be found, who are capable of going any lengths in order to gratify their own selfish and ambitious views. But these transactions were no doubt conceived by the ministers, to render the projected changes in the army a requisite measure of self-defence; and in the number of dismissions the jacobites would of course come in for their share of promotion in the military as well as civil line of advancement.

Of late, it seems indeed to be not unusual to exculpate the earl of Oxford from the guilt of jacobitical practices, and to rest the charge of criminality chiefly upon lord Bolingbroke. But there is no ground for this distinction. The Bolingbroke correspondence, recently published, contains the most demonstrative proofs that no designs were entertained by that nobleman to the prejudice of the protestant succession: it is highly probable, that he was deterred from engaging in the cause of the pretender more from policy than principle. The plain and evident truth is, that lord Bolingbroke, a man of extraordinary talents, of strong passions, of aspiring views, unrestrained by scruples moral or political, had thrown himself without reserve into the hands of the tory party. Perceiving himself the object of the dread and detestation of the whigs, he soon contracted a reciprocal and implacable hatred against them. And though entirely free from that miserable taint of religious bigotry which characterized the genuine high church faction, he was prompted both by resentment and interest to urge things to extremity, in order at once to crush his enemies and re-animate his friends, then newly rising to popularity; adopting, from the ne-

ecessity of his situation, though naturally open and generous in his disposition, and daring in his infidelity, the contemptible cant of the church being in danger. He despised the indecisive and mysterious policy of Oxford, and aimed by the most vigorous and resolute measures to secure such a permanent ascendancy to the tories as should reduce the whigs to a state of political insignificance, and compel the court of Herenhausen to abandon that favourite connexion. "The queen has it now in her power," he tells the duke of Shrewsbury, then ambassador at Paris, (April 1713) "to establish such a plan as she may pursue for the rest of her reign." And in a succeeding dispatch more explicitly: "I cannot help saying in the fulness of my soul to your grace, that if we do not establish ourselves and the true interest of our country, it is the queen's and treasurer's fault; the clamour of jacobitism seems to be the only resource of our enemies." Had the queen survived a few years longer, the great political ability of lord Bolingbroke, directed to the permanent aggrandizement of the tories, would in all probability have been ultimately successful. Since the fatal business of Sacheverel, the tories were become the popular party: but the excellent understanding of lord Bolingbroke could not fail to perceive, that any attempt to repeal the act of settlement must terminate in ruin. For as the popularity of the tories was founded in the prevailing folly, or rather madness, respecting the danger of the church, a measure openly and avowedly calculated to pave the way for a popish pretender to the throne, would instantly and inevitably transfer that popularity to the whigs, who, as lord Bolingbroke, with his characteristic ingenuousness, remarks, "made the same factious use of the supposed danger of the protestant succession, as the tories had endeavoured to do of the supposed danger of the church\*;" and who exerted

\* Letter to Sir William Wyndham.

their utmost efforts to excite the belief, or at least to awaken the suspicion, that the ministers of the crown had the repeal of the act of settlement in contemplation. In the spring of 1712 the duke of Shrewsbury informs lord Bolingbroke, "that several English gentlemen of the St. Germaine's court have asked to visit him, among whom was the duke of Berwick, but he had let them understand that he desired to be excused." Of this conduct lord Bolingbroke expressed, in strong terms, the royal approbation. Is this reconcileable with the existence of a plot for bringing in the pretender? But the duke of Shrewsbury, though acting with the tories, was distinguished by his zeal for the Hanoverian succession. He therefore may be supposed to have been kept purposely in the dark as to the designs of the court. If there was any person more in the confidence of Bolingbroke than another, it was perhaps the celebrated Matthew Prior. The letters of the secretary of state are those of Harry to Matt. and are answered in the same strain of intimate familiarity. In a dispatch from Mr. Prior, then resident at Paris, to lord Bolingbroke, dated August 1712, he says, "that the young gentleman, *i. e.* the pretender, is gone to Chalons very melancholy, but much resigned." In September, the pretender being then at Bar, Mr. Prior remarks, "there is not one thing that young man can do, nor one word he can say, but will be told by Lorraine to the emperor, and from that court will be communicated to the whigs in England." And yet the whigs in England professed to be alarmed at the pretender's residence in Lorraine.

Writing to the earl of Orrery, minister at Brussels, and certainly a secret jacobite, nearly at this time, lord Bolingbroke says, "I cannot foresee, besides the clamour of jacobitism, and the danger of popery—which, except a few old women, nobody is in earnest about—any theme for lord Nottingham's eloquence to display itself upon."



“ On les accuse,” says M. de Torcy, speaking of the conduct of the English ministers during the negotiations of Utrecht, “ de transactions secrète en faveur du prétendant, dont il n’avoit été parlé de leur part que pour demander qu’il fût obligé de sortir de France comme condition essentielle à la paix\*.” At the commencement of the ensuing year, 1714, little more than six months previous to the queen’s decease, Mr. Prior continues in profound ignorance respecting the projects of the court against the protestant succession. He is in consternation at the precarious state of the queen’s health. “ If that,” says he, “ should happen, which one hates even to think of, what sort or set of men are to be our task-masters? What would become of us all? The thought, I grant you, is very mean—What would become of *me*? but humanity is frail and querulous.”

Lord Bolingbroke, writing at this period to the earl of Anglesea, recommended in the most energetic language union among the tories. “ He is sure,” as he affirms, “ that the whigs will be united, and he should be sorry to see it, in any degree, made the interest of the house of Hanover to give into that party whose tyranny the nation has so long felt.”

February 1714, he declares his sentiments to the earl of Strafford, ambassador at the Hague, who was subsequently impeached as an accomplice in the traitorous designs of Oxford and Bolingbroke, in the following remarkable terms: “ For my part, I sleep in perfect tranquillity. We are in the true interest of our country: we have no aims which we need be ashamed to own. The great load we have lain under has been the pretended insecurity of the succession. This the queen has taken an effectual method to remove. Mr. Harley, who will set out immediately, has orders, when he renews those assurances

\* Vol. iii. p. 72.

which have been so frequently given by the queen, of her firm resolution to support the succession of the family of Hanover, to take notice to the princess Sophia and the elector, that these inclinations of the queen continuing the same, the laws on which their right to the crown is established continuing the same, and the oaths of the people, in which we are all bound in the most solemn manner, continuing likewise the same, it will be very unjust, and very disagreeable to her majesty, if they themselves, or any employed by them, should give the least encouragement or countenance to the clamours raised by a faction, who mean nothing less than the real advantage of that family, and whose only view is to regain the power which they abused, even at the expense of the public tranquillity. He is farther to represent, that the queen determines to bring the question about the security of their succession to a short issue, and therefore has commanded him to ask of them, whether they have any additional securities to propose? If they have none, he will say that the queen must understand them to be satisfied with those which now subsist. If they have any, he has orders to assure them beforehand, that in case the proposals they make are consistent with the queen's honour, her safety, with the terms of the laws by which the crown is entailed, her majesty will not only consent to, but promote all such proposals."

To the same nobleman lord Bolingbroke writes, March 1714, "It is indeed, my lord, surprisingly strange, that alliances with Denmark, Prussia, or any other foreign power, can be esteemed at Hanover as true expedients for securing the succession to the crown of Britain. Our laws, our oaths, a just concern for our religion and liberty, will keep the nation firm and steady in their adherence to a protestant, and in their opposition to a popish prince."

Mr. Prior, April 1714, in allusion to the famous debate on the motion of lord Wharton, respecting the dan-



ger of the protestant succession, says, in a private dispatch to lord Bolingbroke, " We are all in admiration at what you have been doing in England, and I pity those whose business it is to keep others in their senses. The pretender, *abandoned* by France, yet dreaded from Luneville and Bar-le-duc, by those men who made a jest of king James attacking us, though *supported* by this kingdom, and either at St. Germain's or on the coast of Normandy, seems a paradox, till one tells M. de Torcy that those men were then in power, and are not so at present."

April 23, 1714, lord Bolingbroke informs the earl of Strafford, " that the queen has forbid M. Schultze, the Hanoverian envoy, the court, for demanding of the lord chancellor the writ for the duke of Cambridge, without the decency of giving her majesty the least intimation of it. Indeed, my lord, at this rate the dispute will not be between the house of Hanover and the pretender any more; the queen will become a party. To come hither with an air of defiance to the queen, and on the foot of a party, is surely the unwisest and most unnecessarily desperate resolution that ever yet was taken. Lord Paget will be going to Hanover very soon, to bring that court, if possible, to a better notion of their own interest."

In a subsequent letter, May 18, he says, " I am heartily glad to find there are at present no farther thoughts entertained of sending the duke of Cambridge over: and I am glad of it, because I wish well to the protestant succession. The plain interest of the house of Hanover is to live well with the queen, and after her decease to ascend the throne with a national concurrence."

In a dispatch, dated May 20th, to the lord chancellor of Ireland, sir Constantine Phipps, a flaming high church bigot, strongly and justly suspected of jacobitism, to whom, if to any man, lord Bolingbroke, if engaged in designs against the protestant succession, would surely

have spoken without reserve, that nobleman declares, "that he hoped the whole church interest would, as one man, have laid hold of this favourable conjuncture to support the queen, exclusive of all other assistance, *to vest all power in themselves*, and by these means to establish themselves for the present age and for futurity. This," says he, "made no impression, and as long as the succession remained in danger, nothing else was, it seems, to be regarded. The danger of the succession was the subject of many private debates, and very fatally, in my opinion, to the church, the cause of some public debates. When it was asked what remedy, what farther security, should be provided? those who expressed their fears had none to offer, but expected that they who saw no distemper should prescribe a method of cure.

In a farther dispatch, dated July 28th, immediately on the dismissal of the earl of Oxford, to the lords justices of Ireland, who were the lord chancellor and the archbishops of Armagh and Tuam, lord Bolingbroke expresses his hopes "that things will soon settle into order, and be conducted with vigour." He gives no intimation that the queen's health was at this time particularly affected, and much less that her death was apprehended. But conscious that the fall of Oxford would add to the terrors, or at least to the clamours, of the opposite party, he adds, "one would imagine that the vigilancy used in discovering, and the severity used in prosecuting, such as were listed, or have listed others, for the pretender, might be sufficient to calm the minds of men, by shewing them they are safe through the care, and under the protection of the government."

July 31, he writes again to their lordships, to apprise them, in a few interesting and important lines, of the then situation of affairs. "I have," says he, "just time to tell you, that the queen draws apace to her latter end. All

possible care has been taken to put the kingdom into a condition of passing quietly under that government which the law has established."

On the 3d August, 1714, he writes to congratulate the new monarch on his auspicious accession to the crown, amidst the acclamations of his people. "*C'est ce même esprit,*" to transcribe his own memorable words, "*qui agit généralement tout le monde et les factions qui ont accoutumées d'agiter ce gouvernement paroissent être cessés. DIEU veuille que la sagesse et la fermité de votre majesté les puissent empêcher de renaitre.*"

Upon the whole, it is manifest that those who are most sceptical upon this point are the persons most credulous,—and nothing of real weight remains to be said in opposition to the authorities of history upon this subject.

*Hardwicke Papers, Bolingbroke Correspondence, Somerville's Appendix, Memoirs of Torcy and M. Berwick, Tindal, &c.*



#### LETTER OF THE EARL OF MAR TO KING GEORGE THE FIRST.

A. D. 1714.

THE general disposition of the high church and jacobitical party, after the death of the queen, quietly to submit to the government as vested by law in the house of Hanover, appears evident and incontrovertible. So peaceable and prosperous was the state of things, that the king did not think it requisite to leave Herenhausen for several weeks after he had received intelligence of that event. And the lord chancellor Harcourt, as chief of the council of regency, assured the parliament, by his majesty's command, "that if the safety of his dominions had

required his more immediate presence, he would without the least delay have repaired hither :” and, “ that his majesty did very particularly express his great satisfaction in the loyalty and affection which his people have universally shewn upon his majesty’s accession to the crown.”

But by the proclamation issued for calling the new parliament, and more especially by the king’s speech at the opening of the session, March 1715, war seemed to be denounced against the partisans of the late ministry. All the passions by which the human mind can be agitated and inflamed were awakened and put in motion; and henceforth the whole powerful faction of the tories, actuated by the desire of self-preservation, on the one hand, and vengeance on the other, became the inveterate enemies of the new establishment.

Soon after the accession of George I. the earl of Mar, who, during the latter period of the queen’s reign, had occupied, and still continued to occupy, the post of secretary of state for Scotland, and who was regarded as the head of the Scottish tories, addressed a letter to the king (dated August 30, 1714), couched in terms of respect and compliment approaching to adulation. But the harshness with which this distinguished nobleman was treated, soon drove him into measures of violence, and in less than a year induced him to set up the standard of revolt and rebellion in Scotland.

“ Having,” says the earl, in the letter alluded to, “ the happiness to be your majesty’s subject, and also the honour of being one of your servants, as one of your secretaries of state, I beg by this to kiss your majesty’s hand, and congratulate your happy accession to the throne. I am afraid I may have had the misfortune of being misrepresented to your majesty, by some here, upon account of party; or to ingratiate themselves by aspersing others, as our parties here too often occasion: but I hope your majesty will be so just as not to give credit to



such misrepresentations. The part I acted in the bringing about and making the union, when the succession of the crown was settled for Scotland on your majesty's family, where I had the honour to serve as secretary of state for that kingdom, doth, I hope, put my sincerity and faithfulness to your majesty out of dispute. I was happy in a good mistress, and she was pleased to have some confidence in me, and regard for my services : and since your majesty's happy accession to the crown, I hope you will find that I have not been wanting in my duty, in being instrumental in keeping things quiet and peaceable in the country to which I belong, and have some interest in. Your majesty shall ever find me as faithful and dutiful a subject and servant as ever any of my family have been to the crown, or as I have been to my late mistress, the queen. And I beg your majesty may be so good not to believe any misrepresentation of me, which nothing but party hatred, and my zeal for the interest of the crown, doth occasion ; and I hope I may presume to lay claim to your royal favour and protection. As your accession to the crown hath been quiet and peaceable, may your majesty's reign be long and prosperous ; and that your people may soon have the happiness and satisfaction of your presence among them, is the earnest and fervent wishes of him who is, with the humblest duty and respect, &c. &c.

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PAPERS RELATING TO LORD BOLINGBROKE'S CONDUCT IN FRANCE.

A. D. 1716.

THE rage of the bigots attached to the cause of the pretender was, after the suppression of the rebellion in Scotland, inflamed beyond measure against lord Boling-



broke, who occupied the post of secretary of state at the court of Commerci, and who was boldly and openly accused of acting, not merely a negligent, but a treacherous part in that capacity. The charge of treachery, and even of negligence, does not, however, appear to have been very justly founded, but it is perfectly manifest that lord Bolingbroke conducted himself towards the partisans and adherents of the pretender in general, with the highest rudeness and disdain, not even excepting the queen-mother, whom he regarded as counteracting by her influence, every project that could be framed for the restoration of her son, which bore the least indication of rationality.

On the return of the chevalier into France, he sent the duke of Ormond to demand the seals of office from lord Bolingbroke, in consequence of the complaints so loudly and universally preferred against him, and particularly for a series of accusations comprized in a formal denunciation or impeachment transmitted from London, March 1716, by the agents and friends of the pretender, in relation to the affairs of Scotland. To this charge lord Bolingbroke did not deign personally to reply; but his secretary, Mr. Brindsden, made a variety of observations upon the several articles in the accusation, in vindication of that nobleman's conduct, addressed in three successive letters to Mr. James Murray, afterwards created by the pretender earl of Dunbar, to which Mr. Murray published an acute and severe reply.

A few extracts from these different productions, will tend to throw some light on the general state of affairs at this period, and will prove that the petty courts of St. Germaine's and Commerci were as much distracted with intrigues and cabals, with jealousies, rivalships, and animosities, as those of St. James's or Versailles. In all the possible diversity of situations in which man can be placed, human nature remains invariably the same.

The articles against lord Bolingbroke are as follow :

I. Lord Bolingbroke was never to be found by those who came to him about business. If by chance or strata-gem they got hold of him, he affected being in a hurry, and by putting them off till another time, still avoided giving them any answer.

II. The earl of Mar, by six different messengers, at different times, acquainted lord Bolingbroke, before the king came from Dunkirk, of his being in distress for want of arms and ammunition, and prayed a speedy relief; and though the things demanded were in my lord's power, there was not so much as one pound of powder sent in any of the ships which by his lordship's direction parted from France.

III. The king himself, after his arrival, sent general Hamilton to inform him, that his want of arms and ammunition was such, that he should be obliged to leave Scotland unless he received a speedy supply. Lord Bolingbroke amused Mr. Hamilton twelve days together, and did not introduce him to any of the French ministers, though he was referred to them for a particular account of affairs, or in all that time so much as communicated his letter to the queen or any body else.

IV. The count de Castel Blanco had for several months at Havre a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, and did daily ask his lordship's orders how to dispose of them, but could never get any, even to the hour the king landed in France.

V. The king's friends at the French court had for some time past no very good opinion of his lordship's integrity, and a very bad one of his discretion; for at a time when many merchants in France would have carried privately any quantity of arms and ammunition into Scotland, my lord desired a public order of the regent for the embarkation, which being a thing not to be granted, is said to have been done in order to beg a denial.

VI. The king wrote to his lordship by every occasion after his arrival in Scotland, and though there were many opportunities of writing in return, yet from the time he landed there to the day he left it, he never received one letter from his lordship.

*Answer to the above Charges, by Mr. Brinsden  
to Mr. Murray.*

EXTRACTS.

April 4, 1716.—I have communicated to his lordship what you wrote to me, and it is by his lordship's order that I give you the following answer.

The charge that you have sent over is so full of improbable lies, that his lordship can hardly imagine it can have any other effect than the shame and confusion of those that brought it.

When my lord returned last summer out of Dauphiné, and at the desire of his friends engaged in this business, he found himself immediately exposed to a daily struggle with difficulties of three sorts: the first, arising from the rivetted prejudices of one person; the second, from the impossibility of keeping the queen, and the whole rabble of the court of St. Germaine's, from meddling in business; and the third, from the cabals of French and English men, women, and children, people for the most part of no name in the world, or else of very bad characters, who had been let into the most secret parts of business, and expected to continue so.

To get over the first of these difficulties, my lord saw would be the work of time; but he saw likewise, the later it was begun the harder it would prove: and that any yielding to these prejudices increased and strengthened them. He therefore began upon the first, and continued upon every occasion to combat them with great decency, but with great firmness, contrary indeed to the opinion of

others, who imagine it will be time enough to talk of those things when his lordship thinks it will be too late.

As to the people of the court of St. Germaine's, my lord knew enough of England and France too, to know they would be a load upon business, but no help to it. With this set of people, and a whole tribe of jesuits, my lord, therefore, avoided all sorts of commerce before the duke of Ormond arrived. He would not so much as see any of them, before his grace came and thought fit to open his door to them. My lord could no longer avoid seeing them: but he never would enter into any familiarity with them. He chose three or four persons of sense and activity: some of them were protestants, and others were very indifferent roman catholics. Those he employed were as many as he wanted. During the time that my lord, much against his will, was obliged to reside at St. Germaine's, he observed the same conduct, and never associated with any one man there but the duke of Berwick, who is not to be reckoned of the court, though he has lodgings in the house, who has a hundred times more capacity and credit than all the rest put together, in concert with whom my lord all along acted, and by whose judgment he is willing to stand or fall.

With the other cabal of people that I mentioned in the third place, my lord had at first some little communication, for he was thrown into their hands; but as soon as he knew of their persons, and informed himself of their characters, he broke all measures with them.

April 8, (N. S.) 1716.—When the resolution was taken of leaving Scotland, and the principal persons returned hither, it was judged a proper time to make the utmost effort against my lord; and perhaps there were people who thought, that the loading of him would excuse the precipitation with which Scotland was abandoned.

That my lord was seldom to be found with any direct answer to their business is true, if by people is meant, any



such as in the former part of what I have writ are designed. If by people is meant any one man who could be of use, or was fit to be trusted, the accusation is false.

As to the second, it is true that the earl of Mar wrote for arms, for ammunition, for money, for officers, and, last, for a body of troops. My lord used his best endeavours to procure all that was desired. Arms and ammunition were to be got but two ways: they were either to be bought and sent into Scotland, or such quantities as had been before promised were to be made use of. That there was not one farthing to buy them with is true; my lord may appeal to those of St. Germaine's, who had the management of the money, upon this head. The little cash that was procured, was either sent in specie to Scotland, or employed in answering the bills that were constantly drawing from the coasts. And besides, if money had not been wanting, the necessary orders for buying, conveying to the coasts, and embarking, could not have been procured.

As for sending such arms and stores as were provided, my lord knew but of two parcels; one, and that a small one, might have been in Scotland in October or November, had the directions given by my lord been pursued: why they were not, he will not say. As to the other parcel of arms and stores, it is that which you call count Castel Blanco's, and contains a very large quantity of both. This Castel Blanco is a Spaniard, who, by the merit of marrying lord Melfort's daughter, sets up for a manager of English business. It is silly to say that orders from my lord were wanting to send them: these orders must be of another kind, and such orders could not be got sooner, or in any other manner, than they were got.

What is said under the second head may serve as an answer to the fourth. As to the third article, upon general Hamilton's arrival, my lord represented, where it was proper, all that he brought by letter and by word of



mouth the very next morning. It is therefore a simple lie, and worthy of those who scribble from this side of the water, to say that general Hamilton was amused for twelve days, as if during all that time the purport of his message had been kept a secret.

The sixth article contains the most impudent falsehood that ever was invented. Without money, and the orders above-said, no merchant could or would undertake to transport any quantity of arms or ammunition; and I am able to cite some very great bargains of this kind which my lord brought to bear, which failed at last for want of money and the necessary countenance.

As to the seventh article, nobody is better able to answer it than myself, since I entered all the letters which my lord writ; and there were no less than five dispatched before Mr. Hamilton came into France, by whom my lord received the first letter of business after the king's landing there. Some of those were lost at sea; and the three last packets were brought back to my lord, the gentlemen that carried them being arrived too late in Scotland.

April 14, 1716.—I hope you have received my last, of the 9th instant, which, with my former, will give you a light into affairs here. There are abundance of things more my lord could say to clear himself, but he rather chuses to be silent. Those on this side who first raised the storm, begin to be sensible of their folly. My lord has acted like a wise, prudent, and honest man; they quite the contrary. And would they have staid a very few days longer in Scotland, which every body now agrees they might have done, they would have had such assistances which, in all probability, must have restored

*Reply of Mr. James Murray.*

## EXTRACT.

His lordship's letters are not calculated so much to clear himself as to weaken the king's interest in England, and to discourage all correspondence with him. He has given general answers to particular charges.

The duke of Mar, by six several expresses, solicited lord Bolingbroke for an immediate supply. In all his letters he assures him that numbers of men would join him if he had arms for them, and that he wanted powder for the few arms that he had. The want of money to provide arms is as groundless as his other pretensions; for though the king did not abound in money, there was always a sufficient sum for that service.

His lordship declines answering the charge of his insisting upon a public order, and neglecting private methods of embarkation. He knew that a public order would not be granted, and he owns that a connivance from the officers might be depended on; and therefore it may be presumed, that his conduct in this case was to amuse the king's friends in Scotland, and cover his wilful neglect of them.

The 10,000 arms, and the 30,000 pounds weight of powder, which he says would have been sent to Scotland if they had staid a few days longer, were not procured by his lordship, but by a gentleman who was sent by the king from Scotland, and who, being convinced of his lordship's former neglects, applied for a supply of arms elsewhere, and upon his own credit obtained it. About the same time the duke of Ormond procured 15,000 arms, with a proportionable quantity of ammunition, without the privity or assistance of lord Bolingbroke.

Another remarkable circumstance of his lordship's conduct was, the variety of excuses he made to those gentle-

men who came from Scotland, for not sending arms and ammunition. In September and October, he said he was providing them; in November, that the sending them through the Channel would endanger the king's passage; in December and January, that the court of France would neither grant arms nor ammunition: and his lordship had probably pretences for every month of the year. What reason, then, had his majesty to expect a supply of arms after so many repeated delays? And with what injustice does his lordship charge the king and the duke of Mar with precipitation in leaving Scotland, when the necessity they were in of coming away was entirely occasioned by his neglect?

What lord Bolingbroke intended as a reflection on the duke of Ormond, will be acknowledged by every honest man here, that his grace observed at Paris a quite contrary conduct from his lordship. His grace, it is true, opened his doors to every gentleman who came to wait upon him. He thought it was for the king's service to receive those persons with civility who cheerfully offered to embark in it; that those gentlemen who were ready to hazard their lives in the same cause with his grace, ought not to be treated with contempt, and that his lordship's conduct was imprudent and unseemly. Upon his grace's first expedition into England, he endeavoured to persuade a gentleman who had promised to accompany him not to go: he told him that the duke of Ormond would certainly be never heard of more; and that it was a rash and foolish enterprize he was going upon: and by the discovery of his grace's designs at that time, and his lordship's conduct since, it may be presumed he had good reasons to be assured that the attempt would miscarry.

His lordship's insinuation of the rivetted prejudices of one person, has the same malicious view; and though his lordship affirms, that from the very first he began to combat them with great decency and firmness, it is certain he

never spoke of his having such a design till a few days before the king had fixed his departure for Britain. And it must be owned, that several worthy men, who were then at Paris, thought it an improper time to press his majesty on that head, when he had not leisure to inquire into it; and that his lordship was not the most proper person to talk of religion.

His lordship's behaviour to his equals and inferiors was not only contemptuous, but his treatment of the queen was insolent to the last degree. To insult majesty in distress aggravates the crime, and such a carriage to the king's mother is an evident proof of want of duty to his majesty.

What the principles were which his lordship says he brought out of England with him, I do not know, having never had reason to believe that he gave himself much trouble about any.



#### PEERAGE BILL.

LORD CHANCELLOR MIDDLETON TO LORD MONTJOY.

*A. D.* 1719.

*ENDORSED.*—This paper I sent sealed to lord Montjoy, to shew my resolution of voting against the peerage bill, though told by lord S. and the duke of B. what the consequences of my so doing would be, almost in express terms.

*March 10, 1718-19.*

I am not at all a stranger to the probable consequences of men's speaking and acting according to their own sentiments, in a certain affair. On the contrary, have had broad hints, nay, plain indications, what is deter-

mined to follow. I have put honour and integrity in one scale, and find it vastly to outweigh convenience; and am determined never to purchase the latter by parting with the former: this is a fixed resolution now, when it is in my power to do the convenient thing if I please.

MEMORANDUM ENDORSED IN LORD MIDDLETON'S  
HAND-WRITING.

*Conversation between Lord Sunderland and me, about  
the Peerage Bill.*

When the duke of Bolton first spoke to me about the matter then under the consideration of the house of lords, for restraining the number of peers, I did not relish the scheme; but refrained expressing myself more against it at that time, being told the king was acquainted with it, and that the ministry thought it very good for the kingdom. Besides, he either had not then, or did not shew me, the resolutions which were intended to be moved in the house of lords, so I was much in the dark. After the lords had passed their resolutions, I waited on him again, and continued of the same mind, but expressed myself determined not to debate or vote against a matter thought of such consequence; but could not be convinced of the reasonableness of the thing.

On the 6th of March, lord Sunderland, at Mr. Boscawen's, desired me to see him on the Sunday morning, that he might discourse with me on this subject. At St. James's he explained to me the motives and inducements the ministry had to push this matter, and I then shewed my not comprehending the reason or necessity for bringing in the intended bill; but expressed myself resolved, considering my being in the king's service, not to speak or vote against the bill. His lordship seemed to think more would be expected from me, and used words of the king's being obliged to change hands, &c.; but whether



he meant that he must be obliged to change the ministry if the bill miscarried, or to remove those of his servants who should not be for it, he did not expressly say, though from the nature of the discourse, and what I was told by the duke of Bolton the first day, I am well convinced which he meant.

On the 15th March, I discoursed this matter with my lord chancellor at St. James's, and expressed myself not convinced of the reasonableness of the intended bill. He was very warm for it, and seemed surprized at my being so uncomplying; but lord Coningsby coming in, broke off the conversation. The more I consider this matter, the more I am confirmed in my opinion, that the bill brought into the house of lords on the 14th March, commonly called the peerage bill, is of that nature, that the commons ought not to pass it: and after having heard the arguments offered by the duke of Bolton, lord Sunderland, lord chancellor, and all that was offered in the house of lords, to induce them to come to the resolutions on which the bill is founded, without being convinced, I think I am not like to alter.

26th March, lord Sunderland, at my lodging, pressed coming into the bill—the king's desire, not the act of his ministry—resents it in foreigners, and others, who represent it now a contest between the king and prince—The whig administration undone if disappointed—The whig majority preserved the constitution in queen Anne's time. This is a way to settle it!—ridiculous, not to say mad things, will be done hereafter, when a certain event happens. Must advise the king to change hands, though he will \* \* \* \* \*. Lords will consent to part with *scand. magnat.*—that commons may administer an oath on elections. The king will consent crown shall not pardon before or after judgment on impeachment. If other things can be thought of, thinks will be come into;—the bill will drop without prejudice. Professed regards

for me—would have me communicate it to my brother. I said I would to him and others. Desired leave to go for Ireland, and to be absent, else would be in the house and vote with my judgment. He told me the king would tell me his own thoughts—I offered to wait on the king, if he commanded it, after his lordship had told him what my thoughts were, and would repeat them to him. Said the prince had launched out 40,000*l.* A lord offered to be bribed—poor, ill used by his father.

28th March, lord Sunderland came to me, told me had spoke to the king, who was uneasy at my not, &c. but, being urged, consented to my going to Ireland—Urged it might be some time the coming week—that I should not say on what occasion, but on my own—that I was wanted, &c.—and desired my brother would not be warm. I said I would go out of town for a few days, then return, kiss the king's hand, and go away. He desired some time this week—I promised. Lord Coningsby, 29th March, meeting me at court, asked me when I went for Ireland—probably he knew it was concerted at St. James's to have leave.

*Lord Chancellor Middleton to Thomas Broderick.*

EXTRACT.

DEAR BROTHER, *Dublin, Dec. 14, 1719.*

I am obliged to you for the account you give me of the peerage bill on Tuesday last. It was what I expected, as well as wished; though I confess I was, and am, a good deal confounded how to account for their prudence, who, after a former unsuccessful attempt, resolved on renewing it so very soon after, without having taken a more exact muster of the troops they should be able to bring into the field on the day of battle. You know last spring what my sentiments were on this subject, and I remember to have told you in what a manner my giving into the bill was pressed upon me, and by whom. For fear of mis-

takes, I wrote down my resolution, and read it to a certain great man, which was in the words following : “ I cannot, with honour or conscience, vote for the peerage bill, it being perfectly against my judgment. I desire I may, without displeasing his majesty, be absent from the house while that bill is under consideration, not thinking it becoming me to give opposition by voting or debating against a bill introduced and carried on as this has been. If this be too great a favour to be allowed me, I am ready, with the most dutiful submission, and without the least reluctance, to suffer any thing which I may be thought to deserve, for not being able to perceive the reasonableness or expediency of the bill.” This I read on the 17th March, 1718, and desired the person I read it to that he would acquaint the king with it. He seemed much out of humour ; said he was sorry, nay surprized, to find me to have taken this resolution, having formerly thought I had been for the bill ; but promised to acquaint Lord S. with it. On the 19th I went to his house, and asked him if he had seen his majesty ; he told me he had not, but should see him that day. About an hour after he called at my lodging, expressed great kindness for me, recommended the Old Whig\* to me, and hoped I would be convinced : I gave him no reason to expect it, and so we parted. Soon after I was told I might prepare for Ireland without loss of time.

\* Addison's pamphlet. The “ great man” alluded to, was the duke of Bolton. After the perusal of these papers there is little occasion to pass any encomium upon the integrity of lord Middleton. This nobleman, descended from sir St. John Broderick, of Richmond, in Yorkshire, who, for his services at the Restoration, was rewarded by a grant of lands in the county of Monaghan, had in the late reign conspicuously distinguished himself by his attachment to the whig interest, and in the last parliament convened, 1713, under the duke of Shrewsbury, was chosen speaker of the house of commons, in opposition to the utmost efforts of the court. At the accession of George I. he was nominated chancellor of Ireland, and advanced to the dignity of the peerage. And it was not in those times thought derogatory to the

## COUNT BROGLIO TO THE KING OF FRANCE.

A. D. 1724.

July 6, 1724.—As the duchess of Kendal seemed to express a desire to see me often, I have been very attentive to her, being convinced that it is highly essential to the advancement of your majesty's service to be on good terms with her; for she is closely united to the three ministers who now govern, and these ministers are in strict union together, and are, as far as I can judge, well inclined. They visit me very frequently both together and singly, and I behave to them in the same manner. Chavigny strongly assured me that I might place an entire confidence in them. Their future conduct will enable me to judge better of their sentiments. The king of England has made Chavigny a present of 1000*l.* which is double to what is usually given to envoys. Both the king and the ministers appear to be very well satisfied with him.

Lord Townshend and Mr. Walpole have been lately indisposed, but they are now quite recovered. It is much to be wished that they should remain in power, for they

high office he held, to sit in the intervals of business as a member of the British house of commons, where his unblemished character, and superior talents, rendered him highly useful to the court. His son and brother, St. John and Thomas Broderick, were also members of the British parliament. The lord chancellor Middleton was not indeed dismissed from his office in consequence of his opposition to the peerage bill, but he no longer enjoyed the same degree of favour and influence: and his determined resistance to Wood's patent, a few years afterwards, exciting anew the resentment of the court, he was at his own request permitted to resign the great seal, May 1725. Writing to his brother, a few months previous to this event, he thus expresses himself: "I shall, I think, very soon retire into Surrey. My way of thinking is not such as is pleasing on your side, and of consequence my advice can have little weight. I have done all in my power to discover what is the right thing to be done, and have an inflexible purpose to follow what I think to be so."



appear anxious to maintain the good intelligence which subsists between the two crowns. They possess an unbounded influence over the king and the duchess of Kendal: they enjoy the whole power of government, and the entire confidence of the king.

The prince of Wales endeavours to obtain information of what passes from persons who are attached to him, but he learns nothing either from the king, the duchess, or the ministers. The king goes every afternoon at five o'clock to the duchess, the ministers occasionally attend, and it is there that affairs which require secrecy are treated. M. Dillon has introduced me to his relations and friends, who, as he informs me, can supply me with good intelligence.

July 10.—The more I consider state affairs, the more I am convinced that the government is entirely in the hands of Mr. Walpole, lord Townshend, and the duke of Newcastle, who are on the best terms with the duchess of Kendal. The king visits her every afternoon from five to eight; and it is there that she endeavours to penetrate the sentiments of his Britannic majesty, for the purpose of consulting the three ministers, and pursuing the measures which may be thought necessary for accomplishing their designs. She sent me word that she was desirous of my friendship, and that I would place confidence in her. I assured her that I would do every thing in my power to merit her esteem and friendship. I am convinced that she may be advantageously employed in promoting your majesty's service, and that it will be necessary to employ her: though I will not trust her farther than is absolutely necessary.

Starèmburg hopes to go to France in a month, with the character of ambassador. He had written to the court of Vienna that he had discovered a close union between the ministers of France, Spain, and England. He received for answer, that the imperial court was persuaded of the



good-will of several persons who compose the cabinet of Spain, but that if they were not implicitly to be depended on, the government was so \* \* \* and their power so weak, that there was nothing to fear. It must be of advantage to your majesty's service that a quarrel has broke out between this ambassador and the king and ministry of Great Britain. I shall not exert myself to adjust the difference.

20th July.—Lord Townshend did not solicit the honour of a garter for himself; he had even requested it for another person; but the king spontaneously insisted on his accepting it, notwithstanding his remonstrating with great modesty that there were many persons more deserving of it than himself. It is however generally believed, that the duchess of Kendal, at the instigation of lord Townshend, suggested to the king that it would be proper to invest him with the garter; and there is a great appearance of probability in the conjecture. It is much to be wished, for the maintenance of the union between your majesty and the king of England, that no misfortune may happen to Mr. Walpole, he being absolutely the helm of government. The king cannot do without him, on account of his great influence in the house of commons, where he depends entirely upon him in every respect. He is a man of great abilities, and very enterprising. The house places a most unreserved confidence in him, and he has the address to persuade them that the national honour is dearer to him than all the wealth in the world. He is very ably seconded by Townshend, who is a man of great capacity, and with whom he is in perfect harmony. The duke of Newcastle, who is indebted to him for his situation, submits to his judgment in every thing; so that the king experiences no contradiction to his wishes, but leaving the internal government entirely to Walpole, is more engaged with the German ministers, in regulating the affairs of Hanover, than occupied with those of England. It is to be observed, that Mr. Walpole adjusted the quarrel be-

tween the king and prince of Wales. He entirely governed the prince at that period, but he has since left him, and attached himself to the king. For some years past the king has not spoke a word to the prince, nor the prince to him. The princess of Wales sometimes in public attacks the king in conversation; he answers her; but some who are well apprized that his majesty likes her no better than the prince, have assured me, that he only speaks to her on these occasions for the sake of decorum. The king regularly receives 1000*l.* every week, which he keeps himself; the remainder of the revenue of the civil list, amounting to 600,000*l.* sterling per annum, is remitted every month to his treasurer. It is said that the prince of Wales is a very good economist, not only of the 100,000*l.* a-year allowed him by parliament, but of the revenues of the principality of Wales, which may amount to 20,000*l.* more.

The king has no predilection for the English nation, and never receives in private any English of either sex. None even of his principal officers are admitted to his chamber in a morning to dress him, nor in the evening to undress him. These offices are performed by the Turks who are his valets-de-chambre, and who give him every thing he wants in private\*. He rather considers England

\* The Turks alluded to, and known by the names of Mustapha and Mahomet, had been many years before captured, during the wars of Hungary, in which the king, then electoral prince of Hanover, served under the imperial banners. As they discovered an extreme attachment to the prince, he took them into his service, and distinguished them by many marks of his favour. Their portraits are on the great stair-case in Kensington palace. Pope has mentioned one of these Turks in terms of approbation in his *Moral Essays*.

From peer or bishop 'tis no easy thing,  
To draw the man who loves his God or king.  
Alas! I copy, or my draught would fail,  
From honest Mah'met, or plain parson Hale.

as a temporary possession, to be made the most of while it lasts, than as a perpetual inheritance to himself and family. He will have no disputes with the parliament, but commits the entire transaction of that business to Walpole; chusing rather that the responsibility should fall on the minister's head than his own, and being well apprized that a king of Great Britain is obliged, when the parliament requires it, to give an account of his conduct, as well with respect to the liberty of the subject as to the execution and formation of laws. I have even been assured that the king has expressed himself to this effect.

I am persuaded, on the other hand, that Mr. Walpole, who is immensely rich, would wish to retire from business, and enjoy his wealth in quiet; but as he has excited a great share of enmity and envy, it would be dangerous for him to retire. He is under the necessity of retaining his situation, to preserve to himself and family the wealth and honours of which they are possessed. I am even inclined to think, that he entertains hopes of a particular protection from the king, if he should happen to fall into disgrace. I labour daily, with all the dexterity I possess, to induce him to think so, that I may keep him in all the favourable sentiments he now entertains towards your majesty. I am very much deceived if affairs are not exactly as I represent them; and I think I may go so far as to claim your entire confidence in the statements I have the honour to make.

Carteret no longer goes to court; the prevailing party has entirely destroyed his influence with the king. He is no longer engaged in business. He is a man of great vivacity and intelligence, and very ambitious. He has already changed his party several times, from interested motives; a circumstance which has brought him into disgrace with all parties. There is a strict friendship and union between him and my lord Cadogan; and I think it

very fortunate for your majesty's interest that Carteret is out of power ; having been assured by people who pretend to great information on the subject, that he was very much devoted to the interest of the emperor.

The ministry hold Cadogan very cheap, and as he receives £20,000 *l.* sterling a-year from the treasury, he is Walpole's humble servant ; a circumstance not at all to his honour, as he is treated with much indignity, and there is no reason for him to expect a change of situation, or that he will obtain the patents of which he is so desirous. He has no influence at court or in parliament, nor is he beloved by the people at large. He keeps up his respectability only by the fortune he has amassed in the wars, and the revenues of his offices. He is a man of courage, and behaved well in his situation of quarter-master-general, and on other occasions. The immense wealth he has acquired, and his having, by means of the powerful interest of the duke of Marlborough, passed over the heads of many of his seniors in the army, have drawn on him a great many enemies. Every body speaks of him to me in those terms ; and I am inclined to think the ministry would dismiss him, and give his place to some one else, but the duke of Argyle is next in rotation to take the command of the troops, and as he is a man of exalted rank, who has seen a great deal of service, is well versed in intrigue, and would not submit to their authority as they would wish, they retain Cadogan, but humble him as much as possible on every occasion.

OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF  
VIENNA.*A. D. 1725.*

THE treaty concluded at Vienna, in the month of April 1725, between the emperor Charles VI. and Philip V. king of Spain, excited the astonishment of Europe, and occasioned great uneasiness and alarm to the courts of London and Versailles; who could not comprehend how an animosity so deeply rooted, and of such long duration, could be so suddenly converted into the most cordial friendship, and the most intimate alliance.

Nevertheless, on the first communication of the treaty to the king of England by the Imperial ambassador, count Staremberg, that minister declared it “to be in all respects conformable to the quadruple alliance, and that it merely regulated those points which remained to be adjusted: and that his Imperial majesty hoped that the kings of Great Britain and France would accede to the treaty, and join in the guarantee of the pragmatic sanction.” He added, “that the duke de Ripperda had informed the emperor, that some points still remained to be settled between Spain and England, and the king his master requested the emperor to employ his mediation to that effect. To this request the emperor had replied, that if those matters related to, and were the consequence of, the quadruple alliance, and if the king of England approved of it, he would willingly offer his interposition, but that otherwise he would not interfere.”

The king of England, in answer, took no notice of the overture for acceding to the treaty; and in regard to the interposition of the emperor, “he did not recollect that any difference subsisted between himself and the king of



Spain, except such as related to commerce, and in those there was no occasion for mediation\*.”

This was certainly an extraordinary declaration, when it was known to the whole world that the king of Spain claimed the restitution of Gibraltar, by virtue of a promise in writing transmitted to him in the king of England's own hand.

Great jealousies were immediately conceived by the court of London, that some fearful mystery lay concealed under the veil of the late treaty; and that the king of Spain would not have consented to guarantee the pragmatic sanction without some adequate compensation, which compensation was supposed to be the recovery of Gibraltar. And it soon began to be the subject, first of suspicion, then of rumour, then of assertion, and at length of serious belief, that deep designs were formed by the two allied sovereigns, for the restoration of the pretender to the throne of Great Britain.

In order to counteract the projects, real or imaginary, of the imperial and Spanish courts, a defensive alliance was framed and signed at Hanover, September 3, 1725, between England, France, and Prussia, to which Holland and other powers afterwards acceded. But the ideas of lord Townshend, the negotiator of this treaty, extended far beyond a mere system of self-defence. Even previous to the completion of it, he wrote a letter in confidence to Mr. Horace Walpole, disclosing the particulars of a rash and romantic project, formed by him for the conquest and partition of the Austrian Netherlands †. But this scheme he did not regard as unjust, being firmly convinced of the reality of the plot concerted in favour of the pretender. In lord Townshend's dispatch of October 4, from Hano-

\* Lord Townshend to St Saphorin, chargé d'affaires at Vienna, May 3, 14, 1725; Coxe's *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, vol. i. p. 243.

† *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 246.

ver, to the duke of Newcastle, secretary of state, to be communicated to sir Robert Walpole only, he says, “ I have been for some months thoroughly persuaded that Spain and the court of Vienna, when they concluded the late treaty, entered into a strong engagement in favour of the pretender by a secret article. I acquainted your grace some time ago with this intelligence, which I had from so good hands, that I no more doubt the truth of it, than if I had actually seen the article\*.

Sir Robert Walpole, however, was far from participating in the ardent credulity of lord Townshend ; for in his reply to this letter (October 13), he declares most strongly against the commission of any act of hostile aggression on the part of England. “ If we are to be engaged in a war,” says this cool and sagacious politician, “ *which I most heartily deprecate*, ’tis to be wished that this nation may think an invasion by a foreign power, or an *evident design* of such invasion, the support of the pretender, and the cause of the protestant succession, are the chief and principal motives that obliged us to part with that peace and tranquillity, and the happy consequences thereof, which we now enjoy †.”

In his next letter to lord Townshend, he says, in language that implies vigilance and caution indeed, but nothing allied to a blind and bigotted belief, “ I must confess, the apprehensions of some design next spring obtain so much with me, that I think it deserves the greatest attention, and we cannot be too watchful to trace and discover all that can possibly be known ‡.” And to a flaming war speech, intended for the opening of the session, of which lord Townshend had sent over a copy from Ha-

\* Coxe’s Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, vol. ii. p. 480.

† Ibid. vol. ii. p. 486.

‡ Ibid. vol. ii. p. 488.

nover, his wiser colleague made such forcible objections, as produced an essential alteration in its whole tenor and purport\*.

“Sir Robert Walpole thought that the king and Townshend were too much alarmed with the exaggerated rumours and apprehensions of distant evils. He thought Townshend too precipitate in concluding the treaty of Hanover, and was dissatisfied with that nobleman for having concealed the negotiation which terminated in that treaty until it was entirely concluded. He was averse to enter upon measures which might tend to diminish the force of the house of Austria, whom he considered as the natural ally of England, and the bulwark against any future ambitious designs of France. He invariably recommended caution and forbearance; and he availed himself of the pacific sentiments of the duchess of Kendal, to counteract, by her influence over the king, the more violent and hostile resolutions of Townshend †.”

In order to decide with impartiality on the conduct of ministers at this juncture, it is, however, undoubtedly requisite to take into our consideration that evidence, and that alone, on which they were compelled to act at the time. Lord Townshend asserts, in his letter of October 4th, to the duke of Newcastle, that Spain had remitted within a short time vast sums, amounting to four millions of crowns, to Vienna. The rage and resentment of the king and queen of Spain, against both England and France, were such as would probably incite them to acts of extravagance and desperation. The councils of that kingdom had long been characterized only by pride and passion, combined with folly and imbecility. At the

\* Coxe's *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, vol. i. p. 254, vol. ii. p. 492, and 494.

† *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 249, and 250.

court of Madrid the dukes of Ormond and Liria held frequent conferences with the Spanish, Russian, and Imperial ministers, and troops were openly assembled for the pretender's service. The duke of Wharton, who resorted thither with credentials from the pretender, was received with distinguished honours; and the British ambassador, to use his own words, "was avoided by the grandees like a pestilence." The duke de Ripperda, the Spanish minister at Vienna, said publicly, "that by this close union of Spain and Austria the two sovereigns would avenge the insults they had received."

The Austrian prime minister, count Zinzendorf, boasted "that the emperor would give laws to Europe." He also said to Petkum, "Let the king take care of himself, for we know that the people of England are beginning to be tired of him." The emperor, in allusion no doubt to the remonstrances respecting the new commercial establishment at Ostend, declared himself "desirous to favour the commerce and people of England, but that Gibraltar and Minorca must first be restored\*."

Notwithstanding the demonstrations of friendship and cordiality subsisting at this time between the courts of Madrid and Vienna, it was to the last degree improbable that the political views of the two monarchs respecting England should really coincide. The strong sagacity of Walpole could never be imposed upon by mere external appearances, and surely it was not difficult, under this veil, to perceive that Spain was the dupe of Austria, who succeeded in drawing from her vast sums of money, in detaching her entirely from the interests of France, and even in obtaining the unqualified guarantee of the pragmatic sanction. In return for which, Spain was to be amused with projects for the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca, and eventually, perhaps, for the restoration of the pretender; and, above

\* Coxe's Memoirs of Walpole, vol. i. p. 251, 252.

all, with the hopes of a double marriage between the infants don Carlos and don Philip, and the two arch-duchesses, Maria Theresa and Marianne, daughters of the emperor: by which means the immense succession of Austria would devolve upon a younger son of the king of Spain, by his present queen, Elizabeth of Parma, a woman of restless and unbounded ambition. In respect to the first of these projects, the Imperial court appears to have been very little, and as to the others, not at all in earnest. The idea of transferring the Austrian empire to a cadet of the house of Bourbon, as a consequence of these marriages, was, on the contrary, entertained with impatience by the court of Vienna, and regarded with indignant detestation.

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COLONEL STANHOPE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

MY LORD,

*Madrid, Feb. 4, 1726. (N. S.)*

Two posts being yet wanting here from England, I am still without any commands from your grace and lord Townshend. The second, hitherto secret treaty, betwixt the emperor and the king of Spain, will, as the duke de Ripperda told me two days ago, soon be made public. It consists, according to his representation of it to me, of three particular articles, besides the general one of alliance offensive and defensive, *viz.* 1. An engagement on the part of Spain, to support and maintain the company of Ostend. 2. An engagement on the part of the emperor, as an equivalent for the former, to procure Gibraltar for the king of Spain, by good offices, if possible, but if they prove ineffectual, by open force. 3. The adjustment of the succours to be reciprocally furnished in case of a war, *viz.* on the part of the emperor, 30,000 men to be actually sent by him into Spain. On the



part of Spain, money to be sent for the payment of the like number of troops, wheresoever the emperor should think fit to employ them. This treaty was concluded soon after the first, but thought not proper to be divulged till it became necessary, in order to frighten the Dutch from acceding to the treaty of Hanover.

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The minister of Spain had long persisted in his denial of any secret treaty whatever between the king of Spain and the emperor ; but the political profligacy of the duke de Ripperda was such, as to divest his testimony of all pretension to credit, equally in what he denied and what he affirmed. It may however be remarked, that this minister was now in the zenith of his power, yet no public step was taken by the court of Madrid in advancement of that cause which this adventure was supposed so much to favour. Colonel Stanhope even assures the duke of Newcastle, in his next dispatch (February 11th), “ that the annual pension allowed to the pretender was, as Ripperda affirmed, at his persuasion actually taken off ; saying, that he would speedily do the same thing with the duke of Ormond and the rest of the jacobites in Spain ; ” though at this very time the pretender professed to rely upon this political mountebank as his only support. The following letter discovers both his fears and his hopes.

THE PRETENDER TO THE DUKE OF RIPPERDA.

*De Rome, ce 4 Mars, 1726.*

Le duc de Wharton n'aura pas besoin de recommandations auprès de vous. Vous connoissés son mérite et son crédit en Angleterre, et son sincere attachment à moy ne vous le rendra pas, je suis sure, moins estimable. Je le'envoye en Espagne pour représenter à leurs majestés ca-

tholiques ce qui regarde mes interests dans une conjoncture aussi critique, et je vous prie de lui donner vos conseils, et de l'appuyer de tout vostre crédit auprès de vos maistres. Je suis plus sensible que je ne puis vous l'exprimer, à tout ce qu'il m'a dit de vostre zéle et amitié pour moy, et j'y place d'autant plus de confiance qu'il semble qu'il ne manque que mon ré-tablissement pour mettre le comble à vostre propre gloire, et pour rendre le roi catholique le plus grand prince de l'univers. Je n'entreray ici en aucun detail, me remettant au duc de Wharton à vous entretenir de toutes mes affaires politiques et domestiques. J'espère tout de vos bonnes offices, et je vous prie de conter sur la sincerité de ma gratitude et amitié.

JACQUES R.

\* \* \* \* \*

The duke de Ripperda was suddenly hurled from the pinnacle of power, in the month of May following, and immediately consequent to his disgrace, having taken refuge from the violence of his enemies at the hotel of colonel Stanhope, he was, as we are informed by the subsequent dispatch of June 15th, *pressed* by the ambassador, who would not lose so inviting an opportunity of multiplying discoveries, and at length *prevailed upon*, to make a full disclosure of the secret treaty of Vienna; which, conformably to this new and improved edition of it, consisted of no less than eight articles. By the first of these all preceding treaties are ratified. By the second and third, the two arch-duchesses are given to the infants don Carlos and don Philip. By the fourth, the emperor and the king of Spain engage to enter into a war with France, for re-conquering this duchy of Burgundy, Franche Comté, Alsace, the French conquests in Flanders, &c. also Navarre and Roussillon; the two latter to be annexed to Spain, and the former to be settled on don Carlos. By the fifth article, the emperor and king oblige themselves

never to give an arch-duchess or infanta in marriage to France. The three following are separate articles: "1. In case the king of France dies without issue, the infant don Philip is to succeed to the crown. 2. The emperor and king solemnly engage to assist the pretender with their forces, to regain possession of the crown of Great Britain. 3. Their Imperial and Catholic majesties reciprocally undertake, and pledge themselves, utterly to extirpate the protestant religion, and not to lay down their arms until this design be fully and effectually executed."

It is astonishing that so gross and impudent a forgery should be able to obtain the least credit. Colonel Stanhope declares, in his dispatch to the duke of Newcastle, July 30, 1726, "that Ripperda, while he was stating the terms of this treaty, appeared to be in the greatest agony, and at times cried like a child." Of the agitation of mind and distress of Ripperda, at this juncture, there can indeed exist no doubt; and that practised dissembler well knew how to convert these effusions of passion to his own purpose. To this *authentic account* of the secret treaty of Vienna, Ripperda added a variety of circumstances worthy of equal attention. He averred, "that the kings of England and Prussia were not only to be stripped of their dominions in Germany, but that the princes who were to succeed to them were actually pitched upon."—"I could never, however," says the ambassador, "induce him to name to me those princes. Upon which occasion I beg leave to observe to your grace, that although in the *discoveries* made to me by him, several particular circumstances, that were to have been wished to have been explained, are omitted, it is not so much to be wondered at, as that he had the *courage* to open himself so far as he did, considering the risque he run thereby while in the dominions of his Catholic majesty." But the risk this flagrant fabricator of falsehoods must neces-

sarily incur, of being detected by the imprudent mention of names, sufficiently accounts for his extreme caution and obstinate reserve on this head.

It is manifest that Ripperda had taken his resolution to throw himself upon England for protection; in order to merit which, it was deemed by him necessary to invent a tale as extravagant and as terrible as any to be found in the Arabian Nights Entertainment; and it is not the least marvellous circumstance of the story, that he had even for a moment the good fortune to be believed.

M. POZOBUENO, SPANISH AMBASSADOR AT LONDON,  
TO THE DUC DE RIPPERDA.

*A. D. 1726.*

*London, May 16, 1726.*

The king of Great Britain suspects more and more, that if the king of Prussia conceives that the treaty concluded at Vienna, between the emperor, Russia, and Sweden, will be prejudicial to his interests, he will recede from the treaty of Hanover; and on this event the king's German dominions will be exposed to invasion, should a war be occasioned by the treaty of Vienna. This reflection has considerably agitated the king's mind, for it is evident that his wishes tend to the preservation and augmentation of his electorate; and his inclination is so great, that he cannot dissemble it. To this inclination may be attributed the resolution which it is said he has taken, that at the least cause of suspicion from the king of Prussia, he will instantly repair to Hanover, to keep Frederic William to his promises, and to place himself at the head of his troops, should any invasion from the emperor or the czarina render it necessary. It is feared that the czarina will form an enterprize in favour of her son-in-law, the

duke of Holstein, and it is added that the duke of Mecklenburg will command the Russian troops at their debarkation.

Besides these subjects of disquiet, the king of England feels no less chagrin in having lost the confidence of the emperor, whom he so much loves and esteems; considers the treaty of Vienna as offensive and prejudicial both to the safety of his Hanoverian dominions and to the British commerce: and if his inclination first leads him to preserve his hereditary dominions, yet his interest obliges him to endeavour to maintain the commerce of England, which is his chief wish, the loss of which, he is convinced, would effectually prove the ruin of all.

The king is no less troubled with the suspicions which he entertains, that the emperor is resolving to annul the treaty of Hanover, as opposite to the constitution of the Germanic empire. The Hanoverian party here encourage these suspicions, and insinuate that an electoral assembly will be convened, for the purpose of declaring the treaty unconstitutional, and of exhorting the king and Frederic William, as electors of Hanover and Brandenburg, to retract it; and in case of refusal, to put them under the ban of the empire. The confidential friends of the king speak with regret of this convocation of the electoral assembly, which is threatened to be called in the month of July. And a hint thrown out by the empress, in a letter to the duchess of Kendal, that it appears from the treaty of Hanover, as if the king had no longer occasion for the emperor's friendship, has tended to confirm the king in his opinion that he has lost the emperor's confidence.



## M. POZOBUENO TO M. RIPPERDA.

## EXTRACTS.

London, May 23, 1726.—The account I transmitted to your excellency last week, of what passed between the king and the duchess of Kendal, lord Townshend and sir Robert Walpole, in regard to the letter from the empress of G. has been confirmed to me from another quarter. I also know, by the same channel, that Fabrice, chamberlain to the king as elector, his favourite, told the Imperial resident that the king was uneasy on account of the situation in which he stands with the emperor; and he added that Fabrice, after abusing lord Townshend as overbearing and violent in his resolutions, declared that he would never speak to him in future. The resident attempted to appease his anger, but in vain, for Fabrice protested that he feared no one, because in all he did and said he consulted only the interest of his master; and he requested the resident to furnish him, according to his promises, with those papers which prove the ill consequences of the treaty of Hanover, in regard to the emperor and the empire, and which give the reasons that induce the emperor to protect and support the Ostend company, and promised not to omit the first opportunity of laying them before the king. Fabrice concluded that the motive which induces the duchess of Kendal to lean to the opinion of Walpole to avoid a war, is not, *as she declares*, because it is the interest of England, but from self-interest. That the misunderstanding between Townshend and Walpole daily increases. Fabrice imagines that Walpole is so desirous of getting rid of Townshend, that he is capable of reconciling himself to Pulteney, and of placing him in Townshend's post.

London, May 30, 1726.—A few days after the departure of the last post, I happened to meet with the Imperial resi-

dent: he proceeded to communicate to me that he had learned from a safe and certain quarter, that the duchess of Kendal had copied afresh a letter to the empress, dictated by the Hanoverian minister. The resident also spoke to me of the division subsisting between lord Townshend and sir Robert Walpole, which he described as very great. Whatever care ministers may take to conceal every unpleasant fact, and to keep a guarded silence even with their great intimates, yet the nation is apprized, that whatever hostilities arise in the north, they will pay dearly for them. They observe, that most of the facts disclosed to them respecting our treaties with Vienna are not truly stated; and that even the treaty of Hanover has not produced the effects they were so liberally taught to expect. They even shew displeasure at the facility with which the parliament has permitted itself to be led by the influence of the minister. The resident also told me, that Mr. Pulteney, the oracle of opposition, who is very intimate with him and Staremburg, had given him this information\*.

\* From the above documents, corroborated by other testimonies to the same effect, published in Coxe's Collection, it is evident that the violent measures of lord Townshend, calculated to bring on an immediate and general war, were happily counteracted by a variety of causes. The court of Vienna itself, far from devising projects for the eventual restoration of the pretender, was manifestly reluctant in the highest degree to come to a rupture with the maritime powers. The empress herself condescended to carry on a private correspondence with the duchess of Kendal, with a view to prevent it. In case of a war, the defection of Prussia being scarcely a matter of doubt, Hanover would be completely at the mercy of the Imperial court. This made the Hanoverian ministers to tremble, and the king himself to ponder and to hesitate. The sagacity and moderation of Walpole led him at once to discern the absurdity, and to avoid the danger. Even the leading members of the opposition, whether acting from patriotic or factious motives, would be happy on this occasion to second the counsels of Bothmar and Fabrice, in order, by effecting a reconciliation with the emperor, to preserve their country from the calamity of war; and also to furnish themselves with so fair a handle for exposing in parliament the late rash and precipitate proceedings of their political antagonists.

## COUNT PALM TO THE EMPEROR.

*London, Dec. 13, 1726.*

In the present circumstances, when the violent proceedings of the English ministry against the Spanish court have the appearance of an almost inevitable breach of the peace with that court, and when it is to be feared that all Europe may be plunged in a destructive war, I, urged by my duty and zeal, have endeavoured to learn, *1st*, how the nation is inclined on that head; and, *2dly*, who it is in reality that labours to blow these coals. As to the first, it is most certain that the greatest part of the nation, nay, as I have been told by people of good experience and knowledge, even two-thirds of it, are discontented at the present ministry, and not only abhor the war with your Imperial majesty and Spain, but also the strict alliance and union with France. As to the second, it is no less manifest that the cause of these measures, so precipitate, and tending to a dangerous rupture, can be imputed to none else but the *English ministry*, that is to say, to my lord Townshend. For the king, as to himself, is of a peaceable disposition, and not to be brought to proceedings of that nature, unless he has been induced to it by such misrepresentations and false suggestions, as have been able to create a suspicion and hearty fear in him.

I have just now said, that the nation is not inclined to a war, especially against your Imperial majesty; and it is very well known to the public, that the Ostend commerce is a grievance industriously enhanced by the ministry, to animate the nation, and make them cry out against your Imperial majesty, fancying that you might thereby be induced to gratify them (the ministry), as well in this point directly, as indirectly in other affairs.

In some of my former, but especially in my reflections upon the answer given to the Spanish court, I men-

tioned how great a mistake the ministry were guilty of in that answer, and how they committed so false a step, that it is almost impossible for them to make it consistent with their honour and security not to make a war. But who is the *primum mobile* in the ministry? 'Tis very well known to the whole world that it can be but my lord Townshend. For his brother, Robert Walpole, though his power and credit be far greater, yet he properly does not meddle with foreign affairs, but receives accounts of them in general, leaving for the rest the direction of them entirely to lord Townshend. As for others, there are none that have any share in those affairs besides the duke of Newcastle only: but then it is also known to every body, that this latter is nothing but a figure of secretary of state, being obliged to conform himself in every thing to lord Townshend, who is *propriè autor et anima negotiorum*. Now, as long as his lordship continues in his post, it does not appear how one may expect from England a sincere good understanding and undisturbed alliance. For the known principles of this minister, as well as the present condition of affairs, hurried by him to the brink of a rupture, are an obstruction to such an amicable composition as might be relied upon. As for his principles, it is known that he has always been against the system of Europe as settled by the quadruple alliance, for he has told upon that head, "that had it depended upon him, he would have ordered it so, that the advantages your Imperial majesty got by it should have cost you dearer." Those were his very expressions. Since he came to the ministry, experience has convinced, that he has almost upon all occasions acted against your Imperial majesty's interests; of which the steps taken in the face of the whole world, both at Cambray and since, are evident proofs, and shew his real disaffection. Besides this, nobody is ignorant of what he said in parliament, for in his speeches he ran into such excesses, that all impartial people could not hear of

them without horror. In this situation it is probable that we can never promise to ourselves any good from him; for should we even resolve to forget his audaciousness and indiscretion, and should he disguise his natural opinion and inclination, yet all that could be negotiated with him could not be lasting, but we should ever run the risk, upon every proffered occasion, of his returning to the maxims formerly used by him, and entirely suitable to his genius.

As much as this man is an obstruction to a general quiet and reasonable agreement, as easy would it be to arrive at it, were he no longer in the way, and removed from the direction of affairs: for the nation in general hates him, and the king himself is not well inclined to him by his own choice; but he only keeps himself in power and credit, because he and his brother have in a despotic manner rendered themselves masters of all affairs. It is true, they have the parliament on their side; but that is not to be wondered at, for upon the foot that matters have been carried on within these few years, when the members, and consequently the majority, are bought with great pensions and employments, it is no great skill to have gained the parliament. But then I have been assured, from a very good hand, that if it should be once perceived that the ministry are not deep in the king's favour, and that his majesty should out of dislike to them make some shew of changing them, in that very moment there would be a turn, and most of them upon whom the ministry chiefly depend would pull off the mask, and declare against them. But as long as this does not happen, it is not so much as to be supposed that the parliament will oppose the government, unless the kingdom should come to be plunged into some visible ruin or danger: for though more than the third part have actually opposed, and will still oppose it, yet this can have no effect, because the ministers will always get the better by their purchased majority.



The nation itself is not satisfied with the parliament, because every body knows that there has not been one, time out of mind, in which the members have been so corrupted and devoted to the court.

For though the parliament has approved the measures and engagements taken with foreign powers, and particularly with France, yet the nation in general, high and low, are of a contrary opinion: the close understanding with France, and the hostile proceedings towards your Imperial majesty, being disapproved by them. Now, as long as the ministry can produce nothing to convince the nation that it has reason to fear any hostile act from your Imperial majesty or your allies, that opinion will not be altered, and all the blame returns upon the ministry. From which one may conclude, that as long as your Imperial majesty and your allies design nothing in favour of the pretender, and will make it known so to the world, the imputations invented on that head by the ministry will do hurt to none but themselves. For the nation must clearly see how ill they are led on by the ministry. Some eminent subjects, who are well inclined to your Imperial majesty's service, and extremely opposed to the present maxims of the ministry, have assured me, not only that the said ministry are extremely put to it, but also, that if your Imperial majesty and the king of Spain should continue with the same steadiness as hitherto, and the nation be convinced, besides, that all is false and groundless which they are told in order to prejudice them against the treaty of Vienna, and to render it odious, then the ministry would not long be able to blind the people, and play their cheating tricks; and a declaration of this, made to please the nation, and the most sensible part of the people, would in due time produce a good effect. Now, therefore, to promote this point, and your Imperial majesty's service, and deprive the ministry of all strength and credit, which they so mightily endea-

your to preserve, both at home and abroad, the opinion of the well-intentioned is, that besides the aforementioned steadiness of your Imperial majesty and Spain, a true state of the present matters should be fairly, and with convincing proofs, laid before the king. As to the nation, it may be done by publishing in print, and by word of mouth, information to such as have most credit and influence among them. And to the king it should be done by a confidential channel: then if his majesty were thus retrieved, by better informations and assurances, from his false impressions, and convinced that his English ministers intended to lead him on in so dangerous a way, there is no doubt but he would apply to better counsels, and then there would be found some people who would enforce such good dispositions, and break the neck of the present ministry. I know most certainly, that the king loves to learn some things *in materiâ negotiorum publicorum*, by other hands than by his ministers; which, it may very well be supposed, proceeds from a suspicion he has, that his ministers do not acquaint him with the true circumstances of matters. The king has many times had such informations conveyed to him, which he has taken as kindly as one could expect from a mind so prepossessed as his is; and this gives reason to believe, that what one would desire to convey to him in that manner would have a good effect.

COUNT ZINZENDORF TO COUNT PALM.

*Vienna, Dec. 21, 1726.*

We see plainly by the proceedings against Spain, that England seeks by all means to compel Spain by force, in order to break with us, as St. Saphorin gives out, in pursuance of their alliance. This arises chiefly from hence, because the ministry cannot support themselves otherwise than by troubling and confounding matters.

We must wait to see whether the nation will suffer themselves to be led away blindly any longer. Do they say that there is a secret engagement entered into, in the offensive alliance, concerning Gibraltar? that is the greatest untruth, as the treaty itself shews. Do they say that an agreement is made concerning the pretender? that is likewise the greatest untruth that can be imagined. Let them ask all the jacobites whether they have heard one word from us, or from Spain, that could be construed to mean such an enterprise, so long as we don't enter into a war: but then we shall help ourselves as well as we can. In short, the mad English ministry shall never bring us to any thing through fear; our measures are so taken, that certainly we shall be able to oppose the aggressor.

As to the commerce of Ostend, we have already made such steps as shew the peaceable desires of his Imperial majesty, and we are ready every moment to go farther. Do they talk of a marriage between an arch-duchess and don Carlos? 'tis very wonderful that they would prevent by a war *now*, a case that is so far from happening; which would not be avoided by a war, were it intended, which is a case put, but not granted. What danger can Europe undergo by that? *This* only, that this being a prince of the house of Bourbon, the strict union between France and Spain and this house will be promoted. But if France herself, as it seems, opposes this, and don't care that a cadet of that family should rise so high, then this fixes a disunion between France and Spain, which was attempted to be fixed by so long and bloody a war. What then is the cause and reason for making war? The augmentation of 30,000 men goes on, and we have many friends.

MEMORIAL OF COUNT PALM TO THE KING OF GREAT  
BRITAIN, PRESENTED FEBRUARY 1727.

MOST SERENE AND POTENT KING,

As soon as the speech made by your majesty to the parliament of Great Britain, now assembled, came to the knowledge of his Imperial and Catholic majesty, my most gracious master, he was struck with the utmost astonishment, that your majesty could suffer yourself to be prevailed upon to declare, from the royal throne, to that most renowned nation, in a manner hitherto unheard of, as undoubted facts, several things, some of which are strained in that speech to a wrong sense, some are entirely distant from the intentions of his Imperial and Catholic majesty; and, LASTLY, which affect much more sensibly than all the rest, some absolutely void of all foundation.

For as to what regards the peace concluded at Vienna with the most serene king of Spain, who can forbear being astonished that this very peace, which is built on the quadruple alliance signed at London, and other treaties contracted with your majesty, as its solid and sole foundation. And for the obtaining of which peace your majesty, together with your allies, waged so bloody, so long, and so glorious a war, and took yourself so much pains to procure, should now be alleged by your majesty as a just ground of complaint, and should be made use of as a pretence for these things which hitherto your ministers have been doing in all parts, to the great detriment of the emperor and the empire and the public tranquillity, and should be represented by your majesty to the British nation, with so much animosity against the emperor and the king of Spain, as a violation of treaties.

After complaining of the peace made at Vienna, complaint is likewise made of the treaty of commerce entered into with Spain, which is calculated to promote the mu-

tual and lawful advantages of the subjects of both parties, which is agreeable to the law of nations, and to the customs of all people in amity with each other : which can in no respect be of any prejudice to the British nation, whether we regard the situation of the countries, or the particular nature of the trade, and which is not in the least repugnant to the treaties made with Great Britain. So that if this treaty be considered with a mind free from prejudice, and from all design of inflaming the nation, there will remain no pretence to say that this treaty can be grievous or hurtful to a nation for which his Imperial majesty has the greatest affection and esteem, and whose glorious exploits, and important succours, no time will efface out of his memory.

The other head of complaint, which contains such things as are void of all foundation, relates principally to that imaginary alliance, which in the speech is called offensive, and is there supposed to have been made against your majesty between the emperor and king of Spain. But it will not only appear how groundless and frivolous this supposition is, from the offer lately made by his Imperial and Catholic majesty, of entering into a convention *de se mutuo non offendendo*, but will be entirely refuted by the consideration of the tenor of the treaty of alliance and friendship itself, made with the crown of Spain, and communicated in its whole extent to your majesty when it is proper : from the words of which, whether the least shadow or appearance of an offensive alliance can be drawn, is submitted to the judgment of the whole world.

Another part of the complaint relates to the secret articles made in favour of the pretender, whereof your majesty asserts that you have certain and undoubted informations, by which articles it should have been agreed to set the pretender on the throne of Great Britain. With what view, on what motive, and to what purpose, these informations, founded on the falsest reports, were repre-



sented to the people of Great Britain, is only not easy to be understood by his Imperial and Catholic majesty, but is obvious to the meanest capacity. But since the inviolable dignity and honour of such great princes cannot suffer that assertions of this nature, entirely unsupported by truth, should be advanced from the royal throne to the whole nation, and to all mankind, his sacred Imperial and Catholic majesty has expressly commanded me, that I should declare to your majesty, and to the whole kingdom of Great Britain, how highly he thinks himself affronted thereby, solemnly affirming upon his Imperial word, that there exists no secret article, nor convention whatsoever, which contains, or can tend to prove, the least tittle of what has been alleged. But that the secret designs, which lie concealed under a conduct till this time unheard of, may more manifestly appear, it must be observed, that the time is purposely taken for doing this, when a negotiation is on foot at Paris for composing the differences which have arisen, without any fault of his Imperial and Catholic majesty; which negotiation sufficiently shews how much his Imperial and Catholic majesty is at all times inclined to peace, and to the religious observation of his treaties.

As to what is said of Gibraltar, and concerning the siege thereof, under which, in the speech, it is insinuated as if some other design was concealed, the hostilities notoriously committed in the Indies and elsewhere against the king of Spain, in violation of treaties, seem to have given a very just occasion to the king of Spain for attempting that siege. But as to the intentions and engagements of the emperor upon that article, it is easy to see what they are by the treaty above-mentioned, which has been communicated.

As to what is said in the last place, concerning the Ostend trade, which the goodness of the Catholic king induced him to favour, being bound by no treaty, after he

had been apprized of the just reasons for the establishment of it, various expedients for a composition have been proposed, not only at the Hague, but even lately at Paris, lest this harmless method of providing for the security of the barrier, should prove an obstacle to the common friendship of the neighbouring powers.

Which things being thus the injury offered to truth, the honour and dignity of his sacred Imperial and Catholic majesty require that they should be exposed to your majesty, to the kingdom of Great Britain, and to the whole world. And his sacred Imperial majesty demands that reparation which is due to him by all manner of right, for the great injuries which have been done him by these many imputations.

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The preceding documents appear in the most decisive manner to demonstrate the non-existence of any such design on the part of the court of Vienna, in favour of the pretender, as the king of England had announced in his speech to both houses of parliament, January 1727. And upon what plausible grounds of evidence the pertinacious belief of that monarch and his ministers, in the reality of this design, was founded, yet remains amongst the arcana of history. Nevertheless, as the original editor of these papers has not merely declared his firm conviction of its truth, in common with the first assertors of it, but has assigned specific reasons for that conviction, it will not in this place be deemed improper, though at present chiefly a question of historic curiosity, concisely to state the argument on both sides, and leave the reader to draw his own conclusions.

I. In vindication of the hypothesis contended for by Mr. Coxe, has been urged the solemn assertion of the king of Great Britain in his famous speech of January

17th, 1727, in which that monarch pledged his faith and honour in support of the veracity of the charge brought by him against the emperor.

II. There is also alleged, the steady and continued belief of the confidential ministers of the crown, Townshend and the Walpoles, in the reality of the design, long after the period of apprehension was past; a belief which we are led to infer remained unaltered to the last moment of their lives.

III. The evidence of the duke de Ripperda is positive respecting the existence of a plan, or plot, concerted between the two courts of Vienna and Madrid, to restore the pretender, however he may have varied as to the particulars.

IV. The testimony of the two Sicilian abbots, Platania and Carraccioli, to the same purpose, is no less express, and not subject to the same imputation of inconsistency.

V. The implied avowal of count Zinzendorf himself, contained in his declaration to count Palm, "that in case of a war the emperor will help himself as well as he can," &c. is strongly insisted on, for no one ever imagined that the pretender could be restored otherwise than by a war\*.

Now, in the first place, and as a preliminary remark, it must be observed, there existed the strongest *previous* improbability that the emperor, a man not destitute of knowledge or understanding, and at this time greatly influenced by the counsels of prince Eugene, scarcely less eminent as a statesman than a warrior, could harbour a design so totally devoid of common sense as that imputed to him. An invasion of Great Britain was a project for the accomplishment of which the Austrian power was altogether unfit and incompetent. The misunderstandings

\* Vide Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, and Appendix. Also, Memoirs of Lord Walpole, p. 139.—Both by the Rev. William Coxe.

between the courts of London and Vienna related almost wholly to the affairs of Germany, and were by no means of such magnitude as were likely to excite the emperor to so vast and desperate an enterprise. Even admitting the attempt to be feasible, what political purpose could be answered by its success? The house of Stuart, odious to the bulk of the nation, if restored, could maintain permanent possession of the throne only by the aid and assistance of France, with which power it must sooner or later be expected to form connexions fatal to the interests of the house of Austria; whose political views had been in the main, and particularly by the late treaty of the quadruple alliance, zealously promoted by the king of England.

At this crisis, it must indeed be acknowledged, that the court of Vienna, perceiving an unexpected opportunity offer itself of detaching Spain for ever from France, was eager to meet the advances of the court of Madrid, which was governed by counsels to the last degree weak, proud, and passionate. The restitution of Gibraltar being one of the most favourite objects of this haughty court, the duke de Ripperda, its minister at Vienna, would naturally urge the emperor to concur in the rash and violent measures in contemplation, to extort that restitution from England. There exists no proof, however, that the court of Vienna carried her complaisance even so far as this. On the contrary, both count Palm in his public memorial, and count Zinzendorf in his private dispatches, absolutely deny that the emperor has entered into any offensive engagement with Spain respecting this fortress. That the court of Madrid was amused by that of Vienna with delusive hopes on this and other points, is indeed sufficiently manifest, and vast sums of money were from time to time remitted to the emperor by the Catholic king, in order to enable his Imperial majesty to act with vigour in support of the wild projects of Spain;

but the real policy of the court of Vienna was widely and totally different from that of her new and restless ally.

After these preliminary remarks, we may with advantage descend to particulars—And,

I. As to the solemn declaration of the king of England from the throne, nothing more can be inferred from it, than the entire conviction of that monarch respecting the truth of the charge thus publicly brought against the emperor. To this may with far greater force be opposed, the equally solemn and positive denial of the emperor. For the king of England *might be*, and very many of his best friends even then believed him *to be mistaken*: but the emperor could not possibly be liable in this case to be deceived; and there is no pretence, from the general character of this prince, to accuse, or even suspect him of hazarding a flagrant falsehood, respecting a matter of the highest importance, in the face of the whole world. Besides, nearly two years had elapsed since the conclusion of the treaty between the emperor and Spain, in which interval no one step had been taken by the court of Vienna towards carrying this pretended project into execution: although, in consequence of the quarrel of England with Russia, circumstances were unusually favourable to its accomplishment, if indeed it could for a moment be supposed possible or feasible, in *any circumstances* of which the most sanguine adversary of Great Britain could indulge the expectation.

II. The unvaried belief of the confidential ministers of the crown, Townshend and the Walpoles, in the truth of this design, if admitted (though the concurrence of sir Robert Walpole in this opinion seems very problematical), proves only the reluctance of human nature to relinquish the prejudices it has once imbibed. Moreover, as we have no specific declarations to judge from on their part,



and must rely on a general and vague assurance of this obstinate adherence to their original opinion, it is impossible to say with what abatements and modifications it might in the lapse of years be qualified.

III. The evidence of the duke de Ripperda is reduced by his innumerable contradictions and extravagancies to a mere nullity. In Mr. Stanhope's dispatch to lord Townshend, December 27, 1725, the ambassador declares, "that he had received the most positive assurances from the duc de Ripperda, that nothing had been concerted, or even treated upon between the courts of Madrid and Vienna in favour of the pretender; and that whatever designs on that head should come to his knowledge, he would oppose to the utmost of his power; and he positively affirmed, that there was no secret treaty or articles whatsoever entered into between the two courts." Early in the following February the duke de Ripperda informed Mr. Stanhope, "that the second or secret treaty would soon be made public; that it included an engagement, on the part of the emperor, to procure Gibraltar for the king of Spain, by good offices if possible, but if they prove ineffectual, by open force." In a few weeks after this (April 11th), the duke declared to Mr. Stanhope, "that the real intention of the secret treaty was defensive; for that although the emperor engaged to join with the king of Spain for procuring him Gibraltar from his majesty, 'tis expressed in the treaty *amicabiliter si fieri potest.*" And it was not till after his disgrace, when he resolved to throw himself upon the protection of England, that he fabricated that extravagant tale which seems to have been swallowed by the ambassador, Stanhope, with implicit credulity.

IV. With regard to the testimony of the Sicilian abbots, Platania and Carraccioli, it bears upon the very face of it the character of a mere Sicilian romance. The secret treaty of Vienna is pretended to have been commu-

nicated to these abbots by the king of Spain on the 15th November, 1725. By the fifth article of this suppositious treaty, "the emperor and king obliged themselves to seek all methods to restore the pretender to the throne of Great Britain." This disclosure was made in confidence by the king, as we are told, for the express purpose of obtaining the observations of these abbots upon it. But, as the romance proceeds to state, "the remarks made by them were so free as to inflame the resentment of the king, and he thereupon banished them from Spain." The king was therefore no doubt willing, if not desirous, that this profound secret should be at length made public; otherwise he would have adopted a different mode of punishment—"not sent them wandering, but confined them at home." They were, however, it seems, allowed to retire to France, where, as the king of Spain unquestionably foresaw and intended, "they imparted much useful intelligence to Mr. Walpole," then resident at Paris. Amongst other extraordinary intelligence, these Sicilian adventurers, to the great terror of the English court, communicated their edition of the secret articles of the treaty of Vienna. Were this marvellous tale uncontradicted by any external evidence, it is from its own incongruity and extravagance wholly undeserving of serious belief; and it may without hesitation be placed on the same shelf with the Exploits of Don Bellianis, or the History of the Seven Champions of Christendom.

V. The declaration made by count Zinzendorf to count Palm, which is supposed to imply the reality of this design, remains to be considered. But in order to decide upon a question of this kind, no particular sentence or expression of the Austrian ministers can with propriety be taken or judged of separately. The whole scope and tenor of the correspondence is to be considered together; and whatever may appear in any degree ambiguous, must be explained agreeably to the plain intention and design of the whole.

Judging in conformity to this rule of common sense, not even the shadow of difficulty can remain.

Far from indicating any wish, and far less any intention, of involving herself in a war with England, the court of Vienna discovers an extreme solicitude for the re-establishment of that harmony and friendship which formerly subsisted between the two countries. Both ministers express a great degree of surprise at the extreme animosity displayed by the English court, which they endeavour to account for in various ways, though unable fully to develop the causes of it to their own satisfaction: and they concert schemes for the purpose of infusing a spirit of equity and moderation into the English counsels. Is this consistent with the existence of any secret and pre-determined design of invading Great Britain for the purpose of restoring the pretender? Is it imaginable that such a design should exist in that court, the confidential ministers of which hold this sort of language in their private intercourse with each other, and even with the emperor himself? The supposition involves in it an absolute moral impossibility.

Count Palm tells the emperor, “ that two-thirds of the English nation abhor the war with Austria; that lord Townshend is the cause of these precipitate measures which tend to so dangerous a rupture; that the king, peaceably disposed himself, has been induced to concur in them, by such misrepresentations and false suggestions as have been able to excite not merely suspicion, but a hearty fear in him; that so long as his Imperial majesty and his allies design nothing in favour of the pretender, and will make it known so to the world, the imputations INVENTED on that head by the ministers, will do hurt to none but themselves; that should the nation be convinced that all is false and groundless which they are told in order to prejudice them against the treaty of Vienna, and to

render it odious, then the ministry would not long be able to blind the people, and play their CHEATING TRICKS; that if the king were retrieved from his false impressions, there is no doubt but he would apply to better counsels," &c. &c.

The empress herself had, as it appears, even condescended to enter into a private correspondence with the duchess of Kendal, in order to secure her influence with the king in favour of the moderate and pacific system.

In fine, the prime minister of the Imperial court, count Zinzendorf, declares positively to the Imperial ambassador in London, count Palm, that "the notion of an agreement entered into in favour of the pretender, is the greatest untruth possible." He even denies that any offensive engagement exists concerning Gibraltar. And as to the commerce of Ostend, and the company established there, he affirms that "the court of Vienna have already made concessions, and are ready every moment to go farther."

His general conclusion is, "that the MAD English ministry cannot support themselves otherwise than by troubling and confounding matters. And though the Imperial court means no such enterprise as is charged against them *in case of a war*:" *i. e.* not surely the war which they themselves have determined secretly and desperately upon, with the view of dethroning the family actually reigning in Great Britain, but the war which they are anxiously apprehensive they may be eventually forced into, by the violence and "madness" of the English ministry, and more particularly of the secretary for foreign affairs, lord Townshend—"they shall help themselves as well as they can." And who would not in the same circumstances say the same thing?

This nevertheless is the irrefragable proof which we are told "confirms beyond a doubt the secret resolutions of the emperor!" And we are gravely reminded of "the

futility of opposing weak conjectures and perverted reasonings against positive facts\*.”

A moral and philosophical conclusion somewhat more pertinent to the occasion may be deduced from this recital, in the words of a discerning and experienced statesman, who tells us, that “there exists in politics a great truth, which is, that as all independent powers are with respect to each other in a state of nature, and consequently ever in a state of distrust, each party continually exaggerates the injuries and views of the adverse party; and that fear always bewildering the judgment, each combats chimeras of its own creation, and finishes by realizing dangers which at the beginning existed only in imagination †.

LORD TOWNSHEND TO KING GEORGE II.

*A. D.* 1728.

IN the collection of state papers published by Mr. Coxe, are to be found a series of notes from lord Townshend to the king, principally serving to demonstrate the eager and unbounded complaisance of that minister in relation to the Hanover system of politics.—A few specimens may suffice.

September 20, 1728.—I have drawn a declaration, in concert with M. Hattorff. If your majesty approves of it, I humbly propose that it should be sent to Mr. Walpole, with orders to communicate to the cardinal the conversation he had with count Bassewitz, and the terms that were offered by him, and that as your majesty would do

\* Vide Coxe's Memoirs of Lord Walpole.

† Count de Segur's Memoirs of Frederic William II, vol. i. p. 49.



nothing without the cardinal's advice, your majesty had thought fit to desire it particularly in this case. By this step I conceive your majesty will have advantages: that if the cardinal advises your majesty to go this length, and desire this declaration, your majesty will be sure that the cardinal is determined to do something in favour of the duke of Holstein, and that it is in such case for your majesty's interest not to be left single; and if the cardinal is of opinion that your majesty should not hearken to these propositions of count Bassewitz, your majesty will find plainly that France has no intention to recede in the least from their guaranty, or give offence to Denmark. In the first case, Mr. Walpole may have orders, with the cardinal's approbation, to talk to count Bassewitz as from himself, and to propose his giving a declaration of the nature of the inclosed, in order to procure your majesty's friendship and good offices. And, in the second case, that the cardinal appears indifferent as to the duke of Holstein's satisfaction, Mr. Walpole may drop the whole, and take no farther notice of count Bassewitz's proposals.

September 24, 1728.—I send your majesty the inclosed draft of a declaration to be made by count Bassewitz, to which I have added the clause marked with dots underneath. By the former paper the duke of Holstein would not have been obliged to renounce his pretensions upon your majesty, unless the whole satisfaction were obtained. But as it is now turned, the renunciation will be immediate, upon your majesty's engaging to act in concert with the Most Christian king to those purposes therein mentioned. And as it is proper the duke should renounce those pretensions which really can never avail him any thing, upon your majesty's promising your good offices in his favour, so your majesty is engaged to nothing but in concert with France. And if that crown joins in obtaining a competent satisfaction for the duke, your majesty

will be undoubtedly quit of all shadow of pretension on the part of that prince. And if France should not be active and hearty in that matter, your majesty, by your readiness to join, will have deserved this declaration from the duke, which will always stand as a proof of your majesty's goodness towards him, and of the little ground he has for any pretensions upon your majesty; so that in all events, whatever the success of your majesty's endeavours may be, if the duke makes this declaration, he will have quitted all claim upon your majesty for any part of the equivalent for Sleswig, and all pretensions to Bremen and Verden.

THE KING IN REPLY.

I like this form of a declaration much better than the first; and if it is to be obtained, it will entirely secure the possession of Bremen, and free me from any obligation of an equivalent.

LORD TOWNSHEND TO THE KING.


EXTRACT.

November 1728.—I cannot but apprehend that Chauvelin is preparing materials in relation to Sleswig, that may in the end prove prejudicial to your majesty's interests. Mr. Walpole, therefore, should have orders to talk with the cardinal, in a calm but serious manner, upon this point, and to shew him how dangerous a step it would be for the two crowns to enter into this discussion at present: that France having given her guaranty to the king of Denmark for Sleswig, can no more insist upon her giving the duke any equivalent for it, than upon his restoring the duchy itself. And Mr. Walpole should do his utmost to induce the cardinal to declare that your ma-

jesty shall not be in any manner affected by any thing that may be done in favour of the duke of Holstein, or given him as an equivalent for Sleswig.

## EXTRACT.

October 5, 1729.—I flatter myself that the use I have made of M. Knyphausen's notion concerning the guarantee of Sweden and Denmark, and what I have grafted upon that proposal, may, if it be accepted by the court of Prussia (considering the great inclination of the Swedes to see themselves again masters of Stettin and what they have lost in Pomerania, and considering the *hank* your majesty has upon Denmark with regard to the affair of Sleswig), facilitate any views your majesty may have upon any part of the country of Mecklenburg.



NEGOTIATIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF  
VIENNA.

THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.  
APART.

(1.)

MY LORD,

*Hague, Sept. 19, (N. S.) 1730.*

I WAS honoured by the last post with your lordship's private letter of the 1st (N. S.), by which I am sorry to find the resolution that seems to be taken about Mecklenburg. It appears to be no less than perpetuating the commission, at least for this duke's life; for if he is too wild and extravagant at his age to be treated with at all, I presume he will hardly ever become more *traitable*. As to

the dissatisfaction his majesty expressed with relation to the pensionary's ideas, I have justified him, and very truly, in my other letter to your lordship by this post; for I really had not informed him of all his majesty's demands, thinking it improper, in the infancy of this affair, to frighten him with a catalogue of pretensions, that might make him consider the very thing I was employing him to transact, as impracticable. However, I look upon our negotiation with the emperor as begun; but I look upon it too as very far from being ended, and I foresee the many difficulties that will arise in the course of it. The king thinks the guarantee so great a concession, that it entitles him to ask any thing or every thing. The emperor considers it in a different light, and though desirous to obtain it, will not purchase it too dear. He knows it is almost as much our interest as his; he sees our situation with France, and he apprehends little from the concurrence of such jarring particles as our present alliance is formed of. These difficulties, which to me are obvious ones, will certainly spin out the negotiation to a considerable length, though not break it off; for the good of it is, that when once begun, and the demands of England and the Republic meeting with little difficulty, as I am persuaded they will, it will be impossible to break it off, for the sake of some certain conditions that your lordship and I know of. But as these difficulties will take up a good deal of time, and probably not be discussed here; or if they were, as I am both unfit and unwilling to be concerned in them, I submit it to your lordship, whether it is not time to think of a successor for me here, who will require some time to get ready, and who it may be proper should be here before I go. There is now a little more than three months to the sitting of the parliament, and since I am to be back by that time, I confess I should be glad it were as soon as possible. I therefore beg your lordship will mention this affair to the king, in what way you think properest, whether as from

yourself or me. It is with the utmost pleasure I reflect, that I can address myself in this manner at the same time to a friend and a minister, and subscribe myself with as much sincerity to the one as respect to the other, &c.

CHESTERFIELD.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

EXTRACT.

(2.)

SIR, *Windsor Castle, 14-25th Sept. 1730.*

Nobody is better apprized than yourself, of the sincere desire and readiness which his majesty has constantly shewn upon all occasions, ever since the conclusion of the treaty of Seville, to have all the engagements entered into by it in favour of Spain, executed with the greatest faith and punctuality; and that the king for the same purpose has not only incessantly pressed his allies, particularly France, to enter into such measures as would most effectually conduce to that end, but also has always readily consented to every proposal that has been made to him of that nature, by offering generously to furnish all such succours as were demanded of him, though far exceeding his proportion as stipulated by the said treaty. You have also been a witness to the several chicanes and unreasonable objections started by France, against the execution of every proposal, though made by themselves, as soon as ever they found it agreed to by his majesty. And you must have observed by what invidious insinuations, and false assertions, they have endeavoured to persuade the the court of Spain, that the inaction of this year, though evidently and solely occasioned by themselves, and consequently the non-execution of the treaty of Seville, ought



to be imputed to his majesty. Affairs being at present in this disagreeable situation, and there being too just grounds to apprehend, from what has passed, that France will either undertake nothing, even next year, and by that means keep matters in the same intolerable state of uncertainty and expense which they are now in, or else, not content with the bare execution of the said treaty, will engage the allies in such a general war as must inevitably overturn the balance of Europe; for these reasons his majesty, who is always desirous and determined to execute with the greatest faithfulness all his engagements, has been induced to hearken to and encourage any proposal conducive to that end, to the preserving at the same time the public tranquillity and equilibrium of Europe, even at the price of entering into such a new engagement as, though not contrary to his treaties with any of his allies, may yet be of that nature, as, in a less violent situation of affairs, he might not have taken upon himself for the present. I mean the GUARANTEE of the PRAGMATIC SANCTION, which the emperor has so much at heart, and which, considering the plan of operations, and the scheme of partitions, which are now concerting at Paris and elsewhere, is so essential to him, as well for the security of his possessions for the present, as for preserving them united and entire to his successor.

But as the taking such a step in favour of the emperor, though strictly justifiable in itself, would inevitably not only be highly disagreeable to France and Spain, but even lose his majesty the confidence and friendship of most of the powerful princes in Germany, and particularly of the electors of Bavaria and Saxony, the court of Vienna cannot but be convinced of the justice, and even the necessity there is, not only that the strictest friendship and union should be at the same time established between the two courts, by finally and effectually adjusting ALL matters at present in dispute between them; but also, that

the emperor in return should heartily concur in all such reasonable measures and proposals as shall be made to him on the part of his majesty, *as well for the present quiet enjoyment of his possessions in Germany, as to secure them against any future attempts that may be made by any of the neighbouring powers,* disobliged by the king's thus voluntarily and generously entering into an engagement of such vast importance and service to the emperor.

Wherefore the king has commanded me to acquaint you, that he expects that the emperor should consent to the introduction of the Spanish garrisons, according to the treaty of Seville; and that the points of the Ostend trade, Ostfrise and Mecklenburg, with all other matters now in dispute that regard the king and his allies, should be adjusted to his satisfaction; *and likewise that such farther particulars as may be necessary to his majesty's security in Germany,* should be settled. And in case you find the Imperial ministers *ready to agree to these proposals,* you may give them to understand that his majesty will also be willing, on his part, to give his guarantee to the pragmatic sanction for maintaining the succession to the dominions of the house of Austria, according to what has been established by his Imperial majesty therein; provided that the emperor will at the same time give such security to the allies of Seville, and to Europe in general, concerning the marriage of the arch-duchesses, his daughters, as may quiet the apprehensions that have arisen on that account, as to the breaking of the balance of power in Christendom.

And as the emperor seems to expect that the king, in order to make known his desire to settle a thorough reconciliation with him, should shew a disposition to give this guarantee, which his Imperial majesty appears to have most at heart; although his majesty is in no wise obliged to take upon himself an engagement of that nature, so his majesty persuades himself that the emperor, on his part,

will not be backward to do every thing that shall tend to re-establish the most perfect friendship between the two courts. And as the king, as elector, has several matters which ought to be adjusted, in order to remove all kinds of seeds of misunderstandings, his majesty, who makes no question but that the emperor is in the same good disposition, has ordered his minister at Ratisbon, M. de Dieden, immediately to repair to Vienna, and to lay before the Imperial ministers his particular demand as elector. The emperor cannot but be sensible, that when a friendship is to be renewed, all occasions of dissatisfaction and diffidence should in prudence and true policy be taken away; and therefore the king does not doubt but that the Imperial court will at once enter into his majesty's thoughts on that head, and not leave any point between the two courts unadjusted. Wherefore, when M. Dieden shall arrive at Vienna, you shall receive him with the utmost confidence, and take your information from him as to what he has to propose in the king's name as elector; and you will support his arguments and reasonings with the Imperial ministers, and endeavour to get his majesty all just satisfaction on the demands which M. Dieden is instructed to make.

These then are the king's sentiments upon the present negotiation with the court of Vienna. His majesty is sincerely inclined to re-establish a perfect friendship with the emperor, and even to enter into the guarantee so earnestly sought for by the Imperial court, *provided* his majesty's demands as to the introduction of Spanish garrisons be agreed to; that the other points relating to him and his allies be settled; *that his ELECTORAL AFFAIRS be adjusted to his satisfaction*, and that the article concerning the guarantee be made wholly a secret for the present.

## LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

## EXTRACT.

(3.)

London, December 5-14th, 1730.—M. Dieden will acquaint you with his instructions, by which you will find him directed to obtain a declaration from the emperor, setting forth the particular satisfaction to be given to the king upon all his electoral points, *which you will procure to be signed at the same time that you execute the treaty.* But if the court of Vienna should obstinately refuse to give such a declaration, *you will not absolutely break off the treaty upon that head, but send an account of every thing withal to England.* And if you find you are not likely to agree upon those points, I believe you would not do amiss to dispose that court to send at the same time full powers and instructions to their minister here to conclude them, if possible without any loss of time.

## EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

## APART.

(4.)

MY LORD, *Hague, Dec. 19th (N.S.) 1730.*

I am in such a hurry to dispatch the courier to Vienna as soon as possible, that had it not been for your lordship's commands in your letter of the 4th, *apart*, I should have deferred giving you this trouble till next post. I confess I have my doubts about the success of our Vienna treaty, at least about the dispatch it will meet with there, and I am



persuaded it will employ couriers some time longer. When I saw the plan transmitted to your lordship by Mr. Robinson, I was concerned to find it clogged with conditions which they could never imagine would be agreed to; such as the guarantee of Brunswick, the duke of Holstein's affair, &c. and consequently seemed to be intended delays\*.

Prince Eugene's behaviour to Mr. Robinson would naturally give one hopes of success; but when I consider how much that gentleness is out of character, I own I refine enough to suspect it. The treaty sent to Vienna, as far as it relates to England and the Republic, is such as the emperor, I think, in prudence ought to agree to; but considering his haughtiness and obstinacy, and the knowledge he certainly has of the distrusts and jealousies among the allies, I fear it is uncertain whether he will or no. I hope M. Dieden's demands will not prove an obstruction to this affair; but I cannot comprehend what can be meant by an additional security to the king's electoral dominions, which are already guaranteed over and over by all the powers upon earth, and by the whole empire, as being a part of it; so that I suspect additional security to mean additional dominions, which can only be dismembering Mecklenburg upon a pretence of paying in that manner the expenses of the commission. And this I think the emperor never can, and the empire never will consent to, it being a total subversion of all the fundamental laws of the empire.

I am very willing to stay here till this affair be determined one way or other, and the more so, because, should the emperor agree, I foresee there will be some difficulties

\* The court of London had transmitted to Mr. Robinson the plan, or *precis*, of a treaty, ready drawn, for the acceptance of the court of Vienna. The plan to which lord Chesterfield refers, was a *contre-projet*, framed by count Zinzendorf, and transmitted by Mr. Robinson to lord Harrington.



in finishing here, where, from the nature of the government, every wrong head or heart has a right of opposition, and can do hurt, though not good.

CHESTERFIELD.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

EXTRACT.

(5.)

Vienna, December 23, 1730.—M. Dieden found by a conversation which he had yesterday with the bishop of Bamberg, that the emperor would make no difficulty to put his majesty immediately into possession of the county of Hadeln, nor even to extend the investiture of Bremen and Verden to the female line.

January 3, 1731.—I expect to be called this day or tomorrow to a conference, wherein the objections of this court will be proposed to me; for objections there are, which turn principally upon the declaration to be given to his majesty's demands as ELECTOR.

EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

APART.—EXTRACT.

(6.)

December 26, 1730.—I heartily wish this affair may succeed, for if it does not, I think we shall be in a very bad condition. The design of France, to do either nothing or too much, is now too plain to be doubted of; and the jealousies and distrusts among the allies have taken too deep a root to be removed with any prospect of future concert. And if the emperor is obstinate enough

to reduce us to return to France after this jealousy, we shall be obliged to give them fatal pledges of our future fidelity.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

EXTRACT—PRIVATE.

(7.)

*Vienna, January 16th, (N. S.) 1731.*

When I wrote on the 18th November, I did not know what were his majesty's demands as elector, and much less apprehend that they would have been forced verbally upon the emperor without remission. Prince Eugene has said more than once, that he believed every minister at Hanover had thrown in his mite to make his court to the king. When I first saw them, I was indeed so much frightened as to write my letter of the 22d by the post. God be praised, I have not been long enough here to be so much habituated to this court, and am not so little a devoted servant to the king, as to think that they have had *the least shadow of reason* in their manner of acting. But I believe there is one consideration which must be made, and without it his majesty's German affairs will always be far from being remedied: that is, as long as this court will regard the king only as elector, with respect to his electoral affairs, and as long as the elector will push them as king of England, and independent of the empire, those two contradictions will thwart the best intentions imaginable. It is a truth which I would mention to nobody but your lordship; and I believe M. Dieden has mentioned it to nobody but me, that the pride of this court has not been so sensibly touched since the time of Gustavus Adolphus, and the next ensuing years. The blood that started in the bishop of Bamberg's face at receiving M. Dieden's paper;

the reproaches that have fallen from every minister in particular of what they think, and have even called an unprecedented manner of negotiation in an elector; their unanimous crying out to M. Dieden at the conference, that it was no less than imposing the law upon the emperor; their retorting upon his demand of the emperor's declaring to administer justice to the states of the empire, that the emperor had never acted otherwise, and only prayed to God to give him less disobedient princes; joined to the confidence which has been made me by a fifth person\*, of the emperor's having been piqued to the quick, as what he would not have dissembled on another occasion; are so many proofs of what they call the offence which has been taken here, that considering the different principles at Vienna and at Hanover, it is almost as much a wonder that we have obtained this declaration, such as it is, in so short a time, as it will be unexpected if his majesty can content himself with it.

THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

APART.

(8.)

MY LORD,

*Hague, Jan. 16 (N. S.) 1731.*

I was extremely glad to find, by your lordship's letter *apart*, that the trouble I had given both you and myself about M. Hop's intercepted letter, was unnecessary; and indeed I should never have thought it necessary to take the least notice of any of that gentleman's surmises,

\* The cabinet council at Vienna consisted of four persons, who were styled ministers of the conference. These were count Zinzendorf, grand chancellor; the bishop of Bamberg, vice-chancellor; prince Eugene, and count Staremberg. The *fifth* person referred to was probably count Windisgratz, from whom, it appears by Mr. Robinson's official letter of the same date with the above, he had received other confidential information.

had I not found by Mr. Walpole's letter, that at least they had made some impression upon him.

Your lordship will have seen by this time, from Mr. Robinson's letters, that I guessed pretty right as to our negotiation at Vienna, that it would still require couriers, and that M. Dieden's demands would create the great difficulty; and that this I find has exactly happened, though I am very sure the court of Vienna was resolved to bring all possible facilities to M. Dieden's demands. I should be wanting to the regard and friendship I profess for your lordship, if I did not lay before you the fatal, but natural, and even necessary consequences, that will attend the breaking off this negotiation upon electoral points, in which you are more particularly concerned as being in your department.

This negotiation is already known by many, and suspected by all. Should it break off, we must be more in the power of France than ever, who then knowing that we have no resource left, will use us as they think fit, and insist upon dangerous pledges of our future fidelity. We must either enter into all their destructive schemes, or at best continue a good while longer in the disagreeable and unpopular situation we are at present in. But this is not the worst neither; for it is impossible that this negotiation, so far advanced, can now break off without additional acrimony on both sides. And in that case, it cannot be expected but that the emperor will take the natural advantage of declaring to the nation, and to this Republic, that the public tranquillity might have been restored, that he had agreed to all the points that related to England and this country, but that electoral considerations only prevented the conclusion of so desirable a work, and plunged us into so dangerous a war. What effect this will have I need not say: our enemies will tell us with pleasure. Nor can I answer, that when the Republic shall once know it, as they certainly will know it, they will not

conclude a separate peace, or a neutrality upon any terms, —such are their apprehensions of a war, and especially of this war. The pensionary at first apprehended difficulties from these electoral points, even without knowing them, and only from the outward aspect of affairs in that part of the world, and he thought it would be impossible to adjust them by treaty. But he hoped they would be referred to future negotiations, after the harmony between the two courts should be restored; and that then the emperor might connive at what he could not publicly authorize. But if the whole negotiation should break off, upon any or all of these electoral points, I think it is impossible to describe the fatal consequences that must result from it, both to the king, the ministry, and the nation.

I find by the accounts from Berlin, that the king of Prussia is frightened out of his wits, if ever he had any, and wants to be friends with the king, and for that reason desires a minister may be sent there, which in my opinion should not be done; for he takes every instance of complaisance to be an indication of fear, and grows insolent upon it: whereas, if he is really frightened, as I believe he is, there is no imaginable meanness to which he will not stoop for his security. And I should think it would be better to make him take some of those steps first, before he meets with the least return from his majesty. Grumkows's conversion, I hope, will be cultivated in a proper manner. A sum of money will be well employed there, and put him too much in our power for him to go back.



## THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

## EXTRACT.

(9.)

Vienna, January 16, 1731.—When I returned in the evening to the chancellor, he continued to shew his concern at M. Dieden's obstinacy. He said the affair must still be finished one way or other; that it was the most glorious opportunity that ever offered, for an Englishman to do his nation and all Europe the greatest service imaginable.

At the conference next day, the prince asked me abruptly if I would treat independently of his majesty's electoral affairs? I told him I had so little to do with them, that my only business was to treat of matters of quite another nature; and that I had not so much as been yet invited to treat directly, after so many days that I had demanded it. The prince justified that delay, by so much time being taken up in endeavouring to adjust his majesty's electoral demands, and summoned me to declare if, in that interval, I had not asserted that I could not treat or sign till that was done to his majesty's satisfaction?

I told them, that though I saw their referendary ready to take down every word that fell from me, yet I would declare to them boldly, that nothing could be so injurious as to tax me, in the quality of an English minister, with so much as interrupting the affairs of Europe for the private concerns of the elector of Hanover. That I might at different times have *insinuated* to them (for what I said or did, nothing on earth would make me deny)—I might have *insinuated*, that if his majesty's affairs as elector, were not

immediately finished, I could not sign till his minister had new orders\*.

During this discourse count Zinzendorf returned, and after having spoken to his brethren in the German tongue, prince Eugene told me that the chancellor had been to receive the emperor's last orders, which he bid the referendary, Bartenstein, read. It was a kind of manifesto, to shew no less wonder than surprise, that after all the mutual professions of friendship between the emperor and the king of Great Britain, the minister of the latter should, for the sake of very unreasonable demands made by his master, as elector of Hanover, refuse to put the last hand to a treaty which was so far advanced for the public good and tranquillity of Europe. Those demands were represented as injurious to the dignity of the chief of the empire, as contrary to its constitution, and as infringing the rights of others. This I took to be the purport of the paper, as well as I could judge, by hearing it once read, and as far as my indignation would permit me to give attention to it; so far I was from taking it into my hands, or giving it a reading myself, and much less, as they would have persuaded me, to transmit it to his majesty.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

EXTRACT.

(10.)

*Whitehall, Jan. 28, Feb. 8, 1731.*

I must not conceal from you, that the king apprehends he has the most just grounds to be highly dissatisfied with the behaviour of the court of Vienna. Although what the mes-

\* Count Zinzendorf affirmed, that the express words of Robinson's declaration were, "that unless all the German points were settled to his majesty's entire satisfaction, every thing else is to be deemed null."

senger brought fell very short of what your former letters gave us ground to expect, the king does not think you went the least too far in giving the credit you did to the strong and repeated declarations and assurances of the Imperial ministers, and particularly of prince Eugene, whose character and reputation are in too high a light in the world, to have his honour or veracity suspected. 'Tis chiefly from the credit given to those professions and promises, that his majesty is induced to make this farther and last tentative of the sincerity of the court of Vienna, which, if rejected, or even trifled with, must inevitably cut up by the roots any possibility of this negotiation being ever brought to perfection; for as the king offers every thing that the emperor can really want, and all that the court of Vienna itself must know his majesty has in his power to grant, any refusal or hesitation to comply with the little, that not only the strongest reasons, but necessity itself, obliges the king to insist upon in return, must demonstrate to all the world how vain it would be to think of treating any longer.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

PRIVATE.

(11.)

DEAR SIR,

*London, Jan. 28, Feb. 8, 1731.*

Notwithstanding my being at present more tired than ever I was in my life, I cannot however let this messenger return to you, without carrying something to you from me as a private friend; and as I hope you will be pleased with what I send you as a minister, I am sure you would not be less so with these good wishes of the friend, if you knew the cordiality and sincere affection with which they are accompanied. I flatter myself with hoping, that the

instructions and powers now sent you, will enable you to bring this great work to perfection, and that without loss of time, for in the present situation of affairs, delay is death to us.

You must be sensible of the necessity there is not to let this treaty miscarry, if it is possible to be avoided. It is heartily to be wished that the emperor would be induced to give entire satisfaction upon all the points which M. Dieden is charged to negotiate; but when every thing is obtained that is possible to be got, you will, I am persuaded, *ACCORDING to your INSTRUCTIONS*, sign the treaty; insisting, at the same time, that all that cannot be adjusted be finally settled afterward, by an amicable negotiation. I heartily wish you all imaginable success, and beg you will be assured of the most warm affection and esteem with which I am ever, &c.

*P. S. G. TILSON*, Under Secretary of State, to *THOMAS ROBINSON*.—Jan. 28, Feb. 8, 1731.—*I hope you will sign, as I take it you are AUTHORIZED to do; and if our plan is agreed to in the main, I do not see how you can decline putting the last hand to it on your part, for all or any collateral difficulties, if there are no essential ones.*

\* \* \* \* \*

Lord Chesterfield's alarming dispatch of the 16th January, to lord Harrington, evidently gave birth to the above private letter; but notwithstanding the courtly professions and artful insinuations contained in it, the plain homespun sense of Robinson enabled him to discern, that between the public and private instructions of the secretary, he was placed by his *dear friend* in a most perplexing and perilous dilemma. Lord Harrington's original public letter, of the 14-25th September, only empowered him to sign when the points respecting "Ostfrize and

Mecklenburg, with such other particulars as may be necessary to his majesty's security in Germany, should be settled." And he is ordered "to receive M. Dieden with the utmost confidence, and to take his information from him, as to what he has to propose in the king's name as elector." But his lordship's private dispatch of January 28, clearly signifies that he is *authorized* to sign, although the Hanover demands were not acceded to by the emperor. Lord Harrington had never indeed ventured to send a precise and positive order to the ambassador not to sign the English treaty, unless the Hanover treaty were signed at the same time. By the dispatch of December 3-14th, he is directed not absolutely to break off the treaty on this head, but send an account of every thing to England;" which amounted to an indefinite delay, and was virtually equivalent to an order of not signing till he received farther instructions. It was therefore in the highest degree insidious, to authorize merely, without at the same time directing Mr. Robinson to sign *separately*, for this was a construction and distinction that threw the whole responsibility upon the ambassador. If he signed in these circumstances, he incurred the risk of forfeiting for ever the favour of his sovereign: if he refused to sign, he run the still more serious hazard of national censure and parliamentary vengeance.

The characteristic artfulness of lord Harrington is severely animadverted upon by Mr. Horace Walpole, at a subsequent period, in a letter to sir Robert Walpole, alluding to some unexplained transaction. "I won't quarrel with my lord Harrington, but I won't have, undeservedly, raps on the fingers, without shewing that I feel them; nor a train laid for making me a dupe, without letting him see that *I know what is meant*. There are some expressions, and some turns in his letters, more cold



and ungracious than I ever had in seven years during my embassy in France\*.”

There are evident proofs also in Robinson's correspondence, that he was not so dull as to be at any loss to know what was meant by this nobleman's high-flown professions of affection and friendship.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

EXTRACT,

(12.)

*Vienna, March 18, (N. S.) 1731.*

Though the treaty which I have the honour to send your lordship should be approved, yet I can hardly hope even that success itself can excuse the many liberties I have taken to obtain it. Your lordship will have seen by my other letter what passed in the first conference, upon the paragraphs in the paper E, with regard to his majesty as elector.

It seemed there remained difficulties, which I began terribly to apprehend would not be removed time enough for me to sign with great tranquillity of mind, and therefore the next evening, after I had settled the Latin project with count Zinzendorf, I represented to him, in the most lively manner imaginable, the ill appearance and effect of such a proceeding. I saw prince Eugene the next day, to thank him for the expedition with which the affairs committed to him had been done. He proposed Friday the 16th for the day of signing: at which time, I only added, I hoped his highness would likewise put me into a condition of making his majesty's satisfaction complete in every respect. To have said more, my lord, would, if I can be allowed to have attained some knowledge of that minister, have been ill placed. But I will

\* Coze, vol. iii. p. 184.

leave your lordship to judge how M. Dieden's and my uneasiness arose, proportionably as the hour of signing, which ought otherwise to have given me so much pleasure, advanced without M. Dieden's receiving any satisfactory answer ; but rather, as it almost appeared to us, that I was destined to be drawn on in uncertainty, till I should be shut up with the ministers to sign, while probably M. Dieden should be at the vice-chancellor's, to comply or not, good or bad, with what the emperor would consent to upon the electoral affairs.

I went, however, the evening before to count Zinzendorf, and in three words told him to take care what was to be done. The king's affairs had indeed been separated with great condescendence, purely to facilitate matters, from those of the elector ; but nothing could separate the honour of the elector from that of the king. The next morning M. Dieden, about half an hour after ten, went to the vice-chancellor : when talking with great earnestness upon the subject, and demanding a final answer, that the same courier might carry his majesty a double satisfaction, the clock struck eleven ; upon which the bishop of Bamberg said maliciously, " Now Mr. Robinson is with my brethren ;" but he was mistaken. I had agreed with M. Dieden to delay my going as long as I could, that if possible he might give me advice of what should have passed with the vice-chancellor, in order for me to take my party, according as despair or cooler judgment, if I had time for the latter, should in that moment dispose of the fate of Europe. I had even agreed with M. Dieden, that if his conference with the vice-chancellor should last longer than I could, with common decency, make prince Eugene, count Zinzendorf, and count Staremberg wait for me, who would certainly be assembled at eleven, I would endeavour to amuse them by objections and cavils, and waste the time before the sign-

ing, till he should send me a billet, to be delivered to me at the conference table, with regard to his transaction.

With these precautions, instead of going to prince Eugene's house at eleven, I went round to M. Dieden's lodgings, to inquire first if he was come back. He was just returned from the vice-chancellor, and I found him writing the note we had agreed upon. It was to tell me, that all the vice-chancellor had had to say was, that he had spoken the day before with the emperor, who had still doubts upon the article of Bremen; and particularly with what was demanded now, contrary to what was supposed to have been granted by the late king to the branches of Wolfenbuttle, Blankenburg, and Bevern; that his Imperial majesty was not resolved to accept the condition under which the king, as elector, offered his guarantee and good offices in the empire; that he, the bishop, had advised the emperor to content the king upon the first article, and to rely upon his majesty's generosity with regard to the second; that he expected the emperor's resolution every moment, but if it did not come, he could not see his Imperial majesty till the evening.

I humbly desire your lordship to judge of my situation at eleven o'clock and a quarter. What could be done? I rather suffered any resolution that should come itself into my mind to take me, than well thought how to take one myself. When I arrived at the prince's, they had waited for me an half hour. I made an excuse like a person embarrassed, and was willing enough they should judge of the pain in my heart by the concern on my face. We proceeded, however, to compare the draughts, and when all was collated, a pause succeeded for bringing in the taper and wax, and ranging other matters for signing. I rose up with some solemnity, and drawing my seal out of my pocket, placed it upon the draughts designed for England, and said, "There, gentlemen, is my seal and my honour; look upon the

treaty as signed ; but I will take this opportunity, while it offers, to disburden my mind. I already speak, and act now as the minister of a great king, who this moment gives a most distinguishing mark of his friendship for the emperor, your master. I demand the same friendship, and the same marks of it from his Imperial majesty, in behalf of the elector of Hanover : however separated their affairs may have been in one light, their honour is inseparable." I added, my lord, such things as the emotion in which they saw me could not but excuse. However, plainly I told them that this new-born friendship, without the satisfaction demanded, would not outlive the six weeks fixed for the ratifications. That for my part, I had taken two resolutions, the one to sign, the other not to dispatch the courier, though all Europe depended upon it, till the elector of Hanover could be the first to reap the fruits of the peace, which, as king of England, he had given to the world.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

PRIVATE—EXTRACT.

(13.)

Vienna, March 20 (N. S.) 1731.—I will not pretend to excuse the manner in which things have been done, but one thing I am sure of, that right or not, nothing could have been done in any other manner whatever. I signed boldly, before I was sure what the king would obtain as elector, without which there would have been no treaty. I have as boldly detained the courier for four days since, without which the papers now sent to his majesty would not have been obtained. M. Dieden has got, by my obstinacy in detaining the courier, more than he expected from the beginning.

Till I have the honour to know your lordship's most sincere sentiments upon my conduct, I will wrap myself up in hopes, that though I may have done ill, yet it will be thought I could not have done better. My lord, I would not pass another month as I have done this last for a kingdom, nor all the kingdoms guaranteed to the emperor; and yet, God knows, till I have the honour to hear from your lordship, I have at least as bitter a month to come.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

EXTRACT—PRIVATE.

(14.)

London, March 30, April 10, 1731.—Your conduct has met with the universal applause here, which it so justly deserved. Both the king and all his servants think, it would have been impossible for an angel from heaven to have acted better than you have done throughout this whole affair.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

EXTRACT—MOST SECRET.

(15.)

Whitehall, March 30, 1731.—I now come to answer your most secret letter of the 18th inst. by Gould, which I shall begin to do by telling you, that although his majesty is extremely pleased with the manner in which the treaty has been finally adjusted and signed, and as the greater proof of his being so, sends back his ratifications of every part of it, which you are ordered to exchange against those of the emperor within the term pre-



scribed by the said treaty ;—the king thinks, however, and with the greatest reason, that the conduct and proceedings of the Imperial court, with respect to his majesty's electoral affairs, are by no means such as, in the strictest justice and reason, he might have expected from them ; and has therefore ordered M. Dieden to employ all the time from the arrival of this messenger to that limited for the exchange of the ratifications, in making the strongest instances to the court of Vienna, for settling to his majesty's satisfaction the points upon which he is instructed to insist. And as he will inform you particularly what those points are, you will employ all the authority and influence of the crown of England, and your own particular credit and friendship with the ministers, in the most efficacious manner, for obtaining, before the term for the exchange of the ratifications is elapsed, all such satisfaction and security for his msjesty's electoral affairs, as M. Dieden shall inform you he is commanded to insist upon.

I need not, I am sure, suggest any arguments to you in support of M. Dieden's demands : the justice and reasonableness of them, especially as they are now reduced, will abundantly furnish you wherewithal to enforce them. But I cannot help expressing my great surprise, that the court of Vienna should not be convinced, that the surest and most effectual way to gain and secure to them the affections and support of the ENGLISH NATION, must be the making his majesty easy as to his electoral affairs. The king, out of his paternal affection and goodness to his British subjects, would not suffer the signing a treaty so necessary and advantageous to them, to be deferred for the settling his electoral demands, though never so justly founded. What less return, then, can the nation make for such an unexampled generosity and goodness, than to look upon all his interests as their own, and be equally solicitous about them.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD.

(16.)

MY LORD,

*Vienna, April 7, (N. S.) 1731.*

I dare not wish your excellency joy in your negotiation till I know whether what I have sent be a proper foundation for it. No moments of impatience which your lordship may have passed lately to hear from me, can equal those of uneasiness and anxiety with which I wait for your answer. I need not say they are principally founded upon what has passed with regard to the electoral affairs. When I had my first instructions, not to give the king's guarantee without procuring satisfaction for the elector, I boldly, out of *honour and duty*, suspended the affairs of all Europe. When afterwards I found myself more at large under my instructions, I as boldly suspended his majesty's electoral affairs for the sake of Europe. The elector's hands are still free, if he does not like the emperor's last offers; and if his majesty does like them, the emperor will execute them notwithstanding the events at Wolfenbuttle. M. Dieden says, the king has obtained more than ever he expected to procure for his majesty; and he owns, that without my behaviour before the signing, and without my obstinacy in detaining the courier after the signing, his majesty would either have less, or nothing at all. But how, my lord, to inculcate all this rightly in England? *The honour of this employment was FORCED upon me*; and even if I have met with any success, I may say with Pyrrhus, "Such another victory would ruin me."

\* \* \* \* \*

It is manifest, on an impartial review of this important and successful negotiation, which originated in the wise counsels of sir Robert Walpole, that the real merit of the execution belongs solely to the Earl of Chesterfield, who, with true political discernment, saw the whole transaction from the beginning to the end in a perfectly just point of view, and painted in colours so forcible to lord Harrington the fatal consequences of the policy he was acting upon, as to incite, or rather impel, that nobleman to the adoption of decisive measures. The insidious art with which the secretary endeavours to throw the whole responsibility upon the resident Robinson, and the servile and selfish terrors of the latter, are well depicted in their respective dispatches.



POLITICAL REMARKS BY SIR ROBERT WALPOLE,  
ON THE PART WHICH GREAT BRITAIN OUGHT TO TAKE  
IN THE PRESENT SITUATION OF AFFAIRS.

A. D. 1733.

DECEMBER 24, 1733.—In considering what part it is most advisable to Great Britain to take in the present situation of affairs in Europe, it will be necessary, in order to avoid prolixity and confusion, to reduce the whole consideration to as few points as possible; which I think may very properly be done under the following heads.

I. Whether we ought to comply with the demands of the emperor, and admit the present war carried on against the emperor to be a *casus fœderis* upon our defensive alliances, and upon that foot enter into the war.

II. How far the dangers that may threaten the liberties

of Europe, and in consequence our own interest and security, call upon us to put a stop to, and oppose the progress of the arms of the three crowns.

III. Whether the mediation of the maritime powers will prove effectual in putting an end to the present war; or if that does not succeed, which of the two measures that seem now to offer is the most eligible to be pursued; viz. whether we should endeavour to detach the king of Sardinia from France and Spain, by securing to him the Milanese; and then, in conjunction with the Imperial troops and the troops of Sardinia, endeavour to drive both branches of the house of Bourbon entirely out of Italy. Or whether, if necessity, and the circumstances of the emperor, should compel him to think of complying with what has seemed all along to be the view of the queen of Spain, of dividing Spain from France by a marriage with don Carlos and one of the arch-duchesses, we should not rather chuse to acquiesce in such an accommodation, than enter into an open war against France and Spain for the recovery of Italy, and for preventing the dangerous and ambitious views of the house of Bourbon.

As to the first article, it seems already to be determined for the present, by the measures we have entered into with the States-General; and it is sufficient for my present purpose to say, that the resolutions taken jointly by the maritime powers may be very well justified when that is the question.

As to the second head, what part it may be incumbent upon us to take, exclusive of our engagements with the emperor in defence of the common cause, and our own interest and security, it must be considered at what time and in what manner we shall enter into a war, if it becomes unavoidable. And here it must be allowed, that Great Britain can neither with safety nor prudence enter into

this war but in conjunction with the States. Let us admit that it is a common cause betwixt us; as they are more nearly and more immediately concerned, it will be expected that they should go hand in hand with us, and unite in our common defence. I will not enter into the consideration of the advantages and prejudices that must attend our being engaged in a war against France and Spain, and the Dutch continuing in a state of neutrality. They are too evident, and we must conclude it is what this nation cannot, will not bear.

What then must be done in this case? The Dutch still decline taking any part. It is to be hoped, that although they would not suffer themselves to be forced into a war with the emperor, nor to be drawn into it insensibly by us, of which they conceived very great, though groundless jealousies; if the common danger becomes very evident, and it shall appear that the views of the house of Bourbon are truly formidable, that the Dutch will be convinced by the common enemy to do what they could not hitherto be prevailed upon to think of. In the mean time it must be confessed, that the maritime powers have acted very prudently and justifiably in the part they have hitherto taken.

But if the Dutch, from an incapacity of bearing the burden of another war, *of which, when once begun, no man can foresee or determine the conclusion,* or not enough alarmed with the views and engagements of the confederated powers, and less apprehensive of the common danger than it may reasonably be thought they ought to be, should persist in a resolution to try all means rather than engage in a war, what part will it be advisable for Great Britain to take separately or jointly with the Dutch to put an end to the present war, and at least to make the dangerous consequences as little fatal to the liberties of Europe as possible? And I cannot but take it



for granted, that in whatever measures are to be pursued, the maritime powers should endeavour to act in concert, that they may have greater weight in any accommodation, and be better able to support themselves in case of extremity.

Thirdly, It must be admitted that the Imperial court has been all along divided upon the question of the marriages. And it may be supposed that a deference for the opinion of Great Britain has had great weight in postponing that affair: and from the beginning of this year to this present time, the menaces of the Imperial court have plainly tended to this single point. There seems likewise at present to be no doubt, but that the court of Spain is now disposed to make some overtures to us upon this head, if we shewed the least inclination to hearken to them. This will make us in some measure answerable for all the consequences, if by dissuading, or at least diverting the emperor on one hand from the only expedient that he seems to have at present of extricating himself; and, on the other hand, by slighting the offers of the court of Spain, we should be the principal authors of bringing things to an extremity, and of continuing the war.

To the emperor we shall be inexcusable, if we obstruct this only measure of saving himself from destruction, and do not at the same time assist him in what he calls his just demands. To Spain our conduct will be thought most provoking, if we defeat their most favourite scheme, and rather chuse to enter into a war against them, than submit to their terms of reconciliation with the emperor. And as to the court of France, I cannot see the least reason to conclude that they are at all inclined to this marriage, and therefore it ought not to be looked upon as a scheme concerted for aggrandizing the house of Bourbon. As little it is to be apprehended, that if Spain was thus

detached from France, that France would look upon it as a sufficient cause to carry on the war against the powers that would be united to support this scheme.

If the chief apprehension is, that such a marriage would tend to aggrandize the house of Bourbon, and make them hereafter upon future events formidable to all Europe, let it be considered how great and imminent is the present danger, if the success of the arms of France and Spain should be carried much farther, by continuing the war: and whether, unless it can be shewn that there will be a sufficient power to resist them united and allied, the course of another year's successful campaign may not make the house of Bourbon immediately masters of all Europe; in which case we should bring immediately upon ourselves the mischiefs which we only apprehend may happen in future times. If the danger to Europe arises from the union in the house of Bourbon, the separating them answers that apprehension. If the emperor and Spain had been reconciled before the war was declared, the war had possibly been prevented, at least had been less formidable.

All that we have lately seen, is very express upon the concern France was under, least Spain should have made up with the emperor. This marriage is mentioned in a most emphatical manner, as an argument to induce the king of Sardinia to submit to the hardships he so loudly complained of. It is said the marriage is carrying on "par l'entremise de l'Angleterre."

\* \* \* \* \*

Don Carlos and the pragmatic sanction have been the cause of all the troubles in Europe for near twenty years last past — Can they be reconciled, and how? Has consanguinity, or relation by marriages, ever among princes outweighed the present interest of the princes concerned? What has been hitherto the case between France and Spain? What regard has France shewn to the court

of Turin but for interest? What effect has the alliance between the houses of Hanover and Berlin? Would another marriage in those families make the friendship more certain, and of longer duration than the ties of interest kept them together? If Spain and don Carlos are brought to guarantee the pragmatic sanction, may not that prevent the troubles that are threatened by France upon that event? If this marriage is to be looked upon as the cause of the house of Bourbon, what gave the alarm to France upon the first treaty of Vienna, which occasioned the treaty of Hanover? The *first* point, to strengthen and secure ourselves at home—The emperor distressed but by his own neglect—The allies exhausted at a great expense of men and money—We continue in a state of mediation.

The excellent and admirable sagacity which dictated the above remarks, is too apparent to need any comment or illustration. Political merit so great and obvious, disdains the frivolous tribute of literary panegyric.



#### THE EMPEROR TO COUNT KINSKY.

*Vienna, July 31, 1734.*

I HAVE been confirmed by yours of the 13th, in the opinion which I before entertained of the sentiments of the English court. You are better acquainted than any other person, with how much sincerity I have desired to renew the ancient and natural system with the two maritime powers. I had good reasons to mistrust the conduct of the Walpoles, after the conclusion of the treaty with England on the 16th March, 1731; but the strong and repeated assurances which I received, that it was intended to fulfil the guarantees, took away my doubts, and fully

satisfied me. From that time I have never failed in paying a due attention to the king and the royal family, and doing every thing which could be agreeable to the present administration.

As soon as the king of Poland was dead, my first care was to communicate to the king of England the principles on which I acted. I took no step without making a previous and confidential overture to him, and I followed in every instance his advice. In conformity to his representations, I entered into an accommodation with the present king of Poland. In deference to his counsels, I sent no troops into Poland; and I consented to every measure which the king of England recommended in regard to don Carlos: and while my conduct has excited jealousies in others, I have no reason to be satisfied with the manner in which I am treated. When the discontents against the Walpoles were carried to so great a height, and when Chavigni and Montijo endeavoured to increase them, you, on the contrary, exerted all your efforts in favour of the court, although even at that period I was apprized that the Walpoles would return my services with ingratitude.

England has never failed to give me promises, both before and since the commencement of the war; but instead of fulfilling them, she has even favoured my enemies. This behaviour, however, has not induced me to address myself to the king of England otherwise than in the most amicable terms, and to represent to him, in the most affecting manner, the imminent danger which threatens to overwhelm not only the house of Austria, but all Europe, and more particularly his royal family, as well as the honour and prosperity of the English nation. But these representations have not hitherto had any effect.

This fatal inactivity has now continued for eleven months; and although the evil might have been easily

prevented, yet the whole is left exposed to the most dangerous extremities. These very extremities, of which England is the occasion, are made a pretext to palliate and excuse the want of assistance; and this want of assistance is urged as an inducement to compel me to accept an unjust and dishonourable peace.

It is not easy to conceive any measure less equitable, and more pernicious; and it must appear evident to every impartial observer, that the English ministry, in direct contradiction to the good intentions of the king, has made overtures to me, with no other intention than to suffer my hereditary estates in Italy to fall under the dominion of Spain; and I am fully convinced that those who persuade the king to act in this manner, are not better inclined to the king and to the nation than to me.

What affects me most sensibly is, that (as I see by your secret relation), with a view to conceal these sinister intentions, many falsities are circulated against me. However averse I may be to adopt measures which, although derived from good motives, may be misrepresented to the king, I may still find myself compelled to act in that manner; for it can never be expected, that, in addition to the losses which I suffer, I ought also to bear the blame of being the cause of them; and that I am indifferent to the attempts made to prejudice against me the English nation, for which I entertain so high an esteem.

Having therefore many reasons to believe that the Walpoles have, for some time past, prevented the good intentions of the king in my favour, my views have been always directed, on one side, not to do any thing of which the king could complain, as if I were endeavouring to excite the nation against him, until I was sufficiently acquainted with the situation of affairs; and, on the other side, if the private interests and intrigues of the



Walpoles should prevail over the obligations of the English nation, and the security and glory of the public good; to be prepared with sound and vigorous answers to all the arguments advanced in justification of such an infamous proceeding. With this view I have been ever ready to refute the objections, drawn partly from the bad situation of affairs in the Low Countries, and partly from the private and unjustifiable negotiations of Boltza. I have considered it also as no less expedient, not only to employ every effort in my power, for the purpose of shewing that the maritime powers do not lie under the necessity of employing as many forces as they maintained during the last war; and I have collected all the representations made to Robinson before and since the rupture; that if it should be thought proper to lay before the public the whole series of affairs, the ill conduct of the Walpoles may be made manifest. For the same reason I unwillingly consented not to publish all the pieces which relate to the answer of the Spanish manifesto, and I now evidently perceive the hidden and perfidious views of the English ministry in opposing the publication.

I have therefore strictly ordered all my ministers to be extremely reserved towards Robinson, Hamel, and Bruyninx; to insist upon the execution of the treaties; not to make any verbal explanation, but, on the contrary, to declare positively, that no business will be transacted with them except in writing.

You have therefore acted right, in having counteracted *there, where it was necessary*, the insinuations of the Walpoles against me, and in developing to all, the real state of the question, and by whose means affairs have been brought into their present dangerous situation. I also entirely approve your resolution to address yourself to the king himself, and to convince him of the extraordinary attention you have always shewn not to do any thing

which might be disagreeable to him ; and at the same time to represent to him the necessity which you are under, of no longer permitting the circulation of those ill-founded reports, which are not only contrary to my interests, but also to my honour, and at the same time no less destructive to the true prosperity of his royal family.

The king himself will have no difficulty in judging whether I or the house of Bourbon are most inclined to court his friendship. Let him know that I never will consent to the plan of pacification now in agitation ; that I had rather suffer the worst extremities than accede to such disadvantageous proposals : and that even if I should not be able to prevent them, I will justify my honour and my dignity, by publishing a circumstantial account of all the transactions, together with all the documents which I have now in possession.

If all these representations produce no effect, and if the Walpoles continue their unjustifiable conduct, means must be taken to publish and circulate throughout England, our answer to the offer of good offices, which was not made till after the expiration of nine months. You will concert with count Uhlfield the best method to effect that purpose, and contrive that the answer shall appear to have been first published in Holland without our concurrence. But should the court of London proceed so far as to make such propositions of peace as are supposed to be in agitation, you will not delay a moment to publish and circulate throughout England a *pro memoria*, containing a recapitulation of all negotiations which have taken place since 1718, together with the authentic documents, detailing my just complaints, and again reclaiming, in the most solemn manner, the execution of the guarantees.

## HORACE WALPOLE TO QUEEN CAROLINE.

MADAM,

*Hague, Oct. 11-22, 1734.*

MY duty to my king and country, my concern for maintaining the balance and liberties of Europe, and that by preserving the house of Austria, as well as the security of his majesty's crown to himself and his family, are all motives that oblige me to take the liberty earnestly to recommend to your majesty, the imagining and pursuing some early measure for disposing the emperor to let his best friends use the best means they can to bring him out of his present great and daily increasing misfortunes, by a pacification, to be compassed by their treating with such of the allies as may appear to them best disposed to make the peace most advantageous to his Imperial majesty. It is demonstration to me, that if the emperor had accepted of our good offices when they were first offered, he might immediately have been brought out of the war, and been upon as good a foot, even in Italy, for convenience and power, though not exactly with the very same dominions, as he was before the rupture.

It is demonstration to me, that if he would now let his majesty and the States negotiate for him, that he might still have a solid peace, and an honourable one, if compared with what he must unavoidably suffer if he persists in going on with the war; for I cannot foresee any possible event in his favour. His expectations, that the further progress of the French arms, next year, on this side, will oblige the States to take a part in the war, are vain, and ill grounded. The worse things shall grow, the more will this government be afraid to stir: and sooner than be forced into a war in their present condition, and against their will, they will take for their only security and protection the word of a cardinal, who is eighty-four years

old, and who, when he finds he can run no risk, can dissemble too.

Supposing the present king of Prussia to be dead, and his brave and active son should be never so well disposed for the liberties of Europe; supposing the princes of the North be inclined to put a stop to the progress of the French arms, yet as they will furnish no troops without money, this state can never second those good inclinations. They have it not in their power, and consequently not in their will to do it: and it will be impossible for Great Britain to pay those necessary subsidies without the States taking their share in it. I can therefore see no event that can happen, to save Europe and the house of Austria, but the emperor's immediate condescension to a peace, to be negotiated for his best advantage by the maritime powers;—otherwise he will be driven next spring out of Italy. The Turks will invade him at the same time in other parts, and although it may seem chimerical, what shall hinder France from carrying the elector of Bavaria, if they and he please, directly to Vienna?

To reason about what the maritime powers may do, from what they have done, is, if I may so say, very absurd. Some miracles, in a manner, happened in their favour after the last war was begun, but there is no room for those miracles now. The best and greatest of those miracles was the vast subsidies paid, and numbers of troops maintained, by the maritime powers. But have they now the power of that miracle in their hands? The Dutch owed in the beginning of that war about five millions sterling. They now owe, would your majesty believe it, fifty millions sterling! and they do not know which way to turn themselves, to lay a new tax upon their people, already so grievously loaded, without a convulsion in the state.

Great Britain certainly, comparatively speaking, is in a much better condition than the States are, and has some

resources still. But if Great Britain should venture to go into this extensive, expensive, and ruinous war, without the Dutch, I say in that sense we are in a worse condition than they are; that is, they are better able to go into a Gallic war jointly with us, than we are without them. The consequences of which would be, if we engaged in it without them, an immediate ruin and stagnation of our trade, to their great advantage; the loss, perhaps, of our best colonies, the great sources of our riches; destitute of all friends and allies, but those that can neither help themselves nor us,—a condition which our envious enemies heartily wish us in, as what must ruin the nation, and, in consequence, the present happy establishment.

For these reasons, and innumerable others that may occur, as the emperor must be convinced of his majesty's real affection for him, even in his own—were it in the king's power, the king and your majesty, if I may be so bold as to say it, should take the liberty to let his Imperial majesty see, by some private and confidential way, the state of things in the true light, and not let him vainly flatter himself that it is possible to help him by any other way but by that of good offices, or at least till that is tried where it is most likely to bring about the soonest the most honourable peace for him. And his Imperial majesty should be undeceived in those idle notions, by which he is encouraged by count Zinzendorf and others to believe that little prating emissaries, and manifestoes printed and dispersed, will have an effect upon the English nation to engage them in a war for him. He should be undeceived in thinking, as I am told he thinks, that their majesties of Great Britain are for him, but that the British ministry is against him: and therefore he will attack them. A noble scheme indeed to beat the French with, and to recover Italy, supposing he succeeds in it! He should be told, that if the maritime powers were to embark in the war, there is



not the least prospect of their recovering for him so much in Italy, as he may in all likelihood still preserve and recover by an immediate peace.

As good a countenance as is possible must be held by the maritime powers, to make the cardinal apprehend a war, that he may be brought to be more reasonable in his terms for peace; but the Imperial court should be made sensible, by some private means, that there are hopes of a general war in their favour. What shall be the conditions of peace, I cannot pretend to determine. When we are once permitted to negotiate, that will soon appear. That there is a door open for peace all the world sees, and France apprehends; and yet the emperor will not let us lead him that way.

I shall only make one observation, which I believe, though coming from me, is a true and a prudent one; that circumstances must determine the reasonableness of things; and that which, in a calm, might be unnecessary and unreasonable, for fear of future contingencies, may become even reasonable and necessary in a storm, because the immediate danger of the ship and crew is first to be considered, and they are to be saved by means that may occasion some future inconvenience. But as that inconvenience is only eventual and contingent, it may be prevented by measures after the great danger shall be over. But I am afraid I have taken too much liberty, and troubled your majesty too much, which I hope you will pardon, as coming from the sincerity of my heart, and from my zeal for his majesty's service.

I am, with the most profound veneration and respect,

MADAM,

Your majesty's most dutiful, most faithful,

And most obedient humble servant,

HOR. WALPOLE.

## LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

## EXTRACT.

*N. B.* The letter from which the following paragraphs are taken, was never sent, the sentiments contained in it not being approved by sir Robert Walpole, to whose judgment it was previously submitted.

SIR,

*Whitehall, Nov. 5-16, 1734.*

THE king, having reflected with the greatest attention upon the present critical situation of the affairs of Europe, and having maturely weighed the vast difficulties which are so justly to be apprehended in our scheme of putting an end to the war, by means of a secret negotiation, either with France or Spain, together with the danger of a private concert between those two crowns, for amusing the maritime powers by overtures of peace, in order to prevent their taking the necessary precautions against such ambitious and fatal designs as they may be preparing to put in execution,—is every day more and more convinced of the necessity there is for his majesty and the States to be prepared against all events, by not neglecting to put themselves betimes into a proper posture of defence and safety, and by providing, in the first place, for the security of the Austrian Netherlands, that important barrier, upon which their own preservation, and that of the balance of Europe, so greatly depends.

His majesty has himself a very considerable fleet ready for service in his ports; he is raising near 10,000 additional landmen; has already contracted for 6000 Danes, and is negotiating the same number, not without hopes of success, in Sweden.

In the same views of safety and self-defence, the king has constantly recommended to the States-General to resolve upon a speedy augmentation of their forces, and would have you continue to press the said augmentation with the greatest warmth; and his majesty hopes that an expedient which he has thought of, for taking off what seems to be one of the principal objections, may produce the desired effect.

To explain this to your excellency, I am to acquaint you, that M. Hoy having frequently intimated in his conversations with the king's servants, that one of the chief difficulties which has hitherto prevented the States from coming to a resolution of augmenting their forces, was an apprehension lest, upon the first preparation they should make for that purpose, the French ministers might conceive a jealousy of that step's being taken with a view of employing their forces in Flanders, and might immediately endeavour to prevent them, by taking possession of those countries;—it has therefore occurred to his majesty, that in case he could be enabled in private to give proper assurances to the emperor, that the States-General, upon seeing the Austrian Netherlands put in the meanwhile into a sufficient posture of defence, to prevent any sudden surprise, would join with his majesty, as soon as their troops could be ready for that purpose, in providing for the future security of the said countries, in conjunction with such forces as should be left there by the emperor; the king would not find it difficult to prevail upon his Imperial majesty to march a body of his troops immediately into the Netherlands, under pretence of changing their winter quarters, to remain there till such time as they should be joined by those whom his majesty and the States-General should determine to send thither. And this method of proceeding, the king thinks, might serve to quiet the apprehensions of the States with regard to the umbrage that might be conceived by France at

their augmenting their forces, and the steps that might be taken by that crown thereupon.

And that they may know in what the said provisional security for those parts is intended to consist, your excellency will then inform them, that his majesty will be ready, on his part, to furnish 10,000 men to be thrown into the Netherlands, in conjunction with an equal number of Dutch troops, whenever their High Mightinesses shall make the necessary requisitions for that purpose, according to the tenor of the treaties in that behalf.

I cannot avoid just taking notice to your excellency, as an addition to what I mentioned to you upon the same head in the beginning of this dispatch, that the paragraph in the cardinal's letter of the 20th inst. (N. S.), wherein he tells you, "that it could not be hoped, that in case our present negotiation proves ineffectual, our great armaments would be employed against the emperor, and that all Europe would certainly look upon them as designed to force France into a peace which idea would be no less injurious to their nation than to the French king:"—this paragraph, I say, seems to imply an indirect menace, as if they would be obliged, in case of the failure of this negotiation, and the continuance of our armaments, which are so much magnified, to do something for the vindication of their honour; and nothing appears more obvious to be apprehended in such a case, than their preventing us in the design of taking possession of the Netherlands.

## LORD HARRINGTON TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

SIR,

*London, Nov. 8-19, 1734.*

BY the return of a messenger from Houghton, with the two packets of Mr. Walpole's letters, I was honoured this evening with one from you, dated yesterday, and was sorry to find by it, that the draft which I had sent you of what I proposed to write to Mr. Walpole concerning the Netherlands, had been so much disapproved by you. The letter itself never went; nor shall I now stir that matter any more: what I therein suggested, was what I apprehended to be right, and agreeable to what you told me were the king's sentiments.

The letters that were due yesterday from Holland are not yet arrived. However, I send you copies of what I write this night to Mr. Walpole, by which you will see that I suspend sending him any orders from the king, upon the subject of his late important dispatches, till we shall have learnt your sentiments upon them, of which I hope to be fully informed by the return of the duke of Newcastle, since you were not pleased to send them to me yourself, which I was in hopes you would have done, and which I should have most earnestly desired of you by letter, had not the duke of Newcastle told me I need not do it, he having the king's commands to desire it of you. I wrote this to you to-night, being to set out early to-morrow morning to hunt in the New Park.

\* \* \* \* \*

The extreme chagrin of lord Harrington, at the rejection of his scheme, is very apparent in the above letter. Indeed, had it been sent as intended, the clear and strong sense of the pensionary Van Slingelandt could never have been so far imposed upon by the cunning of lord Harrington, a statesman far inferior in talents to the Dutch



minister, as to induce him to give his assent to a plan which must inevitably have been regarded by France as equivalent to a declaration of war, and which would have given a decided ascendancy, in the cabinet of Versailles, to the party which, in opposition to the pacific views of the cardinal, were eager to push to the utmost the successes of the allied arms. Fortunately sir Robert Walpole and M. Slingelandt, by their superior discernment and wisdom on this occasion, saved the two nations whose counsels they presided over, from the mischiefs and horrors of the impending calamity: they were convinced, first, that the crisis was not so urgent as to demand the interposition of the maritime powers; and, secondly, from the nature of the case, they saw that such interposition would probably prove wholly unavailing.



### LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

#### EXTRACT.

*N. B.* The letter from which the following extracts are taken, was transmitted by lord Harrington to sir Robert Walpole, then at Houghton, for his approbation, and, like the former, was strongly objected to by that minister, and consequently never sent.

NOVEMBER, 13, 1734.—His majesty being desirous of going as far as possible in his concessions towards the re-establishment of the public peace, has ordered me to authorize you, if the pensionary is willing, and empowered to concur with you in it, to offer the following preliminaries, which are, however, only proposed upon the supposition of the cardinal's concurrence in the reciprocal en-

agement with respect to the allies of France, mentioned in mine of the 8th inst. and of our agreeing together upon a certain plan of pacification, of which it is necessary that I should acquaint your excellency, that the guarantee of the pragmatic sanction by that crown, is understood by his majesty to be one unchangeable condition. The said preliminaries are as follow.

I. That in case of the emperor's refusal to accept the plan so settled between the maritime powers and France, his majesty and the States will not give him any assistance against that crown and her allies, provided France engages that the war shall be solely confined to the limits hereafter mentioned; that the king, in particular, will recall the troops he has sent over, and above his contingent as elector, to that prince's assistance, and will be so far from opposing the negotiations of France, for detaching other princes of the empire, as proposed in your excellency's letter of the 16th, by treaties of neutrality, that his majesty will even concur therein by his own example and influence.

II. As Italy is the part in which the balance of Europe seems least concerned, and as, by the plan supposed to be settled with France, the maritime powers would, in case of the emperor's acquiescence therein, have obtained very considerable possessions there for his Imperial majesty in lieu of Naples and Sicily, the king will therefore concur with the States-General in giving proper assurances, that in case of the war's continuing upon account of that prince's refusal, and provided France engages to confine it wholly to Italy, they will not oppose his being deprived of some of the advantages in those parts, which would have been secured to him by his joining at first in the plan. But, even in this case, his majesty thinks we should labour to fix the forfeitures upon his refusal at as low a rate as possible, and with an abso-

lute exclusion of any acquisitions to the crown of France ; his Most Christian majesty engaging, at the same time, not only to forbear all hostilities in any other part of Germany and Flanders, against the emperor, and not to encourage or excite any other power to attack him in other parts, or to assist them directly or indirectly in so doing, but likewise to restore Fort Kehl and Philipsburg, and whatever else may have been taken on that side during the war.



## SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO LORD HARRINGTON.

## EXTRACT.

Houghton, November 15-26, 1734.—As to the affair of Italy, I should be sorry that positive instructions should be sent to my brother to insist upon any one part as a condition *sine quâ non*, which it may be neither in the power nor inclination of France to procure ; for example, Tuscany. There is no doubt but that would be a great and very valuable addition to the emperor. But if he can recover the Milanese, preserve the Mantuan, and obtain Parma and Placentia, I should be unwilling to advise the breaking this negotiation for the want of Tuscany.

I am sensible that our friends in Holland are of opinion, that the French will insist that the plan of execution shall at least accompany the plan of pacification, if not precede it ; but I cannot be so clearly of that opinion. The French must expect, that whatever engagements they exact of us, with regard to the emperor, in case he shall refuse, upon the acceptance of France and her allies, will be made mutual in common justice. Will France think it a desirable thing, previously to engage not only to dispose of the dominions of don Carlos, very probably without the con-

sent of Spain, but to compel by force the compliance of the court of Spain?

Suppose the emperor to accept the terms of pacification, and Spain to refuse them, will France make peace with the emperor, become neutrals jointly with the maritime powers, and leave Spain to make good their ground in Italy against the emperor? This consideration may be shewn in various views; but, not to enlarge upon this topic, to me it seems apparent, that neither party will chuse previously to engage to compel their allies to accept of terms not even settled and agreed to by themselves. For if this negotiation finally fails, we shall be liable to the reproach of having engaged to impose terms upon our allies without their consent, where they have valuable interests concerned, and such terms as will be found impracticable, and become abortive.

And moreover, I think it is not eligible for us to make engagements so offensive as what is under consideration may be thought to be by Spain, till we see a probability of success. To dispose of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany from don Carlos, and to engage to compel the execution of it, will not sound well in the ears of the queen of Spain, if that part of our secret negotiation should be the first that reaches the court of Madrid; and perhaps I am singular, but I think there is more reason to apprehend the refusal of the allies of France upon the first opening of this affair than of the emperor.

I should with great pleasure see a plan of pacification settled between France and the maritime powers, and the execution, or other good consequences, will certainly follow from it. But I fear the plan of execution will very much encumber the pacification; and the pacification well settled, will facilitate, I had almost said effectuate, the execution.

If my reasonings deserve any regard, it makes it almost unnecessary to trouble your lordship very particularly

about the preliminaries, which, you will perceive, *I wish may be postponed for the present.*

By what I have said before, your lordship will see I think the cession of Tuscany should not be made an absolute condition. I am likewise afraid, if we agree on all other points, it cannot be expected at the French will give a positive guaranty of the pragmatic sanction, if the emperor shall at that time be in actual war with France. If France will agree in no manner, directly or indirectly, to oppose the pragmatic sanction, considering the powers that are already engaged in that case, will the difference between France's engaging to guarantee, or not to oppose, when there are no other considerable opponents left, be considerable enough to defeat this negotiation?



DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.

NEWCASTLE-HOUSE, November 19-30, 1734.—I received on Sunday morning the copy of your letter to lord Harrington, and sent it immediately to the queen, as lord Harrington did the original to the king. I must own I thought it was clear and strong, and not liable to the objection that was afterwards made to it. The queen told me she could by no means agree with her friend about Tuscany; that she thought we went too fast with France. Upon which I told her, that you was against *any* previous preliminary; that as the negotiation was of the greatest consequence, and the success of it so desirable, we ought to forward it as much as we could. Her majesty told me I should speak to the king, which I had an opportunity of doing soon after alone.



The king was at first much out of humour, not pleased with your letter, and understood it as if you proposed that Horace should have a latitude, or discretionary power, as to the terms and conditions to be agreed on. He seemed at first disposed to send lord Harrington's letter which you saw, and said orders must be sent to Horace, that he must not be at liberty, &c.

His lordship is much mortified at his letter not being approved ; thinks your letter cool and formal, and asked me if you was angry with him. I told him not, that I knew ; but he knew very well you was strong in opinion against the project of our sending troops to garrison Flanders. Lord Harrington told me that the king was embarrassed at the difference of opinion amongst us ; that he told him he had at first approved his letter, but that your letter, and some things that I think I happened to suggest, had made him doubt about it, or inclined him to alter his opinion. Harrington, as usual, retains his own, but professes we all mean the same thing, and that it is right for us to tell our opinions. He has desired me to write to Horace, to explain the order he is obliged to send him of restriction. Hitherto, I think, if I understand you right, you have no notion of Horace's having a latitude to agree to terms and conditions without previous order and approbation ; but if, in the course of the negotiation, any such power should be necessary, you, and you only, can get it. I can do no more than I have done.

I do not like things. The more the cardinal seems reasonable and sincere, the backwarder we go ; and I doubt, in the progress of the negotiation, we shall never think of what we can do, but of what we wish to do. We go too fast they say. Has there been any precipitate measure proposed, but that of the preliminary, which the king certainly gave into ? The queen is against giving up Tuscany. Does she know whether she shall be obliged to give it up or not ? She has more than once mentioned to

me, that our application to the emperor must be made alone, to give it the greater weight. But notwithstanding what passed at Houghton, I always have told the queen that nothing of that kind could be done till we had agreed with France. Can one be sure Kinsky will know nothing of this? Hitherto, I dare say, he does not. The king is now renewing his old pretensions of arrears due from Spain to the elector of Hanover. I think I have touched it in a manner to Waldegrave to do no hurt.

In short, upon the whole, so many new incidents arise every day, from king, and queen, and brother secretary, that I can't pretend to do any thing without you. I have done for the best, without passion or prejudice of any kind. I have endeavoured, through the whole, to follow your scheme; and if I have erred, I have done it ignorantly. The only way to prevent it for the future, is for you to come back, which I once more beg most earnestly. My friend has not laid aside his favourite project of a preliminary with France, which he thinks desirable for us, though France should not insist on it; and in that I widely differ with him.

The queen continues to mend, but slowly: her cough still hangs upon her. She is not quite right, and nothing but your presence can make her so *in rebus publicis*.

## LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

SIR,

*Whitehall, Jan. 15, 1734-5.*

YOU have been acquainted, from the beginning, with the several steps taken by the king and the States-General, in relation to the offer of their good offices to the respective powers, to the time of the acceptation thereof by all the parties concerned; and the joint declaration of the maritime powers, made the 17th past (N. S.), that they would then immediately proceed in their endeavours towards an accommodation of the present differences in Europe, which last piece I find, by yours of the first instant, that you had received, and that your court were in earnest expectation of seeing what would be done in consequence of it. I am now, therefore, to acquaint you, that, since the said acceptation of the several parties, the king has been endeavouring to fix and settle, in concert with the States, some such plan of accommodation as might be proposed by them jointly, in pursuance of the admission of their good offices by the respective courts: which way of proceeding appeared to his majesty to be more suitable, as well to the urgency of the occasion, as to the nature of the present disputes, wherein so many various and jarring interests are concerned, than that of demanding of the several powers at war, a declaration in form, of their respective terms of reconciliation, in order to convey it to the opposite parties. And as the king, for these reasons, preferred the former of these methods, his majesty had, at the same time, the satisfaction of seeing, by some of your letters, that it was the way in which the court of Vienna seemed to wish and expect that we should proceed.

You will easily imagine that a considerable time must have been necessarily spent in examining and preparing

the several articles of the plan which has been, as I before told you, under deliberation, as the affairs to which it relates are of so complicated, extensive, and difficult a nature. And I cannot indeed now inform you that it is entirely fixed and adjusted. But as the resolution of proceeding in this method has been taken, and the most essential points of which the said plan is to consist are now in a manner settled, his majesty's perfect friendship and affection to the emperor would not suffer him to lose a moment's time in communicating to that prince an affair of so much importance; and I am therefore commanded to acquaint you, by this messenger, with the principal heads of what is intended to be afterwards proposed to the several courts in form, that you may previously sound such of the Imperial ministers as you may judge proper upon them, in order to give his majesty the most early intimation of the emperor's sentiments, and that you may be at the same time furnished with such arguments as may perhaps be necessary to be alleged, both for the support and recommendation of the plan itself, and for justifying our conduct in proposing such terms to the emperor.

The principal and essential parts of the said plan are these that follow: king Stanislaus to renounce the crown of Poland, and the elector of Saxony to remain in possession of it; and neither of those princes to be obliged either to declare, or in any manner to acknowledge, his own election to have been invalid: Stanislaus to reserve to himself for his life, the title and honours of king of Poland, as was practised in the case of the present elector's father upon his abdication: his estates in Poland to be restored to him; a general indemnification for both parties; and the liberties and constitutions of that kingdom to be guaranteed by all the powers: all that has been taken from the emperor and the empire out of Italy, to be restored: Naples and Sicily to remain with don Carlos,

in exchange for the immediate cession to the emperor of the duchies of Parma and Placentia, and the reversion of that of Tuscany, excepting only the town of Leghorn, which is to be for the future a free port, and independent. Every thing else that has or shall have been taken from the emperor in Italy to be restored, particularly the Milanese, excepting Navarra and the Navarrese, with Tortona and the Tortonese, which are to remain to the king of Sardinia. The emperor's pragmatic sanction, excepting the alterations above-mentioned, to be guaranteed by all the powers now at war with his Imperial majesty, in the same manner as it is already guaranteed by the king and the States, viz. exclusive of future acquisitions.

You will immediately, upon the arrival of this messenger, communicate in the utmost confidence, and under the strictest ties of secrecy, the several propositions above contained, to your court, as the chief points of the plan to be proposed to them afterwards in form. And as it may be apprehended, that upon the first communication you will meet with objections on the part of the Imperial ministry, together with the topics of reproach upon his majesty's not assisting the emperor in pursuance of the supposed obligations of his treaties, but, on the contrary, proposing new sacrifices to him for the sake of peace, the observations that I am now ordered to make to you upon those subjects, may, as the king hopes, be sufficient to answer all that may be said to you of that kind.

I shall be so much the shorter in stating these observations to you, as your own sagacity and experience in affairs, will abundantly furnish you with materials for reasoning with the Imperial ministers upon the points above-mentioned.

Upon recollecting the contents of some of my former dispatches, you will find the reasons for our having deferred entering into the present war so fully set forth, that



the repetition of them here is unnecessary. However, without entering at all at present into the question of the *casus fœderis*, it may not be improper to take a short view of what has passed, and to shew you, in a few words, by what steps, and how unavoidably, his majesty has been led into his present method of proceeding.

As the war was, as you know, from the beginning, declared in all parts to have been occasioned purely by the conduct of the emperor with regard to king Stanislaus, it was generally treated both here and in Holland as a Polish quarrel only, and it was not possible for his majesty to have removed that first impression, to the disadvantage of your court, or to have brought this nation, without the concurrence of the States, to enter cheerfully into a war, the foundation of which was supposed to be owing to interests so remote from those of the maritime powers. The defenceless state in which the emperor's possessions in Italy were found, and to which the rapid progress of the allies in that country were imputed, had likewise very much alienated the minds of people who did not otherwise accustom themselves to look upon those dominions as extremely concerned in the balance of Europe. And the repeated declarations of France, that she would make no conquests for herself, had taken off great part of the apprehensions that were inculcated by your court from the proceedings of that crown against the house of Austria. In this situation the States-General, who had openly and often declared, that they would take no part in the consequences of the Polish affairs, and had engaged themselves likewise thereto by their convention of neutrality with France, proposed to the king their offering their joint good offices to the several parties, in order to try if possible to set on foot a treaty of accommodation, before they should be obliged to explain themselves as to the *casus fœderis*. This was an offer which, in the circumstances

affairs were then in, had such a plausible appearance, and the future harmony between his majesty and that republic depended so evidently upon his consenting to it, that there cannot want much reasoning to convince all impartial persons of the absolute necessity of its being complied with. The result of this was, that the allies accepted, and the emperor declined, the good offices, which occasioned a great loss of time, and prevented his majesty and the States from obtaining, so soon as might have been wished, even for the emperor's service, such an insight into the views and intentions of France and Spain, with respect to an accommodation, as might have determined their future conduct.

That difficulty being at last got over, the maritime powers are now using their utmost endeavours to bring affairs to a precision. They are forming a plan which, they flatter themselves, may be acquiesced in by the several parties, and think they have projected it in as favourable a manner for the emperor, as could possibly be done, consistently with the present posture of affairs in Europe.

To begin with the part of Poland: the king is persuaded your court must readily acknowledge, that he undertakes a great deal in proposing to France to give up, in a manner, the cause of his Most Christian majesty's father-in-law, and by so doing to disavow, in great measure, the principles upon which she has hitherto proceeded; the consequence of which, if this article be accepted, must certainly be, that the honour of having carried this point must remain, in the eyes of the world, to the emperor, as well as all the advantages which he proposed to himself by placing the elector of Saxony upon the throne, and fixing him in the quiet possession of that kingdom.

As to the cessions proposed to be made by the emperor in Italy: and, first, that of Naples and Sicily to don Carlos, in exchange for Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia,

his Imperial majesty will indeed suffer a diminution thereby in his revenues, but it appears that that loss will be in some degree compensated to him by the accession of real power that must accrue from the situation of the countries to be yielded, and their contiguity with the rest of his hereditary dominions : in which respect they seem far preferable to those distant kingdoms which could not but at all times be liable to sudden invasions, and required a maritime force, which is not the emperor's natural strength, for their defence. Besides which, it ought to be reflected on by your court, that, considering the present circumstances of Naples and Sicily, already in the possession of Spain, the re-conquering of them, even with the assistance of the maritime powers, must, if at all possible, which may be fairly disputed, take up a very considerable space of time, and leave the emperor in the mean while exposed to vast expenses, by the continuance of the war, and to the most imminent dangers in other parts, and perhaps to the loss of new dominions.

The portion of the Milanese proposed for the king of Sardinia, will, I suppose, be much exclaimed against by the Imperial court ; but they will consider, that his Sardinian majesty is already in possession of the whole, and supported therein by the powerful assistance of France and Spain ; which is a reflection that seems to make the sacrificing some part, for the immediate restitution of the remainder, advisable at least, if not absolutely necessary, in the emperor's present circumstances. But the chief and most weighty argument, both for justifying the maritime powers in making this proposition, and for inducing your court to accept it, is the consideration, that without proposing something that might save the honour of France, and have the appearance of being given as an equivalent to that crown for the compliance which is expected of the French king in the affair of Poland, and for the guarantee which is demanded of him, as well as of Spain,

and Sardinia, for the indivisibility of the emperor's succession, the king could entertain no hopes of his Most Christian majesty's concurrence in those important articles. The great power of that crown is known by repeated experience, and as the king of Sardinia cannot be supposed to have been drawn into the French quarrel, without assurances even of much greater advantages than what are proposed by this plan to be yielded to him, you will exhort the Imperial ministers to consider very maturely whether, if France, in the midst of her present superiority, will content herself with obtaining such terms as those for his Sardinian majesty, it will be for their master's interest to refuse absolutely to enable her to gratify him with them.

As to any accession of power to the king of Sardinia, which may be apprehended by the Imperial ministers, in consequence of this disposition of the Italian dominions, the king cannot but be of opinion, that any such accession will be entirely overbalanced by the much greater proportion of additional strength which is supposed to accrue to the emperor by the new acquisition to be allotted to him in the neighbourhood of his Sardinian majesty. For it is evident that the emperor, when put in possession of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, together with so much of the Milanese as is by the plan reserved to him, will be in a far better condition to prevent or repel any invasion which the court of Turin, after they shall have become masters of the Navarrese and Tortonesé, may be induced, contrary to the guarantee to be exacted of them, to make upon his dominions, than he was before, whilst the king of Sardinia's possessions were confined to their former bounds, and the emperor had no other footing in those parts besides the duchies of Mantua and Milan, and whilst those of Tuscany and Parma, being in a manner at the disposition of Spain, might encourage and facilitate any such attack upon his Imperial majesty.

The last and greatest and point is, that of the guarantee of France to the pragmatic sanction, the vast benefit and importance of which to the emperor and his family, are so obvious, that it is hardly necessary for me to enter in the least upon that subject. The king is persuaded that his Imperial majesty will give the greatest attention to this part of the plan to be proposed to him; and will acknowledge that nothing can be a greater proof of the zeal of the maritime powers for his interest, than their determining to make that guarantee one of the conditions to be demanded of France, who has hitherto shewn so great an aversion to it. The emperor's favourite view has constantly been, to fix the indivisibility of his succession, and to leave the quiet enjoyment of it to his posterity. The pretensions of the two houses of Saxony and Bavaria, who have been always supposed to be encouraged therein by France, have been hitherto the chief obstacles to this design; but if the present plan comes to take place, all apprehensions from thence are as much as possible removed, the elector of Saxony will have the obligation for his crown to the court of Vienna, and remain in the peaceable possession of that equivalent, in return for which he was induced not only to renew his renunciations to the Imperial succession, but even to guarantee it himself to the emperor's descendants; and as to the elector of Bavaria, it is evident that, without the assistance of France, the house of Austria will have very little to apprehend from that quarter.

Having thus gone through the several principal points of the plan of accommodation, I shall finish my remarks upon it, by observing to you, in general, that when the loss and advantage to the emperor is thus fairly stated and compared, throwing into one scale the cession of Naples and Sicily, and of Navarre and Tortona with their districts, and into the other the immediate peaceable possession of Parma and Placentia, with the right of succeeding



after the death of the present duke, to the duchy of Tuscany, to be secured to the emperor and his descendants, the renunciation of Stanislaus to the crown of Poland, and the establishment of the elector of Saxony in that kingdom, together with the guaranties of Spain and Sardinia, but, above all, that of France to the pragmatic sanction; the whole account being, I say, in this manner balanced, the king cannot but think that the Imperial court will have a very good equivalent for their compliance; and especially when it is taken, as it must be, into consideration, how extremely different the emperor's present situation is from that of the powers with whom he has to treat, both what is to be yielded to him, and what he is to yield, being already in their possession, and the means in their hands, according to all human probability, of extending their conquests a great deal farther, so that it might not, after a few months, be possible, if it is so at present, to obtain such conditions of his enemies. But the king cannot allow himself to suppose, that, after a due examination of all that is proper to be represented upon this subject, his Imperial majesty will be prevailed on, by an imaginary point of honour, or for the sake of gratifying any ill-timed resentment, to abandon and reject such solid and permanent advantages to himself and his posterity, as are hereby proposed to his acceptance: or that he will look upon the conduct of the maritime powers, in endeavouring to procure them in his favour, in any other light than as one of the strongest proofs of their sincere attachment to his family, and zeal for his real interests.

It is therefore the king's pleasure, that you should exert your utmost credit, and endeavour, by the most earnest and serious exhortations, to prevail on the Imperial ministers to obtain their master's acquiescence in the above-mentioned propositions.

I am to acquaint you, before I conclude this letter, that his majesty having thought fit that count Kinsky should be informed in general of the heads of the plan, that he might be induced, by that complaisance, to write favourably of it to his court, that communication was accordingly made to him, verbally, a few days since; and I am since acquainted, that he dispatched a courier upon that subject on Friday last to Vienna; so that you will find the Imperial ministers already prepared upon it.

These orders are sent you by his majesty, in the utmost confidence and secrecy: and you will understand, that they are for yourself alone, and not to be executed in concert with M. Bruyninx, or communicated to him, there not having been time to concert this previous step with the States-General.

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This masterly dispatch is written in a style so manifestly superior to the general tenor of lord Harrington's letters, and is so perfectly conformable to the ideas suggested by sir Robert Walpole in the course of the previous discussions in the British cabinet, that it may well be suspected to owe very different, and much higher obligation to that discerning and sagacious minister, than for the mere sanction of his approbation.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

## EXTRACT.

PARIS, June 1 (N. S.), 1735.—It is chiefly to inform your grace, of the impressions I think his majesty's having ordered a strong squadron to the coast of Portugal has made upon the French ministers, that I trouble you with this dispatch.

Lord Dursley, who has been here some days, having desired me to present him to the French king, I carried him with me to court. It is the custom here to acquaint the secretary of state for foreign affairs when any foreigner is to be presented: for that reason I alighted at Mons. Chanvelin's.

When I presented lord Dursley to him, he scarcely took the least notice of him; and without inviting us to dinner, which is usual on such occasions, he told me, that if I intended to see the French king we had no time to lose, for the levee was begun. I went from thence to the cardinal, whom I found in appearance less angry than his colleague, but equally vexed. He told me, in a most pathetic manner, that he could not but be excessively alarmed at the consequences of our sending so strong a squadron to the coast of Portugal; that he was acquainted with the reasons that had induced his majesty to take this resolution; and though M. Chavigny had wrote word that the king's ministers had assured him nothing would be undertaken by our fleet, but in defence of his majesty's subjects, and to protect their commerce, yet when the king of Portugal should see such a terrible fleet as twenty-five large English men of war come to assist him, it would raise his courage to such a degree, that there would be

no dealing with him. That undoubtedly the emperor's friends at Lisbon would encourage him to attack Spain, and he would probably do it. In fine, this step of ours would bring on a war in those parts, in which we should be parties, and consequently the war would be soon general.

Amongst the several reasons he gave for being alarmed at the sailing of our fleet, he said it would infallibly disappoint his project for an armistice; that, according to his former promise, he had been at work, and had even sent his plan for a suspension into Spain, where he had made no doubt but it would have been approved of. But now the queen of Spain would listen to no reason, and all his hopes of seeing peace restored were vanished. I told him I did not see any thing we had done in the Portuguese affair could make much difference as to other matters now depending in Europe: that if the king of Spain does not attack Portugal, we shall be quiet; that if he should *now*, it would be a demonstration that he was resolved upon it before, and every unprejudiced person would own his majesty did wisely to put himself in a state to protect the trade of his subjects, and defend his ally; that, considering the king's present measures in another light, there is more reason to expect they will take a good than a bad turn, from the practices of the court of Spain. For though they have hitherto talked angrily, and threatened Portugal, yet before they entered upon action they may think more calmly of it; and may weigh the inconveniences of attacking a prince who may be supported by England, and from this consideration they may be more tractable than they would be were not our fleet on the Portuguese coast; and should this be the case, our fleet's going out would rather promote than obstruct the pacification. But the cardinal is so piqued at this step of ours, that he will allow nothing to be a good reason for our taking it.

His eminency talked yesterday to Gedda on this sub-

ject with great concern, and full of fears and apprehensions of its being a forerunner of our declaring for the emperor.

I have endeavoured to lay all I learnt yesterday from the French ministers, in as clear a light before your grace as I could, from the conversations I have had with them. It is evident they are heartily frightened at our preparations, and what adds to their fears is, lest now one step is taken in favour of a prince more inclined to the emperor than to the allies, his majesty may hereafter take some others more disagreeable to them.

I hear they have had a council, to which M. de Maurepas was called, to know what ships they can fit out with speed; but I am assured that at Brest and Rochefort they cannot get fifteen men of war in readiness these six weeks, and to do that, they must work night and day. At Toulon they have not above eight fit for service.



THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

EXTRACT.

PARIS, August 2 (N. S.), 1755.—I am to give your grace an account of a very long and confidential conversation I had this morning with the cardinal at Issy.

I represented to him, in the most friendly and confidential manner, that for my own part I would, as long as it was possible for me, give the best construction to any thing I thought he had a hand in; that I did not doubt of his own disposition for restoring peace to Europe, but hitherto I could see nothing but ruin and destruction from the fluctuating measures of this court—beginning negotiations, and dropping them as soon as there



is the least appearance of their coming to perfection, and substituting new projects in their place, which any one might be sure would come to nothing. He defended himself but slightly, and owned at length, that he did not expect much good from the congress, or the suspension of arms he had proposed. I then pressed him home to say how peace could be restored: and finding him pretty willing to hear any thing I had to say to him, I asked him some plain questions. *First*, whether he would let the emperor have a footing in Italy or not? At this he paused, and, looking earnestly at me, he said, “*Ne me trahissés vous point?*” I assured him it was not my intention. “Well, then,” says he, “I will unbosom myself to you. The emperor shall have a footing in Italy. I think it right he should: for, to keep a balance there, it is necessary that somebody of weight should be between the king of Sardinia and don Carlos.” In fine, he allotted Mantua, a great share of the Milanese, and some other parts which he was not determined upon, to the emperor, and, by his manner of talking, Parma and Placentia. But he apprehended he should have a good deal of difficulty to make the queen of Spain yield up her native country to the emperor. As for Tuscany, he said the emperor could not have it. This brought on, as I expected, the exchange of it against Lorraine, on which subject I gave him some encouragement. He immediately cleared up his countenance, and owned it was the only thing could satisfy the French nation; that for Poland he cared but little, it was only the point of honour made him insist upon it; but that if a real advantage was offered to France, in his situation he could not refuse it. He said he could not propose the exchange, after the declarations that had been made on his part: but Lorraine was what he wished for, and to have the exchange proposed to him. As to the king of Sardinia, he was of opinion he deserved something more than was

allotted to him by our plan, and he thought the places on the coast of Tuscany, lately taken by the Spaniards, ought to be given to don Carlos with Naples and Sicily.

I then asked him who was to propose this plan? He gave me to understand that nobody but his majesty could do it, and that if ever it was to be executed, it must be in consequence of a private agreement between England and France for that purpose. I asked him, next, whether, if that was to be the case, he would leave his allies if they did not approve of it? After a fresh pause, and repeating twice, *Ne me trahissés vous pas?* he said that such a peace, being established on a foundation of justice and reason, since due care was taken of them, he would abandon them if they did not comply.

Your grace sees by this, the cardinal's present project: France to have Lorraine; the house of Lorraine to have Tuscany; the emperor, Mantua, Milan, and a great part of the Milanese; France disposed to give his Imperial majesty Parma and Placentia, but apprehensive of the queen of Spain's not consenting to it: France to guarantee the pragmatic sanction; don Carlos to have Naples and Sicily, and the towns heretofore possessed by the emperor on the coast of Tuscany; the king of Sardinia, besides the Tortonese, Navarrese, and Vigevanasco, to have some farther share in the Milanese; but what, the cardinal could not directly say: the execution of this plan to be privately concerted between his majesty and the French king.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

EXTRACT.

PARIS, September 28 (N. S.), 1735.—As a proof of the obstructions he (*i. e.* the cardinal) put to the siege of Mantua, he told me in confidence that he had written a letter, in his own hand, to the duc de Noailles yesterday se'nnight, to avoid coming near Mantua as long as he could, and to seek as many pretences as could possibly be alleged, to count Montemar, for not undertaking the siege. At last, if he was drove to a *nonplus*, he was to tell the Spanish general that he must write to court for orders, without which he was not to stir. This, he said, would occasion a delay of near three weeks, by which time the season of the year, and other unforeseen accidents, might make the undertaking unadvisable.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

EXTRACT.

FONTAINEBLEAU, October 26, 1735 (N. S.)—All the day yesterday the cardinal was so taken up, on account of the expresses that they received in the night from the army, that none of the foreign ministers could see him, and this morning I saw him but an instant. The sum of what he said to me was, owning a private transaction between this court and the emperor, though he would not say how or by whom it was carried on, upon which he made the following declaration: that it had never been

his intention in this affair to do any thing but what would be agreeable to his majesty ; that he had declared at Vienna, that his majesty must be a party to whatever should be agreed on ; and he added, that nothing should be agreed upon without his majesty's knowledge ; and that if the negotiations at Vienna went on, all relating thereto should be communicated to us. The *Garde des Sceaux* came in as he was finishing this declaration, and his eminency repeated the same in M. Chauvelin's presence : adding, that for this twelvemonth past he had constantly told me that he desired nothing more than to act in concert with his majesty, by which means we could both be sure of maintaining a just equilibrium in Europe.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO LORD HARRINGTON.

PRIVATE.

MY DEAR LORD,

*Hague, Oct. 19, 1735.*

I WAS honoured last night with your public dispatches of the 10th, and as I was extremely busy in writing to England, I had hardly time to peruse them ; referring myself to the copies I had ordered to be made of your last letters to the duke of Newcastle and Mr. Robinson, for my breakfast this morning, for I live upon paper ; but I am now called up by Over the messenger, and as I do not think fit to detain him any longer than while he is getting his horses ready, knowing the king's impatience, I shall only beg leave to observe, that I do not agree with your lordship, in shewing so much dissatisfaction at the imperfect communication made to Mr. Robinson. Although I would not appear pleased with it, I should, in my humble opinion, instead of soliciting with resentment

a farther explanation, have waited and seen what they had farther to say to us.

The emperor has plunged himself into a negotiation with France without us : he must get through it as well as he can, and he must have our assistance for it, and I think he plainly tells us so. The paper delivered to Mr. R. is rather in the nature of a request than of a reproach, and the court of Vienna must become petitioners to us for accomplishing their own work, instead of our having been hitherto petitioners to her. With respect to France, supposing that court disposed to be sincere, as by keeping up the cardinal's apprehensions I think he will become sincere, I think pretty much the same conduct should have been observed. The cardinal should be made sensible that we know, and have constantly known, without the help of the Imperial court, the secret negotiation. He should have been let to see that we were not at all surprised at his denying it, because he must have been under the strongest previous obligations imaginable not to own it, and perhaps to deny it, and was prepared to do so,—and indeed I am not at all surprised at that denial,—and after proper intimations to him of our not being at all in the dark, I would, without solicitation, or appearance of uneasiness to get to the bottom of the negotiation, have left it to the French ministers to explain themselves. If they are desirous, as well as the emperor, to make a peace, they will, as things have fortunately turned out, want our concurrence and assistance as well as him. The Imperial court will want money, and the cardinal some countenance from us, in opposition to Spain ; and it seems our business to wait and hear them explain themselves, and make a merit of what we are to do : but your lordship will pardon these hasty, and, I believe, injudicious reflections.



## HORACE WALPOLE TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

## EXTRACT.

HAGUE, October 25, 1735.—You will have seen by my last, that I am extremely well satisfied with what has been done at Vienna, and with the communication, though imperfect, that has been made to you ; and, between you and me, I could have wished that my lord H. had forborne to express so much resentment and dissatisfaction as I find he has done, against the behaviour of the court of Vienna, in his letter to you on that occasion. I must own, that for several reasons you give, and for others that occur to me, I think ourselves in a more advantageous situation than if we had been originally concerned, and had had the confidence of every step ; since, without our appearing either satisfied or dissatisfied, they must come to us. For I cannot, and indeed I never could see, how the emperor and France could make an absolute pacification without our assistance.



## SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

DEAR BROTHER,

*London, June 18-29, 1736.*

I FIND there may be some difficulty in carrying on this summary correspondence between you and me ; for I do apprehend you will be constantly asked what letters you have, and as constantly desired to shew them, which will be unavoidable, unless upon particular occasions I give you the trouble of a separate paper, with an ostensible letter to be produced. Such a companion this shall

have. Look upon this as my private thoughts, suggested to you alone.

There seems to me to be three points now upon the *tapis*, that may deserve consideration : the affairs of Berg and Juliers, the mediation between the czarina and the Porte, and a northern league said to be in view, to be formed between Denmark, Sweden, and the maritime powers, to observe the growing power of Muscovy. Of this last I shall make no mention in my other letter to you, though I cannot suppose but it must have been mentioned to you by the king and Mr. Finch, who I understand has mentioned it to the king, as suggested by M. Rosenérantz ; but you are to know nothing of this from me, till you hear farther of it. Upon this point I must begin with observing, that count Kinsky, in his parting conference with me, mentioned such a design as a cause of jealousy and complaint in the court of Vienna, which, as I had not heard one word of, I very roundly denied the least notion of it ; and for my part, I cannot conceive what inducements should lead us into such a negotiation, the surmise of which must give offence to the czarina, in consequence to the emperor, and may tend to make the courts of France and Vienna more entirely one, and, in the conclusion, at the expense of the maritime powers. And I cannot think the state of affairs in any part of Europe settled enough to make us desire to be engaged sooner, or more than we shall necessarily be called upon to be so. Let us wait and see how things will turn out, and then determine what part to take. The late treaties with Denmark and Sweden have been burthensome and expensive, and our subsidies will never be unwelcome to them.

The next article that naturally occurs is, the mediation between Muscovy and the Porte ; and here too I think we should defer concerning ourselves until it is demanded of us by both parties. I observe, by Mr. Robinson's letters, that it is expected at Vienna that the Porte should make a

formal demand, and in that expectation full powers are ordered for Mr. Tatman *pro ista vice*. But it seems to me that this will be conditional; and although no mention is made of such an expectation from the Russians, the strict alliance that subsists between the emperor and the czarina, persuade me that no step would be taken upon this subject at Vienna but in concert with the czarina. That should likewise be equally expected by us, and if the demand of both is made, we should then do nothing but in concert with the Imperial court and the States-General.

I have read the long letter from count Osterman to the grand vizier, which seems to me to be as strong a remonstrance of a long-continued series of violences and oppressions as it is possible for one power to lay to the charge of another; and although it concludes with professions of a sincere desire for peace, that is no more than is usual in all declarations of war. And when sir E. Faulkener is desired to deliver the letter, nothing is said to him, that implies at all any desire of our mediation, but proposes the sending ministers reciprocally to the respective borders, to treat and adjust, without any mention of the intervention of other powers. These reasons induce me to think, that we are in this case, too, to wait for events and proper applications, and to be well assured of the real sentiments of both the Imperial and Russian courts before we offer our good offices, and take any step which may possibly disoblige, without a probability of doing any good.

The same spirit of not being too forward, induces me to think our taking any part as yet in the affairs of Juliers and Berg is not advisable. In that case we must wait for the sentiments of the emperor and France, and what part they will probably take, before, in compliance with the Dutch, we make any declaration which may be thoroughly disobliging to the king of Prussia, and in which we may be left singly with the Dutch. It is most cer-

tainly a very desirable thing to me, if it were possible that all future occasions of a rupture in Europe should be remedied and prevented. But as no court of Europe, except the Dutch, have an inclination to make the settlement of that affair a part of the present pacification, but both the emperor and France are expressly of opinion to postpone that affair till the chief business of the negotiation shall be over, and as there is in the preliminaries a positive exclusion of all matters foreign from the late war; I see great inconveniences that may arise from our pressing that affair to be carried on at the same time, although in a separate negotiation with the general transactions now upon the *tapis*.

Upon further consideration, I see no occasion of your communicating my thoughts upon any of the heads at present to the king, but leave them for your own information and amusement only; and shall write you only a short letter upon the army matters, transmitted now by sir William Yonge, as far as I had troubled the king about them before he went from home.



SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

DEAR BROTHER,

*London, Aug. 6-17, 1736.*

UPON the receipt of the project of a treaty between the king and the crowns of Sweden and Denmark, and discoursing with some few of his majesty's servants upon it, I was inclined to think that, for the present, it was not absolutely necessary to lay it before the cabinet council, where I apprehend there would have been great difficulties, not only from the thing itself, but from the surprize of producing so suddenly, and all at once, an




affair of that consequence. It was therefore thought more advisable to postpone the formal consideration of this affair till matters could be better prepared, and it might be seen what probability there was of succeeding in the respective courts where this negotiation was to be transacted. In order to which, it is with great submission presumed, that it may be very advisable to send back Mr. Finch and Mr. Tingley to their respective courts, with proper instructions and intimations of his majesty's sentiments, that they may discover and learn how far such treaties will be agreeable to either or both of these crowns, and upon what terms they will be willing to renew their former, or enter into new engagements with his majesty; and as their cause and interest is more nearly and immediately concerned, it will be an advantage to his majesty rather to hear and receive, than to make proposals.

If any prejudice could arise from the danger of losing the present opportunity, which there might be hazard in retrieving, if now neglected, these cautions might be avoided; but as the jealousies that will arise in other courts, and the umbrage and offence that will be taken, be immediate, it is worth while to consider, whether his majesty will subject himself to all the inconveniences that may immediately follow from setting such a treaty on foot, which, as the courts of Denmark and Sweden are constituted, will not be a secret, before he sees into the probability of concluding such a treaty as may answer his majesty's reasonable hopes and expectations. As we have above a year good before the expiration of the treaty with Sweden, there is time sufficient too, upon the foot that our present alliances stand with Denmark, which it will certainly be proper to think of renewing, either jointly or separately, as circumstances and opportunity shall offer; but I hope there will be no prejudice in taking a little time to look about us. The scene of affairs in Europe should, in my poor opinion, be a little more settled,



that we may see who and who is together, before we form new schemes that may clash with we know not whom nor how.

The mobs and tumults in Spital-fields are now quite over; and it appears, every day, that the dispute with your Irish labourers was the true source of the whole; with this favourable circumstance, that the attempts of the jacobites to carry it farther did not succeed.



SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.

LONDON, August 6-17, 1736.—When I came to consider the project of the treaty which you sent over, and had perused your paper upon that subject, I was so fully confirmed in my own opinion, that it was not proper to be too hasty in proceeding at present upon that affair, that I found it necessary to convince the queen likewise, which I had no ways of doing so effectually as reading your paper to her, which, as it was impossible it should not, had the desired effect, and she will write to the king by this messenger, in the same manner as I now write to you.



THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT  
WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.

PARIS, October 23, 1736.—I had this morning a very extraordinary conversation with the cardinal, which he allowed me to impart to you alone. It was upon the subject of the late riot at Edinburgh, in which captain

Porteus was murdered. I find the jacobites and their abettors here have made a great stir about it, and look upon this horrid act as a signal of a rebellion. In this sense the cardinal mentioned it, not from his seeing it in that light, but as deserving, nevertheless, the utmost attention of the government. I acquainted his eminency with the facts as they were related to me in a letter from the duke of Newcastle, which agreed exactly with the account given in our news-letters on all sides. I satisfied him that in the tumult nothing had appeared like disaffection towards his majesty; that as soon as the mob had perpetrated their inhuman revenge they retired quietly, and had not given the least provocation since.

The cardinal said he knew all this; but that he saw in our Gazettes promises of rewards for apprehending the actors in this wicked scene. That he was sensible they deserved the utmost punishments, but he was not for severity;—that the proclamation might be very proper *in terrorem*, whatever step was intended in consequence of it, after the discovery, though, for his part, was he at the head of affairs in England, he would rather let the matter drop, than be too inquisitive;—that it would be well to know the persons concerned in the scheme, which could hardly have been executed with so much address, had there not been better hands than the mob to conduct it;—that in speaking to me thus, he meddled with other people's business, but that his respect and goodwill towards their majesties, made him wish that rigour might not be used in this case. The cardinal agreed to my mentioning it (*i. e.* his opinion), provided it was to you alone; and he expressed on this occasion, as he has on many others, the greatest value and respect imaginable, and a sincere desire to live in strict friendship with you.

This conversation was followed by another still more extraordinary, considering the man it came from. We were discoursing upon proper alliances to maintain peace,

and a right balance of power in Europe. The cardinal began with making a short apology for himself, telling me that I perhaps would be surpris'd at his frankness; but as he knew me, and was sure I would not make an ill use of any confidence he made me, he would open his mind. The cardinal then laid down as a rule, that nothing but a firm union between the protestant powers in Germany could prevent the emperor's growing too powerful; that it behoved the king, not only as elector, but as king of England, and as such the first protestant prince in Europe, to bring about an union between the protestant powers to support themselves against the emperor, or any one else;—that it were to be wish'd a hearty reconciliation could be effected between his majesty and the king of Prussia;—that the king of Prussia alone, considering his temper, was not of much consequence, yet in a body with others he would make a great figure;—that it would ever be the interest of France to join a protestant league in Germany;—that it was no new thing there, France having been constantly engaged in their support. He ran on a good deal in this project, saying he did not speak on this subject as commonly people of his cloth used to do, but that, as minister of France, he was to prefer his master's interest to all other considerations; therefore he was for keeping well with protestant powers, and glad to see them a respectable body.

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The advice given by cardinal Fleury, relative to the affair of Porteus, is a strong characteristic trait of the candour and good sense which marked that mild and beneficent statesman, when not warped by particular prejudices. The conversation respecting the emperor, however remote from realities, is at least a proof of sincerity;

for the cardinal must have been deeply impressed with the visionary notion of the danger resulting from the aspiring views of the emperor, if he suffered himself to entertain the most distant hope that England would be induced, by any arguments he could use, to join in such a project as he proposed, for the reduction of the Imperial power. He had recently and repeatedly urged the propriety and necessity of a close and intimate union between the crowns of England and France for that purpose, declaring to lord Waldegrave, "that the ambition of the house of Austria had never been more unbounded than at this time, but that he never would be accessory to the emperor's views for enslaving Germany." But ambition, unsupported by ability, is an object not of dread but of ridicule and contempt.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

EXTRACT.

*Paris, Nov. 3, 1736.*

I WENT this morning to Issy about ten, according to the cardinal's appointment. He had great reason to hope every thing that had retarded the conclusion of the peace would be soon got over. As to the definitive treaty, he was for it, and his majesty, was master, to have what share he pleased in it: that I might depend upon it he would not recede a tittle from any thing he had said to me on that point;—that he continued in the same mind, that a strict union between England and France was the only security for the liberties of Europe;—that it is what he wants; and, in saying this, he seemed to throw out a hint, as if we were not so ready to engage with him as he was to engage with us.

I laid hold of a pretence, that fell naturally in my way, to renew the discourse about the pretender. He said he had told me the other day : that I need not *question* him further about it—that he knew the situation of the pretender's affairs, and, were they much more prosperous than it is morally possible for them ever to be, he certainly would not engage in his cause\*.

Paris, November 17, 1736.—I am very sorry that the last accounts I sent of my transactions with the French ministers have not altogether answered your expectations ; but I must beg leave to tell your grace, that I have done all I possibly could towards getting out of them what I wanted to know.—I must remark to your grace, that one gets little by asking questions, and that all that is to be had, must be by putting the cardinal to talk upon matters you want to be informed of, and if you light upon a lucky moment, he will then say more in a quarter of an hour, of his own accord, than can be got out of him in two hours by asking him questions ; besides, he does not love it. He himself has told me many times, that he cannot bear *des questions*. He says they either put him upon equivocating, or make him break off the conversation.

\* This alludes to a singular incident, by which a letter of the pretender to his agent at Vienna, was, through a strange inadvertence, put by M. Chauvelin into the hands of lord Waldegrave, and by that nobleman transmitted to the English government. The letter was expressive of the foolish and sanguine hopes entertained by the pretender, of obtaining aid and assistance of the courts of Vienna and Versailles, in order to effect his restoration, and it excited almost as much alarm at St. James's, as if a treaty had been actually concluded for that purpose.



## HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

EXTRACT—PRIVATE.

*Hanover, Nov. 11, 1736.*

PENDING these difficulties about the execution of the preliminaries, M. Chauvelin has persuaded the cardinal to be for making a definitive treaty between the emperor and France. And if the cardinal, by holding the same language, has almost persuaded the Imperial court to follow that method, I cannot think it proceeds from any ill will even of his eminence towards us, much less of the emperor, but from the necessity of his Imperial majesty's affairs. And, therefore, if a definitive treaty should be concluded at Vienna, between the emperor and France, and even Spain, without desiring the maritime powers to be parties to it—and it is an usual and natural thing for a treaty between the parties concerned in the war to be absolutely made before the guarantee and accession of other powers is asked—I cannot imagine that such a measure proceeds from a concert between the emperor and those powers, in order to favour the pretender, or to be at liberty to do us some mischief. The emperor's interest, his own safety, the preservation of the peace, and the support of the pragmatic sanction, will not suffer him to enter into such a concert with France at any time, I think, but to be sure not at this juncture.

## HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

## EXTRACT.

HANOVER, November 11, 1736.—His majesty having been graciously pleased to communicate to me, the account lord Waldegrave has given to you alone, of an extraordinary discourse which the cardinal had held to him in confidence, I beg leave to trouble you with a few words upon it.

As to the first part, relating to the outrage committed by the populace at Edinburgh—his eminence, according to his calm and pacific disposition, seems of opinion that a strict inquisition and severe punishment of those concerned in this wicked act should rather be dropt than pursued. This way of reasoning, looking upon the cardinal to be an old bigotted popish priest, and a declared enemy, not only to our religion, but to our government and present happy establishment, and that he delights in confusion, would make one naturally suspect his having some knowledge of the horrid crime that was committed, of the authors of it, and of their being persons of consideration, and consequently that his design was, under this colour of friendship for his majesty and his government, to divert us from discovering and punishing the heads of it, and to keep us in ignorance and indolence in regard to the true view of this horrid crime, and the consequences of it.

But without considering whether this advice of his eminence should or should not be followed, in any degree, I really believe, from the long and intimate acquaintance I had for several years with the cardinal, that his confidential frankness towards lord Waldegrave on this head, proceeded from the natural disposition of his mind, as a lover of peace and quiet\*. For he has often told me, at

\* There can be no doubt that the advice of the cardinal, to drop all proceedings of an extraordinary nature, and unusual rigour, in this case, was

times when I could have no reason to suspect his having any particular view, that, notwithstanding his being a cardinal, he was too good a Christian, too much a lover of mankind, to encourage any attempt in favour of the pretender against his majesty's government, which must create a scene of blood and confusion in England, and, in consequence of it, in all Europe. And although he may possibly have from time to time returned civil answers to the pretender's agent, agreeable to his mild temper, yet I never had cause to think his eminence gave him the least hopes or encouragement. Nay, on the contrary, the Jacobites, that had been very numerous and active at Paris, upon the cardinal's first coming to the administration, after some experience of his words and actions, soon vanished and retired in despair; saying, *there was nothing to be had during that old fool's life, who is governed entirely by the Walpoles.* And during several years of my embassy, and his eminence having the chief credit in France, I did not perceive any thing that tended in the least towards favouring the pretender: and notwithstanding the great industry and address of the late bishop of Rochester, to gain, by the means of the Jesuits, whom the cardinal then favoured in opposition to the Jansenists, some interest with his eminence, it had no manner of effect. He was used to tell the Jesuits they had nothing to do with politics.

He has often told me, that as he laid the foundation of his merit in endeavouring to preserve the tranquillity of Europe, and should value himself more upon being called *the pacific cardinal*, than his predecessors could do upon their great and extensive conquests, he was persuaded

founded both in sincerity and good sense. The parliamentary inquisition and punishment resorted to on this occasion, and which gave to an incidental riot almost the aspect of a rebellion, constituted one of the very few instances of indiscretion with which sir Robert Walpole's administration is chargeable.

that the public peace, in a great measure, depended upon preserving the present establishment in England, which makes me believe that the cardinal's discourse was cordial and sincere.

As to what the cardinal added, relating to his majesty's endeavouring, as the first protestant prince in Europe, to bring about a firm union among the protestant princes in Germany, although it seemed very extraordinary to lord Waldegrave, as indeed it would to any body who knows nothing more of him than being a priest and a cardinal, I can assure you he has held that language, during our great intimacy, often to me, founded upon a principle which I thought the late war had cured him of, viz. that the emperor is a most formidable power, and that in consequence of it, he is a most ambitious prince, and desirous to make himself absolute in Germany, which nothing can prevent but an union between the protestant princes in Germany, and France joining, in case of necessity, with those princes, to check the designs of the house of Austria. I have often endeavoured to shew him the weakness of that family without the assistance of the maritime powers. He always persevered in insisting there could be no sufficient restraint to the emperor's power and views, but a perfect harmony among the protestant powers in the empire; and no sure way of preserving the tranquillity of Europe, but a good understanding between France and the maritime powers. However weak the first part of this reasoning, as is found by experience, may be, and however contrary the last maxim may be to the old ambitious views of France, yet I must do the cardinal the justice to own, that he never departed from talking and acting agreeably to these principles for several years. But after Mons. Chauvelin came into the administration, he found means, by his tricks and impositions, to make his eminence deviate from them, particularly in the execution of the treaty of Seville.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT  
WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.—VIDE COXE'S PAPERS.

PARIS, November 21 (N. S.), 1736.—I was with the cardinal the day before yesterday at Issy. I began the conference with reminding his eminence of the discourse we had had some time before, which he had allowed me to communicate to you in the utmost confidence. I then told him that I was authorized by you, and ready to acquaint him with your sentiments upon his friendly overtures. The cardinal seemed earnest to hear.

As the first paragraph of your letter consisted most of compliments, and shewed your desire to cultivate a friendship with his eminency, for the mutual honour and interest of our respective masters, he made the like professions on his part, adding, that he did not question but this correspondence would answer the ends proposed by it, since, besides your known and distinguished abilities, he knew you to be *un tres honnête homme, et de grand courage*—characters he looked upon as highly necessary to carry on good business *bonne besogne*.

The cardinal approved extremely your manner of reasoning upon the late outrageous tumult at Edinburgh; and, from what you were pleased to say on the subject, he was satisfied you would follow the properest step in such a case. He allowed, that what I had advanced about the variations in his negotiations at Vienna, to be true, relatively to the form; but as to the substance, he denied positively there being the least; insisting, that when we saw the whole, we would believe him. He insinuated pretty strongly, that applications were made to him from many parts, *l'on nous recherche de beaucoup d'endroits*; but he should ever prefer a strict union with England,



In reading the next paragraph to him, I laid my stress upon the advices you had from Vienna, that France had proposed to finish alone with the emperor, exclusive of the maritime powers: that this scheme had lain dormant for some time, but began now to revive, and with the addition of Spain to the emperor, and France, for the conclusion of a definitive treaty. I added, carelessly, that I could not give credit to your intelligence, for the same reason you mentioned, since it was contradictory to all his eminence had said to me of his intention.

Here the cardinal bid me take a pen and a sheet of paper, and began to dictate as follows: *Il est faux que l'on ait proposé un traité défensif entre l'Espagne, la France, et l'empereur. Il est vrai que l'on a proposé un traité définitif entre l'empereur et la France comme le moyen le plus court pour parvenir à l'exécution des préliminaires, que le traité proposé n'est que général d'amitié et d'union sans aucune stipulation contre aucune puissance, ni même aucune stipulation particulière à leur sujet que ce traité n'est pas conclu. A l'égard de l'Angleterre— Dès le commencement de la négociation avec la cour de Vienne, la France a proposé que l'Angleterre, et la Hollande eussent part à la pacification, que bien loin de présent de chercher à les en exclure, elle continue dans ses premiers sentimens pour les admettre.*

As the cardinal made a sort of pause, I asked in what manner, how, and by what means, this admission was to be brought about? But the answers to these queries were put off to farther consideration, and the cardinal dictated on: *Que l'objet présent de la négociation à Vienne, c'est l'exécution des préliminaires tels qu'ils ont été communiqués à l'Angleterre, qu'ils n'y à absolument pas d'article secret, que le but en est de garantir réciproquement les arrangements qui y sont contenus.* By way of explication to the foregoing paragraph, he said there might be a small variation as to the letter of the

preliminaries, in case Spain evacuated Tuscany, for then France was to have the actual possession of Lorraine; but this would make no alteration as to the general system with respect to France, since having that duchy in present, or upon the grand duke's demise, considering its situation, seemed indifferent to the rest of Europe. The cardinal then thus pursued to dictate: *Sa majesté tres Chrétienne n'a presentement d'autre vue, que d'empêcher autant que faire se pourra par des alliances défensives, qu'aucune puissance n'envahisse les états ou les droits des autres. Par ce qui est déjà dit, Mons. le chevalier Walpole peut voir la part qu'il conviendra à l'Angleterre de prendre pour ces fins, il pourroit même, s'il le juge convenable, trouver des moyens de faire goûter à la cour de Vienne l'admission de l'Angleterre au present traité; que la France concurreroit volontiers, et cela ne parôitroit pas étrange à Vienne, puisque Mons. le cardinal y a toujours parlé dans ce sens.*

These are the very words, as they were dictated to me by the cardinal the day before yesterday at Issy. I read them over to him yesterday at Versailles, to avoid mistakes, and he acknowledged them as his own. He put me there again in mind, that it was not in his ministerial capacity he took this step, but merely to shew his confidence in you; that he thought it the best way of treating, since, by exposing the state he was in, you might judge what might be proper for England to do, to act in concert with France. To keep up the discourse, I asked the cardinal if he thought of a congress for the general definitive treaty? He said he would avoid one if he could: that we saw how much time a private transaction with the emperor, for matters quite settled by the preliminaries, had taken up: that if a congress was appointed for the discussion of such other as would unavoidably be brought there, God alone knew who would live to see an end of it; therefore, if he was not forced to have a congress, he would have none:—

that the pacification had taken up a long space; that he was tired, and would finish at any rate; and that if the emperor's councils judged right, or he was in the emperor's case, he would agree to the last project of Spain, which seemed to be equitable.

This last passage gave the cardinal an opportunity to assure me, in the strongest terms, that he had no engagement whatsoever with Spain; that his engagements with that court had finished with the war; that the queen of Spain hated him as much as ever, and was as jealous of France as if he was at the eve of declaring war to her; that she pretends to know for certain that France will join its forces with the emperor, to drive her out of Italy, if she does not quit Tuscany. The cardinal observed here, that he has no such intention: he is not sorry the queen of Spain should think it, hoping it will make her more tractable. When he had concluded his story, I put him again upon the subject of his former notions of treating privately with us, when his treaty with the emperor should be continued in the same mind as before; that he would *bona fide* acquaint us with all his treaties; that we ought to do the like by him, and we might then see to form alliances agreeable to both our engagements; that with respect to him, we should have few difficulties, for he had no treaties but what we knew of; that it was a common notion, we had lately concluded one with king Augustus, and that we were now upon concluding one with Sweden. But he was not in pain about them, being sure that you would not take engagements without France, inconsistent with those you might have with other powers; that his object, in treating with us, was to maintain a just balance in Europe, and to obviate what might occasion fresh disturbances; that this object ought to be equally desirable by his majesty as by France; and, for that purpose, he (the cardinal) was as ready to treat, though with this express condition, that in any future

convention or agreement between England and France, we must not look upon ourselves to be engaged only by the terms of art, but be likewise engaged upon our honours, not to enter into any engagements with other powers, without previously acquainting each other with what we proposed to do. In this method, and no other, we could make a lasting work.

In the course of the conversation, the cardinal himself renewed his former professions of having nothing to do with the pretender. He told me frankly, that he fancied we had had some suspicions of his or his master's being disposed to favour him. He said as much as it was possible to say, to clear himself and the French king of such an imputation.

I must not omit acquainting you, that the last thing the cardinal said was, that Chauvelin must not know a word of any thing that passed between us; and this he repeated in a mysterious manner, putting his finger to his mouth—*pas un mot de ceci au garde des sceaux*.

I have endeavoured to relate facts as near as I could, as they were told me by the cardinal. My letter is already too long for increasing it by observations of my own, and you are much more capable of making just ones than any body I know. All I can venture to say on the foregoing subjects is, that though it is to me a great question whether much will be concluded in consequence of these private transactions with the cardinal, yet from what he said, one may judge that he has not taken any engagement, nor is like to take any, to our prejudice.



THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

EXTRACTS.

PARIS, Feb. 22, 1737.—M. de Maurepas went on Wednesday morning, between six and seven, to M. Chauvelin's, and by the king's command demanded the great seal, and an act of dismission, in form, for his place of secretary of state for foreign affairs; both which being complied with, M. de Maurepas added, that it was the king's pleasure he should go immediately to Gros Bois, there to remain till further orders; and that there was an officer of the grey Mousquetaires, M. de Jurnillac, to see him thither. Though M. Chauvelin and his friends had reason enough to fear that it was not the cardinal's intention he should hold his post long, yet none of them thought his fall would have been so sudden. I went thither, *i. e.* to Issy, yesterday. The cardinal desired me to acquaint my court, that his most Christian majesty had thought fit to dismiss M. Chauvelin from all his places, and that M. Amelot de Chaillon, one of the intendants of finances, was to be secretary of state for foreign affairs; that he was persuaded, from this gentleman's good character in the world, that he would discharge the duties of his new employment with honour and probity. M. D'Aguesseau, the chancellor, has the seals restored to him.

Paris, February 22, 1737.—At last the most violent enemy we had is fallen. There are few but rejoice at it; and those that do not, are afraid to shew their concern. I complimented the cardinal yesterday from myself upon it. His eminence took it very well, and was obliging enough to tell me, that I had a greater share in the change, than, considering circumstances, it was proper for the world to know; that as he looked upon me as an



*honnête homme et son ami*, the account I gave him some time ago of M. Chauvelin's behaviour to me, had struck him; that he had at the time opened his heart to me as far as he could; that I must have seen plainly it was not then a time of day to make any *eclat*; but what I then said to him had put him upon inquiring more narrowly into the man's dealings than ever he had done before, and by that means had made such discoveries as not only confirmed all I had said, but brought to light many other matters of the most perfidious nature. This he bid me keep to myself.



EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.

PARIS, April 13, 1737.—I am now to give you an account of the conversation I had with the cardinal upon the secret transaction between you and him. I thought, as you did, that we might keep silent till he should explain himself further than he had yet done, and till I had your answer concerning M. Amelot's admittance to that confidence; and for that reason I did not propose to myself to say any thing more on the subject till I had heard from you. But he began himself, and of himself, for I had not lain any thing in his way to engage the discourse. He began with a repetition of his desire of settling a good and perfect union and understanding between our masters; that neither of them wanted to enlarge their possessions, but it behoved both to enjoy in peace and tranquillity what they had, and to secure the same as far as they could to the rest of Europe; that, in consequence of the discourses we had had on the subject, he thought nothing would better answer that purpose than a private treaty between England and France, under the strictest and

most inviolable secrecy, for a reciprocal guarantee of the rights and possessions of both crowns, and for a mutual defence, to which general articles might be added, if thought necessary, for confirming all former treaties; as likewise, engagements might be taken not to make any new alliances contrary to the present treaty, or without the mutual consent of both parties. The principal object of this treaty, according to the cardinal, was to prevent the ever growing power of the house of Austria, or its representatives in Germany, and to hinder their encroaching upon the rights of the princes there; in fine, to keep them down to the constitution of the empire; but he did not explain himself as to the means.

It may not be improper to make use of this conjuncture, to give you some account of my notions of the cardinal's present situation. I must own, I apprehend he has something that hangs heavy on his spirits. Last Tuesday, in talking to me, as he often does in the utmost confidence, and without restraint, tears came in his eyes, and he remained thoughtful and dejected for about a minute; but, upon recollecting himself, he resumed his natural good-humoured look. Perhaps the experience the cardinal has of the insufficiency of his master's present grand council, may make him thoughtful, which, together with the weight of business he has been forced to bear since Chauvelin's dismissal, should have sunk his spirits, and made him sensible of the difficulty of carrying matters in the way we have at this time.

You know the present council of state is composed of the duke of Orleans, the cardinal, Mar. d'Estrees, M. d'Aguesseau, secretary at war, M. Orry, the controleur-general, and M. Amelot, the new secretary for foreign affairs. The duke of Orleans is deeper in his devotion than ever. Mar. d'Estrees has been a good seaman, now much decayed with gout and age; he is never consulted but in the marine affairs. D'Aguesseau is reckoned to

know less of the affairs of his own office than any that preceded him in it, and nothing at all of any other business. Orry and Amelot are the only two he seems at present to confide in, and the only ones of the board he can do any business with. My opinion of both is, that, by the help of their commissaries, they may be able to reduce into form any plan the cardinal may propose to them, but that neither of them have knowledge or experience enough of foreign affairs, to offer any thing of their own towards settling a good understanding with their neighbours, or in order to molest them. The town talks of several who push at getting into the administration. M. de Noailles is the man that pushes most: he makes his court with the utmost assiduity, both to the king and cardinal; but I believe both know his intriguing temper and turbulent spirit too well, to admit him. Torcy, the cardinal tells me, does not think of getting into business any more. The bishop of Ambrun shews too much eagerness to be admitted, and yet I protest I do not see how business can go on here in the hands it is.

END OF VOL. III.

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VOLUME THE THIRD.

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VOLUME THE FOURTH.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

# APPENDIX:

CONTAINING

*STATE PAPERS AND AUTHORITIES,*

TO THE

FOURTH VOLUME.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

MY LORD,

*Paris, August 15, 1739.*

THE importance and great secrecy of the contents of this letter, oblige me to make use of my own hand, and to send it to your grace directly. Being the day before yesterday at Issy, talking in my usual manner with the cardinal upon the present times, and representing to him in the strongest manner I could, that the only way to shorten the war between his majesty and Spain, was for him not to meddle with it; he made me a pretty extraordinary confidence, of which I am to give your grace an account. Before I begin the relation, it is necessary to observe to your grace, that in order to keep the cardinal in ignorance of what I write, or may now and then presume to advise, at this juncture, I protest to him I am as much for peace as he can be, provided we can get a salvo for our honour, and reparation for our injured property; and he seems so satisfied with what I tell him in this sense, that he frequently asks my private opinion as to means to make up the difference; and it is in such kind of discourse, that I have often opportunities of making judgment of his intentions. It was in a discourse of

his nature that he mentioned the French king's interposition, and his proposing and becoming answerable to the respective courts for the 95,000*l.* and for the withdrawing of our squadrons. Your grace has seen in other letters of mine, how I have treated this matter; and I have since received with great pleasure from your grace, an account of his majesty's gracious approbation of what I have done on that subject. Though he seemed beat out of that project, merely on my opinion that it would be time lost to think of it, yet when I saw him last, he resumed the subject, not, as he said, from himself, but from suggestions from Holland; and in order to convince me it was so, enjoining me to the strictest secrecy, he pulled a small letter out of his drawer, and read part of it, saying it was from one of the most considerable men in Holland, who was of opinion, that if his eminency proposed the payment of the 95,000*l.* and becoming guarantee for it, and the withdrawing of our fleet, both within a short and limited space, the war might still be prevented. This I saw was underlined. The cardinal then read over a little to himself, and coming to another underlined place, he read aloud, and it was to this effect:—That Spain might send out her flotilla under convoy of a French squadron of men of war, and that the English would not attack them. This seemed asserted as a matter out of dispute. Whether it was exactly so in the letter, or turned so by the cardinal, I cannot pretend to say.

The cardinal then looked fully on me, to ask me what I thought of it. I began with the first proposition, and abused the author, whoever he was, that could be stupid enough to imagine we should so much as listen to such a proposal. I urged all the proper reasons that occurred to me on the subject; and the cardinal allowed I was right. He asked me what I thought on the second part, about a French escort to the flotilla. I said his Dutch correspon-

dent must be a very odd one, to imagine such an expedient; that I did not pretend to be versed enough in maritime laws, to say what might be prescribed in such cases, or if any case of this nature had ever existed, but that I should be sorry to see one started now;—that I was persuaded a proper regard would be shewn on all occasions to the French flag; but that, at the first aspect, I thought a neutral squadron protecting the goods and effects of an enemy; could be looked upon but as an auxiliary to the enemy, hired by the enemy for that purpose, and consequently ought, by the rules of war, to be treated as an enemy, and acted against as such, if he should in the open seas pretend to oppose our taking our enemy's effects. I mentioned the case of a majority in number of an enemy's subjects on board a neutral ship, destroying the neutrality of such ship, and making it liable to be taken; concluding from thence, that the majority of power and strength ought to have the same effect. The cardinal turned it off as an odd project, which he did not think of putting in execution; and that what he threw out was more to convince me of there being more dispositions in Holland to peace, than to join with us in this war against Spain.

Your grace will easily believe that I was very curious to find out who this famous letter came from, and to whom it was writ, for, by the style, it was not writ to his eminency. I suspected immediately, and I am persuaded the letter was wrote to Van Hoey, and by him left with the cardinal. If my eyes did not fail me exceedingly, it was signed Lynden. The character is small, and I had but a glimpse on the turning over a sheet, for the cardinal seemed exceedingly cautious lest I should look upon his paper, and I was as careful not to give him any cause of suspicion. I know this M. de Lynden is great with Van Hoey, and carries on a private correspondence with him. Your grace will be better able, from the knowledge you



may have of his dispositions, to judge whether he is a likely person to inspire and advise notions so contrary not only to our interest, but to the mutual welfare of his majesty and the States, whose interests seem at this juncture inseparable from one another. I am persuaded I need not put your grace in mind of the delicacy of this intelligence: the manner I came by it, the possibility that my eyes may have deceived me, and the probability that nobody else could know of the letter but myself, make it of the utmost consequence at this time, and in my station, that I should not be suspected. Few things go to Holland but what Fenelon finds out, and sends back here. Your grace's prudence will, I dare say, obviate all my fears. I gave a hint of this by the post to Mr. Walpole, without naming names. Your grace will see by the inclosed copy of my letter to his excellency, what I say to him on the subject.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

PRIVATE.

*A. D.* 1739.

LONDON, *August 3-14, 1739.*—You will learn by the accounts that are sent you from the office, how matters stand with us in Spain and France, where they are both fully apprized by what has happened, that our fleets are under hostile orders with regard to Spain. And as the Azogues and Buenos Ayres ships are daily expected home, it cannot miss observation, that they may probably fall in with some of our squadrons, whether they are ordered into Cales or the Bay of Biscay. The cardinal has, in one of his usual conversations to lord Waldegrave, mentioned the Azogues as an affair he hopes we will not think

of; but not as a matter of form, but purely confidential to lord Waldegrave. He declares himself under no engagement with Spain; but strongly insinuates what we may apprehend, if we attack Spain. The letters that came from France this week, go further in that style than ever; and I think it ripens apace.

Cambis is expected here very suddenly, and I think his orders will open the whole scene; for I imagine he will have orders to insist, that we shall neither take the Azogues, nor flota, or galleons coming home, nor stop the flota that is now preparing to go out, which France, as the cardinal has already said, has so great a share in, that they cannot suffer the wealth and treasure of France to be taken, though on board Spanish ships.

By the intelligence from 101 (Bussi), it is expressly said, that Fenelon has orders to propose to the states a joint mediation with France, between us and Spain. Surely they will not immediately accept the office of mediators, to put themselves out of the capacity of allies.

But as this grand affair seems now to draw to a sudden crisis, forgive me if I think you should not leave your present station, for some weeks, at least, until it is more certainly seen what we are to expect. To leave an embassy, where you have been so long employed, a little abruptly at this critical hour, may not be thought so right. The parliament will certainly meet this year in November, before which time I should be very sorry not to have you here.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

DEAR BROTHER,

*Hague, Sept. 1, 1739.*

YOUR last letter gave me much uneasiness, for more reasons than one. The disappointment of my friend Trę-

vor affects me greatly, not only on account of my affection for him, who has many good and rare qualities, but for the sake of the public. The situation and conduct of the states is of that consequence to England, and to the balance of power in Europe, that this place cannot be without an agreeable minister from England. Can we find out, you'll say, nobody fit for such an employment but one man? I really think not, unless you are resolved—censure the vanity of my saying it—to keep me here always. I must own I am made to believe by some, that my continuance here is much desired, and that the apprehension of my departure is extremely dreaded. That is a good sign in those who are well inclined; but whether that will have any great effect, to make these people act to any purpose, I cannot tell.

I am extremely obliged to the lord chancellor, for his compliment, in comparing my continuance here to the mission of lord Marlborough, upon the breaking out of the last war. But the case and circumstances are by no means the same. King William, perceiving that he could not live long himself, sent his lordship into Holland, both as ambassador and captain-general of the British forces, that he might make it the interest of the person who would certainly have the credit and power in queen Anne's court, to pursue the war that was necessary for preserving the liberties of Europe. King William had no other object but the liberties and balance of Europe. But, good God! what is the case now? I will tell you in confidence: little, low, partial electoral notions, are able to stop, or confound the best conducted project for the public.

I plainly see that all Europe will soon be in a general combustion, and that France must be absolutely master, unless some plan of united measures be formed to prevent it: and I see as plainly, that if any advantage be proposed for any prince or power, whose assistance may

be necessary for the common cause, we shall never agree to it, without some advantage is to be given to us as elector. We have jealousies of one power, aversions to another prince, contempt for this or that state; we have pretensions or desires of our own, that must either be made ingredients in any scheme for the public good, or that scheme must not go on. I cannot at present foretell in what instances this will be the case, but experience has shewn that this has been the case, and that we must always expect it.

I cannot justify the emperor's giving into the war against the Turks; but his engagements with Russia, and the danger of driving that power into the interest of France, made it, I am assured, necessary—which certainly was a consideration of a public nature. His Imperial majesty obtained the consent of all the princes of the empire to give their contingent; but one considerable elector having refused to give his, others of that rank followed his example, and the princes that had even agreed to give their contingent to carry on the war, refused on that account to pay it. The emperor is now quite undone; he has neither men nor money, and perhaps the sums he proposed to get from the empire, might have saved him; and I dare say, if he is forced to make another campaign, we shall be as backward in giving our contingent, unless something be done for us in favour of our pretensions to Ostfrize, which will be impracticable: and which, if it could be done, would disoblige the king of Prussia, the king of Denmark, and the States-general—all powers necessary for preserving the liberties of Europe, though the first is, I am afraid, lost.

The States-general look upon the town of Embden, in Ostfrize, as the only barrier they have on that side for the security of three provinces. They have, and have had 100 years for that purpose, a garrison in that town by the consent of the people, but on condition of being protect-



ed by the States in their privileges against the encroachments of their prince; and England ought, as well by interest as by obligation, to support the States in this affair. The emperor has of late supported the prince against the people, to vex the States; but ever since the last treaty of Vienna, he has, by a formal declaration, promised to put an end to the differences there. In order to do that, this matter has been committed to the cognizance of the elector of Hanover. His sub-delegates have been appointed, and have lived in the country a long while at the charge of the people, without doing any thing, but in concert with the Imperial court to favour the pretensions of the prince of Ostfrize, in opposition to the people, which is understood to be done here with a view that the prince of Ostfrize may favour the pretensions of the elector of Hanover to the succession, which the States are extremely jealous of, and are at this time extremely uneasy at this conduct.

If we could have consented that the king of Prussia might have had some part in the succession of Berg and Juliers, that affair might have been put in an amicable way of negotiation; but the notion that no prince should have any thing, unless we should get something too, destroyed all schemes that might have accommodated that troublesome dispute: and now France has certainly found means to gain the court of Prussia by some engagements in that respect, and will keep him in case of a war. If France shall come to quarrel with the maritime powers, by threatening one or the other first, in which case we must each make it a common cause, and consider of measures and troops to be provided, I am persuaded that some motive in the advantage of the Hanover troops will interfere, and certainly delay, if not disappoint the reasonable measures and plans that may be upon the *tapis* for the public good; and therefore, although I think we are undone if we shew the least want of spirit and



vigour at this juncture, here or in France, yet unless some means can be found out to prevent our little electorate views from interfering with the common cause, I cannot see what good I can do here. I shall be pushed by certain questions and propositions, which I shall not be able to answer, and which if remarkable, and represented by me in my dispatches, will have no other effect than that of increasing displeasure in England. In the mean time, nobody has credit or courage enough to speak plainly upon these heads, in their respective departments; and if you venture to do it sometimes, 'tis in a cursory manner. You receive a short answer; domestic affairs employ your time and your thoughts, and the foreign mischief continues.

This is too notoriously the case, and I am afraid will ever be so much the case, that I see no remedy for it. In the mean time those that serve abroad have no comfort: they are liked and disliked, not according to their fidelity and diligence, but by humour and fancy; and, were I not your brother, you would soon hear, nay, perhaps, you do hear of me, with my friend Trevor, in the list of those who are of no consequence but to receive that pay which is grudged them; and therefore I must freely own to you, that dangers and difficulties from abroad do not discourage me, but the not seeing the least likelihood of right measures being pursued at home to obviate or withstand them, although such measures might be found out—that is what disheartens me. And to speak plainly at once, I have been often upon the point of taking a resolution not only to retire from hence, but from all public employment and business. There is but one reason in the world that has prevented me from doing it, which, perhaps, you would not believe if I told you.

While I am employed I will serve with the utmost diligence, but I see nothing but disgrace and disappointments; and, as the world ever judges by events, and not

from conduct, I am sensible of what I am to apprehend from my continuance here. However, I should be glad to know how long this servitude is to endure, that I may take my measures accordingly.



HORACE WALPOLE TO LORD CHANCELLOR HARD-  
WICKE.

EXTRACT.

*A. D.* 1739.

COCKPIT, *October 14, 1739.*—Having, since I had the honour of seeing your lordship, perused the draft of a declaration of war against Spain, which the duke of Newcastle had been pleased to send me for that purpose, I must own to you very freely, that I wish it had been digested in another method. For although the omission at first of the most material stipulation in the convention, is in a great measure, by the insertion of some words, supplied, but not so fully as I could wish, yet there are, with humble submission to better judgment, in my poor opinion, some things in the sequel of the draft, not proper for a declaration of war to be made in the king's name; and other things largely expatiated upon, which if proper, ought to have preceded the nomination of the convention, and which are liable, in the place they now stand, to disagreeable inferences with respect to the convention, and to our proceedings in parliament last year.

Surely, my lord, the violations committed contrary to the treaty of 1670, as well as those contrary to the treaty of 1667, if they are to be mentioned, should have been mentioned in the draft antecedently to what is said there of the convention as the grievances complained of; and that those causes of complaint are to be removed, is

actually stipulated in the convention, and all infractions contrary to treaties, and amongst the rest, those of 1667 and 1670, are by the convention to be redressed. Therefore whatever is to be mentioned as done contrary to those treaties, and which were to be removed or prevented for the future by the express orders of the convention, should have been stated in the first place, and the violation of that convention should have followed, to shew that Spain would not execute what had been thereby stipulated, nor redress in consequence the notorious grievances complained of on our part, although she had solemnly agreed to do it. For indeed, my lord, all the ratiocinations about the groundless pretensions of Spain to stop, seize, &c. as well as the infractions relating to commerce, contrary to the treaty of 1667, are stated in the draft as independent of the convention, and in a manner as if that treaty had taken no care at all of them; and thus stated, are made such strong provocations, that the reader will be immediately led to think and say, “why were not these injuries revenged sooner?” But had our grievances from unjust depredations, &c. been placed in the front of the declaration, and the violation of the convention, calculated not only to procure satisfaction for past damages, but to prevent the like injuries for the future, immediately followed, his majesty’s reasons for declaring war against Spain would have appeared in as strong a light, with this difference only, that the administration would have continued to act conformably to themselves; their proceedings in council and in parliament would have had an immediate and natural connexion in the whole series of the affair, from the beginning to the end.—Whereas, my lord, without being partial to my brother, who, I can assure you, knows nothing of this letter or observations, and without giving into his strong inferences about his grace’s unkind intentions in forming the draft in this manner, I can’t forbear saying, that I was

struck, extremely struck, with the perusal of it, as what seemed to favour and support the notions of some favourite lords to his grace, that are in opposition, rather than to justify the advice and proceedings of those with whom he is tied in the ministry, and with whom he has concurred in the council and management of affairs.

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This letter shews in a striking point of view, the jealousies, divisions, and animosities, which prevailed in the administration at this period. As the declaration alluded to was, no doubt, drawn by the duke of Newcastle, in concert with lord Hardwicke, the strong suspicions entertained by the Walpoles, of a deep and artful design to pay court to the opposition, and the public at large, by throwing an unmerited odium upon them, must rest with at least equal force on the chancellor as the secretary.



### EDWARD WALPOLE TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

#### EXTRACT.

LONDON, *January 9, 1741-2.*—For fear your grace should not be informed the earliest possible of a transaction of great consequence, I think it my duty to trouble you with it. The king, a few days ago, sent lord Cholmondeley to bishop Secker, authorized by him to desire the bishop would go to the prince of Wales, and let him know, not by way of message in form, but only as an intimation, that if he would return to his duty, and lay himself at his feet, asking his pardon, and in writing acknowledging his offences in general terms only, he would grant him his other 50,000*l.* a year, pay all his debts, and not give him the least trouble about any of his ser-



vants, friends, or dependents, but would receive them all as friends, in common with the rest of the court; and never inquire any farther into any part of their former conduct. I must observe, that the offering to pay the debts, was not mentioned till the bishop asked if that was not to be done; to which lord C. answered, that it was not part of what he was directed to say; yet from what the king had been pleased to intimate several times in the course of his conversation, he would take upon him to answer for it, that the prince might understand it so, and depend upon it. To all this the prince ordered the bishop to say, that he would listen to no proposals of any kind till sir Robert Walpole was removed.

The heads of the prince's party are outrageous, and think this stroke has put us under the greatest difficulties. I am much concerned, though no way dismayed, at this event.



SIR ROBERT WILMOT TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

EXTRACT.

QUEEN-SQUARE, *January 12, 1741-2.*—Though the opposition at present triumphs in a majority upon the division about the Westminster election, when it was imagined sir Robert would exert his utmost strength; though Nugent carried with him a body of suspected friends, in order to keep them out of harm's way, as they call it; notwithstanding lord Gage and Doddington have laid their heads together, and that his lordship offers even to stake considerable wagers, that all the stories he tells are true; and though Lyttelton and Pitt are determined to blow up Carleton-house, rather than not have a chance to do more mischief;—this same opposition, with many



heads, seems to be neither so powerful, nor so unanimous as it would fain appear. Sir Robert was to-day observed to be more naturally gay and full of spirits than he has been for some time past. The same observation was likewise made of Mr. Pelham, whose steadiness seems to be that excellent mortar that binds my lord president, my lord steward, my lord chancellor, and even his grace of Newcastle himself.

It is generally agreed that sir Robert will never give up, nor bring any body in, if he can possibly avoid it, and that his majesty will never forsake him; that the tories would come into any terms, and that the patriots, being sensible of that, are so afraid of being left in the lurch, that they only wait for the first good offer. It is well known that Pulteney carries with him but four members, and that lord Carteret has few followers besides the Finches. Pulteney's terms seem to be a peerage, and a place in the cabinet council, if he can get it. How far Mr. Pelham's friendship for him may facilitate either of these things, I will not pretend to judge. If somebody must be brought in, it's thought lord Carteret will unsay all he has said, and be heartily glad to laugh at the great Argyle. People do not think lord Hay and his grace hate one another so heartily as they pretend. I cannot put an end to this subject without saying, there never was a time when your grace's presence and counsel were more necessary, or more wished for.



SIR ROBERT WILMOT TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

JANUARY 23, 1741-2.—The minutes of the house of commons will inform your grace of the extraordinary proceedings in that house on the 21st instant. I must

take the liberty to congratulate your grace, particularly upon an event of that day, which cannot but be very satisfactory to you, when two votes would have certainly given to this nation one-and-twenty tyrants. I have good reason to believe it was entirely owing to my lord Hartington, that sir Thomas and sir James Lowther voted for their king and country. Never was a plot better concealed. Some of sir Robert's friends actually went away early, not expecting any thing. Others never came. The opposition were collected to a man, but I believe not above one-and-twenty knew for what. Sir Robert exceeded himself; he particularly entered into foreign affairs, and convinced even his enemies that he was thoroughly master of them. Pulteney, sir Robert actually dissected, and laid his heart open to the view of the house.

As the bomb is burst and no mischief done, I hope the danger is over; and, after a proper question has been carried by fifteen or twenty, some of the sons of Fergus and others will certainly desert a vanquished starving army.



SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

MY LORD,

*London, Feb. 2, 1741-2.*

I WAS unwilling to miss this opportunity of the messenger that carries back the Irish bills, to give your grace an account, by a safe conveyance, of what will immediately happen within the space of three or four days. It is determined that the king shall to-morrow, when he passes the malt act, direct the two houses to adjourn themselves for a fortnight, to give time for settling a new administration. I shall go up immediately to the house of peers, with the title of earl of Orford. Lord Wilmington will

be put at the head of the treasury, but what further steps will be taken, are yet by no means settled among themselves.

To give your grace a short view of this great revolution, I must inform you that the panic was so great among what I should call my own friends, that they *all* declared my retiring was become absolutely necessary, as the only means to carry on the public business, and this to be attended with honour and security, &c. This was fixed with the duke of Newcastle, lord chancellor, lord Carteret, and Mr. Pulteney, but the king has declared lord Wilmington my successor, which leaves the presidentship open, so that lord Carteret can only be president, except one of the secretaries be removed for him. This had fallen upon the duke of Newcastle, if I had not prevented it. But I am of opinion that the whig party must be kept together, which may be done with this parliament, if a whig administration be formed.—The prince was not acquainted with this sudden step till this morning, and I have just heard he receives it in a proper manner.

Your grace may easily imagine that a great deal more might be said upon this subject than is proper to commit to paper; and when I have an opportunity, I shall explain some things to you which are scarce credible. I believe the duke of Argyle, lord Chesterfield, and lord Cobham, have not been in the secret, and into what share they will let them, and how go on without satisfying them, I do not see; and all that I shall say is, that they who thought they had but one obstacle to remove to make all things easy, I believe before they have begun their scheme, encounter such difficulties that they are almost at a stand: but during the recess the scene must open to shew the actors.

I shall be very glad when the business of Ireland will permit your grace to come among us. Few honest men are to be found, and still fewer dukes of Devonshire. One

of the greatest prides and pleasures of my life is, that I have the honour to call you my friend; which is a title that I will never forfeit nor abandon. As occurrences happen I will be watchful, and may still have more opportunities of observing than it will be prudent for me to make use of. I will conclude with acquainting you, that the king has behaved towards me with more grace and steadiness than can ever be enough acknowledged, and never yielded at all to the change till I made it my desire.



MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON TO THE DUKE OF  
DEVONSHIRE.

EXTRACT.

LONDON, *February 2, 1741-2.*—I received your letter last night, and send this by the messenger who sets out with the bills to-night. Sir Robert told me that he would write to you also; but I find he is extremely impatient to have you come, and thinks that you will be of great service to him. He has hitherto kept up his spirits tolerably well, but I think I can perceive that he is now uneasy; and indeed I am afraid he has very good reason to be so; for I really believe, and so do most of his friends, that the other party in three weeks time must get a majority by the alterations in elections, for we have a great many people that have declared they will not attend them any more. Lord Middlesex for one, and lord John has hardly attended any yet. We hope we shall secure Chippenham to-day.

*London, February 4, 1741-2.*—I was with sir Robert Walpole this morning; he seems to bear his change of fortune with great spirit. I own, for my part, I never saw a more melancholy scene than his levee was this morning.



It was the fullest that ever was. I hope now he will be above the reach of all his enemies, though the jacobites, and people of that complexion, were very warm yesterday in the house of commons, and declared that they did not yet despair of having his life; but sir Robert told me that he had wrote you a full account when the bills went, that it will be unnecessary for me to say any thing more on this subject. They say, and I had it from his son, that when he took leave of the king and kneeled down, the king burst into a flood of tears, and expressed great concern at parting with him.



SPEAKER ONSLOW'S REMARKS, &c.

EXTRACTS.—VIDE COXE'S STATE PAPERS.

*A. D.* 1742.

A REMARKABLE event happened at this time (1722), which contributed very much to the fixing Mr. Walpole's interest and power then with the king, and manifesting fresh proofs of his abilities and usefulness as a minister. It was the management of a discovery made by the regent of France to the government here, of a plot in favour of the pretender, formed and carried on principally by Atterbury, bishop of Rochester, a man of great parts, and of a most restless and turbulent spirit, daring and enterprising, though then very infirm; and capable of any artifice, but proud and passionate, and not of judgment enough for the undertakings he engaged in. His views were, not only to be the first churchman, but the first man also in the state, not less than Wolsey, whom he admired, and thought to imitate. He had long been projecting this revolution, but went now upon the foundation of the discontents in the kingdom, arising from the South Sea



transactions in the year 1720, which were still fresh in the minds and hearts of the people.

In the proceedings in the house of lords against the bishop, Mr. Walpole appeared as a witness for the government, to some things which had been solemnly denied by the other. The bishop used all the art his guilt would admit of, to perplex and make Mr. Walpole contradict himself; but he was too hard for the bishop upon every turn, although a greater trial of skill this way scarce ever happened between two such combatants. To say the truth, the bishop sunk under the weight of his guilt.

When Mr. W. had thus, by the unravelling of this plot, and punishing the principal offenders, established his own credit with the party in general, and as he hoped with his master too, he believed himself to have a fair prospect of establishing his own power, which, as he built upon a whig-party bottom only, he laboured all he could to unite those to him who had been peculiarly dependant on my lord Sunderland. Some he succeeded with, but not with all, and of them, several remained in their employments whom he could not remove, or did not dare to attempt, because of the interest they had with the king through the means of the Germans; and this body of people, small, but of considerable rank, remained his enemies to the time of the king's death, waiting and watching for every opportunity to ruin him, which, however, it is most undoubted they could not have done, without ruining at the same time the whig cause and party. But they thought otherwise, and now began something of the whig opposition to his power, which grew afterwards to be so troublesome and formidable to him. It was at first made up chiefly of such of my lord Sunderland's creatures as he could not attach to him; but it had very soon the addition of some others, from various views and motives.

He who first endeavoured to form this opposition into a system, or regular method of proceeding, with a view only to ruin Mr. W. and for that purpose to unite people of every character and principle, and in which he took the most indefatigable pains, was Mr. Daniel Pulteney, in all other respects almost, a very worthy man, very knowing and laborious in business, especially in foreign affairs, of strong, but not lively parts; a clear and weighty speaker, graceful in his deportment, and of great virtue and decorum in his private life; generous and friendly. But with all this, of most implacable hatred where he did hate, violent, keen and most bitter in his resentments; gave up all pleasures and comforts, and every other consideration to his anger.

This animosity to Mr. W. arose from his intimacy with lord Sunderland, to whom he was brother-in-law, by having married the sister of my lord Sunderland's last wife. He was in the depth of all that lord's political secrets, as far at least as he trusted any body, and was designed by him to be secretary of state, in the scheme he formed of a new administration, if he had lived long enough to have once more overset Mr. Walpole and my lord Townshend. But my lord Sunderland's death putting an end to the other's hopes, so soured his mind, that from the moment of his disappointment, I verily believe he scarcely thought of any thing else, but to revenge it in an opposition to him who had been the chief opponent of his friend and patron.

He was the person chiefly who settled his kinsman Mr. Pulteney, afterwards earl of Bath, in this opposition.

Whatever suspicious Mr. Daniel Pulteney might lie under, of entering into some dark and dangerous designs against the government itself, it is most certain the OTHER had never any thoughts that led to jacobitism.

He was without dispute a person of very eminent endowments, rather natural than acquired, although not

without the last, but with a mixture of such natural defects and weaknesses too, that no time I believe can produce an instance of a man of so variable and uncertain a mind, who knew not that he was so, and never designed to be so.

He had the most popular parts for public speaking that I ever knew ; animating every subject of popularity with the spirit and fire that the orators of the ancient commonwealths governed the people by : was as classical and elegant in the speeches he did not prepare, as they were in their most studied compositions, mingling wit and pleasantry, that he would upset the best argumentation in the world. He usually had the *occasional hearers* in the house of commons, and to that audience he generally spoke, and by them established his general fame, as long as his talents were employed against ministers, courtiers, power and corruption. He was undoubtedly a very extraordinary person, and in his private life free from common vices, with a sense of religion even to devotion.

Another person who acted a very considerable part in this opposition, was sir William Wyndham, as a leader of the tories, or such of them at least who were not averse to come with their party into power and offices under the present royal family. In the latter part of queen Anne's reign, he had been secretary at war and chancellor of the exchequer, though a very young man, by the favor of my lord Bolingbroke, with whom he lived in an intimacy of pleasures as well as business ; and from his attachment and gratitude to him, which he ever preserved, and from party violence and the heat of his youth, had engaged in the rebellion of 1715, but escaped any punishment except that of a short confinement, by the consideration then had of the noble family he had married into, and who had great merit with the king and his family. He continued, however, in all the measures of his party against the government, and by frequent speaking in pub-

lic, and great application to business, and the constant instruction he still received from his friend, and as it were his master, especially in foreign affairs, he became, from a very disagreeable speaker, and little knowing in business, to be one of the most pleasing and able speakers of his time; wore out all the prejudices of party, grew moderate towards the dissenters, against whom he once bore a most implacable hatred, studied and understood the nature of government, and the constitution of his own country, and found such a new set of principles with regard to the public, and from them grew to think that the religion and liberties of the nation so much depended on the present family on the throne, that he lost all confidence with the jacobites, and the most rigid of the tories.

He was, in my opinion, the most made for a great man, of any one that I have known in this age. Every thing about him seemed great. There was much of grace and dignity in his person, and the same in his speaking. He had not the vivacity of wit and pleasantry in his speeches, but there was a spirit and power in his speaking, that always animated himself and his hearers, and with the decoration in his manner which was indeed very ornamental, produced not only the most attentive, respectful, but even a reverend regard to whatever he spoke\*. He was generally serious, always decent, never positive, and often condescending, though sometimes severe and pointed. He had certainly great notions, and appeared to have a high regard to the principles of honour and justice. It has been said, that he was haughty and passionate. Those who spoke most of this, took their thoughts of him chiefly

\* A striking instance of the high respect paid to sir William Wyndham, appeared in one of the debates, which related to the convention. In the midst of a speech, being confused, he turned to the speaker, and said, "Sir, I must beg leave to recollect myself," he then sat down. A profound and respectful silence ensued for some minutes, when sir William again rose, and continued his speech with his usual animation and energy.



from what they remembered of him in his younger days, when it is very true he had too much of this temper. But as far as I could observe, he was much changed in this, as he was in his principles and other things; and surely no man in general was ever less in his advanced age of what he had been in his youth, than he seemed to be.

The next person in the house of commons whom I shall mention, and gave much disturbance there to sir Robert Walpole, and his administration, was sir John Barnard, one of the members for the city of London, and the most eminent man among them: not for fortune, which he seemed to have no appetite for, beyond a competency for his rank and fashion, which was that of a merchant by profession, and of the great offices in the city, all of which he had passed through. But his consideration arose from his own intrinsic worth and abilities, unassisted by any collateral advantages whatsoever: for he had neither birth, alliances, riches, or stations in the government, to forward him; but was himself, if ever any man was, the worker out of his own true fame. Nor had he the advantages of learning, language, or manner, to ornament or set off his natural or acquired endowments, the latter of which lay chiefly in the knowledge of trade, its foundation and extent, and of the whole circle of taxes, funds, money and credit; in all which he had more sagacity, acuteness, force, and closeness of argumentation, better and more practicable notions, than almost any man I ever knew; with a disinterestedness as to himself, that no temptation of the greatest profit, or very high station (for such he might have had) could have drawn him from the very retired and humble life he generally chose to lead in a neighbouring village to London, from whence he only came as he was occasionally called to any business of importance in the city, or in parliament; in the first of which he was a great magistrate, and in the other of true weight and influence. He was besides of a very regular and religious



life, without shew or affectation, as in his public deportment he seemed to have made the best principles of both parties to be the guide of political acting, so that he was in truth one of the greatest examples of private, and in general, of public virtue, that this age has produced; and had a popularity arising from that, which, though he did not court or cherish in the way it is usually got and kept up, was more universal and lasting than that of any man of his time.

But among all his great qualities, he had some blemishes, rather from his constitution, however, than his will or design. He was of a very warm temper, too soon wrought up to passion, and when under that operation, was often deprived of his judgment, and even of his usual discernment. He was likewise too persevering and tenacious of his opinions, and when in the wrong, would shift and refine, and subtilize so much to save himself in his disputing, that in some instances, with those who did not know him well, it created some unkind suspicions of his sincerity. He had also that regard for the city of London, and the profession of merchants, and that warmth for their interests, and, indeed, for every person he undertook to serve, that on some occasions it has thrown him into partialities for them, that he himself might not perceive, though every body else did. He was not, perhaps, without his vanity too, and that might carry him into a desire of trying his skill with sir Robert Walpole, in those matters in which he was thought to have no equal, and to be sure he had none, unless sir John Barnard was the man.

There were two other persons, who, in different ways, contributed very much to the keeping up the fire of opposition to sir Robert Walpole's administration: the late lord Bolingbroke, and the lord Carteret, afterwards earl of Granville. They were universally esteemed of the greatest genius for parts and knowledge, of any men of the

age. The latter, thought to be the better scholar, and to have formed his eloquence more upon the ancients, and to have more of their spirit in it than the former; but the first was far the better writer, and had been a very lively and able speaker in both houses of parliament. They were both of them of unbounded spirit and ambition, impatient of restraint, contemning the notion of equality with others in business, and even disdaining to be any thing, if not the first and highest in power. In the conduct of affairs they were deemed bold, if not rash, and the lord Bolingbroke was of a temper to overturn kingdoms, to make way for himself and his talents to govern the world; whilst the other thought more of raising a great name all over Europe, and having that continued by history to all posterity. They were both very incorrupt as to money. It was not their aim to aggrandize themselves that way. Lord Carteret was all glory, even to the enthusiasm of it, and that made him rather more scrupulous than the other, in the means he used for his greatness; but lord Bolingbroke's was merely power, and to be the leader of it, without any other gratification but what the present enjoyment of it might give him: in a word, they were both made rather for the splendour of great monarchies, than the sober councils of a free state, whose liberty is its chief concern. With these talents and temper, it will not be wondered at that they should be enemies to sir Robert Walpole, and he to them. It was at court he feared lord Carteret most, as the most likely person to supplant him with the king and queen, who disliked lord Carteret less than any of the others who carried on this opposition: for he had very early in his life applied himself to the affairs of Germany, and the northern courts; he had been a minister at one of them, and had made many connexions of acquaintance and intimacy with the persons that came from that part of the world hither, and especially with the Hanoverian minis-

ters (none of whom ever loved sir Robert Walpole,) by whose means he had some communications with the queen, if not the king, and they at least had no unfavourable opinion of him : and when he did come into power, upon the removal of sir Robert Walpole, had more of the king's favour and opinion, than any of his other ministers, partly for the reasons before-mentioned, but chiefly that his politics made very much for the interests of Hanover, which he always laboured to unite with those of his country.

But lord Bolingbroke did not molest sir Robert Walpole in this way. He had no hopes of coming into business and power under the present king, at least, but by forcing his passage to it. He had by his writings, so irritated and inflamed the nation, who eagerly read his invectives, that at sometimes there was too much reason to fear the rage he had wrought the body of the people up to, might have produced the most desperate attempts. But he meant only to terrify the king into a change of his ministry, and for himself to be thereby restored to his honours, which would, as he always flattered himself, soon put him at the head of affairs.

There was besides these two, another person of great rank, who came to have a considerable share in the design of ruining sir Robert Walpole ; I mean the earl of Chesterfield. He was esteemed the wittiest man of his time, and of a sort that has scarcely been known since the reign of king Charles II. and revived the memory of the great wits of that age, to the liveliest of whom he was thought not to be unequal. He was, besides this, a very graceful speaker in public ; had some knowledge of affairs, having been ambassador in Holland, and when he was engaged in debates, always took pains to be well informed of the subject, so that no man's speaking was ever more admired, or drew more audience to it than his did ; but chiefly from those who either relished his wit, or were pleased with see-

ing the ministry exposed by his talent of ridicule, and the bitterness of jest he was so much master of, and never spared.

Sir Robert Walpole continued in his fulness of power till 1741, fortified as he believed, by his triumphal defeat of his principal opposers, in their motion for an address to the king to remove him from his presence and council. That success rendered him too secure in his own mind, and, it is said, made him remiss in his means to obtain the next parliament. But be that as it will, he could not support himself in the new house of commons, at least his best friends thought so, although he himself thought otherwise, and reproached them for it. And therefore, after many attempts to save himself, but in vain, he yielded at last, although with much reluctance; resigned his employments, and was made an earl, with every private favour he desired of the king. His retreat was entire from any concern in the business of government, but not from the following estimation of almost every man of those that had surrounded him in the height of his power. He lived but a very few years afterwards.

I will end this account of him with saying, that he was a wise and able minister, and the best man, from the goodness of his heart, which was characteristic in him, to live with, and to live under, of any great man I ever knew.

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Mr. Pelham told me soon after sir Robert's death, mentioning several things of him, that lord Bolingbroke had, by some German intrigues and influence, so wrought himself into the confidence and favour of the then late king, Geo. I. that had he lived to come back from Hanover, it was very probable he would have made lord Bolingbroke his chief minister, and of which sir Robert was so sensible, that he intended, just before the king went abroad, to



have obtained a peerage for himself, and resigned his offices. But acquainting his great friend the duke of Devonshire of it, he was strongly averse to it, and it was so strenuously opposed by the princess, to whom the duke of Devonshire had imparted it, that he had laid aside his design, although against his judgment, at that time. This shews the interest he had then with the princess, and will account for the early re-establishment and increase of his power in the following reign, against the new king's first inclination and resolution, which were certainly for Mr. Compton, the speaker, who had been long his treasurer, and very near to him in all his counsels. It went so far as to be almost a formal appointment; the king for two or three days directing every body to go to him upon business; and sir Robert, I know, did believe himself it would be so; but by the queen's management all this was soon over-ruled, with a sincere regard I am persuaded, to what she believed to be most for the king's real service, with perhaps at the same time a little vanity, to have the person deemed the ablest minister in parliament of that age, to be a dependant of her's, which the other was not, or much in her esteem.

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A little before sir Robert Walpole's fall, and as a popular act to save himself (for he went very unwillingly out of his offices and power), he took me one day aside, and said, "What will you say, speaker, if this hand of mine shall bring a message from the king to the house of commons, declaring his consent to having any of his family after his own death, to be made by act of parliament incapable of inheriting and enjoying the crown, and possessing the electoral dominions at the same time?" My answer was, "Sir, it will be as a message from heaven." He replied, "It will be done." But it was not done; and I have good reason to believe it would have been op-



posed and rejected at that time, because it came from him : and by the means of those who had always been most clamorous for it. Thus perhaps the opportunity was lost. When will it come again? It was said that the prince at that juncture would have consented to it, if he could have had the credit and popularity of the measure, and that some of his friends were to have moved it in parliament, but that the design at St. James's prevented it. Notwithstanding all this, I have had some thoughts that neither court ever really intended the thing itself ; but that it came on and went off, by a jealousy of each other in it, and that both were equally pleased that it did so, from an equal fondness very natural for their own native country.

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### TREATY OF Breslau.

*A. D.* 1742.

In the month of June, 1742, the treaty of Breslau was concluded between the queen of Hungary and the king of Prussia, under the mediation of Great Britain ; the earl of Hyndford, minister of the court of London at Vienna, being vested by her Hungarian majesty with full powers to sign in her name. This treaty laid the foundation of the present greatness of Prussia, and the cessions made by it so far exceeded the most sanguine hopes originally entertained by the Prussian monarch, as to cause him to speak of it publicly in terms of the highest exultation : declaring, that he would be willing to part with one of his hands, to ensure the perpetual and faithful observance of it.

The articles are in substance as follows :

I. There shall be henceforth and for ever, an inviola-

ble, as also a sincere union and perfect friendship between her Hungarian and Bohemian majesty on one side, and the king of Prussia on the other.

II. The contracting parties shall not grant any succour or assistance to the enemies of each other, nor shall contract any alliance contrary to these preliminary articles of peace.

III. There shall be a general amnesty on both sides.

IV. All hostilities shall cease on both sides immediately on the signing of these presents, &c. The king of Prussia shall in sixteen days withdraw all his forces into his own dominions, and it shall be lawful for such as dwell in the countries hereby yielded to the king of Prussia, to sell their estates at any time within five years, and withdraw their persons and effects, without being subject to any tax or imposition whatever on that account.

V. In order to put an end to all disputes about boundaries, and to destroy pretensions on both sides, of whatever kind they be, her majesty the queen of Hungary and Bohemia yields by these preliminaries, as well for her heirs and successors as herself, in perpetuity and in full sovereignty, independent of the crown of Bohemia, to the king of Prussia and his successors, as well the Low as the High Silesia, except the principality of Teschen and the city of Trappau, and the country lying beyond the river Opau, and the high mountains bounding Upper Silesia; as also the lordship of Herendorf, and other districts which belong to Moravia, though included in Upper Silesia. In like manner her majesty yields for herself, her heirs, &c. to his majesty the king of Prussia, the city and castle of Glatz, and all the county of that name, with the entire sovereignty thereof, and independent of the crown of Bohemia. In return, his Prussian majesty renounces all pretensions whatsoever on the queen of Hungary.

VI. The king of Prussia shall preserve the catholic religion in *statu quo*, as also the inhabitants of the coun-

try in their possessions, liberties, privileges, &c. without derogation, however, to an entire liberty of conscience for protestants, and the rights of the sovereign.

VII. The king of Prussia charges himself wholly with the repayment of what was lent by the English merchants, on the security of the revenues of Silesia, by the contract of London, January 21, 1735.

VIII. Prisoners on both sides shall be released without ransom, and all contributions shall cease.

IX. Whatever concerns commerce shall be regulated by the peace.

X. There shall be drawn and signed on the matter of these preliminaries, a peace, in due form, within convenient time; and till then, these articles shall have all the force of such a peace.

XI. The two high contracting parties agree to comprehend in these preliminaries of peace, his majesty the king of Great Britain, in that quality, and also as elector of Hanover; her Imperial majesty of all the Russias, his majesty the king of Denmark, the States-general of the United Provinces, the most serene house of Wolfenbuttle, and his majesty the king of Poland, as elector of Saxony, provided that within sixteen days after the signing of these presents shall be duly notified to him, he shall withdraw his forces from the French army in Bohemia, and out of all the dominions of her majesty the queen of Hungary.

XII. The exchange of the ratifications of these presents shall be made at Breslau, in eight or ten days from the signing of these preliminaries. In the faith of which, &c.

HYNDFORD, L. S.

PODIWELTS, L. S.

*Breslau, June 11, 1742.*

Such were the easy terms on which the king of Prussia acquired this vast accession of dominion, territory, and

revenue. "The dark and doubtful conduct of cardinal Fleury rendered the French court," as the monarch himself tells us, "the object of his extreme distrust." He knew that secret negotiations were carrying on at Vienna; and that La Chetardie, the French ambassador at Petersburg, had declared to the empress of Russia, that the most certain means of effecting a reconciliation with Sweden, was to indemnify that power in Pomerania, at the expence of the king of Prussia. Added to this, his treasury was exhausted, and he possessed not those resources, to which sovereigns who reign over rich and opulent countries have recourse. In these circumstances he was happy to avail himself of the mediation of England, the affairs of which were now directed by lord Carteret, who urged with all his influence the conclusion of this treaty, in the hope that the king of Prussia would afterwards become a party in the war which he had then in contemplation against France. But this was far from that monarch's intention: on the contrary, in a letter addressed to cardinal Fleury, he exerted all his eloquence to palliate his defection from the French alliance, as arising not from any change of sentiment, but from motives of uncontrollable necessity.

"Par les negotiations, et par l'épée," says he, "j'ai contribué autant qu'il a été en moi à soutenir le parti de mes alliés sans que les effets ayent jamais assez répondu aux désirs de ma bonne volonté. Quoique mes troupes épuisées par les fatigues continuelles demandassent à prendre quelques repos, je n'ai point refusé aux pressantes sollicitations du marechal de Belle-isle de les employer en Bohême. De retour en Bohême j'ai marché contre le prince de Lorraine. Maintenant la Bavière est coupée de la Bohême, & les Autrichiens maitres de Pilsen interceptent en quelque sorte les secours que le marquis de Broglio peut attendre de la France. Malgré les promesses que les Saxons ont fait à M. de Belle-isle, loin de se préparer à les remplir



et à se joindre aux François, j'apprends qu'ils quittent la Bohême et retournent dans leur Electorat. Dans cette situation où la conduite des Saxons est plus que suspecte, et où il n'y a rien à espérer de M. de Harcourt, l'avenir ne me présente qu'une guerre longue et interminable dont le principal fardeau retomberoit sur moi. D'un côté l'argent des Anglois met toute la Hongrie en armes ; d'un autre côté les efforts de la reine font que ses provinces enfantent des soldats. Les Hongrois se préparent à tomber sur la haute Silésie : les Saxons dans les mauvaises dispositions que je leur connois, sont capable d'agir de concert avec les Autrichiens et de faire une diversion dans mes pays héréditaires, à présent sans defense. L'avenir ne m'offre que des perspectives funestes, et dans une situation aussi critique, quoique dans l'amertume de mon cœur je me suis vu dans la nécessité de me sauver du naufrage et de gagner un asile : si des conjunctures fâcheuses m'ont obligé de prendre un parti que la nécessité justifie, vous me trouverez toujours fidele à remplir les engagements dont l'exécution ne dépend que de moi.—Plutôt mes armes tourneroient contre moi-même que contre les François."

The king of Prussia does by no means arrogate the merit of making this great acquisition merely by the force of his own talents. Circumstances, says he, seconded this enterprize throughout. In order to render it successful, it was necessary that France should have taken the part she did in the war against Austria—that Russia should have been attacked by Sweden—that the Hanoverians and Saxons should have been restrained by timidity, from timely and vigorous action—and that the king of England, the enemy of Prussia, should have become in his own despite, the instrument of their aggrandizement. If this great undertaking had failed, the king would have been censured as an inconsiderate prince, who had attempted an enterprize beyond his strength. Success established his reputation.



## HORACE WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF ORFORD.

MY DEAR LORD,

*Woolterton, Nov. 8, 1744.*

THE circumstances and contents of the letter you received from lord Cholmondeley by express, evidently shew that it was first concerted by the influence of Carteret with the king, then settled and dispatched between his lordship and lord Cholmondeley alone, all entirely without the privity and knowledge of the Pelhams; that there has been a contest in the closet about the conduct of the approaching session; and that Carteret's opinion for supporting with vigour the present war, prevails. I was convinced by some observations on Mr. Pelham's behaviour before I left the town, that either want of resolution or capacity in his great and difficult station, or both, inclined him to wish an end to the present troubles abroad at any rate. His intimation by Mr. Selwyn to you, to stay in the country, and the language the speaker is said to hold lately, who is in Pelham's confidence, that we should wrap ourselves up within ourselves, has strengthened that opinion; and the inclosed letter of the 3d instant, from the duke of Newcastle, in answer to one I had wrote to him about the Sicilian abbot, induces me to believe that his hatred to Carteret, has even made his grace fall from his glorious notions of making a figure abroad, into his brother's way of thinking. Your lordship will observe how coolly and doubtfully he speaks of the two only points that seem favourable to the allies abroad; and how remarkable his conclusion is about the backwardness of the Dutch, and our inability to do without them. So that upon our arrival in town, we shall meet among that set, the same doctrine about the war, as we did last year about the Hanover troops.

Your lordship's answer to lord Cholmondeley, for the

sight of which I return you my thanks, is, in my opinion, as proper and prudent, considering your situation, as could be. But the wile you give to *the present system of politics*, and your avoiding to enter into any previous consultation of measures, will make Carteret perceive that you decline having any thing to do with him. However, your strong expressions of zeal and attachment to his majesty, must obviate any ill impression he may endeavour to make upon the king to your prejudice.

Is it not possible that the baron's \* advantageous report of you, may have had a great effect upon his majesty; and that Carteret perceiving it, may have taken this turn, either to engage you in his measures, or to make an ill use of your coldness, where your assistance is sought for by his majesty himself? But let that be as it will, I think it impossible for you to return any other answer than you have done. I think Mr. Pelham can't avoid writing circular letters to the members; but I much doubt whether you will hear from him, on account of his sentiments relating to measures; because he will not encourage Carteret's notions, and he will scarce venture to write against what he knows to be his majesty's inclination.

We set out for London next Saturday se'might; so that we shall not interfere with you upon the road. Perhaps you will hear something from your son Horace; if any thing material comes I should be glad to know it.

## ENCLOSURE.

- *Newcastle-House, November 3, 1744.*—I had the favour of your letter relating to the Sicilian abbot, &c. We know yet nothing certain of the Prussian and Austrian armies, except that the latter was certainly joined by the Saxons; and the former seeming to go towards

\* Baron Hartenberg, grand chamberlain of the electorate of Hanover, who had lately returned from a visit to the earl of Orford, at his magnificent mansion of Houghton.

Prague, with a view to lie under that town. The siege of \* \* \* we think is certainly raised, though we have yet no certain advice of it. I am sorry to say your old friends the Dutch are much too backward, considering their interest and danger, and our inability to do without them.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF ORFORD.

MY DEAR LORD,

*Woolterton, Nov. 27, 1744.*

FINDING by your lordship's letter, that you had received nothing from any body else but your son Horace, relating to the present crisis at court, I have thought proper to send you the inclosed anonymous letter, which I received by the last post, wrote I suppose the same day with your son's, because it is plain that it wholly concerns yourself. The hand is so well counterfeited, that it is impossible to guess the author by that; but the sense and substance of it shew plainly, that it is from some friend that is well informed; and I imagine it may be from John Selwyn. The inclosed, that came at the same time from Popple, who I conclude must have had his intelligence from Cleveland-court, by his intimacy there, in some measure strengthens that opinion. Whether you think the hint of such weight and authority, as to make you put off your journey to London for some time longer, you are the best judge; in that case, a letter wrote by this day's post to me, addressed to the Cock-pit, will be in town on Monday, and will upon my arrival there, enable me to say what you shall think proper, for your not coming to town, or to execute any other commands.

I must own that this unexpected revolution at court, without any previous notice to you, gives a new turn and interpretation to lord Cholmondeley's express; and in-

clines me to think that it concerns men more than measures, though the last are in consequence included in it. And as this grand affair, pursuant to what Mr. Pelham hinted to you in his letter by Morris, *that the dance would no farther go*—has been some time in agitation, I am really surprised that lord Cholmondeley was not so kind as to inform you by a private letter, when he sent the express, how matters stood at court; for it is very possible, unless you hear this day of the disposition of places, and a complete and determined scheme of the new ministry, the king's, or rather lord Granville's resolution for filling up the vacancies, may be reserved for your arrival; which, as it concerns persons, is extremely hazardous and embarrassing; for I take it for granted, that the meeting of parliament will be put off for some time, or adjourned immediately. As I thought it my duty to send you the anonymous letter, I could not forbear these loose speculations, entirely submitted to your better judgment.

## ANONYMOUS LETTER INCLOSED IN THE PRECEDING.

By the time you receive this, you may reckon upon alterations in the administration, and that Carteret has quitted his office. I mean literally his office, for he has parted with none of the king's confidence or favour, but enjoys that as amply as ever, with assurances of its continuance. In the hurly-burly with which this will be attended, will it not be advisable that your brother deferred his journey a few days, till there is some consistency? I am clear it would be right, but every one knows his own business best. ADIEU.



THE EARL OF CHOLMONDELEY TO THE EARL OF  
ORFORD.

MY LORD,

*November 5, 1744.*

I HAD this morning the honour of attending his majesty in the closet, being called for by the lord of the bed-chamber by his majesty's command; when he was pleased, after many gracious expressions in your favour, and speaking of your service the last year in particular, in relation to the question of the continuance of the Hanover troops, in the strongest terms to command me to inform you, that it would be highly agreeable to him, your coming to town a week or ten days before the meeting of parliament. He further added, that the experience he had for so many years received of your lordship's zeal for his service, your consummate judgment in the interior and domestic affairs of this kingdom, were so many motives to desire your attendance, when England was under the necessity of taking upon herself so large a share in the conduct and support of the common cause, in the present dangerous and disturbed situation of Europe; knowing of what real weight your opinion and influence must be with numbers in both houses of parliament, when such nice and important points must come before them for their deliberation and advice. As I write by express command, I make use of his majesty's very expressions to the best of my recollection; and shall therefore not presume to add any thing more of my own, but only to assure you, that I am, &c.

I send this express, being directed so to do by his majesty.



THE EARL OF ORFORD, TO THE EARL OF CHOL-  
MONDELEY.

MY LORD,

*November 7, 1744.*

I AM infinitely obliged to his majesty for the goodness he was pleased to express for me by you. He does me but justice, in believing that the care and study of my life, whilst I had the honour to serve his majesty, was to deserve his favour and good opinion; and I shall still persevere in a private capacity to endeavour to merit the continuance of his grace and goodness, the only reward I have now to ask for all my past and future services. I will set out for London with all the expedition I can; and am heartily sorry to see his majesty's affairs reduced to such extremities. It has been a long time easy to foresee the unavoidable, and almost unsurmountable difficulties that would attend the present system of politics. I wish to God it was as easy to shew the way out of them. But be assured that I will in every thing, to the utmost of my power, consult and contribute to the honour, interest, and safety of the king and kingdom.

I have often been out of order this summer with making bloody urine, which has frequently returned upon me from the motion in a coach. I am at present perfectly free from it, and hope by lying still and quiet a week longer, I shall be able to undertake a London journey, and by care and management, to perform it so as to get to town several days before the meeting of parliament will be finally adjusted and settled at court. Till that is done, I can be of no use or service in recommending the measures to such as may have a regard for my opinion.

THE EARL OF CHOLMONDELEY TO THE EARL OF  
ORFORD.

MY LORD,

I HAD the favour of your lordship's letter, and communicated the contents of it immediately; and am directed to tell you, that nothing could be more acceptable than the assurances you give, and that they were received with great cordiality. The desire of seeing your lordship in town grows every day stronger, and I am to enforce your doing it, without inconvenience to yourself, as early as may be. The warmest and strongest expressions were made use of in speaking of your lordship's behaviour. I venture this by the post, as I imagine it will still find you at Houghton. The moment you arrive, I will in person assure you of the real respect, &c.



ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE REGENCY  
BILL.

*A. D. 1751.*

ON the 20th of March, 1751, died Frederick prince of Wales, aged forty-five years; and in just contemplation of the inconveniences which might arise from a minority, the king sent on the 26th of April, the following message to both houses of parliament:

“ GEORGE R.

“ His majesty having it entirely at heart to secure the future welfare and happiness of his people, has maturely considered that nothing can conduce so much, under the protection of the divine providence, to the preservation of

the protestant succession in his royal family, and the support of the religion, laws, and liberties of these kingdoms, which have been always most dear to him, as the making proper provisions for the care and tuition of the person of his successor, and for the regular administration of the government, in case such successor should be of tender years; by means whereof their safety and princely education may be secured, the public peace and good order maintained, and the strength and glory of the crown of Great Britain suffer no diminution. For these reasons, his majesty out of his paternal affection and tenderness for his royal family, and for all his faithful subjects, earnestly recommends it to both houses of parliament to take this weighty affair into their most serious deliberation; and proposes to their consideration, that when the imperial crown of these realms shall descend to any of the issue of his son, the late prince of Wales, being under the age of eighteen years, the princess dowager of Wales, their mother, should be guardian of such successor, and regent of these kingdoms, until they shall attain such age; with such powers and limitations as shall appear necessary and expedient for these important purposes."

When the bill was presented to the house of peers by the duke of Newcastle on the 5th May ensuing, it appeared that the limitations referred to in the royal message, were of a nature very extraordinary and alarming. It enacted, that there shall be a council of regency to assist her royal highness, consisting of the duke of Cumberland, and such persons as for the time being shall be archbishop of Canterbury, lord chancellor, lord treasurer, lord president, lord privy seal, lord high admiral, the principal secretaries of state, and lord chief justice of the king's bench; together with any other four persons whom his majesty shall appoint; any five shall act, and of this council, the

duke of Cumberland shall be chief or head.—The consent of the majority of five or more of the council, shall be necessary in all creations, pardons, gifts, grants, dispositions, instructions, orders, or authorities. The regent shall not make war or peace, or ratify treaties, prorogue, adjourn, or dissolve any parliament, without the consent of the council. The regent shall not remove the officers of the crown, who by virtue of their offices are of the council, without the consent of the majority of the *whole council* or the address of parliament: vacancies by death or removal, to be filled up by the regent in two months, with the consent of the major part of her council, and not otherwise: the parliament in being at the descent of the crown, or if no parliament then in being, the preceding parliament shall continue for three years, except the minor be sooner of age, or the parliament be dissolved by the regent with consent of council.

The object of this bill, beyond all question, must have been to throw the chief power of government into the hands of the duke of Cumberland; to enable the present ministers to retain their offices; and to render the nominal regent a mere cypher. Could any three of the nine great officers of state be gained over by that prince, they, in conjunction with those four persons whose nomination was to be left to the king, would constitute a majority of the council, without exposing the duke to the odium of giving a vote in his own favour. In order doubtless to guard against the arts of intrigue, or the efforts of violence on the part of the regent, no officer of the crown having a seat in the council, was made subject to removal, unless the majority of the *whole council* gave consent. Vacancies must be filled up in the same manner. But the most extraordinary clause was, that by which the existence of the parliament, in which the duke of Cumberland's interest so strongly predominated, was prolonged for three years; so



that if the parliament happened to be on the point of dissolution, the duration of the house of commons would be extended from seven to ten years, and the constitutional and popular election of representatives be entirely superseded by an arbitrary parliamentary appointment. Surely it would have been infinitely better to have named the duke of Cumberland sole regent, entrusting the guardianship of the king's person to the princess dowager, than by a bill framed like the present, to lay the certain foundation of a divided and distracted government! It is unpleasant to observe, that a measure so deeply affecting the most essential interests of the kingdom, was treated on both sides as a mere party question. Those who supported it, viz. Mr. Pelham, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, Mr. Charles Yorke, &c. with the law officers of the crown, were courtiers and partizans of the duke; while on the contrary, the speakers against it, Mr. Fazakerly, lord Strange, sir John Barnard, sir John Hynde Cotton, lord Cobham, &c. were systematic oppositionists and partizans of the princess. One illustrious exception, however, must be made, viz. the speaker Onslow, who opposed the bill, as there is every reason to believe, from the purest and most unsullied motives of patriotism. The arguments for and against the regency bill may be comprised in the following impartial and general summary.

#### ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE REGENCY BILL.

I. This bill is to be considered as a precedent for future times, and no power ought to be entrusted with the virtuous, which would become dangerous when, by a natural succession of events, it shall devolve upon the vicious. The acknowledged public and private virtues of her royal highness therefore ought not to weigh in the present crisis, if there exists a probability that in the next,



or any future emergency, the person to be appointed regent could not safely be entrusted with sovereign power.

II. As a minority has often produced confusion and calamity, it is fit that in such an exigency some general law should immediately take place; and surely the public tranquillity, and the right of the young prince, will be more effectually secured, if it be established as a general rule, that a regent be appointed, together with a council which shall at once assist and restrain, than that a sole regent be immediately invested with sovereign authority. And though this bill has been said to be unprecedented, it is perhaps only so, in so far as the mother of the monarch is appointed regent; for the establishing of a council of regency has been the practice of our ancestors ever since the Conquest, except in the case of the earl of Pembroke during the minority of Henry III. and of Richard duke of Gloucester in the minority of Edward V. When the earl of Pembroke was appointed sole regent, the nation was in a state of such danger and confusion, that it became necessary to deviate from the general rule, however prudent: in the case of Richard, a sole regency with sovereign authority was rather usurped than appointed, and the use he made of his power, is the strongest reason why it should not be suffered to come into the hands of another.

III. It does not appear that the fear of factions, in such a council of regency as is appointed by this bill, is justified by experience; and if not justified by experience, it cannot be supported by reason; for as mankind in general are the same, act from the same principles, and fall by the same temptations, the future is best inferred from the past, and no better arguments can be advanced for the probability of a future event, than that it has happened before; so that reason as well as experience is in favour of the bill; for if factions have not been the consequence of former councils of regency, it is improbable they should be the consequence of this.

IV. The restrictions in the bill, are such only as a wise and good sovereign would lay upon himself; for it cannot be believed that such a prince would either make peace or war, prorogue or dissolve parliament, or remove or appoint any great officers of state, or bishops, or judges whose places continue for life, without the advice of his council. And the power of the council of regency is merely restrictive: they cannot meet but when called by the regent, nor when met, can they take any thing into consideration that is not by the regent laid before them; their resolutions are ineffectual without her concurrence; and their dissent to any useful measure may be over-ruled by parliament, as upon the address of both houses, the whole council or any of its members may be removed.

V. This bill is rendered absolutely necessary by a defect in our constitution: for the king is never supposed to be a minor by law, but upon his accession to the throne becomes immediately invested with sovereign authority, and the whole executive power rests in his hands; the consequence of which is, that he who, by whatever means, obtains possession of the infant's person, is eventually possessed of regal power and authority. It is indeed enacted by the statute of 8th William III. that upon the demise of the sovereign the parliament shall meet, and that the session shall continue six months, but it is immediately added—unless the same shall be dissolved by the next heir to the crown, without any exception as to infant kings. Whoever therefore shall be in possession of the person of the infant sovereign, may, under the specious appellation, and by assuming the dangerous powers of sole regent, effectually prevent the parliament from acting; or adopt such means as shall make it the instrument of oppression and usurpation. Nor is this mere speculation; for the authority of parliament was thus eluded and perverted by Richard III. while he was regent; though, when the king his brother

died, there were nine persons who would have legally succeeded to the crown before him\*.

VI. This bill is calculated not only for the public benefit, and for the security of the young king, but for the ease, the safety, and the honour of the regent. It is for the security of the prince, and the welfare of the public, that the regent is restrained from such acts as could admit of no remedy, if they should appear to be of pernicious consequence, even by the king himself when he should come at age; but it is for the honour of the regent, that she is invested with every other branch of sovereign authority; and though she is restrained from appointing the bishops or judges, who hold their places for life, yet she may by her sole power appoint much more important officers for the time being; such as the lord lieutenant of Ireland, the general of the army, the governors of the plantations, and many others; and it is for her ease as well as safety, that a council is appointed her, because the regent, a subject, being still accountable for her conduct, it is of great moment to her, that the consent and approbation of the chief officers of state to every important act of her government should be authentically ascertained. On the other hand, to constitute the princess sole regent with sovereign authority, would afford a precedent which might hereafter be fatal to some of her royal highness's descendants, and deprive her administration of a sanction which would at once add weight to her authority, wisdom to her councils, and security to her person.

#### ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE REGENCY BILL.

I. As to the allegation of danger from the setting of a precedent which it may be improper for posterity to fol-

\* Two sons and five daughters of the late king, and a son and daughter of the duke of Clarence.

I w it is sufficient to answer, that by universal acknowledgment, the appointment of the princess as regent, with sovereign power, is the immediate interest of the nation. And by what argument can it be proved, that the immediate interest of the nation ought to be given up for a remote possibility? A possibility that some future generation may be so weak or so corrupt as to make no new provision for a new exigency, in which, except the minority of the king, every circumstance shall be different. It cannot be supposed or pretended that the regulation which the present parliament is about to make, will restrain all future parliaments from the same exercise of their power; or that the authority with which the princess may now be entrusted, shall of course devolve upon future regents. On the contrary, if that reasoning which is derived from facts is least subject to fallacy and error, it is so far from being probable that this precedent will always be followed in time to come, that it is probable it will never be followed at all. For it appears from our histories, that no two regulations for the administration of government, during a minority, are alike; nor is it now thought expedient to pay any regard to what has been done on these occasions in times past. But granting that this bill will descend as an inviolable law, from which, upon no exigency, the legislators of futurity shall dare to depart, the reasons against it become still more numerous and more cogent. It is a precedent for violating the constitution, by dividing the prerogative of one; for the executive power is the prerogative of one, not the joint privilege of many; and if future attempts to change the constitution shall be supported by the solemn sanction of this bill, the deference that shall be paid to it by posterity, will ensure the success of sedition, and overturn the legislature, by dividing it against itself.

II. That a minority has often produced confusion and



calamity, is true; but it is probable that this confusion and calamity will rather be increased than prevented by the immediate intervention of a general law, by which the same regulation is to be established, however circumstances may differ. The dangers of a majority, on the contrary, can only be obviated by adapting the regulation to the particular exigencies of the state, the character of the regent, the influence of parties, and the factions of the court; circumstances which, as they may be infinitely varied, must render different measures expedient, which precedent cannot possibly direct, and which no general regulation can supply. To suit an administration to particular national circumstances, seems at least to have been attempted in all the minorities that have already happened, by the great difference of the forms of government that have been at different times established on these occasions. The earl of Pembroke was appointed sole regent at the commencement of the reign of Henry III. with little less than sovereign authority. In the infancy of Henry VI. there were two protectors, with a council; in the minority of Edward VI. there was a council of regency, without a regent, and subject to the controul of another council; so that a kind of general precedent results from all these regulations—that of acting as the case requires, without any regard to former appointments, which were necessarily temporary and occasional.

III. It has been asserted, that a council of regency will not expose the nation to the misery of contending factions. If however what shall be, is best inferred from what has been, no doubt can remain of the confusion that must arise from the strife of many for distinction and power. Farther, it is alleged, that though factions in such a council may possibly produce some degree of confusion and debility in the state, yet from the greater danger of usurpation, we are effectually secured by this bill. But by this bill the royal power is not limited; it is di-



vided; and it will appear from our histories, that every attempt to divide the royal power, has proceeded with confusion, and terminated in usurpation. If this measure is suffered to take effect, a factious majority in the council of regency *may* be supported by a factious majority in parliament. It will then be impracticable for the regent to dissolve either combination; because no member of the council is to be removed but upon the address of both houses; nor is the parliament to be dissolved but by the consent of the majority of the council. But this is not all; for it is evident that the regent may, in these circumstances, be compelled to dismiss from her council whoever is not in the combination; and thus the danger of an usurpation is demonstrable; for whoever is at the head of the confederacy, in which the whole council will be absorbed, must almost insensibly become invested with sovereign power, and by an easy transition become absolute and despotic. This bill, therefore, is not adapted to prevent that mischief, in the fear of which every positive good is confessedly given up, and every other evil is incurred.

IV. It has been said, that the restraint which is laid upon the regent, is such only as a wise and good sovereign would lay upon himself. But there is surely a wide difference between a sovereign who takes the advice of his council with respect to important transactions, of the fitness of which he is finally to judge, and which are either to be suspended or executed as he alone shall determine, and a regent to whom the will of this council must eventually give law; who can pursue no measure of moment in which they do not concur, and who cannot remove them, however insolent, arbitrary, or capricious, however wanton in the power they possess, and however negligent in the duties which they owe. As the power of the council is not merely restrictive, neither is it true that they cannot meet but when called together by the regent, or take any subject into consideration which is not by her laid be-

fore them ; for of this council a president is appointed, and the office of a president is to call a council together, and to propose such subjects as he thinks proper to their consideration. The bill indeed says, that they shall meet when her royal highness shall please to direct ; but there are no words to prevent their meeting without her direction, nor any by which she is empowered to put an end to their meeting ; neither is there any clause to restrain them in the subjects of their consideration. The regent appears to have no right to be present at their deliberations, and they seem to be empowered not only to deliberate, but to act, without her concurrence ; for it is expressly said, “ that any five should be sufficient to act, and that the acts of such five shall be deemed to be acts of the council of regency.” The regent does not therefore appear to have always even a negative voice ; but as the dissent of the council to any useful measure can only be over-ruled by the address of both houses, their influence will probably secure them in the possession of their power.

V. Among other reasons urged in defence of this bill, it is asserted, that by a certain defect in our constitution, it is made absolutely necessary. The king, say they, by the law, is never supposed to be a minor. Whoever obtains possession of his person, consequently is invested with the whole executive power, and may dissolve the parliament, which by the 8th William III. is appointed to meet on the demise of the king, and thus secure himself in the possession of regal authority. This however is far from being a true state of the case. A parliament meeting by virtue of the above act, cannot be prevented from acting by any who shall have possession of the person of the minor ; for the words, “ unless the same shall be sooner prorogued or dissolved by the next heir to the crown,” plainly suppose the minor to have come of age within six months after the demise of his predecessor, his

capacity to act being necessarily implied. And should any subject, in the rashness of his ambition, dare to prorogue or dissolve the parliament in the name of a minor before they had settled a regency, it is much more probable that they would send him to the Tower, than that they would separate. How the power of parliament was eluded by Richard III. it is not of importance to inquire, because subsequent statutes have made the same methods impracticable; and his example, like the head of Medusa, is held up for no other purpose than to astonish and petrify.

VI. Upon the whole, this bill is not calculated for public benefit, because it must necessarily produce faction; nor for the security of the sovereign, because it tends to facilitate usurpation; nor for the benefit of posterity, because the precedent is pernicious; nor for the honour of the regent, because she can be considered only as an instrument in the hands of others, who have sacrificed her glory to the continuance of their own importance. It is indeed pretended, that the governments abroad, the army, the navy, and many important ecclesiastical and civil employments, are in her disposal: but this is true only in appearance; for, in fact, she can dispose of no employment, the patent, commission, or warrant for which, must pass the great or privy seal, or be countersigned by any of the great officers whom she cannot remove; and few other places are in her gift. The security of her person is another compliment paid her by this bill; but her person would have been secured by her sagacity and her virtue;—or, supposing these to have been insufficient, it is not easy to conceive that any benefit is conferred, when, to prevent the consequences of acting wrong, a person is restrained from acting at all; or that he who takes away honour, deserves thanks for conferring safety.

## JEW NATURALIZATION BILL.

A. D. 1753.

ON the 16th of April, 1753, a bill which had been passed without opposition by the lords, entitled, "an act to permit persons professing the jewish religion to be naturalized by parliament, &c." was sent down to the commons, where it was next day read a first time, and ordered to be read a second time. May 7th, it was, after the second reading, ordered to be committed. On the motion of commitment, and not till then, a dangerous spirit of opposition to the bill began to show itself; an opposition compounded of faction and fanaticism. The bill itself was an harmless, and almost an insignificant one; for it only went to the removal of certain legal disabilities under which the jews laboured, and to make them, in common with other aliens, *capable* of being naturalized. Even with regard to those few individuals of the jewish community who might be supposed to have interest enough to avail themselves of this indulgence, the privileges included in the term *naturalization*, were by the public in general grossly misunderstood. A naturalization bill does not give a right so much as to a parish settlement; though a foreigner without naturalization may acquire this right either by service, apprenticeship, or renting an house of a certain value. A naturalization bill doth not convey the freedom of any city, borough, or corporate society, in the kingdom; neither doth it qualify a person to be employed in any office or trust, civil or military. A naturalized foreigner cannot receive any grants from the crown, directly or indirectly; nor can he be a member of the privy council, or of either house of parliament; and no bill can be so much as proposed to parliament for the naturalization of any foreigner, except a clause restraining



him from those privileges be first inserted. Neither can a naturalized jew so much as vote for members of parliament, without perjury, or abjuration of his religion; for such oaths may be tendered him as, upon jewish principles, he cannot take. In short, the object of a naturalization bill is merely to empower foreigners to purchase lands, and to merchandize, without paying alien's duty.

After some warm discussion in the remaining stages of the bill, and several petitions presented against it, particularly one from the city of London by the sheriffs, stating, "that should the said bill pass into a law, the same would tend greatly to the dishonour of the christian religion, endanger our excellent constitution, and be highly prejudicial to the interest and trade of the kingdom in general, and the city of London in particular," it received the royal assent in the precise form as transmitted from the lords, without alteration or amendment.

It might have been expected, that so preposterous a clamour as had been raised against this bill would have insensibly died away; but on the contrary, during the recess of parliament, in consequence of the wicked arts used to deceive, by some, and the gross ignorance and deplorable bigotry of others, the storm of popular discontent rose to a most dreadful and alarming height. The whole body of the common people, and very many of the higher classes, seemed inflamed almost to madness against the bill. Instructions were sent up from all parts of the kingdom to the members, urging the repeal of the bill, which, at the eve of a general election, must of course come with great additional weight. It was to no purpose to allege, that the naturalization in question gave no greater privileges to any jew settling here, than are at present enjoyed by the son of a jew born in England, and much less than have been granted to them, and which they actually enjoy in many other countries. The jews themselves were exposed to, and in some places suffered



such insults and outrages, that recollecting the terrible examples of former times, they were with reason apprehensive for the consequences, and seriously wished for the repeal of the bill; and the government, too wise to think of opposing such a torrent, scrupled not to make publicly known their intention of moving the repeal.

On the first day of the ensuing session, November 15, 1753, the duke of Newcastle, in person, presented to the house of peers a bill for repealing the obnoxious *act of naturalization*, as it was usually, though very inaccurately and improperly, styled. Finding a ready passage through the lords, it soon came down to the commons; and Mr. Pelham distinguished himself by an early speech in favour of the repeal. He was answered by Mr. Potter, who had the rashness to advise an obstinate, or, to use his own language, a firm and resolute perseverance in the measure, declaring himself, for one, ready to abide the consequences. Sir George, afterwards lord Lyttelton, replied in the following excellent and decisive speech, well deserving the applause and approbation which it met with from the house:

“ MR. SPEAKER,

“ I see no occasion to enter at present into the merits of the bill we passed the last session, for the naturalization of the jews, because I am convinced that, in the present temper of the nation, not a single foreign jew will think it expedient to take any benefit of that act; and therefore the repealing of it is giving up nothing. I assented to it last year, in hopes it might induce some wealthy jews to come and settle among us: in that light I saw enough of utility in it, to make me incline rather to approve than dislike it; but that any man alive could be zealous either for or against it, I confess I had no idea. What affects our religion, is indeed of the highest and most serious importance. God forbid we should ever be indifferent about that! but I thought

this had no more to do with religion, than any turnpike act we passed in that session; and after all the divinity that has been preached on the subject, I think so still.

“ Resolution and steadiness are excellent qualities, but it is the application of them upon which their value depends. A wise government will know where to yield as well as where to resist; and there is no surer mark of littleness of mind in an administration, than obstinacy in trifles. Public wisdom on some occasions must condescend to give way to popular folly, especially in a free country, where the humour of the people must be considered as attentively as the humour of a king in an absolute monarchy. Under both forms of government; a prudent and honest ministry will indulge a small folly, and will resist a great one. Not to vouchsafe now and then a kind indulgence to the former, would discover an ignorance of human nature; not to resist the latter at all times, would be meanness and servility.

“ Sir, I look on the bill we are at present debating, not as a sacrifice made to popularity, for it sacrifices nothing, but as a prudent regard to some consequences arising from the nature of the clamour raised against the late act for naturalizing jews, which seem to require a particular consideration. It has been hitherto the rare and envied felicity of his majesty's reign, that his subjects have enjoyed such a settled tranquillity, such a freedom from any angry religious disputes, as is not to be paralleled in any former times: The true christian spirit of moderation, of charity, of universal benevolence, has prevailed in the people, has prevailed in the clergy of all ranks and degrees, instead of those narrow principles, those bigotted prejudices, that furious, that implacable, that ignorant zeal, which had often done so much hurt both to the church and state. But from the ill-undersood, the insignificant act of parliament you are now moved, to repeal, occasion has been taken to deprive us of this inestimable advantage. It is a

pretence to disturb the peace of the church, to infuse idle fears into the minds of the people, and make religion itself an engine of sedition. It beloves the piety as well as the wisdom of parliament, to disappoint those endeavours. Sir, the very worst mischief that can be done to religion, is to pervert it to the purposes of faction. Heaven and hell are not more distant, than the benevolent spirit of the gospel and the malignant spirit of party. The most impious wars ever made, were those called "Holy Wars." He who hates another man for not being a christian, is himself not a christian. Christianity breathes love and peace and good-will to man. A temper conformable to the dictates of that holy religion has lately distinguished this nation: and a glorious distinction it was. But there is latent at all times in the minds of the vulgar, a spark of enthusiasm; which, if blown by the breath of a party, may even when it seems quite extinguished, be suddenly revived and raised to a flame. The act of last session for naturalizing of foreign jews, has very unexpectedly administered fuel to feed that flame. To what a height it may rise, if it should continue much longer, one cannot easily tell; but take away the fuel and it will die of itself.

"It is the misfortune of all the roman catholic countries, that there the church and the state, the civil power and the hierarchy, have separate interests, and are continually at variance one with the other. It is our happiness that here they form but one system. While this harmony lasts, whatever hurts the church injures the state; whatever weakens the credit of the governors of the church, takes away from the civil power a part of its strength, and shakes the whole constitution. Sir, I trust and believe that by speedily passing this bill, we shall silence that obloquy which has so unjustly been cast upon our reverend prelates, some of the most respectable that ever adorned our church, for the part they took in the act which this repeals; and it greatly imports the whole community, that they should not lose that respect which is so justly due to them, by a

popular clamour kept up in opposition to a measure of no importance in itself. But if the departing from that measure should not remove the prejudice so maliciously raised, I am certain that no farther step you can take will be able to remove it ; and therefore I hope you will stop here. This appears to be a reasonable and safe condescension, by which nobody will be hurt ; but all beyond this would be dangerous weakness in government. It might open the door to the wildest enthusiasm, and to the most mischievous attacks of political disaffection working upon that enthusiasm. If you encourage and authorize it to fall upon the synagogue, it will go from them to the meeting-house, and in the end to the palace. But let us be careful to check its farther progress. The more zealous we are to support christianity, the more vigilant should we be in maintaining toleration. If we bring back persecution, we bring back the anti-christian spirit of popery ; and when the spirit is here, the whole system will soon follow. Toleration is the basis of all public quiet ; it is a charter of freedom given to the mind, more valuable than that which secures our persons and estates. Indeed they are inseparably connected ; for where the mind is not free, where the conscience is enthralled, there is no freedom. Spiritual tyranny puts on the galling chains, but civil tyranny is called in to rivet and fix them. We see it in Spain and many other countries ; we have formerly both seen and felt it in England. By the blessing of God we are now delivered from all kinds of oppression ; let us take care that they may never return. 'The bill of repeal before us, assuredly is not persecution. It only puts every body in that situation where every body was easy. It is a gentle, a prudent, and a moderate measure tending to quiet and settle the minds of men which have been unhappily disturbed without any necessity, and therefore I give it my most hearty concurrence.'

It is needless to add, that the bill of repeal passed with unanimity, and completely answered the purpose intended.



CONVENTION OF CLOISTER-SEVEN,  
SEPTEMBER 1757.

THE famous convention of Cloister-Seven, concluded between the duke of Cumberland and the marechal duke de Richelieu, through the mediation of the court of Denmark, who named as its minister the count de Lynar, consisted in substance of the following articles, remarkable for their vagueness and incertitude :

- I. Hostilities shall cease within twenty-four hours, &c.
- II. The auxiliary troops of the army of the duke of Cumberland, Hessians, Brunswickers, &c. shall be sent home—the route to be settled with a general officer of each nation—and to be placed and distributed in their own countries, as shall be agreed between the court of France and their respective sovereigns.
- III. The duke of Cumberland shall pass the Elbe with such part of the Hanoverian troops as he shall not be able to place in the city of Stade. The French troops shall remain in the duchies of Bremen and Verden till the definitive reconciliation of the two sovereigns.
- IV. The French army shall, besides, keep all the posts and countries of which it is in possession.

This very singular capitulation gave almost equal umbrage to the two courts of Great Britain and France; the former being to the last degree chagrined at the disgrace which it reflected on the Hanoverian arms; and the latter, that the English general had been suffered to escape on terms so easy from a danger so great and imminent. And immediate orders were sent to the marechal duke de Richelieu, to propose to the duke of Cumberland certain explanatory articles, which the count de Lynar declared to be consonant to the true spirit and intent of the convention. They were substantially as follows :

- I. The cessation of hostilities shall last during the whole of the present war.



II. The Hanover troops which were to be sent to the other side of the Elbe into the duchy of Lawenburg, should not leave that country while the convention remained in force.

III. No English troops should be admitted into the duchies of Bremen and Verden.

IV. The troops included in the convention, should not serve during the present war, either in the armies of the king of England or in those of his allies.

These explanatory articles were rejected by the court of London with the highest indignation, and the original treaty was interpreted in a mode the most opposite, by the two contending parties.

In the month of November, 1757, the army of observation re-assembled under the command of the prince of Brunswick, in consequence of which unexpected measure, the court of Versailles, equally astonished and enraged, published (December 30) a long and elaborate manifesto, consisting of three distinct parts. The 1st, contains preliminary *eclaircissements*. The 2d, is called parallel of the king's conduct with that of the king of England; and the 3d, exhibits vouchers of the facts mentioned in the two former.

The manifesto declares, that the alliance between the courts of Vienna and Versailles, which his Britannic majesty has pretended to be so very unnatural, was rendered necessary by the treaty between the courts of London and Berlin, which indulged the imagination that the one should give law on the continent, the other on the ocean.

It charges the king of Prussia with having by the most flagitious injustice, made himself master of Saxony, and the king of England with the guilt of acting as his accomplice, instead of accepting the neutrality offered him.

After detailing the successes of the French arms in

Germany, this paper remarks, that it was the concern of the duke of Cumberland, to save his troops from the total destruction with which they were threatened : for which purpose a military convention had been concluded through the mediation of Denmark. “ If,” says the manifesto, “ the king of England, elector of Hanover, on his receiving advice of the capitulation, had disowned the duke of Cumberland, his general and son, still would the king have had cause of complaint, military conventions not requiring a ratification ; but at least there would have been in this proceeding an appearance of good faith ; but to temporize during near three months, let the French army march for Halberstadt, wait till it was separated in the bad season, lay hold of the circumstances of a check to come out of the prescribed limits, afterwards take advantageous posts equally contrary to the convention, and when all these preparations are made, and the enemy is thought to be sufficiently weakened and deceived to be fought with advantage, to declare to him that hostilities are to be renewed, and that the capitulation is looked on as broken at the very same moment that troops are marching to him, and his troops are attacked ;—this is trampling on the law of nations, on the laws of justice, honour, and good faith ; it is to fear neither the judgment of cotemporaries, or of posterity.”

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An answer to this manifesto, equally full and elaborate, was in a short time published by the court of London, and containing many severe and just reflections on the ambitious and artful policy of the court of Versailles, in respect to Germany. The king of England acknowledges that he rejected the project of neutrality for the electorate of Hanover, offered by the court of Vienna—“ repeating with that freedom and uprightuess from which he never

departed, his resolution to stop the French troops, and to take no other share in the war." And at the very time that a neutrality was offered to him upon terms dangerous and dishonourable to accept, "the court of Vienna signed a convention with the count d'Estrees, by virtue of which, the French army was to pass the Weser the 10th July."

After the battle of Hastenbeck, the king seeing the efforts he had made wholly ineffectual, resolved in quality of elector, to make proposals of peace to the empress queen, and the court of France. "The two courts," proceeds this justificatory memorial, "had as yet given no definitive answer, when his royal highness the duke of Cumberland, by the mediation of count de Lynar, concluded the TRUCE of September 8, 1757." It needs but little attention to discover the nature and end of this convention. It is a suspension of arms, a military regulation, which the French minister himself drew up. It was to continue till the issue of a negotiation begun by his Britannic majesty in the quality of elector of Hanover, and upon the declaration of the courts of Vienna and Versailles, which was expected. This was the reason why it was not thought necessary to fix the time the suspension of arms was to last. It was drawn up by the generals of the two armies, who mutually agreed that it might be concluded without the ratification of the two courts: and indeed they might well agree to a truce which was to last only for a short time; but it is impossible to suppose that they had power to make a treaty by which, without the ratification of the sovereigns, the king's dominions should be delivered up into the hands of foreigners till a general peace, of which there was not the least appearance. It is a thing unheard of, to give the general of an army so extensive an authority.

It is plain that France herself understood the convention in the very same sense. For if the hands of the Hanoverians were tied up by the suspension of arms concluded

at Cloister-Seven, till a general peace, why did France insist upon having it stipulated by the scheme of explanation proposed by the count de Lynar?—The court of France itself acknowledged, that the last conditions proposed did not exist in the treaty of Cloister-Seven, as it wanted them to be granted by new conventions. The king had therefore an undoubted right to reject them. The king then took the most just measures, and the most agreeable for his own dignity and preservation: the only measures which the arrogance of his enemies had permitted him to take; measures, in short, which, however dangerous and uncertain they then appeared, could not possibly prove more fatal than the equally heavy and shameful yoke which France wanted to impose upon the king by the new convention.

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It is justly remarked by the historian Smollet (vol. iii. p. 200, continuation), “that the king of England’s tenderness for Hanover was one of the chief sources of the misfortunes which befel that electorate.” It is indeed not unlikely, that from the period when a war between France and England appeared inevitable, the court of Versailles might secretly harbour the idea of an attack upon the king’s electoral dominions. But a design of this nature would scarcely have been carried into execution, if the king of England had not himself furnished the French court with a plausible pretext for this odious measure. For, as the manifesto from which the preceding extracts are taken, justly observes, “it would be an open violation of the best established maxims of the law of nations, and would involve the empire in continual wars, if it might be maintained that the states of which it was composed, could be attacked for quarrels that regard only their sovereigns in quality of sovereign powers.”



Had the king of England, therefore, observed a dignified impartiality as to the internal disputes of the empire, employing only his good offices for the accommodation of differences, and taken no precaution whatever for the defence of his electorate, it would probably have wanted no defence. But the restless and impatient temper of the English monarch, impelled him to the adoption of specific measures of security.

His first project was to form an alliance with Russia, who, by a subsidy treaty concluded September 1755, agreed to furnish 40,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, at the requisition of his Britannic majesty. But this treaty gave great offence to the king of Prussia, who declared that he would not suffer the introduction of foreign troops into the empire. It was obvious, that so near and so potent a neighbour as the king of Prussia, might over-run the whole electorate, long before an army of Muscovites could come to its assistance. The system of Hanoverian policy was therefore changed, and a treaty was forthwith negotiated, and signed January 1756, between the courts of London and Berlin, which had been for fifteen years at variance; and conformably to the tenor of this convention, the two courts solemnly pledged themselves to oppose the introduction of all foreign troops into Germany. And had this object been attainable, it were certainly a far preferable policy on the part of the king of England to prevent the march of French troops into the empire, than to oppose them by the aid of such doubtful and dangerous friends as the Russians.

This unexpected junction gave extreme chagrin and alarm to the court of Vienna, then meditating a war against Prussia for the recovery of Silesia, and depending with confidence on the favourable dispositions, if not the actual co-operation, of Great Britain for that purpose. France conceiving herself at the same moment deserted by Prussia, and Austria abandoned by England, it was na-



tural to expect these two great powers to unite for the support of their mutual interests; and on the 1st of May, 1756, a treaty or convention was signed between them, of defence and amity, at Versailles; the French monarch professing nothing more than, as one of the guarantees of the treaty of Westphalia, to march at the requisition of the head of the empire to the aid and assistance of the Germanic body, and particularly of Saxony, unjustly attacked by a rebellious member of that body.

The hostile opposition of the army of Hanover afforded the court of Versailles the wished-for occasion to invade the territories of the electorate, through which she had originally asked only a free passage. The elector of Hanover was now involved in what was styled the rebellion of the elector of Brandenburg, and both these princes were threatened with the ban of the empire, which was indeed shortly afterward promulgated against the latter. The army of observation, far inferior in force to that of France, and commanded by a general whose military skill and talents certainly did not compensate for that inferiority, was, after a short and feeble resistance, driven to the disgraceful necessity of soliciting a capitulation, which left the whole electorate, with the contiguous territories of Brunswick and Hesse, in the undisturbed possession of the French—the very catastrophe which it was the sole object of the king of England's confused and anxious policy to avoid.

To attempt to expose the weakness of this policy, were indeed to attack resistless imbecility. But an examination of the conduct of the king of Prussia at this period, is confessedly a task which demands, in order to form a correct judgment of its merits, the most profound political sagacity. If that great monarch erred in his decision, amid the complicated and innumerable embarrassments with which he was surrounded, it must be ascribed to that too great passion for refinement, and proneness to deduce re-

more consequences from existing, but ever varying circumstances; which so frequently influences men of deep reflection.

The king well knew, by means of a secret and perfectly authentic channel of information, the whole purport of the schemes formed or agitated against him by the three courts of Vienna, Petersburg, and Dresden. The question was, in what mode could they be most effectually counteracted? As to the vigorous and decisive opposition which he gave to the introduction of Russian troops into the empire, he could have no hesitation. But to the proposition of the court of London, in relation to a treaty of amity and alliance founded upon that principle, he, not without good reason, demurred, sensible that he could not gain a friend without at the same time making an enemy. No words can, on this singularly interesting occasion, do so much justice to the system ultimately adopted by this monarch, as his own.

“The two kings of Great Britain and France,” says the royal historian, vol. ii. p. 51, “perceiving themselves menaced with war, strove on each side to fortify their party by confirming their ancient alliances, or forming new ones. The king was at this period courted both by the French and English. His alliance with the court of Versailles was not yet expired; but the possessions of France beyond the Atlantic were not included in the guarantee of Prussia: and in present circumstances, it appeared that the policy of the Prussians was to remain neuter during these troubles, and to look on as mere spectators. This however was not the mode of thinking at Versailles. That court appeared to entertain the notion, that the king of Prussia was, with respect to France, what the despot of Walachia is in relation to the Porte; that is to say, a dependent prince, obliged to make war as soon as he receives his orders. The court of France moreover persuaded herself that, by carrying the war into the elec-

torate of Hanover, she should mollify the king of England, and terminate in the centre of the empire the differences which subsisted between her and Great Britain in the new world. M. Rouillé, then minister of foreign affairs, said one day to M. Knyphausen, the Prussian resident at Paris, with a view to engage the king to contribute to this diversion, "Write, sir, to the king of Prussia, that he must assist us in this Hanoverian expedition. There is fine scope for plunder; the treasury of the king of England is well furnished; the king has nothing to do but to seize upon it; he will find it a good capture." The king caused this minister to be informed, that such propositions were proper to be made to persons of another cast, and that he hoped in future M. Rouillé would learn how to make the necessary distinctions.

"These negotiations became more vivid towards the end of the year 1755. King George, informed of the designs of the French, and alarmed at the storm which impended over his electorate, persuaded himself that the most certain way of avoiding the danger, was to conclude a defensive alliance with Prussia. He knew that the ties which united the kings of Prussia and France, were on the point of dissolution, the term of the subsisting treaty of Versailles expiring in the month of March 1756; and he gave it in charge to lord Holderness, secretary of state, to set on foot a negotiation with the court of Berlin. Lord Holderness, uncertain of the disposition of the king of Prussia respecting this alliance, not to expose his master to the hazard of a direct refusal, made his first overtures through the medium of the duke of Brunswick. They were founded on the pretext of securing the repose of Germany against the danger with which she was threatened of a foreign war. It was demanded of the king, whether he would enter into measures calculated to assure and maintain the public tranquillity? This proposition drew after it great consequences; for in the ac-

tual situation of Prussia the determination of such a question involved in it that of peace and war. If the king renewed his treaty with France, it would be necessary to attack the electorate of Hanover. This would be to draw upon him the forces of the English, the Austrians, and the Russians. If, on the other hand, he concluded an alliance with England, it was probable that the French would not carry their arms into the empire, and that Prussia would be supported by Great Britain and Russia. This would apparently oblige the empress queen to remain peaceable, however great might be the desire she entertained to re-conquer Silesia, and whatever preparations she might have made to act as soon as occasion permitted.

“ Before he decided, the king nevertheless judged it expedient to be at a certainty with respect to the manner of thinking at the court of St. Petersburg. But as he had in the person of the chancellor Bestuchef a declared enemy, it was not possible to obtain direct eclaircissements from Petersburg itself, where all communication with Berlin was broken off. He therefore had recourse to M. de Klingraaf, his minister at the Imperial court, and to lord Holderness himself, to know upon what terms Russia was with England; and above all, whether it was the court of Vienna, or that of London, which had most influence at Petersburg. M. de Klingraaf answered, “ that the Russians being a nation governed by interest, there was no doubt but they would be more attached to those who were able to purchase their friendship, than to those who had nothing to give them; that the empress queen often wanted the means to defray her own expences; and that, of course, the Russians would never relinquish their connexions with England, whose immense riches enabled them to give such enormous subsidies.” The answer of lord Holderness imported, that the good understanding between England and Russia being perfect, his



Britannic majesty relied with firmness upon the friendship of the empress Elizabeth.

“ The informations which the king received from his minister at the Hague, corresponded so well with his intelligence from Vienna and London, that he imagined so many persons could not be deceived upon the same subject, and that their conjectures being coincident, must of course be just. This determined him. He entered into negotiation with England, and gave lord Holderness to understand, that he was not averse to taking, in concert with the king of Great Britain, measures innoxious, defensive, and such as related merely to the neutrality of Germany. These two powers finding themselves in perfect accord as to the object of their connexion, soon arrived at the conclusion of the treaty, which was signed at London the 16th January, 1756.

“ This treaty contained four articles; the three first of which regarded only the reciprocal guarantees given for the safety of their own dominions; the last had a direct relation to Germany, and comprehended engagements for preventing any foreign troops from entering the empire.

“ This treaty came actually *signed* to Berlin, about a month after the arrival of the duc de Nivernois at that place. Louis XV. sent that nobleman to the king, to renew the alliance of Versailles, the term of which was so nearly expiring; and also to draw Prussia into the project which France meditated against the electorate. The most forcible argument employed by the duke was, to offer the king the sovereignty of the island of Tobago, which, after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, had been granted to marshal Saxe. But as the English appeared much dissatisfied at this, it was stipulated that the island should remain uncultivated, and in a state of neutrality. This offer was too singular to be listened to. The king turned it into ridicule, and requested M. de Nivernois to cast his eyes upon some one more proper than him to be-



come governor of the island of Barataria. He even declined renewing the alliance, and involving himself, upon any terms, in the war now in contemplation; and in order to act with the most perfect candour towards France, and to demonstrate the innocence of the new engagements which he had contracted with England, he made no difficulty to shew to the *duc de Nivernois* the original treaty which he had just received from London.

“ The news of this alliance caused a lively sensation at Versailles in the mind of Louis XV. and his council. Scarcely could they avoid saying, that the king of Prussia had revolted against France. Investigated, however, with the spirit of impartiality, the fact was different. The alliance of Prussia with France was to expire in two months. The king, in quality of sovereign, was authorized to enter into connexions with such nations as could best ensure the safety and advantage of his own dominions. He was chargeable therefore with no violation of his faith or his honour in uniting with the king of England, especially as he had nothing farther in view than to preserve the peace of his own kingdom, and of the empire at large. But the French would hear no reason. Nothing was mentioned at Versailles but the defection of the king of Prussia, who had perfidiously abandoned his ancient allies; and the court gave vent to reproaches, which indicated that she would not confine her resentment to words.

“ We have seen (in the preceding chapter) by what arts and address the court of Vienna had endeavoured to gain upon that of Versailles, and with what assiduity the count de Kannitz had profited of his residences at Paris, to familiarize the minds of the French with the idea of the Austrian alliance. A momentary gust of ill humour on the part of Louis XV. and the fashion now introduced into the council of Versailles, of declaring against the king of Prussia, caused on a sudden this seed to germinate. The

excessive vivacity of the French nation, pictured an alliance with the house of Austria as a superior stroke of policy. Upon this, the count de Staremberg was charged by the empress queen to propose the alliance between the two courts. An agreement soon took place, both parties wishing the same thing; and the treaty was signed in the name of the most Christian king, at Versailles, by M. Rouillé and the abbé de Bernis, May 1, 1756. This famous treaty was of a defensive nature, containing merely in substance, the promise of succours to the amount of 24,000 men, in case either of the contracting powers was attacked. By this alliance, however, the empress queen was encouraged to proceed to the execution of that grand project which she had so long meditated against Prussia.

“The union recently formed between the houses of Bourbon and Austria, gave strong cause of suspicion, that the treaty of London would not be able to secure the tranquillity of Germany. The sword was suspended by a single hair. Nothing was wanting but a pretext, and when nothing but a pretext was wanting, war might be considered as already declared. It very soon appeared inevitable, for the event shewed that all the politicians deceived themselves in relation to Russia. That power, with whom the intrigues of the Austrian ministers prevailed, broke with England, in consequence of the alliance which the king of Great Britain had concluded with the king of Prussia. M. de Bestuchef experienced an indecisive moment, in which his passion for English guineas struggled against his hatred of the king, and that hatred in the end predominated. The empress Elizabeth, enemy of the French nation ever since the last embassy of M. de la Chétardie, chose rather to join in a league with her, than to preserve the shadow of union with a power which had Prussia for an ally. The court of Vienna keeping all the courts in Europe in a state of agitation, profited of

the passions of the sovereigns and of their ministers, in order to attract them to herself, and to govern them according to the ends which she had continually in her view."

\* \* \* \* \*

On this animated and masterly statement of the politics of the Continent, at this period, it may be pardonable to offer with great deference, two or three cursory remarks ; and,

I. It may admit of suspicion, that this great monarch, in the decision of the important question before him, was in part influenced by a secret emotion of vanity. France had assumed a tone of insulting superiority, and had affected to treat Prussia as a dependent power, which was not competent to support itself without her assistance and protection ; and which was under a sort of obligation to conform to that system of policy which she thought proper to adopt. This provoked the resentment of the king of Prussia, and might induce him more easily to listen to any proposals which came from the adverse quarter.

II. It should seem that his Prussian majesty did not exert himself in the most effectual manner to ascertain the real sentiments of the court of St. Petersburg. The answer which he received from lord Holderness, was such as might with certainty be expected : and the opinions of his ambassadors at Vienna and the Hague, were founded, as far as appears, on no specific data. By an application direct or indirect to the court of Petersburg itself, could the determination of the empress be known, with sufficient certainty to make it the foundation of a choice on which the prosperity and safety, perhaps even the existence of Prussia in a political view, depended. If this application was not a thing impracticable, the omission of it was a material error, whether we attribute it to negligence or to pride.

III. The king of Prussia appears not to have been deeply enough impressed with the probability, obvious as it was, that the alliance of the houses of Bourbon and Austria would be the consequence of that between Great Britain and Prussia. He relied too much upon the ancient and hereditary animosity subsisting between them. But that animosity, on the part of the house of Austria, was evidently superseded by the violence of her resentment and hatred against Prussia. And the refusal of the king of Prussia, not only to renew the alliance with France, but his entering into adverse engagements with England, would naturally throw that power into a predicament too favourable to the views of the court of Vienna, to leave any doubt of the ultimate result.

Upon a general review of the question, it was reasonably to be expected and inferred, that if Prussia united herself with France, she would have to contend against Austria, Russia, and England; if she united herself with England, she would have to contend against Austria, Russia, and France; either way, these were fearful odds indeed. It would therefore probably have been the wisest and safest policy for the king of Prussia, no less than the king of England, to have avoided entering into any new and specific engagements of any kind, or with any power whatever; and to have adopted a conciliatory method of procedure with respect to all. In this case, though he might have had Austria and Russia for enemies, France probably would not have entered into engagements with Austria, and most certainly would never have joined the confederacy against him; and as it was greatly and obviously her interest to prevent the re-conquest of Silesia by the empress queen, she might be expected sooner or later to have granted her powerful assistance to enable him to maintain the possession of it.

In a word, had the kings of Great Britain and Prussia maintained a steady and dignified neutrality, Austria



would probably have abstained from the attack of Prussia, from the apprehension of breaking with England; and France would have refrained from the invasion of Hanover, from the dread of exciting the resentment of all the Germanic powers. Russia, Sweden, and Saxony, would not have moved without Austria, and the peace of the Continent would have been ultimately preserved. But it is easy, in speculations of this nature, to discover on a subsequent re-vision of the conduct of men of the greatest ability and sagacity, plausible grounds of censure. The balance wavered almost *in equilibrio*, and the decision of the Prussian monarch, if eventually erroneous, only served to give scope and occasion to the most extraordinary and astonishing display of talents that has for many ages been exhibited on the theatre of the world.



MEMORIAL PRESENTED BY BARON GEMMINGEN,  
ELECTORAL MINISTER OF BRUNSWICK LUNENBURG, TO  
THE DIET OF THE EMPIRE, NOVEMBER 1758.

This memorial, though somewhat tedious and diffusive, contains information of great importance, and throws much light upon the situation of affairs in the empire at this period.



HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY hath been pleased to communicate to the diet of the empire, by a pretended most gracious decree of the aulic council, dated the 23th August last, mandates issued the 21st of the same month, on pain of the ban of the empire, and with avocatory letters thereto annexed, against his majesty the king of Great Britain, my most gracious master, and



also against some others of the most respectable princes of the Germanic empire. There is not an example of this kind in the history of the empire. His Britannic majesty, during the one and thirty years of his glorious reign, hath observed so unimpeachable a conduct towards all his co-estates of the empire, without distinction of religion, that no prince of the empire hath received greater proofs of esteem and confidence than he can produce : his majesty hath, as much as the weakest states, always observed right and justice.

On the death of the emperor Charles VI. he beheld the time which will be a famous æra in the history of the house of Austria, when the crown of France poured numerous armies into the empire, to exterminate that house, and make itself master of Germany. His majesty, in his double capacity of king and elector, put himself in the breach ; he led in person the auxiliary army of her majesty the empress queen, the greatest part of which was composed of his own troops ; at the battle of Dettingen he exposed his sacred person for that princess ; and his royal highness the duke of Cumberland his son, still bears the scars of wounds there received.

The year 1745, when his present Imperial majesty was chosen emperor, is still recent in the memory of all the states of the empire, as well as the pains which his Britannic majesty took upon that occasion. He purchased the preservation of the house of Austria, which was effected at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, with the blood of his subjects, and by means of the most important conquests of his crown. He hath endeavoured to maintain the Imperial crown in that house, by negotiations for the election of a king of the Romans. The treaty of succession, concluded with the duke of Modena, and the aggrandizement resulting from it to the house of Austria, was owing to his majesty's friendship for it.

Instead of a recompense, instead of performing the

tender protestations of regard and gratitude which his majesty then received from her majesty the empress queen, and which his magnanimity hinders him from making public; instead of the observation due to the most solemn treaties, her majesty the empress queen refuses him the assistance which she ought to give him, against an invasion proceeding wholly from the hatred of France, which his Britannic majesty has drawn upon himself by his friendship to that princess; and his Imperial majesty even denies him the deportatorial letters he solicited. The court of Vienna signs a treaty with the crown of France, in March 1757, at a time when his majesty's troops were quiet in his own dominions, by which the French troops were to pass the Weser the 10th of July, and enter the electorate of Hanover. She joins her troops to those of that crown, and ravages the king's dominions worse than the French troops had done. The same duke of Cumberland who was wounded at Dettingen in defending her Imperial majesty, is obliged to fight at Hastenbeck against the troops of that princess, which attacked the king's dominions.

The empress queen sends commissaries to Hanover, who are to share, and actually did share with the crown of France in the contributions. She rejects all proposals of peace; she dismisses the king's ministers from her court, and after the Divine Providence, according to its righteous ways, had by a victory granted to the king's army, delivered the electorate from its enemies, when we were endeavouring to hinder the French troops from entering it a second time, as all the world knows they threatened, his Imperial majesty, who by virtue of the capitulation which he has sworn, ought "to protect the empire, and at all times consider the electors as its internal members and main pillars, and oppose the entrance of foreign troops destined to oppress the estates of the empire,"—finds it his duty, without making the least mention of this inva-

sion by the French troops, to require his majesty to withdraw his troops from the countries where they then were, to put a stop to all his warlike preparations, and by that means again open a passage for the French army to enter his German dominions. His Imperial majesty thinks proper to recal the king's troops, to seduce them from their allegiance and duty to his majesty, to enjoin them never more to obey his orders, but to abandon their colours, their service, and their post; threatening the said troops with punishment in body, honours, and estates, and the king himself with being put under the ban of the empire, which is not in the power of the emperor, and employing in the proceedings on this occasion, a style proper only to be used to a Tuscan, or an Austrian subject.

The public has already judged of these proceedings, and history will transmit them to posterity without disguise, but with indelible colours.

His Britannic majesty still retains the same veneration for the Germanic body; that respect peculiar to the house of Brunswick Lunenburg, which will always hold it inviolable, is become habitual to his majesty in particular. Accordingly, he again hath recourse in quality of elector to the diet of the empire, by means of this memorial, though previously reserving to himself a power to do it hereafter in a more ample manner. The records of the empire shew what he has done for Germany, in such a manner, that at least, it cannot yet be forgotten in that country. He hopes that upon this occasion it will have some weight, the rather, as his high co-estates will easily consider that what is now endeavouring to be done to his majesty, may one day, and perhaps sooner than they think, be done to themselves.

His majesty, as elector, is charged, 1st, with not conforming to the resolutions taken the 17th of January, and the 9th of May, last year; but on the contrary, refusing his concurrence, and declaring for a neutrality. 2ndly,

with giving succours, aid, and assistance, to his majesty the king of Prussia, entering into an alliance with that prince, joining his troops with those of Prussia, under the command of a general in the service of his Prussian majesty, of sending English troops into Germany, and making them take possession of the city of Embden, and employing the auxiliary troops of some other states of the empire; and 3dly, it is complained, that contributions had been exacted in his majesty's name, of divers states of the empire.

With regard to the first charge, it is very true, in the deliberations held at the diet of the empire the beginning of last year, it was given as his majesty's opinion, as well as that of most of his protestant co-estates, that the present troubles should be amicably terminated. His majesty, in giving this opinion, had, as usual, no other view than what equity, and the good of the Germanic empire, seemed to him to require. Whatever judgment shall be formed of the unhappy war that hath broke out, the public will always remember, that, by a bare declaration of her majesty the empress queen, "that she would not attack his Prussian majesty," the rupture would have been avoided, and the effusion of much blood, as well as the desolation of Germany, prevented. The states that have suffered by the calamities of the war, may judge whether the way that was taken was the shortest for the re-establishment of peace, so much to be desired; and whether it were not to be wished that, laying aside all private views, his Britannic majesty's proposal had been followed.

It is true, his majesty took no part in the resolutions, which were contrary to his sentiments; but the laws of the empire have not thereby received the least infringement. The question, whether, *in materia collectarum*, the majority be sufficient, has been referred *ad comitia imperii* by the *instrumentum P. W.* art. v. § 52, and is



yet undecided. It is not by the plurality of voices that it can be there determined, but only by means of an amicable accommodation; since otherwise, that reference would have been a very useless course; and it is well known at the negotiations for the peace of Westphalia, what was the tendency of the opinion of the catholic states which formed the majority. Those very states, and all other members of the empire, ought however to consider well, whether it be their essential interest to acknowledge in the present case, that every state in the empire is obliged to submit to the majority of votes, in matters of consent, as in the present case, which the principal catholic electors have in other cases denied, and which will certainly be retorted upon them in proper time. But whatever principles shall be assumed with regard to this question, nothing is more evident than that, considering circumstances, and the situation of the affair then and now in question, his majesty could never be required to give his troops, to comply with those resolutions of the empire. All Germany knows, though the decree of the aulic Imperial council says not a word about it, that at the very time when those resolutions were taken, his majesty's electoral dominions were most unjustly threatened with an invasion by France. In the month of March that year, the court of Vienna signed a convention with France, by virtue of which the enemy was to pass the Weser in the month of July, and enter the king's territories. This invasion was made accordingly. The empress queen joined her own troops to those of France, and in return stipulated, by solemn treaties signed before-hand, to have half of the contributions that should be exacted. The damage which the king's subjects suffered by the first invasion, exclusive of the sums which the provinces were to furnish, and which have been paid out of the royal demesnes, amounted to several millions. And still the unjust rage of his majesty's enemies was not exhausted.



The French army which entered on the other side, under the command of the prince de Soubise, in company with the troops of Wirtemberg, which the reigning duke (a thing of which there is no example) led himself, under a French general, against a co-estate—hath again invaded, the second time, his majesty's dominions, and those of his allies, exacted insupportable contributions, carried off the king's officers, entirely foraged the country, and plundered several places, and committed the greatest disorders; whilst the court of Vienna boasts of having ordered this invasion, the sole end of which was to ravage the king's dominions and those of Hesse, as an effect of its magnanimity, and as a merit with the Germanic body.

If, in such circumstances, his majesty should be required to suspend the preparations he has begun, and join the troops he wants for his own defence to those which, from the arbitrary views of the court of Vienna, are led against his Prussian majesty by a prince who doth not belong to the generality of the empire, and on whom the command hath been conferred without a previous *conclusum* of the Germanic body; the right of the states of the empire to defend themselves when such defence squares not with the views of the Imperial court, ought at the same time to be settled. It is hoped that things are not yet come to this pass in Germany. Self-defence is the most urgent duty. The resolutions of the empire cannot deprive the meanest man, much less a free state, and an elector of the empire, of his right; nor require him to join the troops he wants for that end to those which, jointly with the troops of France, have invaded his country, and shared in the contributions there extorted.

In the second place, his majesty doth not deny, that he hath entered into an alliance with the king of Prussia, which is entirely conformable to the rules of right. But as he is accountable to God alone for what he doth as

king, on the other hand, in the report made of what he has done as elector, the times which preceded, have been confounded with those that followed, the French invasion. From the beginning of the last year, his majesty took every method to shew that the only thing he aimed at, without taking part otherwise in the war, was to oppose the French foreign troops, knowing they were sent only to invade his electorate, as indeed they have employed themselves almost wholly in ruining estates comprehended under the guarantee of the empire, as well those of the duke of Saxony, of the Ernestine line, of the duke of Brunswick Wolfenbuttle, the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, and the count of Lippe Schaumbourg, as those of his majesty. This just intention, founded on the laws from which his majesty hath been so far from derogating in the smallest matter, that no instance thereof hath been, or can be brought, did not nevertheless hinder the French troops, who were furnished with the emperor's letters requisitorial, from entering Germany in the avowed quality of auxiliary troops to the empress queen, in company with those of the house of Austria and the elector Palatine. The empire hath already been informed on the 3d of December last year, of the first proposals made, both to the Imperial court and the court of France, for an amicable determination of differences; proposals which could not have been rejected, had not an hostile attack been resolved on.

These offers, which, from the manner in which they were received, his majesty hath reason to regret that he ever made, leave no shadow of plausibility to the reproaches that may be made on account of the engagement that ensued, in whatever light the king of Prussia's cause may be considered. His majesty is indeed fully persuaded, that he might at any time have entered into an alliance with that prince for their common defence; but no one can doubt that, in this urgent necessity, when he was left alone, he had a right to seek assistance where it could be

got. No fault can possibly be found with that which the king of Prussia gave him to deliver the electoral states of Brunswick, and those of Wolfenbuttle, Hesse, and Buckebourg. The very nature of this deliverance, and the prudence and bravery with which it hath been effected, have acquired immortal glory to his most serene highness duke Ferdinand of Brunswick Lunenburg, who doth not command the king's army as a Prussian general; a glory which is the greater, as it is more laudable for that prince to have delivered from such heavy and unjust oppression the dominions of a king from whose family he is descended, and principalities in which he drew his first breath, where his ancestors have reigned, and where the duke his brother still reigns. It is with an equally just right that this duke, with the duke of Saxe Gotha, the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, and the court of Schaumbourg Lippe, put their troops into his majesty's pay. Posterity will hardly believe, that at a time when Austrian, Palatine, and Wirtemberg auxiliaries, were employed to invade the countries belonging to the states of the empire, other members of the Germanic body who employed auxiliaries in their defence, were threatened with the ban. His majesty ordered the English troops to be sent over, and possession to be taken of Embden, in his quality of king, and hath no occasion to give account thereof to any. Meanwhile, the laws of the empire permit the states thereof to make use of foreign troops in their own defence; they forbid only the introduction of them into the empire, to invade the dominions of another, as the empress queen hath done.

In the third and last place, his majesty the king of Great Britain, elector of Brunswick Lunenburg, sent ministers, particularly to the Palatinate court and that of Cologne, to divert them from joining in the designs of France against his dominions. It cannot therefore be doubted, that it would have been highly agreeable to him,

if those courts had taken measures that would have freed him from the burden of the war. But none can expect that his majesty should with indifference see himself treated as an enemy by his co-estates. The elector of Cologne and the bishop of Liege had no troops that were wanted in the French army; but in consideration of subsidies, opened to it the gates of their towns, and gave it all the assistance in their power; without which, that army could not at that time have proceeded so far as the electoral estates, where the Austrian and Palatine troops behaved much worse than the French themselves. How can it be expected that his majesty, after God hath blessed his arms with success, should not resent this treatment? The laws of the empire forbid the attacking the estates of the empire; but they permit defence against, and the pursuit of those who, by their invasion, have violated the public peace.

If the crown of France be free to ravage the dominions of the duke of Brunswick and the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, because they have given the king auxiliary troops; if the empress queen may, for the assistance she hath lent the French king to attack the king's dominions, appropriate to herself half of the contributions raised there, his majesty ought to be equally permitted to make those states who have favoured the unjust enterprises of his enemies, feel the burden of the war.

These are facts notorious to the whole empire. His majesty hath too good an opinion of the penetration of his high co-estates, to doubt of their perceiving the importance of them, and laying to heart what the merit he has acquired with the empire might have required, and still requires; and therefore his majesty expects that the diet will, by way of advice, propose to his Imperial majesty to annul his most inconsistent mandates, and not only take the most effectual measures to protect the electorate and the countries of his majesty, and those of Brunswick,



Wolfenbüttele, Hesse Cassel, and Lippe Schaumbourg, and procure them a proper indemnification, but also give orders for those proceedings against the empress queen, as arch-duchess of Austria, the elector Palatine, and the duke of Wirtemberg, which her majesty, without being required to do it puts in force against his Britannic majesty, elector of Brunswick Lunenburg. For which end, the undersigned most humbly requests your excellencies to ask immediately necessary instructions from your principals.

Can it be said that this was approving of a convention, and demanding an explanation, so important and so contrary to its true meaning? His majesty the king of Denmark had too great regard for the king, to think it just to engage him to subscribe to that, as a consequence of the treaty signed at Cloister-Seven. If marechal Richelieu did not mean by his pretended words of honour, the assurance not to begin hostilities before the rupture of the negotiation, we own we know not what he meant; at least that is the sense in which we have ever understood those expressions, and in which we have executed the convention. The French ministry know very well, that the chief point is to determine how long the obligation of the treaty ought to subsist, according to the views of the contracting parties. "Hence," say they, "it is evident, that the expression of final reconciliation is made use of in article 3d, only to denote that Bremen and Verden were to remain in the hands of the French till that final reconciliation should happen. This is the same thing as if it had been stipulated, that the French should remain in possession of that country till a peace. That the duke of Cumberland knew very well that his most Christian majesty had formerly refused to treat with him about a neutrality for Hanover; that he had therefore left out the condition of a separate reconciliation, fearing that his proposal might have caused the convention to be rejected,



which he had so much interest and honour to obtain. That it is plain from the preamble to the convention, that the intention of it was to hinder the countries of Bremen and Verden from being any longer the theatre of the war."

His royal highness the duke of Cumberland, so far from being convinced of the impossibility of obtaining a separate accommodation for the king, knew that the court of Vienna had promised her utmost efforts to bring it about, and had even, for that purpose, sent a courier to Versailles, to hasten its conclusion. These promises were the more to be depended on, as France had all along pretended in her writings, that her sole motive in not acceding to these proposals, was, because she was not willing to do it without the concurrence of her allies. The final reconciliation of the two sovereigns, namely, the king as elector, and the king of France, had certainly no relation to a general peace. The proposals made to France of an accommodation, and known both to cardinal Richelieu and count Lynar, could leave no difficulty as to the true sense of the term of a final reconciliation. She may exaggerate as much as she will, the dangerous situation, and the extremity to which the king's army was reduced when the suspension of arms was concluded; but the event could not have been more fatal than that which France wanted to bring about, as the intention of the two contracting parties; for, by her principles, the states of the king would have remained in the hands of the enemy as long as the court of Versailles should have thought proper to keep them; the auxiliary troops would have been disarmed, and those of the king exposed to total destruction. It is plain, that the preamble to the convention speaks only of the reasons which induced his Danish majesty to interpose in that affair. The king gives them that justice which they deserve, and looks upon the case of the king of Denmark as a proof of his inestimable friendship, and at the same time as an effect of his humanity, and of

the generous concern which his Danish majesty took to prevent the effusion of blood, and to stop the scourge of war. But by this also the king is persuaded, that the court of Copenhagen never intended to become an instrument to France, to make the king submit to the severe terms which the latter wanted to impose upon him, under pretence of the convention, and by means of pretended necessary explanations.

The disarming of the Hessians, is properly the rock on which the convention split, so the French spare no pains to give a colour to this pretence. "The duke of Brunswick," say they, "ratified without any alteration the convention signed at Vienna, relating to the disarming of his troops. The landgrave had formerly demanded to be treated as that prince; it was not natural to trust to a considerable body of troops which submitted only through fear; and it was a silly precaution to take away the means of offence, without being sure of taking away the inclination. It follows evidently from the terms of the convention, that these troops being disbanded, they were disengaged from all connexions with the king of England, elector of Hanover, who consequently had no right to retain them, and to steal away the son of the duke of Brunswick. The only condition which the Hanoverian general had a right to demand for the auxiliary troops was, that they should not be regarded as prisoners of war; and he could not pretend but that they had been disarmed. The condition of disarmed troops, is by no means equal to that of troops prisoners of war."

It is not our purpose here to examine the negotiations which, as is pretended, the landgrave and the duke of Brunswick entered upon with the court of France; but every one knows that these princes thought themselves in no wise bound by what passed. The design of sowing diffidence among the allies, which France had certainly in view, by alleging these pretended negotiations, will not have its desired effect. Nor will we trouble ourselves to

examine whether the prudence and interest of the court required the disarming of the auxiliary troops. Though that court has long adopted it as a maxim, to consult only her own interest, and to give no other reason than her own convenience, without considering whether it would be possible to reconcile these motives with the laws of justice and equity; these are not, however, sufficient means to justify to the eyes of the public the pretensions formed with regard to the auxiliary troops. Nor need we enter into explanations with France, about the manner in which the Brunswick troops were retained, nor of that which concerns his royal highness the hereditary prince of Wolfenbüttele. It would be very easy to free ourselves from all reproach on that head. It is sufficient that these two articles were amicably terminated with his royal highness the duke of Brunswick.

The question between the king and France is, whether the king had reason to oppose the disarming of the auxiliary troops, and whether he had a right to keep them in his pay? We need only see the convention to decide in favour of the affirmative. It does not contain one word which can naturally mean a disarming; nor does it contain any tacit consent to this pretence. It is indeed stipulated, that the troops should not be considered as prisoners; but if it could be concluded from hence, that the disarming had been granted, it must at the same time be owned that the convention delivered up these troops to the mercy and discretion of France. The French ministry themselves would not go upon so strange a supposition.

These troops, in quality of troops, and consequently armed, were to return home, and there to find quarters. It was in consequence of this regulation, that advice was given of the convention to the sovereigns of the auxiliary troops. It is absurd to say, that by this means they had been disbanded. The landgrave's troops remained notwithstanding in the pay of Great Britain,

and the troops of the dukes of Brunswick and Gotha, and also those of the count de la Lippe, never lost their quality of subsidiary troops of the king as elector. To maintain the contrary, would be to say that his majesty, in quality of king and elector, had the power of revoking the treaties of subsidy concluded between them, without consulting these princes; a power which his majesty does not pretend to, and which the duke of Cumberland neither had nor could have a design to make use of. The true sense of the convention certainly was, that during the continuance of the suspension of arms, these troops should remain quiet in their respective countries, and at the expiration of the suspension, they should be at liberty to renew their services by virtue of treaties, and in consequence of their quality of subsidiaries, which was by no means destroyed. This having happened, it would be useless to examine the extent of the articles of the convention, with regard to the destination of the Hessian troops in the pay of England.

The French ministry make but a very short answer to the accusations of their having broke the convention, set forth in the *motives*, and general Zastrow's letter of November 14. They say, "that none of the reasons alleged, could occasion the breaking of the convention: that no stipulation had been made for the castle of Schartzfeld, nor the restitution of prisoners; that no mention had been made of the treatment of the conquered countries; and lastly, that the things set forth in M. Zastrow's letter, did not happen till after the convention had been first broken by the Hanoverians."

When one of the contracting parties thinks itself authorized to break a treaty, and no recourse can be had to a superior judgment, it is most naturally for the other to think itself equally disengaged from all obligation. It is true, that in the treaty of Cloister-Seven no mention had been made of prisoners of war, but this point was adjusted



six days after, by the act of accommodation concluded at Bremerworden the 16th of September, 1757, between general Sporcken and general Villemar.

The suspension of arms had put an end to the hostilities of all sorts which the French army could commit against the king, in quality of elector. But was it not an hostility, to take by assault the castle of Schartzfeld, to plunder it, and carry off the garrison prisoners of war? Was it not an hostility to redouble, after signing the convention, the exactions and violences towards the king's subjects, instead of granting them the relief which they expected? When a people submits, and ceases to make resistance, they have a natural right to a milder treatment from the conqueror, than another which is still in fear of hostilities. The subjects of the electorate tried, though impossible, to satisfy the exactions that were imposed upon them. Their resignation only multiplied the most exorbitant demands, accompanied with threatenings, which but too plainly shewed that the total ruin and destruction of the country would be the consequences of a convention concluded to prevent this misfortune. Lastly, if the other breaches by the French had not existed before the open breaking of the convention, general Zastrow would have no reason to complain of them in his letter of the 14th of November.

They pretend to justify themselves by saying, "that the pretence of disarming the Hessians had been taken away by the king's complaisance in desisting from that condition; that what was said in the *motives*, was false; that France had but very lately softened her language on that head; that as early as the 2d November, marechal Richelieu had declared his having desisted from them, by virtue of his full powers; and in that case the Hanoverian general had no pretence left for executing the convention of Cloister-Seven."

On the 17th of October, 1757, count Lynar wrote to



his majesty's electoral minister, that marechal Richelieu's courier was returned from Versailles, with instructions which expressly said the court would hear of no terms of peace; that it was resolved to hold to the scheme of explanation; and lastly, that it would less than ever desist from the condition of disarming the Hessians; and that it had rejected the offer of his Danish majesty to receive these troops into his territories.

It was therefore necessary to come to a determination on this head, or to wait to see the war kindled up afresh. The battle of Rosbach happened on the 5th November, soon after the arrival of that letter. The king could not foresee that France would then change her tone. He saw himself obliged to take measures, in consequence of the declarations which he had been informed of by the letter of October 17th; nor could he afterwards change them, when it at length pleased the court of Versailles to come down, though very little, from her unjust pretensions. On one hand, he had already addressed himself to his Prussian majesty; and on the other, the proceedings of France shewed but too plainly that he had reason to be diffident of her fidelity. Besides, it is not true, that she desisted from the disarming of all the auxiliary troops. In marechal Richelieu's letter of November 9th, he makes only mention of the Hessians, and is silent with regard to the fate of the troops of Brunswick. Lastly, she never renounced her pretensions to keep the states of the king till a general peace.

It is plain, that during the continuance of a negotiation, and before every thing be regulated and concluded, the two parties have a power to retract their engagements. If all difficulties had been removed by the convention of Cloister-Seven, what need was there of a new negotiation? France, persisting to want further clauses and explications to be added to it, gave the king an incontestible right to declare himself according to the nature of the subject and circumstances,

Not content with having combated the motives which engaged the king to take up arms, they criticise violently upon the manner in which that was executed. "Had there been," say they, "any honourable way of withdrawing from the execution of that solemn act, it would have been to declare it void, by putting themselves in the same position they were before it was concluded. But instead of that, the most odious means were made use of to violate that capitulation successively, and with impunity. The time was spun out for three months, to find an opportunity to break the convention. The French army was suffered to go to Halberstadt, and they waited till it was separated by the bad season. They seized the opportunity of a repulse, to come out of the limits prescribed them, under pretence of extending their quarters. They afterwards took advantageous posts, under pretences equally contrary to the convention. They made all the dispositions for the siege of Harbourg, without any previous declaration of war; and having made all these preparations, and when they thought the enemy sufficiently weakened and deceived to fight them with advantage, they declared that hostilities were to be commenced, and that they considered the convention as broken, while they were marching against them, and attacking their posts."

The more the author of the *parallel* exhausts his rhetoric in this sort of declamation, so much the less regard doth he pay to truth. It is certain and incontestible, that the Hanoverians conformed on their part in every respect to the convention, as it was signed. It was neither the king's generals, nor marechal Richelieu, who caused it to be broken by their declarations; but the court of Versailles, which would not look upon the convention as obligatory, unless it should be extended to the disarming of the auxiliary troops, and unless the king would leave his country to the discretion of his enemies till a general peace. The king therefore had

the same right to look upon this affair as depending upon the resolution of the respective courts, and to take his measures accordingly. He made use of that right. It was natural not to commit hostilities as long as count Lynar's negotiation lasted: but that minister, as the court of Versailles well knows, could never bring about negotiations of peace, which was, however, the true intention of the suspension of arms. Could it be thought strange if the king, by virtue of the right which the inflexible severity of his enemies gave him, determined himself according to the events that happened, and the victory gained over the French army at Rosbach? This event, however, did not influence his majesty's resolutions. If any one will but calculate the date of these events, he will be convinced of the contrary. The battle of Rosbach happened on the 5th November, and the motions of the Hanoverian army were renewed on the 26th of the same month. The king could not have been informed at London in so short a time of that success, to give orders to his minister to solicit the consent of his Prussian majesty with regard to prince Ferdinand, to whom the king offered the command of the army, so as to receive the king of Prussia's answer, to hear of the prince's arrival, and cause hostilities to be renewed. If the rules of good faith had not been scrupulously observed, the French army might have been reduced to a more dangerous situation than it really was. In what a critical situation would it have found itself, if the king's troops, as they were fully authorized to do, had marched on the first discovery of the design, to disarm the auxiliary troops, and at the same time that the battle of Rosbach happened, and when marechal Richelieu was at Halberstadt with his army, had attacked him in the rear! The operations of the army did not begin till after the king of Prussia was gone into Silesia, and when the French were not only upon their guard, but the first columns of their

army had even advanced beyond Lunenburg, with design to obtain, by open force, the unjust conditions proposed by the court of Versailles. As to the pretended preparations for the siege of Harbourg, we know nothing at all of them. We do not deny but the quarters of the troops were extended; but that we were obliged to through unavoidable necessity, the quarters destined to receive only the Hanoverian troops, not being at the same time sufficient for those of Hesse and Brunswick also, which by a natural consequence of the proceedings of France, could not be separated from the body of the army. Neither of the two French detachments were surprised: the two armies were assembled when the scene of operations was again opened, and in this respect they were in the same situation as at Cloister-Seven. Nor was it in the year 1757, but in the year following, that the French army was driven out of his majesty's German dominions. The victory gained at Rosbach, the bad season, the diseases and decrease of the French army, events which never followed from the king's resolutions, could not oblige his majesty to maintain a convention which in itself was not binding, and which France would not acknowledge as such when it was a proper time.

We flatter ourselves we have fully answered the reproaches of the court of Versailles, at least none of the objections that relate to the decision of the subject have been wilfully forgot. We do not pretend to anticipate the judgment of the public. We leave it to pronounce, after having seen a true representation of his Britannic majesty's conduct, whether the ministry of Versailles are in the right, when they say, "that such odious principles and proceedings can only be owing to the artifices and evil councils of some corrupt ministers."

We will not trouble ourselves to answer this abusive language, nor will we retort it, but pass over the above, as well as many other reproaches equally odious and



trifling. The French ministry cannot be so ignorant of the judgment which their own nation forms of their principles, to doubt that we might, if we had a mind, reproach them with their evil counsels and measures, equally ruinous to France and Germany, in a manner which even in France itself would not fail to make an impression. It is, however, necessary to add two remarks on what has been said. Our days have produced a phenomenon of which history does not furnish us with an example: we have seen the houses of Austria and Bourbon uniting their forces to give chains to Europe, and especially to Germany. Providence does not want means to prevent this misfortune. This dominion, so eagerly sought for, could not be exercised in concert if they should make themselves masters of it. That alliance, the first years of which have flowed with rivers of blood, will occasion no less bloodshed when it comes one day to be broken; but the violent and imminent dangers with which the political system of Europe, and so many kingdoms and states are threatened during this crisis, merit the most serious attention of those who are at the helm of government. Especially, it is manifest that the protestant religion is in inevitable danger, notwithstanding the false protestations given to the professors of it. The pretended schemes of secularization ascribed to his Britannic majesty and the king of Prussia, are so ill-founded, that they are taken upon the authority of an obscure work, every page of which shews the author to have no right to be a negotiator of peace. Never had the catholic religion less to fear than at a time when its arms are united, and dissention reigns among the protestants. It is not the same with regard to what the latter have to fear from their enemies. The designs of the court of Vienna to render the catholic religion predominant in Germany, have been plainly exhibited by the reflections and advices of a



very able minister, who certainly would not have imposed upon his court, and who had his information from the fountain head. The justice of his discoveries has been proved by the event, for we see not one catholic state of the empire but what has bowed the neck to this new system, out of a zeal for religion, notwithstanding the real disadvantages that must naturally follow. It is only answered to these arguments, that the treaty of Versailles has been founded upon the treaty of Westphalia. But are not the courts which have contracted these new engagements, free to change them at pleasure, and according to circumstances? Besides, if the protestant states, as they pretend, are bound to adopt the treaty of the peace of Westphalia in what sense the catholics please to give it, it is but too clear that the protestants are already divested of the most important privileges granted to them by that treaty.

All the king's measures will ever tend to the general safety of Europe, to the liberty and independence of the empire, and the maintenance of the protestant religion. Neither the misfortune which his estates of Germany have suffered, nor the base treatment which he hath received from the court of Vienna, nor the conduct of several of his co-estates which favour the unjust designs of that court, will ever be able divert him from an end so worthy of himself. He hopes that the Divine Providence will continue to bless the arms which he has taken up in his own defence, and that it will make this the means of procuring peace to the empire, and also of blasting the wicked designs of those who have brought into it the flame of war, and have opened a scene of calamities of which we have not seen an instance since the peace of Westphalia.

## GENERAL WOLFE TO MR. SECRETARY PITT.

*A. D. 1759.*

This letter was written immediately previous to the celebrated and successful attack on the city of Quebec, by gaining the heights of Abraham. The battle of Quebec was fought on the 15th, and the city surrendered on the 18th September, 1759. The letter itself is a model of perspicuity, simplicity, and elegance.

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*Head-Quarters at Montmorenci,  
in the river St. Laurence, Sept. 2d, 1759.*

SIR,

I WISH I could upon this occasion have the honour of transmitting to you a more favourable account of the progress of his majesty's arms; but the obstacles we have met with in the operations of the campaign, are much greater than we had reason to expect, or could foresee; not so much from the number of the enemy, though superior to us, as from the natural strength of the country, which the marquis de Montcalm seems wisely to depend upon.

When I learned that succours of all kinds had been thrown into Quebec, that five battalions of regular troops completed from the best inhabitants of the country, some of the troops of the colony, and every Canadian that was able to bear arms, besides several nations of savages, had taken the field in a very advantageous situation, I could not flatter myself that I should be able to reduce the place. I sought, however, an occasion to attack their army, knowing well that with these troops I was able to fight, and that a victory might disperse them.

We found them encamped along the shore of Beaufort, from the river of St. Charles to the falls of Montmorenci, and entrenched in every accessible part. The 27th June we landed upon the isle of Orleans, but receiving a message from the admiral, that there was reason to think that the enemy had artillery and a force upon the point of Levi, I detached brigadier Monckton with four battalions to drive them from thence. He passed the river the 29th at night, and marched the next day to the point: he obliged the enemy's irregulars to retire, and possessed himself of that post; the advanced parties upon this occasion had two or three skirmishes with the Canadians and Indians, with little loss on either side. Colonel Carleton marched with a detachment to the westernmost point of the isle of Orleans, from whence our operations are like to begin.

It was absolutely necessary to possess these two points, and fortify them, because from either one or the other the enemy might make it impossible for any ship to lie in the bason of Quebec, or even within two miles of it. Batteries of cannon and mortars were erected with great dispatch on the point of Levi, to bombard the town and magazines, and to injure the works and batteries. The enemy, perceiving these works in some forwardness, passed the river with 1600 men to attack and destroy them. Unluckily they fell into confusion, fired upon one another, and went back again, by which we lost an opportunity of defeating this large detachment. The effect of this artillery has been so great, though across the river, that the upper town is considerably damaged, and the lower town entirely destroyed.

The works for the security of our hospitals and stores on the island of Orleans, being finished on the 9th of July at night, we passed the north channel, and encamped near the enemy's left, the river Montmorenci between us. The next morning captain Dank's company of rangers, posted

in a wood to cover some workmen, were attacked and defeated by a body of Indians, and had so many killed and wounded as to be almost disabled for the rest of the campaign. The enemy also suffered in this affair, and were in their turn driven off by the nearest troops.

The ground to the eastward of the falls seemed to be, as it really is, higher than that on the enemy's side, and to command it in a manner which might be made useful to us. There is, besides, a ford below the falls, which may be passed for some hours in the latter part of the ebb, and beginning of the flood tide; and I had hopes that possibly means might be found of passing the river above, so as to fight M. Montcalm upon terms of less disadvantage than directly attacking his entrenchments. In reconnoitring the river Montmorenci, we found it fordable at a place about three miles up; but the opposite bank was entrenched, and so steep and woody, that it was to no purpose to attempt a passage there. The escort was twice attacked by the Indians, who were as often repulsed; but in these rencounters we had forty men killed and wounded.

The 18th July, two men of war, two armed sloops, and two transports with some troops on board, passed by the town without any loss, and got into the upper river. This enabled me to reconnoitre the country above, where I found the same attention on the enemy's side, and great difficulties on our's, arising from the nature of the ground, and the obstacles to our communication with the fleet. But what I feared most was, that if we should land between the town and the river Cape Rouge, the body first landed could not be reinforced before they were attacked by the enemy's whole army.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, I thought once more of attempting it at St. Michael's, about three miles above the town; but perceiving that the enemy were jealous of the design, were preparing against it, and had actually



brought artillery and a mortar, which, being so near to Quebec, they could increase as they pleased, to play upon the shipping, and it must have been many hours before we could attack them, even supposing a favourable night for the boats to pass by the town unhurt, it seemed so hazardous that I thought it best to desist. However, to divide the enemy's force, and to draw their attention as high up the river as possible, and to procure some intelligence, I sent a detachment under the command of colonel Carleton to land at the point de Frempe, to attack whatever he might find there, bring off some prisoners, and all the useful papers he could get. I had been informed that a number of the inhabitants of Quebec had retired to that place, and that probably we should find a magazine of provisions there. The colonel was fired upon by a body of Indians the moment he landed, but they were soon dispersed and driven into the woods. He searched for magazines, but to no purpose, brought off some prisoners, and returned with little loss.

After this business I came back to Montmorenci, where I found that brigadier Townshend had, by a superior fire, prevented the French from erecting a battery on the bank of the river, from whence they intended to cannonade our camp. I now resolved to take the first opportunity which presented itself of attacking the enemy, though posted to great advantage, and every where prepared to receive us.

As the men of war cannot for want of a sufficient depth of water, come near enough to the enemy's entrenchments to annoy them in the least, the admiral had prepared two transports drawing but little water, which upon occasion could be run aground to favour a descent. With the help of these vessels, which I understood would be carried by the tide close in shore, I proposed to make myself master of a detached redoubt near to the water's edge, and whose situation appeared to be out of musquet shot of the entrenchment upon the hill. If the enemy supported this



detached piece, it would necessarily bring on an engagement—what we most wished for; and if not, I should have it in my power to examine their situation, so as to be able to determine where we could best attack them. Preparations were accordingly made for an engagement. The 31st July in the afternoon, the boats of the fleet were filled with grenadiers and a part of general Monckton's brigade from the point of Levi. The two brigades under the brigadiers Townshend and Murray were ordered to be in readiness to pass the ford when it should be thought necessary; to facilitate the passage of this corps, the admiral had placed the Centurion in the channel, so that she might check the fire of the lower battery, which commanded the ford. This ship was of great use, as her fire was very judiciously directed. A great quantity of artillery was placed upon the eminence, so as to batter and enfilade the left of their entrenchments.

From the vessel which ran aground nearest in, I observed that the redoubt was too much commanded to be kept without very great loss; and the more, as the two armed ships could not be brought near enough to cover both with their artillery and musquetry, which I at first conceived they might. But as the enemy seemed in some confusion, and we were prepared for an action, I thought it a proper time to make an attempt upon their entrenchments. Orders were sent to the brigadier-general to be ready with the troops under their command; brigadier Monckton to land, and the brigadiers Townshend and Murray to pass the ford. At a proper time of the tide the signal was made, but in rowing towards the shore, many of the boats grounded upon a ledge that runs off a considerable distance. This accident put us in some disorder, lost a great deal of time, and obliged me to send an officer to stop brigadier Townshend's march, whom I then observed to be in motion. While the seamen were getting the boats off,

the enemy fired a number of shells and shot; but did no considerable damage. As soon as this disorder could be set a little to rights, and the boats were ranged in a proper manner, some of the officers of the navy went in with me to find a better place to land. We took one flat-bottomed boat with us to make the experiment, and as soon as we had found a fit part of the shore, the troops were ordered to disembark, thinking it not yet too late for the attempt. The thirteen companies of grenadiers, and 200 of the second royal American battalion got first on shore. The grenadiers were ordered to form themselves into four distinct bodies, and to begin the attack, supported by brigadier Monckton's corps, as soon as the troops had passed the ford, and were at hand to assist. But whether from the noise and hurry at landing, or from some other cause, the grenadiers, instead of forming themselves as they were directed, ran on impetuously towards the enemy's entrenchments in the utmost disorder and confusion, without waiting for the corps which were to sustain them, and join in the attack. Brigadier Monckton was not landed, and brigadier Townshend was at a considerable distance, though upon his march to join us in very great order. The grenadiers were checked by the enemy's first fire, and obliged to shelter themselves in or about the redoubt which the French abandoned upon the approach. In this situation they continued for some time, unable to form under so hot a fire, and having many gallant officers wounded, who, careless of their persons, had been solely intent upon their duty. I saw the absolute necessity of calling them off, that they might form themselves under brigadier Monckton's corps, which was now landed, and drawn up on the beach in extreme good order.

By this new accident, and this second delay, it was near night; a sudden storm came on, and the tide began to make; so that I thought it most advisable not to persevere in so difficult an attack, lest, in case of a repulse,

the retreat of brigadier Townshend's corps might be hazardous and uncertain.

Our artillery had a great effect upon the enemy's left, where brigadiers Townshend and Murray were to have attacked, and it is probable that if those accidents I have spoken of had not happened, we should have penetrated there, whilst our left and centre, more remote from our artillery, must have bore all the violence of the musquetry. The French did not attempt to interrupt our march. Some of their savages came down to murder such wounded as could not be brought off, and to scalp the dead, as their custom is.

The place where the attack was intended, has these advantages over all others hereabout: our artillery could be brought into use; the greatest part, or even the whole of the troops might act at once; and the retreat, in case of a repulse, was secure at least for a certain time of the tide. Neither one nor other of these advantages can any where else be found. The beach upon which the troops were drawn up was of deep mud, with holes, and cut by several gullies. The hill to be ascended very steep, and not every where practicable. The enemy numerous in their entrenchments, and their fire hot. If the attack had succeeded, our loss must certainly have been great and theirs inconsiderable, from the shelter which the neighbouring woods afforded them. The river of St. Charles still remained to be passed before the town was invested. All these circumstances I considered; but the desire to act in conformity to the king's intentions induced me to make this trial, persuaded that a victorious army finds no difficulties.

Immediately after this check I sent brigadier Murray above the town with 1200 men, directing him to assist rear-admiral Holmes in the destruction of the French ships, if they could be got at, in order to open a communication with general Amherst. The brigadier was to

seek every favourable opportunity of fighting some of the enemy's detachments, provided he could do it upon tolerable terms, and to use all the means in his power to provoke them to attack him. He made two different attempts to land upon the north shore without success, but in a third was more fortunate. He landed unexpectedly at De Chambaul, and burnt a magazine there in which were some provisions, some ammunition, and all the spare stores, clothing, arms, and baggage of their army. The prisoners he took informed him of the surrender of the fort of Niagara, and we discovered by intercepted letters that the enemy had abandoned Carillon and Crown Point, were retired to the isle Aux Noix, and that general Amherst was making preparations to pass the lake Champlain, to fall upon M. Bourlemaque's corps, which consists of three battalions of foot, and as many Canadians as make the whole amount to three thousand.

The admiral's dispatches and mine would have gone eight or ten days sooner, if I had not been prevented writing by a fever. I found myself so ill, and am still so weak, that I begged the general officers to consult together for the public utility. They were all of opinion, that as more ships and provisions are now got above the town, they should try, by conveying up a corps of four or five thousand men, which is nearly the whole strength of the army after the points of Levi and Orleans are left in a proper state of defence, to draw the enemy from their present situation, and bring them to an action. I have acquiesced in their proposal, and we are preparing to put it into execution.

The admiral and I have examined the town, with a view to a general assault; but after consulting with the chief engineer, who is well acquainted with the interior parts of it, and after viewing it with the utmost attention, we found, that though the batteries of the lower town might be easily silenced by the men of war, yet the business of



an assault would be little advanced by that, since the few passages that lead from the lower to the upper town are carefully entrenched, and the upper batteries cannot be affected by the ships, which must receive considerable damage from them and from the mortars. The admiral would readily join in this or in any other measure for the public service: but I could not propose to him an undertaking of so dangerous a nature, and promising so little success.

To the uncommon strength of the country, the enemy have added, for the defence of the river, a great number of floating batteries and boats. By the vigilance of these, and the Indians round our different posts, it has been impossible to execute any thing by surprize. We have had almost daily skirmishes with these savages, in which they are generally defeated, but not without loss on our side.

By the list of disabled officers, many of whom are of rank, you may perceive, sir, that the army is much weakened. By the nature of the river the most formidable part of this armament is deprived of the power of acting, yet we have almost the whole force of Canada to oppose. In this situation there is such a choice of difficulties, that I own myself at a loss how to determine. The affairs of Great Britain I know require the most vigorous measures; but then the courage of a handful of brave men should be exerted only where there is some hope of a favourable event. However, you may be assured, sir, that the small part of the campaign which remains, shall be employed, as far as I am able, for the honour of his majesty and the interest of the nation; in which I am sure of being seconded by the admiral, and by the generals; happy, if our efforts here can contribute to the success of his majesty's arms in any other parts of America.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. WOLFE.



## CONDUCT OF LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE.

*A. D. 1759.*

IN the general orders given out after the victory of Minden, the commander-in-chief expressed in the strongest terms his approbation and admiration of the behaviour of the English infantry; declaring further "his persuasion, that if he had had the good fortune to have had the marquis of Granby at the head of the cavalry of the right wing, his presence would have greatly contributed to make the decision of that day more complete and more brilliant."

Lord George Sackville, finding himself reflected upon in this pointed and public manner, addressed himself by letter to colonel Fitzroy, requesting him, who, as aide-de-camp to prince Ferdinand, had delivered his serene highness's orders to his lordship, to bear testimony to the propriety of his conduct. Colonel Fitzroy on the same day returned the following answer:

MY LORD,

*Minden, Aug. 3, 1759.*

His serene highness, upon some report made to him by the duke of Richmond, sent captain Ligonier and myself with orders for the British cavalry to advance. His serene highness was at this instant one or two brigades beyond the English infantry, towards the left. Upon my arrival on the right of the cavalry, I found captain Ligonier with your lordship. Notwithstanding, I declared his serene highness's orders to you; upon which you desired I would not be in a hurry. I made answer, that galloping had put me out of breath, which made me speak very quick. I then repeated the orders for the British cavalry to advance towards the left; and at the same time mentioning the circumstance that occasioned the

orders, added, "that it was a glorious opportunity for the English to distinguish themselves, and that your lordship, by leading them on, would gain immortal honour."

You yet expressed your surprise at the order, saying, it was impossible the duke could mean to break the line. My answer was, that I delivered his serene highness's orders word for word as he gave them. Upon which you asked which way the cavalry was to march, and who was to be their guide? I undertook to lead them towards the left, round the little wood on the left, as they were then drawn up where they might be little exposed to the enemy's cannonade. Your lordship continued to think my orders neither clear nor exactly delivered; and expressing your desire to see prince Ferdinand, ordered me to lead you to him; which order I was obeying, when we met his serene highness. During this time I did not see the cavalry advance. Captain Smith, one of your aids-de-camp, once or twice made me repeat the orders I had before delivered to your lordship; and I hope he will do me the justice to say they were clear and exact. He went up to you whilst we were going to find the duke, as I imagine, being sensible of the clearness of my orders, and the necessity of their being immediately obeyed. I heard your lordship give him some orders: what they were I cannot say, but he immediately rode back towards the cavalry.

Upon my joining the duke, I repeated to him the orders I had delivered to you; and appealing to his serene highness, to know whether they were the same he had honoured me with, I had the satisfaction to hear him declare they were very exact. His serene highness immediately asked where the cavalry was; and upon my making answer that lord George did not understand the order, but was coming to speak to his serene highness, he expressed his surprise strongly.

I hope your lordship will think I did nothing but my duty as aid-de-camp, in mentioning to his serene highness my orders being so much questioned by your lordship.

I am, &c.

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Lord George Sackville, affecting to feel the utmost astonishment at having thus fallen under the displeasure of the commander-in-chief, immediately applied for his majesty's permission to return to England, in order to answer any accusation that should be brought against him, as no court-martial could be held upon him in Germany. This was very easily acceded to; and on his arrival in England, he found the voice of the public almost unanimous in the censure and condemnation of his conduct. His lordship was also informed in writing by the secretary of state, lord Holderness, that a court-martial would be granted as soon as the officers capable of giving evidence could leave their posts; and previously to the receipt of this letter, he was dismissed from all his military employments.

On the 29th of the following February, 1760, a court-martial was accordingly held upon his lordship, which continued till the 3d April; at the termination of which, the court declared its opinion, that lord George Sackville was guilty of having disobeyed the orders of the prince Ferdinand, and adjudged his lordship to be unfit to serve his majesty in any military capacity whatever.

This sentence was confirmed by the king, who moreover signified his pleasure, "that it should be given out in public orders, not only in Britain, but in America, and every quarter of the globe where any English troops happened to be, that officers, being convinced that neither high birth nor great employments can shelter offences of such a nature, and that seeing they are subject to censures

much worse than death to a man who has any sense of honour, they may avoid the fatal consequences arising from disobedience of orders.’

To complete the ignominy of the punishment, his majesty called in council for the council-book, and ordered the name of lord George Sackville to be struck out of the list of privy counsellors.

The circumstances on the trial which caused so general a conviction of the culpability of his lordship, and which drew upon him such a dreadful accumulation of disgrace, were concisely and substantially as follows :

Captain Winschingrode, aid-de-camp to prince Ferdinand, deposed, that upon his delivering his orders from the prince to his lordship to form a line, as a third line, to support the infantry, and advance, lord George seemed not to understand them ; asked how that was to be done : that he then explained them, and made him understand that he was to pass with the cavalry between the trees that he saw on his left ; that he would then arrive upon a heath, where he was to form with the cavalry, and advance, in order to sustain the infantry, which he then thought to be engaged.

Colonel Sloper, in corroboration of this evidence, deposed, that Captain Winschingrode, upon lord George’s appearing not to understand the orders he delivered in French, pronounced them as well as he could in English, expressing that the movement was to be to the left, and through the trees, both by waving his hand and by words.—Colonel Sloper also deposed, that it was at least a quarter of an hour after Captain Winschingrode left lord George, before the arrival of colonel Ligonier, who came with fresh orders from the prince.

Colonel Ligonier deposed to the same purpose with captain Winschingrode, that his order extended to the whole wing of cavalry, and that he directed the movement of it to the left, through the trees, to the heath,



where it was to form, in order to profit of the disorder which appeared in the enemy's cavalry.

Both colonel Ligonier and colonel Sloper remarked the confusion apparent in the countenance of lord George ; and the latter said to the aid-de-camp Ligonier, " for God's sake repeat your orders to that man, that he may not pretend not to understand them—but you see the condition he is in." To which Ligonier answered, " Yes." Soon after this the third aid-de-camp, colonel Fitzroy, came up, who repeated the same orders with great earnestness, as mentioned in his letter, with this trifling variation, that he said the prince's words were, " the British cavalry;" the whole wing consisting of British, except a few brigades of Hanoverian horse.

Upon this variation, however, lord George laid the greatest stress, and insisted upon going to the prince in person for an explanation, as he could not think that the prince meant to break the line. The prince received his lordship with *sang-froid*, and ordered him to bring up the whole cavalry of the right wing (some squadrons of Hanoverians to the right excepted) in a line upon the heath ; an order exactly conformable to those delivered by captain Winschingle and colonel Ligonier, and differing verbally only from the order brought by colonel Fitzroy, as it was impossible, by lord George's own acknowledgment, that the prince could mean to break the line. Lord George having at length put the wing of cavalry in motion, advanced, to adopt his own words in his letter to colonel Fitzroy, " as fast as he imagined it was right for cavalry to march in line." After some time he halted, to complete his forming the whole. Upon lord Granby's advancing the left before the right, he again sent orders to halt. Lord Granby said, as the prince had ordered us to advance, he thought we should move forward. I then, said his lordship, let him proceed at the rate he liked, and kept my right up with him as regularly as I could, till we got to the rear of



the infantry and the batteries. After halting here together for some time in expectation, as his lordship affirms, of being ordered to charge the enemy's cavalry, the battle was declared to be gained, and they were told to dismount the men.

Lord Granby on his part deposed, that captain Winschingle having told him it was absolutely necessary the cavalry should march, he had put the second line immediately in motion; that meeting colonel Fitzroy, he was again ordered to advance the cavalry as fast as possible; that in marching, they were nevertheless twice halted by lord George Sackville; that, in his opinion, they might have marched with more expedition, and even have come up time enough to act against the enemy.

END OF VOL. IV.



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VOLUME THE FIFTH.

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# APPENDIX :

CONTAINING

*STATE PAPERS AND AUTHORITIES,*

TO THE

FIFTH VOLUME.



SPEECH OF KING GEORGE III. TO THE PARLIAMENT,  
NOVEMBER 18, 1760.

*My Lords, and Gentlemen,*

**T**HE just concern which I have felt in my own breast on the sudden death of the late king, my royal grandfather, makes me not doubt but you must all have been deeply affected with so severe a loss. The present critical and difficult conjuncture has made this loss the more sensible, as he was the great support of that system by which alone the liberties of Europe, and the weight and influence of these kingdoms, can be preserved, and gave life to the measures conducive to those important ends. I need not tell you the addition of weight which immediately falls upon me, in being called to the government of this free and powerful country at such a time, and under such circumstances. My consolation is in the uprightness of my own intentions, your faithful and united assistance, and the blessing of Heaven upon our joint endeavours, which I devoutly implore.

Born and educated in this country, I glory in the name



of Briton ; and the peculiar happiness of my life will ever consist in promoting the welfare of a people whose loyalty and warm affection to me I consider as the greatest and most permanent security of my throne ; and I doubt not but their steadiness in those principles will equal the firmness of my invariable resolution to adhere to and strengthen this excellent constitution in church and state, and to maintain the toleration inviolable. The civil and religious rights of my loving subjects are equally dear to me with the most valuable prerogatives of my crown ; and as the surest foundation of the whole, and the best means to draw down the divine favour on my reign, it is my fixed purpose to countenance and encourage the practice of true religion and virtue.

I reflect with pleasure on the successes with which the British arms have been prospered this last summer. The total reduction of the vast province of Canada, with the city of Montreal, is of the most interesting consequence, and must be as heavy a blow to my enemies as it is a conquest glorious to us ; the more glorious, because effected almost without effusion of blood, and with that humanity which makes an amiable part of the character of this nation.

Our advantages gained in the East Indies have been signal, and must greatly diminish the strength and trade of France in those parts, as well as procure the most solid benefits to the commerce and wealth of my subjects.

In Germany, where the whole French force has been employed, the combined army under the wise and able conduct of my general prince Ferdinand, has not only stopt their progress, but has gained advantages over them, notwithstanding their boasted superiority, and their not having hitherto come to a general engagement.

My good brother and ally the king of Prussia, although surrounded with numerous armies of enemies,

has, with a magnanimity and perseverance almost beyond example, not only withstood their various attacks, but has obtained very considerable victories over them. Of these events I shall say no more at this time, because the nature of the war in those parts has kept the campaign there still depending.

As my navy is the principal article of our natural strength, it gives me much satisfaction to receive it in such good condition, whilst the fleet of France is weakened to such a degree, that the small remains of it have continued blocked up by my ships in their own ports. At the same time the French trade is reduced to the lowest ebb, and with joy of heart I see the commerce of my kingdoms, that great source of our riches, and fixed object of my never-failing care and protection, flourishing to an extent unknown in any former war.

The valour and intrepidity of my officers and forces, both at sea and land, have been distinguished so much to the glory of this nation, that I should be wanting in justice to them, if I did not acknowledge it. This is a merit which I shall constantly encourage and reward; and I take this occasion to declare, that the zealous and useful service of the militia in the present arduous conjuncture is very acceptable to me.

In this state I have found things at my accession to the throne of my ancestors; happy in viewing the prosperous part of it; happier still should I have been, had I found my kingdoms, whose true interest I have entirely at heart, in full peace: but since the ambition, injurious encroachments, and dangerous designs of my enemies rendered the war both just and necessary, and the generous overture made last winter towards a congress or a pacification has not yet produced a suitable return, I am determined, with your cheerful and powerful assistance, to prosecute this war with vigour, in order to that desirable object, a safe and honourable peace. For this pur-

pose it is absolutely incumbent upon us to be early prepared, and I rely upon your zeal and hearty concurrence to support the king of Prussia, and the rest of my allies, and to make ample provision for carrying on the war, as the only means to bring our enemies to equitable terms of accommodation.

*Gentlemen of the House of Commons,*

The great uneasiness which I feel at this time is, in considering the uncommon burdens necessarily brought upon my faithful subjects. I desire only such supplies as shall be requisite to prosecute the war with advantage, be adequate to the necessary services, and that they may be provided for in the most sure and effectual manner. You may depend upon the faithful and punctual application of what shall be granted. I have ordered the proper estimates for the ensuing year to be laid before you; and also an account of the extraordinary expences which, from the nature of the different and remote operations, have been unavoidably incurred. It is with peculiar reluctance that I am obliged, at such a time, to mention any thing which personally regards myself; but as the grant of the greatest part of the civil list revenues is now determined, I trust in your duty and affection to me, to make the proper provision for supporting my civil government with honour and dignity. On my part, you may be assured of a regular and becoming economy.

*My Lords, and Gentlemen,*

The eyes of all Europe are upon you. From your resolutions, the protestant interest hopes for protection, as well as all our friends for the preservation of their independency; and our enemies feel the final disappointment of their ambitious and destructive views. Let these hopes and fears be confirmed and augmented by the vigour, unanimity, and dispatch of your proceedings. In

this expectation I am the more encouraged by a pleasing circumstance, which I look upon as one of the most auspicious omens of my reign. That happy extinction of divisions, and that union and good harmony which continue to prevail amongst my subjects, afford me the most agreeable prospect. The natural disposition and wish of my heart are, to cement and promote them; and I promise myself that nothing will arise, on your part, to interrupt or disturb a situation so essential to the true and lasting felicity of this great people.

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So flattering is the picture drawn in this celebrated speech, of the situation of Great Britain, that it is impossible not to ask with astonishment, what can have occasioned the fatal change which has taken place? To this question, the annals of the present reign must furnish the answer; and the records of history exhibit no instance, in which the disastrous effects of evil counsels, operating for a long series of years, may be more clearly and distinctly traced.



#### HISTORIC MEMORIAL RELATIVE TO THE WAR.

*A. D. 1761.*

Soon after the final rupture of the negotiation carried on by M. Bussy at the court of London, the French government published a paper, very ably written, to which was given the name of Historic Memorial; containing a defence of its own conduct, previous to the war, and during its continuance; an extract from which it is but justice in an English historian to insert in a collection of this nature. Certain it is, that the voice of Europe was by no means favourable to England, either in regard to the origin of the present quarrel, or as to the manner in



which hostilities were commenced on the part of Great Britain.

Even the king of Prussia, the sole ally of England, charges the court of London with great want of calm and sound discretion, in relation to France. In the History of his own Times, he makes no scruple to assert that the duke of Cumberland, from motives of interested policy, endeavoured to involve the nation in a war with France, knowing that the duke of Newcastle was wholly unequal to the task of conducting it, and hoping that this nobleman would quickly be compelled to resign his office to Mr. Fox, who possessed the entire confidence of the duke of Cumberland. "He recollected," says the Prussian monarch, "the great age of the king his father; and he had formed a project to fill the council with persons wholly devoted to himself."

In the event of a minority, the princess of Wales was indeed appointed regent by act of parliament; but such extensive powers were by the same act vested in the council of regency, of which the duke of Cumberland was the head, that if he had succeeded in his design of filling the great offices of government with his own adherents, the princess of Wales would have found herself a mere cypher and pageant of state. The regency act seemed indeed calculated for the express purpose of exciting the spirit of faction and discord throughout the kingdom, had it ever unfortunately been carried into effect. "The project of the duke," says his Prussian majesty, "was vast and complicated. In order to put it into execution, it was necessary to begin by heightening the quarrel between the two nations, and urging them to a rupture. This was easy. At the very name of the French the people of London rise into fury. Combustible materials being collected soon burst into flame. That impetuous people obliged their sovereign to arm. One step led to another. At length they came to blows. These violences gave occa-



sion to reprisals, and from the end of 1754, war between the two nations appeared inevitable. It was, however, remarked that the ministry of Versailles acted with more temper and moderation, and that all the exceptionable measures came from the English. At length the ships of Great Britain kept no terms with the French. The vexations and injuries which they committed, forced the king of France, almost in spite of himself, to declare war."

Though the general truth of this representation cannot well be denied, it is no less certain, that the cause of dispute between the two nations was so important, and at the same involved in such perplexity, that it is probable no degree of moderation on the part of England could have prevented its terminating in a war. France at no time, though far more guarded in her conduct than England, appeared in the least disposed to relinquish any part of her American claims; and it was impossible that England could ever acquiesce in such a construction of the existing treaties, as would reduce the limits of her colonies to the narrow tract of land situated between the Apalachian and Alleghahany mountains and the western shore of the Atlantic. Justice also to the character of the duke of Cumberland renders it necessary to remark, that the accounts transmitted from London to the court of Berlin, respecting the political intrigues, which are described by the king of Prussia as the immediate cause of the war, were probably blended with mistake, and magnified by misrepresentation. The duke of Cumberland was unquestionably a man of honour and principle; but he must have been exempt from the common failings of humanity, if, after the regency bill passed, he had not embraced with eagerness every favourable opportunity of introducing his own partisans into those situations which would entitle them to places in the council of regency. In case of a war, it is indeed very likely that he expected Mr. Fox

must soon rise to the highest post in administration. But when so many intelligent and disinterested persons avowed their opinion, that the aggressions of France in America were such, as to make a war with that power just and necessary, it is no great stretch of candour to admit, that the duke of Cumberland, in the advice he gave respecting this momentous question, might be actuated chiefly, if not wholly, by public and laudable motives.

In the French memorial, the court of London is charged with "commencing hostilities, and taking two French ships, the Alcide and the Lys, at the very time when the duc de Mirepoix, the French ambassador, in the midst of peace, and under the sanction of the law of nations, was treating at London to prevent a rupture. This act of violence was an indignity to France, which her honour obliged her to repel by force. If England had intended only to establish the possessions of the two crowns in North America upon a firm footing, she would, as France has done, have endeavoured to prevent the powers of the Continent from taking part in a war that was wholly foreign to them. On the contrary, she endeavoured to renew the famous league which was formed against Louis XIV. upon the accession of Philip V. to the crown of Spain, and to persuade all the courts of Europe, that they were as much interested in the limits of Acadia, as in the succession of the Spanish monarchy."

After stating the offer made by France of a neutrality for Hanover, the rejection of this offer by the court of London, the events of the campaign in 1757, terminating in the capitulation of Cloister-Seven, the violation of that capitulation, and successive attempts of the court of Versailles, to effect an accommodation of differences; first, through the mediation of the court of Denmark in 1758, to which a haughty and negative answer was returned by England; secondly, in 1759, by a proposal to treat through the good offices of Spain, to which no

answer was given, and again in 1760, by directing the count D'Affry, her ambassador at the Hague, to confer with general Yorke, envoy extraordinary from Great Britain to the States-general on the subject, the result of which only proved the averseness of the court of London, to an accommodation, the memorial thus proceeds :

“ France, however, was not yet discouraged, but in 1761 declared her pacific intentions to her allies, and finding them willing to concur in any measures for peace, all the confederate powers agreed to transmit a declaration to London, of the following purport :—‘ That France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Poland, had unanimously agreed to invite England and Prussia to a negotiation for peace, and accordingly proposed a congress at Augsburg, or any other place in Germany, that England and Prussia might deem more convenient, and declared they had already made choice of plenipotentiaries, in expectation that England and Prussia would do the same.’”

But as great delay and perplexity were foreseen, at a congress where the interests of America were to be treated at the same time with those of Russia, Austria, Sweden, Saxony and Prussia, France pressed for a separation of the two wars, proposing, in a memorial accompanying a letter addressed by the duc de Choiseul to Mr. Pitt, dated March 26, that the situation in which the two crowns shall stand on the 1st of September, 1761, in the East Indies; on the 1st of July, 1761, in the West Indies and Africa; and on the 1st of May, 1761, in Europe, shall be the position that shall serve as a basis to the treaty which may be negotiated between the two powers.

In Mr. Pitt's answer to the duc de Choiseul, the terms proposed by France were agreed to, except that nothing was expressly said with respect to the epochas. After some necessary forms had been settled, M. Bussy set out for England, and Mr. Stanley for France, on the part of their respective governments. The allies of France, though

uneasy, as the memorial states, at this measure, did not obstruct it. M. Bussy's instructions were as follow :

I. To demand whether the periods annexed to the proposition of *statu quo* are accepted, and if not, what others are proposed ?

II. To declare that the war of France with England was distinct from that of Austria with Prussia ; consequently that, except Wesel and Gueldres, which belonged to the empress, France was at liberty to evacuate Gottingen, Hesse, and the county of Hanau ; but that this evacuation was to depend on two conditions : 1st, that England should give security that the army of prince Ferdinand should be disbanded, and not serve against the allies ; and 2dly, that England should agree to some restitution which should be judged reasonable, as an equivalent for such evacuation.

England having resolved on the expedition against Belleisle, the expectation of success retarded a categorical answer relating to the epochas. Belleisle at length was taken, and then Mr. Pitt gave M. Bussy a memorial, in which he fixed the epochas two months later than those proposed by France ; and agreed that all subsequent conquests shall be immediately restored. In return, France exhibited specific propositions in a *projet*, dated July 15, in substance as follows :

I. France cedes and guarantees Canada to England, on condition of the restitution by the latter of the island of Cape Breton : a value to be fixed on this restitution, and liberty granted to fish and dry cod on the banks of Newfoundland.

II. France shall restore Minorca, as when taken.

III. England shall restore Guadaloupe and Marigolante.



IV. Dominica and St. Vincent to remain neutral, as by the treaty of 1660:—St. Lucia and Tobago, referred to negotiation.

V. The treaty concluded between Godeheu and Saunders, shall be a basis for the re-establishment of peace in Asia.

VI. England shall restore either Goree or Senegal.

VII. Belleisle shall be restored.

VIII. In consideration of the above cessions, France will evacuate Hesse and Hanau.

IX. Subsequent to the suspension of arms, neither shall England assist Prussia, nor France Austria, with any part of their forces. France, however, cannot evacuate the countries which have been conquered, and are still governed in the name of the empress queen, without her consent.

X. Farther conquests shall be restored without recompense.

XI. The captures made at sea by England before the declaration of war, except king's ships, to be restored, or recompense made for them—they having been taken contrary to the law of nations.

XII. France will guarantee the protestant succession, if desired.

XIII. Prisoners on both sides to be sent home without ransom.

This sketch of a treaty was accompanied with a private memorial, in which France proposes that England shall terminate her differences with Spain, and invite her to guarantee the new treaty; and expresses her fears that these differences will otherwise occasion a fresh war, both in Europe and America, by which France will be affected.

France having obtained the consent of the empress queen for a separate peace, and to stipulate that she would, after such peace, yield her no farther succours, M. Bussy,



in a note to Mr. Pitt, acquainted him that this consent had been obtained under two conditions :

- 1st, That the empress should keep possession of the countries belonging to the king of Prussia, *i. e.* the countries conquered by France—Wesel and Gueldres.
- 2dly, That England would afford the king of Prussia no succours.

“ France,” thus the paper proceeds to state, “ thought it just and advantageous both to herself and England, thus wholly and absolutely to withdraw from the war in Germany, and to secure the intended peace against a new war, which the complaints of Spain might kindle, and in which France would be obliged to take part, by proposing to adjust the differences between England and Spain, and invite Spain as guarantee, especially as Spain had before offered to act as mediator between the two crowns.”

On the 23d July all these pieces were laid before Mr. Pitt, who in conference, at the same time discovered a personal opposition to peace; refused to agree to any of the articles of the memorial of propositions; entered very little into the motives of his opposition; expatiated with some warmth on the memorial relating to Spain; rejected the note which concerned the allies in Germany with disdain; and concluded with saying, that he would take the directions of the king his master.

In consequence of this, having returned the memorials concerning Spain and Germany to M. Bussy, he wrote him the following letter, dated July 24, 1761 :

“ SIR,

“ Having explained myself, in our conversation of yesterday, on certain engagements of France with Spain, concerning the discussions between this last crown and Great Britain, the which your court did not till this mo-

ment announce to us, had been taken before their first proposals were made here for the particular peace of the two crowns; and as you desired, for the greater exactness, to take a note of what passed between us on so weighty a subject, I renew to you, sir, by order of the king, word for word, the same declaration which I made to you yesterday; and apprizing you again of the king's most sincere sentiments of friendship and real consideration towards his Catholic majesty, in every thing that is reasonable and just, I am again most plainly to declare to you in the name of his majesty, that he will not suffer the disputes with Spain to be mixed in any shape whatsoever with the negotiation of the peace of the two crowns; to which I am to add, that it will be even considered as offensive to the dignity of the king, and not compatible with the good faith of the negotiation, to make further mention of such an idea. Moreover, it is not understood that France has at any time a right to intermeddle in like discussions between Great Britain and Spain. Such just and indispensable considerations have determined the king to order me to send you back the inclosed memorial concerning Spain, as totally inadmissible.

“ I also send you back, sir, as totally inadmissible, the memorial relating to the king of Prussia, as affecting the honour of Great Britain, and the unshaken fidelity with which his majesty will fulfil his engagements with his allies. I have the honour to be, &c.”

On the 29th July an answer was returned to the memorial of propositions, declaring in substance, that England would never relax with regard to the full cession of Cape Breton, and all other islands in the gulf of St. Laurence; that both Senegal and Goree shall be ceded to England; that Dunkirk shall be reduced to the situation described by the treaty of Utrecht; and upon this condition only,

England will *consider* of the restitution of the privilege of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland.

It must be remarked, that France was willing to *fix a value* on the restoration of Cape Breton, which was verbally explained to mean, that Dunkirk should, as an equivalent, be reduced to the situation required by the treaty of Utrecht. This was refused with disdain by England. Moreover, France was peremptorily required to make restitution of *all* that she had conquered from the allies of England in Germany; expressly specifying the territories belonging to Prussia. The treaty between Godeheu and Saunders, was refused as an inadequate basis for the re-establishment of peace in Asia. The demand made by France, of the restitution of captures made by England previous to the declaration of war, is declared inadmissible, "it not being founded on any particular convention, nor yet resulting from the law of nations; for the right of hostilities does not result from a formal declaration of war, but from the hostilities which the aggressor first offered." France is required immediately to evacuate Ostend and Nieuport, the temporary possession or occupation of which had been entrusted to that power by the empress queen; and it is expressly declared, that no restitution on the part of England can take place till this is done. Lastly, England will continue to assist Prussia with efficacy and good faith; France being free also to support her ally the empress queen in the contest for Silesia. In other respects, no material deviation occurs from the *projet* offered by France.

"Unwilling," says the narrative of the French government, "to break off the negotiation," France ordered a reply to be made, in the form of an ultimatum, to the following effect:

"France consents to cede Canada in the most extensive manner, but insists on the conditions as to the religion and removal of her subjects. She will maintain her im-

memorial right of fishing in the gulf of St. Laurence, and drying fish on the banks of Newfoundland, as agreed by the treaty of Utrecht; but this would be vain, without shelter for the vessels. France therefore proposes the restitution of Cape Breton, or the island of St. John, or such other port without fortification in the gulf, or within reach of it, as may answer that purpose.

“ France demands, that all the intermediate nations between Louisiana and the English colonies, be considered as neutral, independent of the sovereignty of both crowns, and a barrier between them.

“ France is willing to negotiate on the state of Dunkirk, so soon as a convenient port shall be agreed upon within, or within reach, of the gulf of St. Laurence, to be ceded to France as a shelter for her fishing vessels.

“ France will evacuate all her conquests in Germany, in consideration that England shall restore Guadaloupe and Marigalante; but cannot surrender any place held in the right of the empress queen without her consent; and refers this to the congress at Augsburg.

“ France agrees to leave to the two East India companies the care of reconciling their respective interests in Asia.

“ France insists on restitution, or amends, for the captures made by England before war was declared.

“ France never had any intention of keeping possession of Ostend and Nieuport after a peace. Lastly,

“ France will, in like manner with England, vigorously and faithfully assist her allies; or, if England will agree not to support the king of Prussia, France will agree not to support his enemies.”

This memorial was accompanied with an answer by M. Bussy to Mr. Pitt's letter; in which he says, that what related to Spain in the private memorial, was well meant; that it contained neither menace, nor offer of mediation; that the king his master refers himself to Spain



for the manner in which it was received and remitted, but charges him to declare, that so long as Spain shall approve of it, he will interfere with the interests of that crown, notwithstanding any repulse from the power that opposes his good offices. That as to the note relating to the conditions on which Austria consented to a separate peace between England and France, Bussy is ordered by his king to declare, that he will rather sacrifice all the power which God has given him, than conclude any thing with his enemies that may hurt his friends, and impeach the integrity in which he glories. He expresses also the astonishment of his court at the style of Mr. Pitt's letter, and the tenor of his propositions: that, however, for the sake of peace, France is willing to forget the imperative style, so unfit for negotiation, and to do every thing reasonable and just to bring the negotiation to an happy issue.

As the memorial concerning Spain was resented by the British ministry, Spain ordered her ambassador here to explain it to the following effect: "That it was intended with great integrity, merely to make the peace firm and lasting; that if the king of Spain had any other view, he would have given full scope to his greatness, and have spoken for himself, as became his dignity; and that he is astonished to hear that England sees the memorial in a light different from that in which it was intended, and hopes she will concur in every friendly view for establishing a general and lasting tranquillity."

M. Bussy received orders to agree upon the limits of Canada and Louisiana, according to the English map, though unfavourable to France; to consent to the cession required by England with respect to Africa, provided the exportation of negroes might, by some safe and easy expedient, be confined to France; and to sacrifice Dunkirk to the right of fishing in the gulf of St. Laurence. But he was directed to present a memorial, urging many reasons for the restitution of the captures made before the



war; to represent in its full force, the benefit that would arise, both to France and England, from the total desertion of the war in Germany; and, if England should refuse the conditions now offered as an *ultimatum*, to wait for farther instructions.

The *ultimatum* of France arrived in London, August 8. M. Bussy soon after wrote to Mr. Pitt, who in his answer, dated August 15, says, that as to the style of the *ultimatum* (of England) and the letter annexed, the king his master adheres both to the form and substance of them; he laments that peace appears, by the proposals and conduct of France, to be far distant, and retorts some charges of elusion and delay. Mr. Pitt and M. Bussy, however, had a conference on the two *ultimatums* jointly, and on the 30th August an answer to the French *ultimatum* was delivered, in which the French propositions are agreed to, except in the following particulars:

I. The limits of Louisiana, as drawn in a note from M. Bussy to Mr. Pitt, dated 18th August, cannot be admitted, because they in one part include vast countries which M. Vaudreuil yielded to England under the description of Canada, and in another, extensive countries and numerous nations who have been always reputed to be under the protection of England.

II. The French that remove from Canada shall remove within a year.

III. England will grant to France the isle of St. Pierre, in the gulph of St. Laurence, with its port, as a shelter for her fishing boats, provided the French do not fish on any part of the coast belonging to England, that they erect no fortification, nor keep troops there; that the vessels of no other nation shall be suffered to partake of the conveniency, and that an English commissary shall reside there.

IV. England insists on the restitution and evacuation of all the conquests made by France over her allies, particularly of Wesel and the other territories of the king of Prussia.

V. England is inflexible in her resolution to succour Prussia as an auxiliary, and agrees that France shall succour her allies in their particular contest for Silesia.

VI. England refuses restitution of captures before the declaration of war.

VII. England insists on the evacuation of Ostend and Nicuport.

A new memorial, dated September 9, was sent by France to England, as her final answer; importing that,

1. Canada shall be guaranteed to England in the utmost extent required.

2. That Dunkirk shall be demolished, in return for the confirmation of the right of fishery on the banks of Newfoundland, and the cession of the island of St. Pierre.

3. France will restore Minorca for Guadaloupe and Marigalante.

4. France will evacuate Hesse, Hanau, and Gottingen, provided one settlement in Africa shall be guaranteed to her.

5. France engages to leave the settlement of affairs in the East Indies to be treated by the companies—and

6. To leave England in possession of Belleisle.

Upon receipt of the last memorial of France, England without any reply recalled Mr. Stanley.

“It is with regret that the king finds himself obliged to continue an opposition by force to the progress of the

ambitious designs of his enemies, and under an impossibility of procuring his people that repose which his majesty wished for their welfare. The king trusts, that providence will disappoint those vast projects which England scarce endeavours to disguise, and which threaten the security of every potentate. His majesty, invariable in his pacific dispositions, will be always ready to concur in every expedient which may be judged proper to re-establish the public tranquillity, and will make no difficulty of sacrificing even his own interests to the glory and consolation of restoring peace to his kingdom and to Europe.

(Signed) " LE DUC DE CHOISEUL."

The conduct of France throughout this difficult negotiation, appears blameable chiefly or solely in the presentation of the memorial relative to Spain. This was indeed a very false step, and afforded just cause of offence. But she so soon perceived her error, and apologized for it so plausibly, that it ought not to have had any effect, and much less so serious an effect, upon the subsequent proceedings of the court of London.

It is plain, on perusing the series of memorials, and especially the summary of the whole by France, that the negotiation between the two courts broke off upon two points only—1st, The positive and reiterated demand of France, in which she was certainly supported by the voice of Europe—not to say the plain dictates of equity and humanity—in respect to the restitution of, or compensation for, the ships captured by England, belonging to private individuals, previous to the declaration of war. Hostilities committed by the crown of France in America; might be a valid reason for making reprisals upon the crown of France in Europe; and the court of Versailles did not pretend to require the restitution of the *Lys* and *Alcide*, and other ships of war captured in the same

circumstances, without any formal declaration of war by England: but to avenge an aggression of the French government in a remote part of the empire, by a sudden and general seizure of the property of the unsuspecting and unoffending subjects of that government at home, was contrary to the law and practice of nations, and making a precedent in the highest degree alarming and abominable.

The second point of final difference related to a case in its own nature extremely difficult to adjust. The court of France, valuing itself upon that high sense of honour which has ever been accounted a distinguishing characteristic of this great and gallant nation, refused in the most peremptory terms, in every one of her successive memorials, to resign the countries of Wesel and Gueldres, which she had conquered from Prussia, as the auxiliary of the empress queen, and still retained possession of in her name, as her property, and subject to her disposal.

Mr. Pitt, on the other hand, without in the least regarding the point of honour, or paying the slightest attention to the feelings of France, insisted rudely and haughtily that Wesel and Gueldres should be unconditionally restored to Prussia: though it does not appear that England was placed in such circumstances as to render it necessary in any view, to demand immediate restitution in language so offensive and obnoxious, of those unimportant conquests. It would have been in the highest degree unreasonable in Prussia to expect that England should carry on the war merely on account of Wesel and Gueldres; and this was a matter which, without doubt, both required and admitted of modification. The consent of Austria to the separate peace of France, was indeed given only on condition that nothing should be stipulated contrary to her interests; but if England had proposed that the places in question should be se-



questrated into the hands of Denmark, or some other neutral power, till a final accommodation had taken place between Austria and Prussia, or had suggested any other expedient that did not directly militate against the honour of France, it is highly probable that the consent of Austria would have been requested in a manner that the empress queen could not easily have refused. But Mr. Pitt's mode of negotiating was throughout arrogant and imperious, and he was too conscious of his own talents for carrying on the war with success, to allow him to be truly solicitous for the acquisition of that more rational, though less splendid species of glory, which was to be derived from the re-establishment of peace, even when attainable on terms the most equitable and honourable.



PAPERS, &c. RELATIVE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS  
BETWEEN THE COURTS OF LONDON AND BERLIN.

*A. D. 1762.*

THE heavy charges brought by the king of Prussia, in the History of his own Times, against the court of London, and more particularly against the earl of Bute, first minister of the crown from the æra of the resignation of Mr. Pitt, October 1761, are known throughout Europe. For near twenty years these charges remained uncontradicted. At length, in a valuable appendix to a History of the present Reign, recently published by John Adolphus, esquire, the original papers, or those most material to the elucidation of the transactions in question, have been properly and honourably given to the world, which is now enabled to judge between the parties. With a view to do the fullest justice to both



those passages of the king of Prussia's history which exhibit the charges in question, the papers themselves, though of considerable length, are re-printed whole and entire in the present collection.

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ŒUVRES DE FREDERIC II.

Tome iii. p. 155. “ Dans ce tems (Octobre 1760) l'Angleterre perdit le roi George II. Il termina son règne glorieux par une mort douce et prompte. Il eut avant sa fin la satisfaction d'apprendre la prise de Montreal, par où les Anglois achevèrent la conquête du Canada. Ce prince, entr'autres bonnes qualités, avoit une fermeté héroïque qui faisoient que ses alliés pouvoient prendre une confiance entière en sa personne. Son petit-fils lui succéda ; il étoit à peine majeur : c'est celui qui règne à présent sous le nom de George trois.”

*Ibid.* p. 220. “ Deux hommes se trouvoient à la tête de ce gouvernement, différens de caractère, et opposés en tout ; l'un étoit Pitt. Il avoit l'ame élevée, un esprit capable de grands projets, de la fermeté dans l'exécution, un attachement inflexible à ses opinions parce-qu'il les croyoit avantageuse à sa patrie qu'il aimoit. L'autre c'étoit Bute il avoit été gouverneur du roi. Plus ambitieux qu'habile, il vouloit dominer à l'ombre de l'autorité souveraine. Il avoit pour principe, que la trame de l'honneur devoit être d'une tissure grossière pour tout homme d'état ; il crut qu'en procurant la paix à tout prix à sa nation, il en deviendroit l'idole. Il se trompa, et le peuple l'eut en execration. Ces deux Anglois envisageoient la proposition de l'Espagne avec des yeux tout différens. L'avis de M. Bute prévalut dans le conseil du roi sur celui de son antagoniste. M. Pitt en ressentit un chagrin si vif, que plein d'indignation il se démit de ses charges. A

peine M. Bute fut il en place, que la froideur qui commençoit à regner entre la Prusse et l'Angleterre s'accrut considérablement. Le sieur Bute refusa les subsides que la nation avoit payés jusqu'alors au roi ; il se flattoit par là de réduire ce prince par nécessité à consentir aux propositions de paix, que le ministère Britannique jugeroit à propos de lui prescrire. Cet Anglois croyoit que l'argent fait tout, et qu'il n'y avoit d'argent qu'en Angleterre. Mais à quoi tiennent les affaires du monde et les projets des hommes ! L'Imperatrice de Russie meurt ; sa mort trompe tous les politiques de l'Europe, et renverse une infinité de plans et de desseins, arrangés avec soin et laborieusement combinés. Cette princesse, dont la santé avoit été chancelante dans les dernières années, fut subitement emportée par un crachement de sang, le 8 de Janvier, 1762. Par sa mort le trône étoit dévolu au grand duc son neveu, qui regne sous le nom de Pierre trois. Le roi avoit cultivé l'amitié de ce prince dans le tems où il n'étoit encore que duc de Holstein, et par une sensibilité rare parmi les hommes, plus rare encore chez les souverains, ce prince en avoit conservé un cœur reconnoissant. Il en avoit même donné des marques dans cette guerre, car ce fut lui qui contribua le plus à la retraite du maréchal Apraxin en l'année 1757, lorsqu'après avoir battu le maréchal Lewwald, il se replia en Pologne.

“ Se prêtant à tous les desirs du roi, il alla même au delà de ce qu'on pouvoit attendre. De son propre mouvement il rappella de l'armée Autrichienne M. de Czernichef avec sons corps ; il n'exigea du roi aucune cession quoiqu'il y fût autorisé sans qu'on pût y trouver à redire. Il hâta la négociation de la paix, et ne demanda pour tout retour que l'amitié et l'alliance du roi.

“ Les vues de l'empereur se portèrent alors particulièrement sur le Danemarck. Il ressentoit les torts que les rois de Danemarck avoient faits à ses ancêtres.”

*Ibid.* p. 226.—“ Le sieur Bute qui par mépris pour les autres nations ignoroit ce qui se passoit en Europe, et encore plus la façon de penser du nouvel empereur de Russie ; rempli des idées de la paix générale qu’il vouloit faire à toute force, chargea le prince Gallitzin ministre de Russie à Londres, de marquer à sa cour que quelques cessions que l’empereur exigeât de la Prusse, l’Angleterre se faisoit fort de les lui faire obtenir, pourvu qu’il ne se précipitât point, et qu’il continuât de tenir le roi de Prusse en échec, en laissant le corps de M. Czernichef auprès des Autrichiens. L’Empereur, indigné de ces propositions, y répondit comme un ministre Prussien l’auroit pu faire. Il envoya la copie de la dépêche du prince Gallitzin au roi, pour lui découvrir à quel point l’Angleterre le trahissoit. Ce ne fut pas la seule perfidie que ce ministre Anglois fit au roi. Bute non content de vouloir embrouiller les affaires de la Prusse à Pétersbourg ; négocioit, en même tems à la cour de Vienne. Il vouloit à l’insçu du roi faire la paix avec la maison d’Autriche. Libéral des provinces Prussiennes, sacrifiant sans scrupule les intérêts du roi, il offroit ses dépouilles à l’impératrice reine, comme s’il étoit le maître d’en disposer. Dans cette occasion le hazard servit encore mieux le roi, que n’auroient pu faire les plus fines intrigues. Le comte Kaunitz prit ces ouvertures de travers. Il soupçonna que le dessein de l’Angleterre étoit de commettre la cour de Vienne avec celle de Versailles, et il répondit au sieur Bute avec toute la hauteur et toute la morgue d’un ministre Autrichien : il rejeta avec dédain des propositions qu’il croyoit captieuse, en ajoutant que l’impératrice reine étoit assez puissante pour se faire raison de ses prétensions, et qu’elle agiroit contre sa dignité, en acceptant une paix, quelle qu’elle pût être ; dont l’Angleterre se rendroit la médiatrice. Ainsi avorta ce projet à la honte de celui qui l’avoit formé.”

*Ibid.* p. 228.—“ Les lettres de Pétersbourg faisoient trem-

bler pour la personne de l'empereur ; elles annonçoient toutes un germe de conspiration qui étoit près d'éclorre. L'Amitié, la reconnoissance, aussi bien que l'estime du roi pour les excellentes qualités de ce prince, le portèrent à lui écrire et à entamer cette matière scabreuse. Il falloit ménager cette extrême délicatessé qui fait que tous les souverains veulent qu'on croie leur autorité affermie. Il falloit s'expliquer avec une réserve infinie au sujet des Danois. Pour le dissuader d'entreprendre d'abord la guerre contre le Danemarck, le roi lui détailloit toutes les raisons qui pouvoient lui faire différer cette entreprise, et finissoit en conjurant l'empereur d'une manière affectueuse, de ne point négliger des précautions essentielles pour la surété de sa personne. Cette lettre fit peu d'impression sur l'empereur. Il y répondit en propres termes, " Ma gloire exige que je tire raison des outrages que les Danois ont faits à ma personne, surtout à mes ancêtres. A l'égard de l'intérêt que vous prenez à ma conservation, je vous prie de ne vous en point inquiéter ; les soldats m'appellent leur père—Je me promène seul à pied dans les rues de Pétersbourg, &c. Cette réponse n'empêcha pas le roi de continuer à tâcher d'éclairer ce prince sur les dangers qui le menaçoient. M. de Goltz et de Schivérin eurent ordre de mettre cette matière sur le tapis, dans des conversation familières qu'ils avoient avec ce monarque ; mais c'étoit à pure perte qu'on lui disoit que dans un pays où regnoient des mœurs telles qu'en Russie, un souverain ne pouvoit prendre assez de précautions pour la surété de sa personne. ' Ecoutez, repondit-il, enfin, si vous êtes de mes amis ne touchez plus cette matière qui m'est odieuse.' Il fallut alors garder le silence, et abandonner ce pauvre prince à la sécurité qui le perdit."

*Ibid.* p. 232.—" L'Empereur de Russie poussoit vivement son projet contre le Danemarck.—M. de Saldern, plenipotentiaire de l'empereur, étoit chargé de demander aux Danois la restitution de tout le Holstein, qui avoit



anciennement appartenu aux ancêtres de sa majesté Impériale. Ce prince étoit bien persuadé que les Danois ne consentiroient jamais à des conditions aussi honteuse, et c'étoit le prétexte dont il vouloit se servir pour se déclarer contre eux. Une armée de 60,000 Russes qui devoient être joints par 6000 Prussiens étoit destinée pour cette expedition."

*Ibid.* p. 300.—“ Les préliminaires de la paix furent signés vers ce tems-là entre les François et les Anglois. Les Anglois dont la conduite avoit été si odieuse depuis que M. Bute avoit eu l'administration des affaires, abandonnèrent entièrement les intérêts du roi dans le cours de cette négociation. Ils consentirent même à ce que les François demeurassent en possession du duché de Clèves, et de la principauté de Gueldre. Les Anglois agissoient envers lui moins en amis qu'en ennemis déclarés.”

*Ibid.* p. 310.—“ Les Anglois de leur côté, au lieu de faire une paix glorieuse dont ils pouvoient dicter les conditions à leurs ennemis, gouvernés par le sieur Bute sacrifièrent les intérêts de leurs alliés. Ils avoient consenti que les François restassent après la paix en possession des places de Wésel, de Gueldre, et de leur territoire. Non content de fouler aux pieds les engagements et la bonne foi des traités, le sieur Bute intriguoit encore à la cour de Pétersbourg, et y sémoit des germes de méfiance et de soupçons contre le roi ; de sorte que celui-ci ne pouvant compter sur aucune des puissances de l'Europe, avoit tout lieu d'apprehender de nouvelles brouilleries avec les Russes.”

Tome iv. p. 6.—“ La conduite de l'Angleterre sur la fin de la dernière guerre avoit rompu notre alliance avec elle. La paix séparée qu'elle fit avec la France, les négociations qu'elle entama en Russie pour me brouiller avec l'empereur Pierre III. les avances qu'elle avoit faites à la cour de Vienne pour lui sacrifier mes intérêts : toutes ces infidélités ayant dissous les liens qui m'avoient uni à la



Grande Bretagne, me laissoient après la paix generale, isolé, et sans alliés en l'Europe."

*Ibid.* p. 13.—“ Lorsque le sieur Pitt quitta le ministère, sa place fut donnée à l'Ecossois Bute. Ce ministre Anglois rompit toutes les liaisons qui subsistoient entre nos deux cours. L'Angleterre comme nous l'avons rapporté, ayant fait sa paix avec la France, lui avoit sacrifié les intérêts de la Prusse, et avoit offert la conquête de la Silésie à la maison d'Autriche, pour renouveler à la faveur de ce service, les anciennes liaisons de la cour Impériale avec celle d'Angleterre : et comme si ce n'en étoit pas assez de tous ces procédés, le sieur Bute avoit mis tout en œuvre à Pétersbourg pour brouiller le roi avec l'empereur Pierre III. ; en quoi cependant il ne peut reussir. Tant de mauvaise foi avoit rompu tous les liens formés entre la Prusse et l'Angleterre. A cette alliance que l'intérêt réciproque avoit produite, succéda l'inimitié la plus vive, et la haine la plus violente.”

THE KING OF PRUSSIA TO KING GEORGE III. 103

*A Breslau, ce 22 Janvier, 1762.*

MONSIEUR MON FRERE,

La longueur de la campagne derniere et différentes fatalités survenuës de suite, m'ont empêché d'écrire plutôt à votre majesté. A present voila l'imperatrice de Russie morte, et le grand duc qui m'a temoigné en toute occasion de l'amitié, est sur le trône. Je suis persuadé que pour peu que le sieur Keith sache profiter de ces circonstances, qu'il en pourra tirer un parti avantageux. Pour moi, je ne doute pas que cette année ci ne soit plus heureuse que les precedentes, et ne nous mette en etat d'obliger nos ennemis à des conditions de paix, plus honorables pour nous que les loix arrogantes qu'ils vouloient nous prescrire. La declaration de guerre des Espagnols, est selon moi avanta-

geuse à l'Angleterre; en ce que la grande superiorité de la flotte Britannique triomphera des Espagnols comme des François. Quelle gloire pour le regne de votre majesté de rendre par la, sa nation la dominatrice des mers sans contradictions, et à nous tous d'avoir resistés, et de nous être soutenus, contre les forces réunies de toute l'Europe! Il n'est question que d'un peu de constance et de fermeté, pour terminer cette funeste guerre à l'avantage de l'Angleterre et de ses alliés: mais il faut perseverer jusqu'au bout. Je vois encore: difficultés sans nombre. Elles m'encouragent au lieu de me rebuter, par l'esperance de les vaincre. Personne ne prend plus d'intérêt que moi à la gloire, et à la prospérité de vôtre majesté; je la prie d'en être convaincuë, ainsi que de la haute estime avec laquelle, je suis

Monsieur mon frere,  
de vôtre majesté,  
le bon frere,  
FREDERIC.

LORD BUTE TO MESSIEURS KEITH AND WROUGHTON,  
MINISTERS FROM GREAT BRITAIN AT PETERSBURG.

*St. James's, 23d Feb. 1762.*

GENTLEMEN,

All the letters which I have received from Keith, since the late great event, have been already acknowledged. I congratulate you very sincerely upon the symptoms which have hitherto appeared of a change in the measures of your court, so greatly to be wished for the good of Europe. At the same time, I cannot but acquaint you with the particular pleasure and satisfaction with which the king received your accounts of the very friendly disposition of the present emperor towards his Prussian majesty, his visible disinclination towards France; and above all, his intention to do all in his power towards

bringing about a peace between the powers at war, upon reasonable terms.

This was the most capital point in the instructions which his majesty commanded me to send you, upon the first view of the late empress's death : and it is still that which the king would have you recommend with the greatest zeal ; and in which we hope that his Imperial majesty will employ all his credit and influence, and especially with the king of Prussia. The reports which you have made, and those which we have received from Mr. Mitchell, of the great prospect of a speedy reconciliation between those two courts, must undoubtedly give pleasure here ; but I must at the same time observe to you, that it arises chiefly from the hope and expectation that his Prussian majesty will be earnestly exhorted by the emperor, rather to put an end by reasonable and proper terms to his war with the empress queen, than encouraged by him to persist in it.

I am, with great truth and regard,

GENTLEMEN,

your most obedient humble servant,

BUTE.

LORD BUTE TO MESSIEURS KNYPHAUSEN AND MITCHELL,  
MINISTERS OF PRUSSIA AT THE COURT OF LONDON.

*A St. James's, ce 26 Fevrier, 1762.*

MESSIEURS,

Comme vous semblez souhaiter d'être mis en état de depecher vôtre courier ce soir même, je n'ai pas voulu differer de m'informer de la reponse qu'il plairoit au roi que je vous rendisse, sur les instances pressantes que vous avez faites dernièrement au sujet du subsidie ; et l'ayant fait ce matin je vais en consequence vous faire part des intentions de sa majesté la dessus, a fin d'éviter les meprises

qui se peuvent glisser dans les rapports de ce qui se traite en des conférences, et pour que vous en puissiez rendre un compte authentique au roi votre maître.

Je vous dirai donc que, sa majesté se trouve encore portée d'inclination, comme auparavant, de fournir l'aide pecuniaire en question au roi de Prusse; mais comme le grand événement que nous avons vu arriver dans le nord à opéré un changement qui semble promettre les plus grandes facilités à sa dite majesté, pour l'amélioration de sa situation présente, en la tirant de ces dangers multipliés, auxquels elle s'étoit trouvée exposée, le roi souhaiteroit que le secours qu'il voudroit prêter à ce prince, dût plutôt aider à la conclusion de la paix qu'à la continuation de la guerre.

C'est dans cette vue, que sa majesté a attendu avec tant d'impatience la lettre que vous avez tant de fois annoncée de la part du roi de Prusse, comme aussi les éclaircissements qu'elle avoit demandée par le canal de son ministre à Magdebourg.

Les voila enfin arrivés ces dépêches de M. Mitchell, mais sans avoir apporté le moindre ouverture dans aucun des points essentiels qui en sont le sujet, qui pût satisfaire à la juste attente du roi. Je suis obligé d'en dire autant par rapport à ce que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de me communiquer des instructions de sa majesté Prussienne, qui ne s'ouvre le moins du monde au sujet des conditions particulieres, sur lesquelles elle voudroit conclure la paix; se bornant au contraire aux expressions générale de sa disposition à conclure sur un pied qui seroit conformes à ses intérêts et à sa gloire.

Il est vrai que par une lettre de plus fraîche datte, M. Mitchell nous apprend la mission d'une personne accreditée et munie des plein pouvoirs du dit roi à la cour de Russie, et que sa majesté à bien voulu lui faire savoir que c'étoit pour s'en servir si l'occasion se presentoit. Elle ne s'explique pas d'avantage, et ne fait la moindre



communication au roi des instructions particulieres, qu'elle auroit données à ce ministre.

Vous jugez bien, messieurs, qu'un silence si extraordinaire, par rapport à un objet qui interesse les deux cours à un tel point, ne sauroit être regardé qu'avec beaucoup de surprise par sa majesté. Je vous assure pourtant qu'il ne l'a nullement fait changer de resolution. Mais elle continue d'esperer que le roi votre maître se determinera enfin, à lui faire part de ses idées au sujet de la paix ; et elle se flatte en même tems qu'elle les trouvera propres à faciliter l'obtention de ce but tant desirable.

Dès que le roi aura eu cette consolation, il ne se perdra pas un jour à moyenner à sa dite majesté la remise des 670,000 livres sterling. Et comme ces sentimens et cette intention du roi, ne sont seulement raisonnables en eux-mêmes, mais qu'ils se trouvent aussi marqués au coin de l'amitié et de l'attention les plus parfaites envers sa majesté Prussienne ; je me flatte qu'une telle ouverture ne sauroit manquer d'être reçue avec la même cordialité avec laquelle on la fait, et qu'il y sera répondu d'une maniere, à lever toutes les difficultés qui subsistent actuellement ; événement qui me rejouira infiniment en mon particulier.

J'ai l'honneur d'être,  
avec la consideration la plus parfaite,

BUTE.

THE KING OF PRUSSIA TO KING GEORGE III.

*A Breslau, ce 12 Mars, 1762.*

MONSIEUR MON FRERE,

Les nouvelles qui viennent de Pétersbourg depuis la mort de l'imperatrice sont si favorables, que je les communique avec joie à votre majesté. Le nouvel empereur est entierement disposé à la paix. Les soins de M. Keith ont beaucoup contribué à entretenir cette disposition avanta-



geuse. J'ai envoyé le baron Goltz à Pétersbourg, pour complimenter ce prince sur son avènement au trône ; et il est en même tems chargé de plein pouvoirs pour signèr la paix si l'empereur y consent. Cette negociation passe par les mains de M. Keith. L'Angleterre n'a pas été en guerre contre le Russie ; et les intérêts de votre majesté ne peuvent rien souffrir de cette paix, de sorte que je n'ai aucun reproche à me faire, et je suis même persuadé qu'elle sera bien aise de cet evenement. Voila la grande alliance separée. C'est un très grand article. Si avec cela nous parvenons a pousser la cour de Vienne vigoureusement, il faudra bien qu'elle prenne enfin des sentimens plus modérés qu'elle n'en a marqué jusqu'ici ; et son consentement à la paix entrainera infailliblement celui de la France. J'ai regardé de tout tems la reine de Hongrie comme la promotrice de la guerre presente, et votre majesté verra que la guerre ne finira, que lorsque cette princesse commencera à craindre pour ses propres etats. Je souhaite d'avoir toujours des nouvelles agréables à marquer à votre majesté ; je la prie cependant de croire que personne ne prend plus que moi de part à ses intérêts, étant avec le plus grand attachement,

Monsieur mon frere,  
de vôtre majesté,  
le bon frere,

FREDERIC.

KING GEORGE III. TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

ANSWER.

*A St. James's, ce 30 Mars, 1762.*

MONSIEUR MON FRERE,

En remerciant votre majesté des deux lettres qu'elle a pris la peine de m'écrire le 22d de Janvier, et le 12 du courant, je la felicite très sincèrement de l'heureux change-

ment arrivé en Russie ; et particulièrement sur la déclaration faite le 23 du mois passé par cet empereur aux cours de Vienne, de Versailles, et de Stockholm. La résolution qu'a prise ce digne prince de faire connoître à tout le monde ses sentimens par rapport à la guerre présente, et son intention de contribuer de tout son possible, au rétablissement d'une paix générale, m'a été infiniment agréable ; et ma façon de penser sur ces grands objets y correspond entièrement ; je ne manquerai pas de co-operer par tout ce qui pourra dependre de mes soins à un dessein si salutaire. En même tems je prie vôtre majesté, d'être persuadée que je souhaite toujours également de pourvoir à son assistance. Elle voit pourtant combien mes facultés diminuent de jour à autre, en suite de la nouvelle guerre, où je me trouve engagé ; et des secours indispensable pour le soutien de mon bon et ancien allié le roi de Portugal. Ce n'est pas que dès que vôtre majesté m'aura confié les moyens dont elle propose de se servir pour l'obtention de la paix, je ne sois résolu de faire tout ce qui sera en mon pouvoir pour aider à sa réussite. Je suis avec la plus parfaite estime et affection,

Monsieur mon frere,  
de vôtre majesté,  
le bon frere,

GEORGE R.

LORD BUTE TO MR. MITCHELL,

RESIDENT AT BERLIN.

*St. James's, 26th March, 1762.*

\* \* \* \* The Prussian ministers having yesterday acquainted me that they had information from their court of some overtures, supposed to be privately made from hence to the court of Vienna, and having desired that I would communicate the particulars for their master's satisfaction ; in order to enable them to set the matter in a true light,

I gave them a sight of the *precis* of the king's order of the 12th of January last to sir Joseph Yorke. It is to be hoped that Messrs. Knyphausen and Mitchell will make the proper use of this communication, towards removing any ill-grounded suspicions which may have been conceived by the king of Prussia, with regard to a step calculated for procuring, if possible, an information that might prove beneficial to the common cause; a step perfectly inoffensive to every power engaged in it, and which was so far from being taken with a view to prejudice his Prussian majesty's particular interests, or even being attended with any neglect of them, that it carried upon the very face of it, a suggestion thrown out with an eye to turn the empress's thoughts to obtaining in another part what might serve as an equivalent to her pretensions in Silesia. But to obviate any failure therein on their part, the king has ordered me to send the above extract at all events to you, that you may represent it in its true colours, and justify the rectitude of his majesty's intentions.

For your own further information, and to put it in your power to rectify, upon occasion, any misconception of the tendency and result of the insinuations that were made in consequence of the king's intimation to sir Joseph Yorke, I enclose copies of his answer likewise, and of that which was returned, through the channel of M. Reischach, on the part of the empress queen.

*Precis des Instructions données par la dépêche de S. E. le Comte de Bute, a M. le Chevalier Yorke, du 12 Janvier, 1762.*

A cette occasion (viz. de la publication du pacte de famille entre le France et l'Espagne, et du danger qui menace le royaume de Portugal), le roi seroit bien aise que votre excellence pût trouver quelque canal convenable

pour sonder les sentimens de la cour de Vienne ; afin que sa majesté sache s'il y a lieu d'esperer de voir revivre dans l'esprit de l'imperatrice, les craintes bien fondées qu'ont conçu tous ses augustes predecesseurs, de la puissance enorme et dangereuse de la maison de Bourbon. Et si elle ne s'alarmeroit pas à la vue de l'invasion dont le Portugal est menacé, aussi bien que des dangers qui sont justement à apprehender pour ses propres etats en Italie ; ou bien si elle ne seroit pas capable de se laisser flatter de l'esperance de quelque acquisition ulterieure dans ce quartier, en cas qu'elle resolut à se joindre aux puissances qui pourroient vouloir opposer, les projets pernicioeux de la France et de l'Espagne.

*Precis de la Reponse de M. l'Ambassadeur Yorke, à la Lettre du Comte de Bute, du 12 Janvier, datée à la Haye, 19 Janvier, 1762.*

Par le canal dont je me suis servi selon les ordres de V. E. du 12 de ce mois, pour sonder les sentimens de sa majesté l'imperatrice reine, par rapport a l'union formidable de la maison de Bourbon, j'espere d'apprendre quelque chose ; et il est à presumer qu'au cas que cette princesse trouve a redire au pacte de famille, elle ne s'en cachera pas long tems. On en verra des indices, et il ne sera pas difficile en ce cas de trouver moyen d'etre mis au fait plus particulierement de ses intentions. Et comme la guerre ou elle se trouve engagée avec le roi de Prusse fait le premier et principal objet de son attention, rien ne conduiroit plus surement à la connoissance que l'on souhaite de se procurer des sentimens réels de cette cour, que si on étoit en etat de lui faire quelque ouverture de la part de sa majesté Prussienne.



*Extrait traduit d'une Apostille à la Lettre du Comte de Kaunitz, au Baron de Reischach, datée de Vienne, le 3 Mars, 1762.*

Si l'on veut considerer attentivement le contenu des memoires qui ont été remis de part et d'autre, à la cour d'Angleterre dans l'année 1755, et sur tout si l'on veut relire avec attention le plan que M. le comte Charles de Colloredo à communiqué au ministere, il en resultera qu'on conviendra que nous avons deja commencé dans ce tems la, à prévoir à connoître notre propre danger. Mais la conduite de l'Angleterre nous a dans le suite, entierement ouvert les yeux; et il n'y a rien de plus naturel que chaque puissance prenne d'avance les mesures pour sa propre conservation. Dans ces circonstances je dois vous avouer que sa majesté Imperiale et son ministre, ne peuvent point comprendre ce que l'ouverture confidentielle des Anglois signifie proprement, et par consequent il est aisé à comprendre qu'on ne se trouve pas ici en etat de pouvoir y faire une reponse.

LORD BUTE TO MR. MITCHELL.

*St. James's, 30 March, 1762.*

In my last I acquainted you with the complaint made here by Messieurs Knyphausen and Mitchell, of some supposed secret overtures on our part to the court of Vienna, and I then explained the matter to you from the beginning to the end. I am now to add, that though they gave that intelligence a turn, as if they had received it from their own court, yet we know with certainty that they picked it up here. And as it appears from their way of talking upon that subject to me, but more especially from what they have said to the duke of Newcastle,



that they will probably have made a handle of it to inflame the mind of their master, the king thinks it expedient for his service, as well in respect to this affair, as to many others, that you shall repair forthwith to Breslau, where you will lay the whole of that business before the king of Prussia ; communicating to him the letters sent you by the last post, as containing the king's original orders to sir Joseph Yorke, which gave birth to it, and which, you may assure him, are the very orders that were given, and not a part only or abstract of them ; and you will give his Prussian majesty to understand, that so far from disavowing such a step, the king is so fully persuaded of its inoffensiveness, and of his right to take such a step, that his majesty has no desire to conceal what passed in that transaction, either from him, or any body else. Though you must take care that the communication which you make of it to his Prussian majesty may appear in its true light, viz. that of a particular attention to his Prussian majesty, and totally different from an excuse, which the king will by no means believe can be expected from him on such an occasion. Neither does his majesty comprehend what title the Prussian ministers had to complain of any application which he may have thought fit to make to the empress queen, of a nature like this now in question, entirely foreign to any of the king of Prussia's concerns. The conduct, therefore, of those ministers, upon the present occasion, is justly displeasing to his majesty ; and it is his pleasure that you should express to the king of Prussia his desire, that they may be instructed to proceed with a greater degree of caution for the future.

You will execute these instructions in your audience of his Prussian majesty, in their fullest sense, without any softening, since, in the manner wherein the affair has been treated here by the gentlemen above mentioned, the king's honour is concerned.

LORD BUTE TO MR. MITCHELL.

*St. James's, 9th April, 1762.*

SIR,

The reserved and unfriendly manner in which the king has been treated by his Prussian majesty, in respect to M. Goltz's mission to Petersburg, cannot but be very sensibly felt by his majesty. It was determined at first without previous communication: we were told that he went with compliments, or, at most, with general instructions for a reconciliation between the two courts; and when it was owned that he had full powers, still he was to open every thing to Mr. Keith, and to take no step but in concert with him. It now comes out, by Mr. Keith's letters of the 11th past, that M. Goltz has been negotiating upon affairs of the highest consequence with the emperor, and that without the least degree of participation with his majesty. No less a point than that of giving his Prussian majesty's guaranty for Sleswick in exchange for that of Silesia, was in agitation; and, by Mr. Keith's account, we may expect to hear that a treaty has been concluded upon that foot some weeks since; a treaty wherein the king of Prussia must know, that it would be impossible for his majesty to take any part, consistently with the engagements of his crown to that of Denmark. There is, therefore, no longer cause for surprise, though there is certainly a great one for complaint, with respect to the dead silence of your court, and their concealment from his majesty's knowledge of such measures, as, instead of promoting his pacific views, according to the general assurances given of the king of Prussia's intentions, have the greatest tendency to spread the flames of war; and increase the miseries of mankind.

With the consciousness, however, of this unjustifiable

treatment of the king our master, his Prussian majesty has still continued to direct his ministers here, if I may judge from their constant representation, to press the payment of his former subsidy; but the condition upon which the king has declared, both by my letter to them, and by his majesty's to that prince, that he was ready to give it, was the employment of it towards the procurement of peace, and not towards the continuation of war. And I cannot conceal from you, that to see the bounty of this nation converted to so pernicious a use as that of fomenting new troubles in Europe, would be of all things the most disagreeable to his majesty.

The king must, therefore, receive farther intelligence, and see more clearly what use is intended to be made of any subsidy which he might be induced to give, before he can determine to give any at all. And this pause, on resolving upon that important question, is so much the more necessary, as in case his Prussian majesty's treaty with Russia be actually concluded, and the weight of that empire taken consequently out of the opposite scale, he will then, if he continues in the same mind in which he was when you wrote your letters to lord Holderness, of the months of June and July, 1756, have so little occasion for any assistance from England, that he might even be ready to furnish a body of troops for his majesty's defence. This was the king of Prussia's language to you upon the supposition of our barely preventing his being attacked by Russia. With how much more reason then may the English subsidy be dispensed with, if he shall have obtained, not only the neutrality of the Russian emperor, but even his guaranty for the duchy of Silesia. You are commanded, therefore, by his majesty, to represent the purport and substance of what is above to the king of Prussia, but in the way of a cool and dispassionate remonstrance, and with very particular caution in what relates to his guaranty of Sleswick, not to put it in his

power to hurt his majesty's interest at the court of Russia, by representing there, that his engagement, if he has contracted one with the emperor for assisting him in his designs upon Denmark, is likely to cost him his subsidy from England : or, if he has not, by charging his refusal to do it upon the king's withholding that succour. You will let me know very particularly all that passes upon this execution of your orders.

In regard to your notion expressed in your last both to count Finkenstein and me, of the king's soliciting his Prussian majesty's assistance in dissuading the czar, by their joint good offices, from proceeding to hostilities against Denmark ; you will see by the enclosed copy of what I am writing to Mr. Keith, that his majesty would willingly concur in such dissuasion, but he sees no hopes of any weight being added to them from the representations of a power, who, supposing the guaranty of Silesia to have been purchased by him at the expense of a reciprocal one for Sleswick, will have taken a step so well calculated to destroy the whole effect of every pacific remonstrance.

LORD BUTE TO MR. MITCHELL.

*St. James's, May 26, 1762.*

SIR,

As this is the last dispatch that it will fall to my share to write to you in quality of secretary of state, I think it necessary, and especially as the parliament is upon the point of breaking up without any grant or subsidy, as in the former years, to the king of Prussia ; to enable you to justify the king's conduct from any misapprehensions or misrepresentations of what has passed in that affair, and and to set forth his majesty's true motives for withholding



that succour in the present circumstances; that so the natural consequences of public events, and the effects of pure necessity, may be no more imputed, as they have been very maliciously, to such a change of dispositions or such a failure of friendship, as have in truth never existed; since the king never had, nor has now, the least thought of abandoning his Prussian majesty to his enemies, or deserting his alliance.

In order to your being prepared to execute this instruction in a manner conformable to the king's intention, I must desire you to recollect with me the several stages of the negotiation concerning the subsidy, and what passed in the different periods of it.

Upon the conclusion of the last campaign, which ended so greatly to the king of Prussia's disadvantage, by his loss of the two important fortresses of Schweidnitz and Colberg, the king saw the distress of his ally with the utmost distress and commiseration; and, upon the pressing application of the Prussian ministers here, his majesty, notwithstanding the great load of expenses, from the continuance of military operations in so many parts of the globe, as well by sea as land, for which the parliament could with difficulty make provision, yet did not hesitate a minute in determining to give the former succour to the king of Prussia. The term in which that business had been before transacted, the treaty being then expired, was indeed objected to, but the substance was not disputed.

The negotiation for settling the mode of that business, was carried on through the months of November and December. In the beginning of the present year, our war with Spain broke out, and the necessity of our undertaking the defence of Portugal against the ambitious views of that crown was foreseen. The additional weight of such vast charges upon the almost exhausted resources of this country, could not but alarm the warmest advocates for the



continuance of war, and the indisputable expedience of lessening the objects of them was universally felt and acknowledged. In that circumstance you were directed to recommend, in the king's name, to his Prussian majesty, to endeavour to set on foot some negotiation of peace with the court of Vienna. He was desired to entrust his majesty with the terms upon which he would be willing to treat, and assured of the king's desire to assist in bringing any such salutary design to perfection. You were likewise ordered to ask a communication of the means on which he would rely, after so many misfortunes, and such a diminution of his power, for carrying on the war, if that were his intention.

After some weeks waiting for an eclaircissement upon either of those heads, in the beginning of February the king did indeed complain of so unexpected a silence; but you were still told that his majesty was thinking of the proper time for making the demand of the subsidy in parliament.

In this interval, we had the great news of the decease of the late czarina, and a most promising prospect from our very first accounts, of that happy change of measures which has so greatly bettered the king of Prussia's situation.

His majesty saw that amendment with the truest satisfaction. He rejoiced in it as a sincere friend to that prince, and as a well-wisher to the public interests of mankind: for he considered the defection of Russia from the contrary alliance, as what must give his Prussian majesty a great advantage towards obtaining a speedy peace. And though his majesty could not, consistently with the interests of his people, whose burdens were increasing in proportion as those of his ally were lessened, think then of contributing by any act of his to the prolongation of war, yet he still declared, and has continued till near the present times declaring, that if he might have assurance

that the subsidy should be employed towards the procurement of peace, his majesty would be still ready to ask it immediately of the parliament.

This was the language as well of my letter of the 26th of February, to Messrs. Knyphausen and Mitchell, as of one which his majesty was pleased himself to write a month after that to the king of Prussia.

It was not till the 9th of last month, that, after a long and fruitless waiting for such an overtare from Breslau, as might have justified to his majesty's own paternal sentiments, and to the public, the laying again in so different circumstances, so heavy a charge upon his people, that you were directed to hold a language to the king of Prussia, which might prepare him for a total cessation of the former pecuniary succour. It was not till after the actual conclusion of his armistice with Russia, and when an agreement of the like kind with Sweden was in view. It was when the former of those powers seemed on the point of concluding a definitive treaty, at least with his Prussian majesty, and the latter, from her absolute inability to continue the war, and the universal cry of her people for peace, was preparing to make the first step towards him : in a word, it was subsequent to our receiving here that important declaration of the 23d of February, by the new emperor, wherein he openly exhorts the king of Prussia's enemies to put a speedy end to the war, and declares his own resolution of restoring to that prince all the important conquests of his predecessor.

With these facts and dates in your memory, you may venture to appeal not only as you were directed by my last cited dispatch, to that prince's former eventual declarations, but even to his own present judgment, and that of his ministers, whether the king could have still reasonably been expected to persevere in his intention of giving the former subsidy. We have a very powerful additional enemy to contend with ; his Prussian majesty has a new and very

powerful friend. The weight of Spain is thrown into our opposite scale; that of Russia, and Sweden too, is taken out of his. The king of Prussia has Pomerania and Brandenburg to defend, besides Saxony and Silesia; the two former are no longer in danger. We had on our part a most expensive land-war to support in Germany; we must now provide for another in Portugal. It seems hardly imaginable that this striking comparison should not be sufficient to convince even the court of Breslau, that in such circumstances, without a certainty of its application towards lessening the objects of war, it was impossible to propose the subsidy to parliament with any hopes of success\*.

Having thus stated to you in its true and genuine colours, the whole of the king's proceeding, in relation to the Prussian subsidy, with the real motives of it in every step; I come now to say something upon another affair, which concerns myself more particularly, and in which his majesty is very graciously pleased to permit me to make my own dis-

\* It seems that the English minister, unfortunately for the king of Prussia, forgot to take into his comparison, circumstances at least as striking as those which he has specified: viz. that England, in consequence of the great superiority of her maritime power, had been completely victorious in the war; that her commerce had flourished to an unexampled extent, and her burdens so little felt, that the nation was eager for the prosecution of hostilities, against the united power of France and Spain, and that the withdrawment of the Prussian subsidy was totally contrary to the feelings of the British nation, which held the genius and talents of the king of Prussia in the highest admiration, and which abhorred the idea of deserting him in his distresses. And although the situation of that monarch was in some respects materially improved, he had still to contend against the undiminished power of Austria and the empire, assisted by France, while his own dominions had been ravaged and laid waste by a series of bloody and disastrous campaigns. It was notorious, that commerce and manufactures were in a manner annihilated in the Prussian territories; and that the royal finances were in a state of the most terrible derangement. In this situation it was, that the minister Bute conceived all pecuniary aid from Britain to be superfluous, and that the court of Berlin itself must be convinced of the propriety of relinquishing the accustomed subsidy.

culpation a part of this dispatch, written by his order, and with his approbation.

I need not tell you, for you are fully apprized of it, that I have been charged with having held to prince Gallitzin, some little time before his departure, a most unfriendly discourse with regard to the king of Prussia, and with having in particular endeavoured to persuade the emperor of Russia, through the channel of that minister, in the first place, not to withdraw his troops from the Prussian territories, but to keep them still there, in order to force that prince to make cessions to the queen of Hungary; and secondly, to prefer an alliance with the house of Austria to that of his Prussian majesty. These are the chief points of accusation, to which are added some embellishments of less consequence. And in answer to them, what I have to observe to you is, that I see no resemblance in that account, to my real conversation with prince Gallitzin. If he did really, therefore, make such a report to the emperor, he must either grossly have mistaken my meaning, or failed in his memory; or, what I am sorry to suppose possible with respect to a gentleman so deservedly esteemed, may have been prompted by his known attachment to the court of Vienna, to give such a turn to his relation of my discourse, as he might think most likely to serve that interest.

By a particular coldness shewn by the czar to Mr. Keith, and by hints which dropped from his Imperial majesty, there was reason to think that something written to him by prince Gallitzin, with regard to the king's dispositions towards the king of Prussia, had given him offence.

He without doubt, communicated that intelligence to his Prussian majesty, who had been before disposed, by those malevolent and mischievous insinuations which we have, by a multitude of combined circumstances, but too much reason to suppose he receives from his ministers here,



to give an entire belief to it, with the same credulity with which he listened to that groundless and shameful falsehood, transmitted to him from hence, of his majesty's having offered to treat with the court of Vienna at his expense.

But however that be, the fact is, that I held no such discourse. I do perfectly recollect the interview which I had with prince Gallitzin before he left us, and I remember as perfectly, that I had then lying by me my first dispatch, after the late empress's death, to Mr. Keith, and that I talked to him from the contents, and entirely in the language of it; and I must add, that in using that style, I spoke not my own notions only, but those of his majesty and of all his servants, who had seen and concurred in the instructions then sent to Mr. Keith.

I communicated to you at that time, what appeared necessary for your information of the contents of that dispatch; but as it is now become of more importance, I have his majesty's leave to send you *in extenso*, every word in it that related to the general affairs of Europe, or to the king of Prussia in particular. You will see that instead of advising the czar to continue his armies upon the prince's territories, the king's particular pleasure and satisfaction is expressed in the orders given to those troops to advance no further upon them, to abstain from all hostilities, and even to accept an armistice if offered. You will see too, that so far from desiring that the court of Russia should prefer the Austrian alliance to the king of Prussia's, Mr. Keith was directed to execute the instructions sent him by the king of Prussia himself, which were certainly not in favour of the queen of Hungary.

It is true, that the preference is very strongly given to pacific measures in that dispatch, and Mr. Keith is restrained from concurring in any thing that might tend to protract the war; but this was no secret instruction, for



you were directed to make the same declaration, and to shape your own conduct by the same rule.

You see then, besides my own assertion to the contrary, how totally improbable it is that I should hold a language to the Russian minister, I do not say so different, but so absolutely contradictory to the orders which I had just sent from his majesty to his own minister at that court, and that with those very orders in my hand, I should declare, or even insinuate to prince Gallitzin, that his majesty's real sentiments were just the reverse of them.

Upon this foot, therefore, I shall leave it to you to clear me from such an unworthy imputation, having only just to add to this letter, that as one which his majesty has received from the king of Prussia, seems to adopt the same ill-founded charge, and does not yet express a full satisfaction in the declarations made by his majesty, with respect to the idle story of our negotiation with the empress queen, the king would have you insinuate civilly to count Finkenstein, that his majesty had not thought it suitable either to his own or his Prussian majesty's dignity, to enter into such altercations, but had chosen to enable you his minister, to explain and set in their true light, those facts, which have either erroneously or maliciously been misrepresented to the king of Prussia.

I am, &c.

BUTE.

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Upon an attentive review of the foregoing documents, it appears that the charges of the king of Prussia against the court of London, may be reduced to three different heads:—1st, The withdrawment of the subsidy; 2dly, The propositions made by lord Bute to the prince Gallitzin; 3dly, The secret overture transmitted to the

court of Vienna\*.—First, in relation to the subsidy, it does incontrovertibly appear, that the king of Prussia had very just and weighty cause of complaint. In consequence of the alliance entered into by that monarch with great Britain, he had drawn upon himself the vengeance of the three greatest powers of the Continent. The subsidy was all the assistance which he derived from England, and though the treaty was indeed annual, the withdrawalment of it was ungenerous, inequitable, and contrary to the spirit of the alliance. The defence set up by lord Bute on this head, is very feeble. “ Upon the pressing application,” his lordship says, “ of the Prussian ministers in London, at the end of the campaign of 1761, his majesty did not hesitate a moment in determining to give the former succour to the king of Prussia.” So much cavilling, however, took place respecting the mode of settling this business, that the months of November and December passed over, and the English nation then found itself engaged in a new war against Spain. In these circumstances, Mr. Mitchell, the British ambassador at Berlin, was directed, January 1762, “ to recommend in the king’s name to his Prussian majesty, to endeavour to set on foot some negotiation of peace with the court of Vienna; he was desired to entrust his majesty with the terms upon which he would be willing to treat, and assured of the king’s desire to assist in bringing any such salutary design to perfection.” Mr. M. was likewise ordered, “ to ask a communication of the means on which he would rely, after so many misfortunes, and such a diminution of his power, for carrying on the war, if that were his intention.”

\* Another cause of complaint mentioned by the king of Prussia; viz. the apathy with which his interests were deserted by England in the treaty of peace, and particularly the leaving of Cleves, Wesel, and Gueldres, in the possession of France, afterwards “ to be scrambled for,” to adopt the expression of lord Bute, by Austria and Prussia, has already been animadverted upon, in the history to which these papers are an appendix.

To these peremptory, not to say insolent interrogatories, the king of Prussia did not deign formally to reply. But on the 22d of January, he wrote with his own hand a letter to the king of England, in which he acquainted him with the death of the empress of Russia, and also with the friendly disposition which he had reason to believe the grand duke, now emperor, entertained in his behalf. He alludes to the Spanish war, which, he says, cannot but be glorious to Great Britain; and that a little more of constancy and fortitude only are wanting to bring matters to a favourable termination. "I still see difficulties," says this magnanimous monarch, "without number, but they encourage instead of terrifying me, by the hope of vanquishing them."—Was not this letter sufficiently explanatory of the king of Prussia's views? That prince advanced no claims upon his enemies. He fought merely in defence of his own rights, and to maintain the integrity and independence of his own dominions. If Austria chose to relinquish her pretensions, the war was at an end. This the court of London well knew, and of two alternatives, which offered themselves, they might either—1st, grant the same aid and assistance as heretofore to the king of Prussia, for the purpose of enabling him to compel the court of Vienna into a pacification on equal terms, of which there was now a fair prospect; or, 2dly, declare explicitly to the Prussian monarch, that it was requisite he should make some sacrifices, in order to purchase a pacification. This last step, however incompatible with firmness and grandeur of sentiment, would have been a measure far less objectionable than the irritating policy adopted by the English minister.

On the 26th of February lord Bute wrote to Messrs. Knyphausen and Mitchell, the Prussian residents in London, to complain "that the king of Prussia will not open himself in relation to the particular conditions on which he would be willing to treat for peace; merely saying, that he would conclude it on such a basis as should be con-

formable to his glory. Notwithstanding this extraordinary silence," lord Bute says, "the king continues to hope that his Prussian majesty will at length determine to communicate to him his ideas relative to peace, and he flatters himself they will be such as may be calculated to facilitate the attainment of this desirable object. As soon as the king shall have this *consolation*, he will not lose a day in procuring for his Prussian majesty the remittance of the former subsidy."

This was a plain intimation, not only that sacrifices on the part of Prussia were expected, but that the king of Prussia himself must propose them, in order to entitle himself to the subsidy. That monarch, as before, disdainng to reply officially to propositions so derogatory to his honour, wrote a second letter to the king of Great Britain, dated March 12, in which he informs his Britannic majesty, that a peace is soon likely to take place between Russia and Prussia. "At this event," says he, "I am persuaded your majesty will rejoice. Behold the grand alliance separated! This is a great point gained. If withal, we resolve to push the court of Vienna vigorously, she will be compelled to adopt other and more moderate sentiments than those which have hitherto marked her conduct, and a pacific disposition on her part, will infallibly draw after it the consent of France. I have ever regarded the queen of Hungary as the promoter of the present war, and your majesty will see that this war will not terminate till that princess begins to fear for her own estates."—This surely was a declaration sufficiently clear and explicit on the part of the king of Prussia, and England had now only to explain her views with the same frankness.

To this letter of the Prussian monarch, the king of Great Britain replied; on the 30th of March, in a strain of the most provoking equivocation. He begs the king of Prussia to be persuaded that he is at all times equally



disposed to grant him his assistance; that he sees how his faculties diminish from day to day; but that when his Prussian majesty shall have confided to him the means by which he proposes to serve himself for the obtaining of peace, he would do all in his power to contribute to its success." From this time, the king of Prussia appears to have despaired of obtaining the British subsidy, without incurring personal and political degradation.

In the letter of lord Bute to Mr. Mitchell, April 9th, he declares "that the king was ready to give the subsidy for the procurement of peace, and not towards the continuance of war." But in regard to this vague and general principle, there could be no diversity of opinion; but the court of London, under the guidance of such a minister as lord Bute, could neither perceive the force, nor feel the magnanimity of the application of it by the Prussian monarch, that by a vigorous prosecution of the war only, in present circumstances, was an honourable and permanent peace to be procured. This narrow-minded statesman, in excuse of his conduct, takes occasion to quote a declaration of the king of Prussia to Mr. Mitchell, made so long since as the month of June, 1756, viz. "that in case England could secure the neutrality of Russia, he might even be ready to furnish a body of troops for his majesty's defence." It must be recollected that at this time England was menaced with an invasion from France, and in contemplation of such an emergency, the king of Prussia, supposing that he should have Austria only to cope with, generously expressed his hope of "being able to spare a body of troops for the defence of Great Britain." And this declaration was now most ungratefully, as well as most unjustly made a plea for abandoning Prussia to her fate, when her strength, population, and resources, were exhausted by seven successive campaigns carried on against all the great Continental powers combined against her, and confederated for her destruc-



tion. But what appears most remarkable is, that lord Bute, after informing Mr. Mitchell in his dispatch of May 26, "that the parliament is on the point of breaking up without any grant of subsidy," affects violently to resent the *malicious imputation*, that there has been any failure of friendship on the part of the king of England; and he has the astonishing effrontery to say, that the king never had, nor has now, the least thought of abandoning his Prussian majesty to his enemies, or of deserting his alliance."

II. The second charge of the king of Prussia against the court of London, relates to the proposition made, or supposed to be made to prince Gallitzin, ambassador from Russia at that court, most injurious to the interests of that monarch, at the last conference of the British minister with the Prince, previous to his departure for Petersburg, about the beginning of February, 1762.

On this head, we learn from the king of Prussia, that prince Gallitzin (whom lord Bute himself allows to be a man deservedly esteemed) in a dispatch to the court of St. Petersburg, informed the emperor, "that the English minister, in a conference with the ambassador, expressed an eager desire that the czar should still permit the corps of prince Czernichef to act with the Austrians, in order to hold the king of Prussia in check, and that England would support any demands which the emperor might have upon Prussia, in case he would enter into the views of the court of London, which meant at all events to compel the king of Prussia to conclude a peace with Austria." And it seems to have been a fixed opinion with lord Bute, though it was an opinion which he durst not openly and fairly avow, that Prussia ought to make some considerable sacrifice, and if necessary, be forced to that sacrifice, in order to the attainment of that object.

The emperor, Peter III. indignant at these overtures, transmitted without hesitation, a copy of the dispatch to

the king of Prussia, with a view to put him upon his guard against the perfidious friendship of England. In answer to this charge, lord Bute positively denies that any thing passed in his conference with prince Gallitzin, hostile to the interests of Prussia: and he accounts for the misrepresentation of the prince, by supposing—1st, that the ambassador might have mistaken his meaning; or 2dly, that his memory might have failed him; or 3dly, that he might purposely have given this turn to his narrative, from his attachment to the court of Vienna.

The two first of these suppositions are ridiculous, and the last highly improbable. Allowing that the prince, a man so much esteemed for his probity, could have been induced to falsify his narrative in order to serve the interests of the court of Vienna, is it possible that he should be so ignorant of the disposition of the new emperor, as to imagine that he could be wrought upon to change his whole political system, by an artifice so gross, and at the same time so hazardous to the contriver of it? This is a most inadmissible hypothesis. Lord Bute says, indeed, in his own defence, that he spoke in perfect conformity with his dispatch to Mr. Keith, which then lay open before him; a dispatch approved by his colleagues, and which contained no such propositions, or any thing similar to them. But considering the very high degree of favour which lord Bute at this period possessed with the king, it is by no means incredible, that he should in a confidential conference with the Russian ambassador, throw out insinuations, and advance propositions, which he had not previously communicated to his colleagues in office, and much less to Mr. Keith; and which, as the *primum mobile* of the political system of Great Britain, he could not indeed be expected to communicate till he had satisfied himself of the practicability of his own projects.

In short, we have here a positive assertion on the part

of prince Gallitzin, a man of honour, to his own sovereign, which, if found to be false, must have exposed him to disgrace and ruin, encountered by as positive a denial on the part of lord Bute, a nobleman whose probity in private life has never been called in question, but who on the present occasion must have felt himself impelled by the strongest motives to invalidate the force of the Russian ambassador's testimony, even if strictly conformable to truth; and it is certain that the subsequent conduct of lord Bute, relative to the king of Prussia, was by no means calculated to create the smallest suspicion in the mind of that monarch, that the relation of prince Gallitzin was in any degree distorted or exaggerated.

III. The third charge respects the secret overture confessedly made by lord Bute to the court of Vienna, the inveterate foe of the king of Prussia, of whom England still pretended to be the friend and ally. This monarch affirms, that England offered without scruple to the Imperial court, the spoils of Prussia as the price of peace: but that prince Kaunitz, suspecting that the design of the English government was to embroil the court of Vienna with that of Versailles, replied to the sieur Bute, with all the haughtiness of an Austrian minister, rejecting with disdain these overtures, which he believed insincere; at the same time "declaring the empress queen to be sufficiently powerful to do justice to her own claims, and that she would accept of no peace of which England was the mediatix."

Lord Bute's defence of himself from this charge, though certainly better than from the former, is not altogether satisfactory. The English minister, it appears, had transmitted instructions to sir Joseph Yorke at the Hague, to find some channel whereby the court of Vienna might be sounded, whether in consequence of the family compact just concluded between the courts of France and Spain, the ancient jealousy of the house of Austria, in relation to

the house of Bourbon, might not be awakened, and whether she was not capable of suffering herself to be *flattered* with the hope of some ulterior acquisition in Italy, in case she would resolve to join in opposing the pernicious projects of France and Spain. This was an attempt to the last degree puerile; and the Austrian minister, a man of talents and sagacity, was in no danger of becoming the dupe of lord Bute's shallow devices. The prince de Kaunitz, and the duc de Choiseul, who prided themselves on being the authors of the union between the houses of Bourbon and Austria, still enjoyed the highest degree of credit at their respective courts, and there was not the slightest probability that this effort would be attended with any other consequence than that of cementing the union which it aimed to destroy. As to any direct offer on the part of the court of London, of the provinces of Prussia to the empress queen, so far as the evidence of written documents extends, the king of Prussia appears to have been misinformed. But the temptation held out by England to the court of Vienna, was a most extraordinary one: no less than an ulterior acquisition in Italy. But at whose expense? Not surely at the cost of the king of Sardinia, the ancient ally of Great Britain; not of the unoffending republics of Venice or of Genoa. No; the destined victim of this chimerical league must have been, doubtless, the infant duke of Parma, whose sole crime it was to have been born a prince of the house of Bourbon, and who had conducted himself since his settlement in Lombardy, in virtue of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, with uniform equity and moderation. This was a proposition which could not but excite in the breast of the empress queen, renowned for the justice of her government, and the inviolable fidelity with which she adhered to her engagements, the utmost disgust and contempt. But it may well be suspected, that a very different project lurked in the breast of the English minister; and that if the Impe-



rial courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg had listened with complacency to his suggestions, that his real intentions were to re-establish a mutual concert and union between those courts and that of London, at the expense of the provinces of Prussia. If any such insinuation or overture in any shape, conformably to the firm belief expressed by the Prussian monarch, whose means of information were extensive, did in fact take place, it is no wonder that prince Kaunitz should reject it as insincere, though the king of Prussia might well consider it as a real and most serious effect of the machinations of a minister whom he regarded with detestation, as the worst and most dangerous of his enemies.

The reply of prince Kaunitz, dated March 3d, 1762, as it appears in the dispatch of sir Joseph Yorke, to the suggestion of that minister, is expressive of the most lively resentment at the conduct of England, which he says, "has for a series of years been such, as entirely to open the eyes of the Imperial court respecting her in the present circumstances." He remarks to the baron de Reischach, resident at the Hague, through whom the communication was made, "I must confess to you that her Imperial majesty and her ministers are unable to comprehend what can be the meaning of the confidential overture from that power, consequently it is easy to infer that this court does not find itself in a situation to make any sort of answer to it."

As a feeble counterbalance to all these charges, it is requisite to state, that lord Bute brings in his turn an accusation against the king of Prussia, viz. that of carrying on a clandestine negotiation with the court of St. Petersburg, to the prejudice of Great Britain.

In a letter dated February 26, 1762, the English minister informs the Prussian resident in London, M. Knyphausen, that recent advices had been received from M. Mitchell, the English ambassador at Berlin, stating, that



a person accredited with full powers had been sent from Berlin to Petersburg by his Prussian majesty, but that no communication whatever had been made relative to his particular instructions ; adding, that this extraordinary silence was regarded with much surprise by his Britannic majesty, and intimating, that the subsidy would not be moved for in parliament till a full disclosure of those instructions had taken place. But the king of Prussia, in a letter, written no doubt in consequence of this complaint, dated March 12, from Breslau, frankly avows, that he had sent baron Goltz to Petersburg with full powers to sign a peace with Russia. “ This negotiation will,” he says, “ pass through the hands of Mr. Keith. England has not been engaged in war with Russia, and the interests of Great Britain can suffer nothing from this peace ; so that he has nothing to reproach himself with. On the contrary, he is persuaded that the king of England will rejoice sincerely at this event.”

So far, indeed, was England from being at war with Russia, that no entreaties of the court of Berlin could prevail upon that of London to risque a rupture with the czarina, by sending a fleet into the Baltic to the relief of Colberg, which important maritime place fell into the hands of the Russians, for want of a naval force to prevent, or raise the blockade of it by sea. It seemed, therefore, no more necessary that the king of Prussia should acquaint the king of England with the particulars of this negotiation with Russia, than that the Prussian monarch should have been made a party to the English negotiation with Spain. The overture made by England to Austria, was to a power in the highest degree hostile to Prussia, and might well excite extreme umbrage, yet this was kept most carefully concealed from Prussia ; and when discovered by that monarch, the most petulant resentment was expressed when his minister in London re-

quested to be informed of the tenor and purport of it. And the same resentment was again awakened, because Prussia had omitted to make a confidential communication to England of an overture to a power with which the court of London had invariably maintained the relations of peace and amity. The king of Prussia might well, therefore, remark, "that with the English minister Bute, money was every thing." The power of granting or of withholding the subsidy, gave him a right to advance claims the most inconsistent and opposite.

Suspicious, however, were probably from the first entertained by the court of London, and in the progress of the negotiations between the courts of Berlin and Petersburg, it became manifest that the czar seriously purposed to revive the pretensions of the house of Holstein Gottorp, from which he was descended, to the duchy of Sleswick, guaranteed by Great Britain to Denmark, and in return for which Denmark had guaranteed the duchies of Bremen and Verden to Hanover. This was the real source of the uneasiness of the court of London, and this claim of the czar occasioned very great embarrassment to the king of Prussia, who in vain made every effort to dissuade him from the prosecution of it. But this weak and ill-fated prince would hear no reason. "His glory impelled him to avenge upon the Danes the wrongs suffered from them by his ancestors:" and in carrying this project into effect, he insisted upon the aid and concurrence of Prussia. In this perilous and perplexing crisis, how was it possible for the Prussian monarch to refuse his assent? Knowing that he could no longer rely upon the friendship or assistance of England, and that his preservation depended on making his peace with Russia, he at length, with the greatest reluctance, agreed to send 6000 Prussian troops to join the Russian army destined for the invasion of Denmark.

In a dispatch to Mr. Mitchell from lord Bute, dated

9th April, that minister renews his complaints of "the reserved and unfriendly manner in which the king had been treated by his Prussian majesty. Baron Goltz, who was represented as vested with general instructions only, for a reconciliation between the two courts, had been negotiating upon affairs of the highest consequence with the emperor, and that without the least degree of participation with his majesty. No less a point than that of giving his Prussian majesty's guarantee for Sleswick, in exchange for that of Silesia, was in agitation; and by Mr. Keith's account, we may expect to hear that a treaty has been concluded upon that foot some weeks since; a treaty wherein the king of Prussia must have known that it would be impossible for his majesty to take any part, consistently with the engagements of his crown to that of Denmark."

In this predicament, although the conduct of the king of Prussia was perfectly justifiable on his part, it must also be acknowledged, that, on the part of the king of England, it would have been equally justifiable to have declared openly and explicitly to his Prussian majesty, that he would no longer grant subsidies to a prince who had made himself a party in a quarrel against him. But this would have been evidently inexpedient and impolitic. From a nominal, it might have converted him into a real party in the contest. By granting the subsidy to Prussia, notwithstanding his reluctant concession to the czar, that prince would probably be enabled speedily and honourably to terminate the war with Austria: and there could be no question but he would then gladly and cordially enter into a confidential concert with England to rescue Denmark from the imminent danger which threatened her. The peace with Austria once concluded, he would be free to act, and in the wisdom and energy of his measures, seconded by the power and wealth of Britain, would the wild and extravagant projects of the czar, in

all probability, have received an effectual check, and the peace of the north have been preserved from any serious or durable interruption.

PROTEST AGAINST THE REPEAL OF THE STAMP ACT.

A. D 1766.

*Die Mercurii, 11. Martii, 1766.*

THE order of the day being read for the second reading of the bill, entitled “an act to repeal an act made in the last session of parliament, entitled an act for granting and applying certain stamp duties, and other duties, in the British colonies and plantations in America, towards farther defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the same, &c.” Then the said bill was read a second time, and it being proposed to commit the bill, the same was objected to :

Content, . . . . . 73	} 105
Proxies, . . . . . 32	
Not Content, . . . . . 61	} 71
Proxies, . . . . . 10	
Majority . . . . .	<hr/> 34

*Dissentient,*

I. Because, as this house has in this session, by several resolutions, most solemnly asserted and declared, *first*, that the king’s majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal and commons of Great Britain, in parliament assembled, has, hath, and of right ought to have full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain, in all cases whatsoever. *Secondly*, That tumults and insur-



rections of the most dangerous nature have been raised and carried on in several of the North American colonies, in open defiance of the power and dignity of his majesty's government, and in manifest violation of the laws and legislative authority of this kingdom. *Thirdly*, that the said tumults and insurrections have been encouraged and enflamed by sundry votes and resolutions passed in several of the assemblies of the said provinces, "derogatory to the honour of his majesty's government, and destructive of the legal and constitutional dependence of the said colonies on the imperial crown and parliament of Great Britain:" which resolutions were founded on a full examination of the papers on our table, manifesting a denial of the legislative authority of the crown and parliament of Great Britain to impose duties and taxes on our North American colonies, and a criminal resistance there made to the execution of the commercial and other regulations of the stamp act, and of other acts of parliament. We are of opinion, that the totally repealing of that law, especially while such resistance continues, would, as governor Barnard says is their intention, "make the authority of Great Britain contemptible hereafter;" and that such a submission of king, lords, and commons, under such circumstances, in so strange and unheard-of a contest, would be in effect to surrender their ancient unalienable rights of supreme jurisdiction, and give them exclusively to the subordinate provincial legislatures established by prerogative; which was never intended or thought of, and is not in the power of prerogative to bestow; as they are inseparable from the three estates of the realm assembled in parliament.

II. Because the law which this bill now proposes to repeal, was passed in the other house with very little opposition, and in this, without one dissentient voice, during the last session of parliament, which, we presume, if



it had been wholly and fundamentally wrong, could not possibly have happened : as the matter of it is so important, and as the intention of bringing it in had been communicated to the commons by the first commissioner of the treasury the year before : and a resolution relating and preparatory to it was then agreed to in that house without any division.

III. Because, if any particular parts of that law, the principle of which has been experienced and submitted to in this country without repining, for near a century past, had been found liable to just and reasonable objections, they might have been altered by a bill to explain and amend it, without repealing the whole ; and if any such bill had been sent to us by the commons, we should have thought it our duty to have given it a most serious consideration, with a warm desire of relieving our countrymen in America from any grievance or hardship ; but with proper care to enforce their submission and obedience to the law so amended, and to the whole legislative authority of Great Britain, without any reserve or distinction whatsoever.

IV. Because it appears to us, that a most essential branch of that authority ; the power of taxation, cannot be properly, equitably, or impartially exercised, if it does not extend itself to all the members of the state, in proportion to their respective abilities, but suffers a part to be exempt from a due share of those burthens which the public exigencies require to be imposed upon the whole ; a partiality which is directly and manifestly repugnant to the trust reposed by the people in every legislature, and destructive of that confidence on which all government is founded.

V. Because the ability of our North American colonies to bear, without inconveniency, the proportion laid on them by the stamp act of last year, appears to us most

unquestionable, for the following reasons: *First*, That the estimated produce of this tax, amounting to 60,000*l.* *per ann.*, if divided amongst 1,200,000 people, being little more than one-half of the subjects of the crown in North America, would be only one shilling per head a year, which is but a third of the wages usually paid to every labourer or manufacturer there for one day's labour. *Secondly*, That it appears, by the accounts that have been laid before this house from the commissioners of trade and plantations, that of the debt contracted by those colonies in the last war, above 1,755,000*l.* has already been discharged, during the course of three years only, by the funds provided for that purpose in the several provinces; and the much greater part of the remaining incumbrance, which in the whole is about 760,000*l.* will be paid in two years more. We must likewise observe, that the bounties and advantages given to them by parliament in 1764 and 1765, and the duties thereby lost to Great Britain for their service, and in order to enable them the more easily to pay this tax, must necessarily amount in a few years to a far greater sum than the produce thereof. It is also evident, that such produce being wholly appropriated to the payment of the army maintained by this kingdom in our colonies, at the vast expense of almost a shilling in the pound land-tax, annually remitted by us for their special defence and protection; not only no money would have been actually drawn by it out of that country, but the ease given by it to the people of Great Britain, who are labouring under a debt of 70 millions contracted by them to support a very dangerous war, entered into for the interest and security of those colonies, would have redounded to the benefit of the colonies themselves, in their own immediate safety, by contributing to deliver them from the necessary expense which many of them have hitherto always borne in guarding their frontiers against the savage Indians.

VI. Because, not only the right, but the expediency and necessity of the supreme legislature's exerting its authority to lay a general tax on our American colonies, whenever the wants of the public make it fitting and reasonable that all the provinces should contribute in a proper proportion to the defence of the whole, appear to us undeniable, from these considerations:—*First*, That every province being separate and independent of the others, and having no common council empowered by the constitution of the colonies to act for all, or bind all, such a tax cannot regularly, or without infinite difficulty, be imposed upon them at any time, even for their immediate defence or protection, by their own provincial assemblies, but requires the intervention and superintending power of the parliament of Great Britain. *Secondly*, That in looking forwards to the possible contingency of a new war, a contingency perhaps not far remote, the prospect of the burdens which the gentry and people of this kingdom must then sustain, in addition to those which now lie so heavy upon them, is so melancholy and dreadful, that we cannot but feel it a most indispensable duty to ease them as much as is possible, by a due and moderate exertion of that great right which the constitution of this realm has vested in the parliament, to provide for the safety of all, by a proportionable charge upon all, equally and indifferently laid. We likewise apprehend, that a partial exemption of our colonies from any exercise of this right by the British legislature, would be thought so invidious and so unjust to the other subjects of the crown of Great Britain, as to alienate the hearts of these from their countrymen residing in America, to the great detriment of the latter, who have on many occasions received, and may again want, assistance from the generous warmth of their affection.

VII. Because the reasons assigned in the public resolutions of the provincial assemblies in the North Ame-

rican colonies, for their disobeying the stamp act, viz. that they are not represented in the parliament of Great Britain, extends to all other laws, of what nature soever, which that parliament has enacted, or shall enact, to bind them in times to come, and must, if admitted, set them absolutely free from any obedience to the power of the British legislature. We likewise observe, that in a letter to Mr. secretary Coaway, dated the 12th October, 1765, the commander in chief of his majesty's forces in North America has declared his opinion, "that the question is not, of the inexpediency of the stamp act, or of the inability of the colonies to pay the tax, but that it is unconstitutional, and contrary to their rights—supporting the independency of the provinces as not subject to the legislative power of Great Britain." It is moreover affirmed, in a letter to Mr. Conway, dated the 7th November, "that the people in general are averse to taxes of any kind; and that the merchants of that place think they have a right to every freedom of trade which the subjects of Great Britain now enjoy." This opinion of theirs strikes directly at the act of navigation, and other subsequent laws which from time to time have been made on the wise policy of that act. And should they ever be encouraged to procure for themselves that absolute freedom of trade which they appear to desire, our plantations would become not only of no benefit, but in the highest degree prejudicial to the commerce and welfare of their mother country. Nor is it easy to conceive a greater encouragement than the repealing of a law opposed by them on such principles, and with so much contempt of the sovereignty of the British legislature.

Because the appearance of weakness and timidity in the government and parliament of this kingdom, which a concession of this nature may too probably carry with it, has a manifest tendency to draw on farther insults, and by lessening the respect of all his majesty's subjects to the



dignity of his crown and authority of his laws, throw the whole British empire into a miserable state of confusion and anarchy, with which it seems by many symptoms to be dangerously threatened. And this is the more to be feared, as the plea of our North American colonies, that not being represented in the parliament of Great Britain, they ought not to pay taxes imposed or levied upon them by the authority thereof, may, by the same reasoning, be extended to all persons in this island who do not actually vote for members of parliament. Nor can we help apprehending, that the opinion of some countenance being given to such notions by the legislature itself, in consenting to this bill for the repeal of the stamp act, may greatly promote the contagion of a most dangerous doctrine, destructive to all government, which has spread itself over all our North American colonies, that the obedience of the subject is not due to the laws and legislature of the realm, farther than he, in his private judgment, shall think it conformable to the ideas he has formed of a free constitution.

IX. Because we think it no effectual guard or security against this danger, that the parliament has declared, in the resolutions of both houses passed during this session, and now reduced into a bill, that such notions are ill-founded. As men will always look more to deeds than words, and may therefore incline to believe that the insurrections in our colonies, excited by those notions, having so far proved successful as to attain the very point at which they aimed, the immediate repeal of the stamp act, without any previous submission on the part of the colonies; the legislature has in fact submitted to them, and has only more grievously injured its own dignity and authority, by verbally asserting that right, which it substantially yields up to their opposition. The reasons assigned for this concession, render it still more alarming, as they arise from an illegal and hostile combination of the people of America to distress and



starve our manufacturers, and to withhold from our merchants the payment of their just debts: the former of which measures has only been practised in open war between two states, and the latter, we believe, not even in that situation, either by the public, or by individuals, among the civilized nations of Europe in modern times. If this unprecedented plan of intimidation shall meet with success, it is easy to foresee that the practice of it, for other and still greater objects, will frequently be renewed, and our manufacturers and merchants reduced to the like and more permanent distress. We cannot therefore but wish that some more eligible method, consistent with their future safety, and our dignity, had been taken by parliament, to shew our tender concern and compassion for their sufferings, and to discourage any other such unwarrantable attempts; which we are fully persuaded would have been very practicable, with due care and attention, and at an expense very inferior to the importance of the object.

LASTLY, Because we are convinced, from the unanimous testimony of the governors, and other officers of the crown in America, that if, by a most unhappy delay and neglect to provide for the due execution of the law, and arm the government there with proper orders and powers, repeatedly called for in vain, these disturbances had not been continued and increased, they might easily have been quieted before they had attained to any dangerous height; and we cannot, without feeling the most lively sense of grief and indignation, hear arguments drawn from the progress of evils which should and might have been stopped in their first and feeble beginnings, used for the still greater evil of sacrificing, to a present relief, the highest permanent interests, and the whole majesty, power, and reputation of government. This afflicts us the more deeply, because it appears from many letters, that this law, if properly supported by government, would, from

the peculiar circumstances attending the disobedience to it, execute itself without bloodshed. And it is said in one of the letters to Mr. secretary Conway, “that the principal view is to intimidate the parliament; but that if it be thought prudent to enforce their authority, the people dare not oppose a vigorous resolution of the parliament of Great Britain.” That vigorous resolution has not yet been found in the parliament; and we greatly fear that the want of it will certainly produce one of these fatal consequences—either that the repeal of this law will in effect annul and abrogate all other laws and statutes relating to our colonies, and particularly the acts that restrain or limit their commerce, of which they are most impatient, or, if we should hereafter attempt to enforce the execution of those laws against their will, and by virtue of an authority which they have dared to insult with impunity and success, that endeavour will bring upon us all those evils and inconveniences, to the fear of which we now sacrifice the sovereignty of the realm; and this at a time when the strength of our colonies, as well as their desire of a total independence on the legislature and government of their mother country, may be greatly augmented, and when the circumstances and dispositions of the other powers of Europe may render the contest far more dangerous and formidable to this kingdom.

Bedford,	Bolingbroke,
Coventry,	Marlborough,
Bridgewater,	W. Gloucester,
Temple,	Ker,
Buckinghamshire,	Leigh,
Wentworth,	Bangor,
Sandwich,	Waldegrave,
Aylesford,	Vere,
Gower,	Trevor,
Weymouth,	Thomas Bristol,

Ferrers,	Grosvenor,
Scarsdale,	Townshend,
Lyttelton,	Dudley and Ward,
Dunk Halifax,	Charles Carlisle,
Eglington,	Powis,
Suffolk and Berkshire,	Hyde.
Abercorn,	

As the above protest is framed with art and plausibility, and contains the whole strength of a weak and indefensible cause, it must not be suffered to pass without a few general animadversions.

I. As to the first reason assigned, it will easily be allowed, that "the honour of the crown and the dignity of the legislature," to adopt the favourite court phrasology, had been, and still were exposed both to injury and contempt, in consequence of the extreme folly of the late measures. The most obvious and effectual mode therefore of repairing what had been thus unfortunately impaired, was to restore things as speedily as possible to their former state. The extensive and indefinite authority of Britain over the colonies, had, from their first establishment, been found sufficient for every practical purpose. The declaratory act served as a salvo for the national honour, and the stigma of shame and disgrace would have adhered only to those who had wantonly and rashly attempted so violent, so unjust, and so unpopular an innovation as that of the stamp act.

II. The second proposition is founded on a presumption (so far at least as it bears relation to the *expediency* of the bill, the only question actually at issue) contrary to the fact, as verified by the event. It is in effect saying, "the bill must certainly be right now, because we all thought it right at the time it passed, and we will not con-

sent to the repeal, though the result proves it to have been wrong." The facility, and even eagerness with which so dangerous a power as that of taxation, for the purpose of revenue, was assumed by the British parliament, must have appeared to the Americans dreadfully ominous of its subsequent abuse.

III. To the third reason it is obvious to reply, that the rage of opposition in America being directed against the principle of the bill, no alteration or modification of it which could have been proposed, would have answered the purpose of restoring peace and order in the British colonies.

IV. In answer to this argument, it may be advanced as an axiom, that the power of taxation could never long be equitably or impartially exercised, if the persons exercising this power relieved themselves in the same proportion as they burdened others : the grand constitutional and practical principle on which Great Britain originally expected to be indemnified for the expense of protection, was by a monopoly of the trade of America ; and for the purpose of commercial regulation merely, the British legislature had been long in possession of a discretionary power of imposing port duties, and for the support of our own government, the colonies had severally passed the privilege of taxing themselves.

V. This is a trifling and irrelevant consideration. The produce of the stamp act might perhaps not amount to more than 60,000 *l.* ; but if it had not exceeded as many shillings, the opposition would have been the same : because the principle of the act once admitted, put their whole property, to the very last shilling, into the power of the British parliament. If half a million, according to the allegation of the protesting lords, was remitted for the pay of British troops stationed in America, the dictate of common sense surely was, not to tax America in order to provide a fund for the payment of the troops, but to recal

the troops in order to preclude the necessity of a tax. It does not appear that America wanted or applied for British troops; if she did, it was fair and reasonable that she should be at the expense of maintaining them.

VI. Did any such emergency actually occur as is suggested in this article, the proper and regular mode of raising supplies for the public defence, was by requisition from the crown, which had hitherto answered every purpose of government: whenever America refused to contribute in the accustomed and constitutional mode, it would be time enough to consider what was the best, the safest, and most efficacious remedy. But it is remarkable, that the real object of this new system of American taxation, is in this article openly avowed to be "the easing of the gentry and people of Great Britain, as much as possible; and no doubt, if a similar power had been vested in an American parliament, they would have endeavoured to ease themselves at the expense of Great Britain, as much as possible. Is it necessary to say, that in such situations, human nature is not to be trusted? To profess that this power will be confined within the limits of "due and moderate exertion," is the mere cant of politics. A principle which leads to irresistible temptation, must itself be encountered by the most determined and obstinate resistance. With such a principle, no compromise can take place. It will infallibly conquer, if it be not conquered.

VII. As to the charge of inconsistency, brought against America, it has reference to a mere abstract speculation, unworthy the attention of practical statesmen. The Americans were in the *habit* of submitting to general acts of legislation, as exercised by Great Britain, but not to taxation. An attempt to tax them internally for the avowed purpose of raising the revenue, was an innovation so alarming, and led by a rapid and infallible progression to such insupportable tyranny and oppression, as mechanically and instantly to excite the spirit of resistance. The best



general or speculative reason that could be assigned for their resistance to this new claim was, doubtless, that they were not represented in the British parliament. If by an adept in political chicane, occupying the station, and assuming the name of a statesman, it should be urged upon them, that they submitted to the legislative authority of parliament, though unrepresented, it would be sufficient for America to reply, that representation was much more essential in the case of taxation, than of legislation ; that it was not the *interest* of Great Britain to oppress by legislation, as it was by taxation, and that long and uninterrupted prescription, had admitted and established the distinction. Should the distinction contended for be treated, in the rage of innovation, as futile and absurd, and metaphysical arguments be resorted to, in order to justify a system of practical oppression, America might, and no doubt would in time, be provoked to acknowledge the validity of the argument, and to infer in her turn, that Great Britain had no more right to *legislate* for the colonies than to *tax* them.

VIII. The next argument is metaphysically as well as politically contemptible. If any man, whether peer or commoner, is really so devoid of understanding as to believe that unrepresented America is in the same circumstances with unrepresented Englishmen, whom the two houses of parliament cannot tax, without at the same time, and in the same proportion, taxing themselves, that man is far beyond the reach of argument. With respect to the latter, virtual representation is a privilege little inferior to actual representation. In regard to the former, it has no meaning : as applied to the American, virtual representation is an empty sound and a wretched mockery.

IX. As the people of America would be at least as great sufferers by a rupture with the mother country as the people of England, a similar resistance could not be looked for, until a similar provocation should be offered,

A precedent of general resistance is that which is of all others least likely to be followed. It is that of which a wise and good government needs to be at all times the least apprehensive. Considering indeed, the hazards and dangers of a resistance to established governments, it is not in human nature, that it should proceed solely from a principle of self-interest, and still less of public spirit. Passion, prejudice, and resentment, must lend their invigorating influence, and it is the part of political discretion, to embrace every opportunity of allaying, and to avoid every occasion of exciting, those incalculably dangerous emotions.

X. As to the insinuation, that the execution of the act was practicable with the early assistance of an armed force, it is probable that the persons who signed this protest, would have been amongst the first to exclaim against the calling in the aid of the military to execute an act, which, as they subsequently and inconsistently boast, "would, from the peculiar circumstances attending the disobedience to it, execute itself without bloodshed." The plain fact is, that the act could not have been enforced but at the evident risque of a civil war; that it was both unconstitutional and unjust; and that the only remedy for the horrible disorders and disturbances occasioned by it, was its absolute, total, and unconditional repeal.

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It is remarkable, that of the 71 peers who voted against the repeal of the stamp act, one was of the blood royal, twenty-four actually held places under the government, eight were bishops, and a great majority of the others, if indeed any exceptions can be made, were of the number of those generally styled the "king's friends," with lord Bute himself at their head; or, of the late ministerial, Bedford, and Grenville connexion. Such was the nature of the opposition which the Rockingham administration had to encounter.

MEMORIAL,  
DELIVERED NOVEMBER 4, 1766,  
TO THE KING AND REPUBLIC OF POLAND.

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY, ever excited by reasonable desires of protecting by all methods the christian protestants, especially those who by virtue of particular conventions have a right to expect his assistance, finds himself obliged to repeat his pressing representations in favour of that oppressed part of the Polish nation, known by the name of dissidents; wherefore the undersigned, in conformity to fresh orders from the king his most gracious sovereign, has the honour to represent to you, sir, and to the republic of Poland, that his Britannic majesty, besides the many solid motives of justice and humanity which give him reason to hope for a happy success of the present negotiations relative to this affair; finding himself compelled by a strict alliance with the courts of Petersburg, Berlin, and Copenhagen, to interest himself in behalf of the dissidents, in all the forms of law, and in quality of guarantee of the treaty of Oliva, wishes that in the present diet, this virtuous, but unhappy part of the Polish subjects, may be re-established, as members of the state, in the possession of their rights and privileges, as well as in the peaceable enjoyment of their mode of worship, which every one knows belonged to them before the signing of the said treaty of Oliva. At the same time, his Britannic majesty considers how great is the connexion between the interests even of the republic and the justice of this affair, as well as the fundamental laws of the kingdom; laws which were not only observed for two centuries, but renewed by treaties with the northern powers, so solemn, that they do not permit the least alteration to be undertaken, unless with the general consent of the contracting

parties. For these causes, his Britannic majesty, filled with confidence of the equity and penetration of his Polish majesty, who from the beginning of his reign has given so many testimonies of zeal for the happiness of mankind, and of love towards the administration of justice in the republic, has not the least doubt that his just desires will no longer be opposed by references to inellicacious constitutions, established in the midst of intestine troubles, contradicted by the formal protestations and express declarations on the part of foreign powers.

Although the rights and privileges of the dissidents are founded on a doctrine, whose principles of charity and benevolence make it characteristical of christianity; and the divinity of its institutor, who first preached it, renders it still less a matter of doubt; yet it is this religion of which the exercise is disturbed, and of which its professors are excluded from all honourable employments, and deprived of all means of serving their country. Nevertheless, their rights and privileges have been confirmed to them by many ordinances of the kingdom, settled by so many treaties, supported on foundations so sacred and so evident to the eyes of all nations, that the undersigned minister of a monarch who preserves towards the republic the sincerest sentiments of friendship, and of inclination to give proofs of them on every occasion, flatters himself, that the mediation of the king his master, will produce the effects which he may naturally promise himself; that the wisdom of the nation assembled, will afford a remedy to the evils which rend the state and oppress the dissidents; and that with regard to things ecclesiastical and civil, they may be re-established in the situation they were in before the treaty of Oliva. As to the rest, the sincere wishes of his Britannic majesty for the glory of the king of Poland, and for the prosperity of the republic, are so notorious, that it would be useless to give fresh assurances of them. In the meanwhile, the under-



signed cannot avoid reiterating them as an incontestible proof of their reality.

(Signed)

WROUGHTON.

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## AFFAIRS OF INDIA.

### LORD CLIVE'S DEFENCE.

*A. D. 1772.*

FROM the æra of the acquisition of the Dewance of the three provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa (A. D. 1765), which was supposed at the time to have raised the company to the highest pitch, the general state of things in India was, on the contrary, tending with accelerated rapidity to confusion, distress, and ruin. A system of rapine and oppression was established, under which the natives sunk into a state of universal misery and despair. The revenues and population of the country alarmingly decreased, the expenditure of the company rose to an enormous height, and while fortunes more than princely were suddenly made by almost all those who occupied the principal stations in her service, the proprietary trembled on the verge of bankruptcy. Astonished and terrified at the situation in which they found themselves, they sent out, in the autumn of 1769, a committee of supervision to India, invested with full powers to redress all grievances, and to rectify all abuses. What effect this measure would have produced, must for ever remain uncertain and conjectural; for the Aurora frigate, in which the commissioners, Mr. Vausittart, Mr. Scrafton, and Mr. Ford, embarked, was, by some fatal disaster, lost in crossing the Indian ocean.

After two or three more years of confusion and calamity had elapsed, the company determined upon sending out a



second commission, but deemed it first expedient to obtain an act of parliament, to enable them to carry their proposed regulations into execution with additional weight and energy. On the 30th of March, 1772, Mr. Sullivan accordingly moved for leave to bring in a bill to regulate the conduct of the company's servants in India, together with the course of commerce and administration of justice. In support of the motion, it was urged that the wretched prospect of affairs in India, was owing to the little power the directors had to punish their servants for disobedience to their orders or mal-practices in their different departments in India; that nothing conduced more to those enormities, than that solecism in politics, that the governors of any country should be merchants; that this exposed them to irresistible temptation, especially in regard to those articles which were of general use, and on which immense profits would, from an abuse of power, necessarily accrue. The first part of the bill, therefore, was framed to prevent the governors and councils, and the rest of the company's servants, from being concerned in trade, and in lieu thereof, to give them sufficient and ample appointments.

Also it was affirmed to be notorious, that the mayor's court established in India, was in its original institution intended for a very small district, the town of Calcutta, and a few acres around it: but by the accession of the recently acquired provinces, it was become insufficient, and incapable of administering justice to either English or natives. The second part of the bill proposed, therefore, to send a chief justice to India, with several puisne judges, and an attorney-general, with adequate salaries, to administer justice in those provinces.

The minister, lord North, well knowing the distressing embarrassments of the company, whose whole system exhibited the unsubstantial fabric of a vision, seemed to regard the present bill with an indifference approaching to

contempt. After a debate, in which he took but little share, the bill was ordered in, but it was soon perceived that it would not be suffered to pass. In the course of the discussion to which it gave rise, heavy censures were thrown upon lord Olive, who was represented as the original author of the new system in India, and as having given the first grand example of rapacity, avarice, and lawless ambition, in his own person and conduct. Touched to the quick with these reproaches and accusations, his lordship entered into a long and laboured vindication of himself, which failed, however, of producing that universal conviction in his favour which he so eagerly sought to obtain.

His lordship began by stating to the house, that at the time he accepted the appointment of the directors, as governor of India, in the year 1764, the affairs of the company were in a critical and dangerous situation; that his own circumstances were independent and affluent: happy in the sense of his past conduct and services, he undertook this arduous task from a principle of gratitude, from a point of honour, from a desire of doing an essential service to that company, under whose auspices he had acquired his fortune and his fame. The welfare of the company, said his lordship, required a vigorous exertion, and I took the resolution of cleansing the Augean stable. This, he asserted, was the real source of the scurrility and abuse which he had been loaded with since his return to England; the administration of the government in the hands of his lordship, being, according to his own representation of it, a model of political purity and perfection. Laying his hand upon his heart, he declared most solemnly to the house, and to the world at large, that he had never in a single instance lost sight of what he thought the honour and true interest of his country and the company; that he was never guilty of any acts of violence and oppression; that as to extortion, such an

idea never entered into his mind; that he did not suffer those under him to commit any acts of violence or oppression; that his influence was never employed for the advantage of any man, contrary to the strictest principles of honour and justice; and that so far from reaping any personal benefit from the expedition, he had returned to England many thousand pounds out of pocket.

His lordship then entered into a minute justification of his conduct, from various specific charges adduced against him, with various success. As to the grand article, relative to the monopoly of salt, betle-nut, and tobacco, which was attended with such complicated and mighty mischiefs, his lordship declared, that in no point had his public conduct been less liable to exception: He observed, that many years ago, a grant had been obtained by the company from the court of Delhi, investing them with the privilege of trading duty-free. This grant or privilege, had never till of very late years been construed to extend beyond the duties of export and import; but a claim had recently been set up under the sanction of this grant, by the servants of the company, and in the name of the company, of carrying on an inland trade, duty-free. The absurdity of a privilege so ruinous to the natives, and so prejudicial to the revenues of the company, was obvious. At the revolution of 1757, no such claim was set up; nor was any such trade carried on publicly during the term of his lordship's first appointment to the government of India, which ended in the beginning of the year 1760. The first appearance of this claim was in governor Vansittart's time. The nabob Cossim Ali Khan strongly objected to it, representing to the governor and council, the fatal consequences to the black merchants, and to the revenues of his country. Mr. Vansittart was sensible of the justice of the nabob's complaints, and soon after entered into articles of agree-

ment, that the English should carry on an inland trade in salt, paying a duty of nine per cwt. which in fact was no remedy to the evil, because the natives paid infinitely more. The council disavowed this act of Mr. Vansittart, and insisted upon their right to all inland trade, duty-free. The nabob, enraged, threw open the trade throughout his country, and abolished all duties, in order that his own subjects might trade upon an equal footing with the English. This on the other hand disoblged the council, who insisted that the nabob should not suffer even his own subjects to trade duty-free, but that the English alone should enjoy that privilege.

These transactions were not clearly known to the court of directors till the year 1762, when they disapproved of them in the strongest terms, positively forbidding their servants to carry on any inland trade whatsoever. It was nevertheless continued, and with exemption from duties, except in the article of salt, upon which a duty of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cwt. only was agreed to be paid, by a treaty with the nabob Meer Jassier, after the deposition of Cossim Ali Khan.

Although the court of directors had been at first of opinion that the inland trade ought to be totally abolished, they, as well as the proprietors, at a subsequent period, thought the company's servants might be indulged in it under certain restrictions and regulations. In consequence of this idea, the general court, on the 18th of May, 1764, came to the following resolution :

“ RESOLVED, that it be recommended to the court of directors to reconsider the orders sent to Bengal, relative to the trade of the company's servants in the articles of salt, betle-nut, and tobacco ; and that they do give such directions for regulating the same, agreeably to the interest of the company and Subah, as to them may appear most prudent.”

This resolution was supported by the court of directors,



who in their general letter to the governor and council, dated 1st of June, 1764, at the time the noble lord went out a second time to India, issued the following orders :

“ For the reasons given in our letter of the 8th of February last, we were then induced to send positive orders to put a final and effectual end to the inland trade in salt, betle-nut, and tobacco, and all other articles whatsoever produced and consumed in the country. To the remarks we made in that letter, we must add one observation, which is, it appears very extraordinary, that in a trade so extremely lucrative to individuals, the interest of the company should not have been at all attended to or considered. Those orders were sent, it is true, before we received the new treaty you entered into with Meer Jaffier Ali Khan, upon his re-establishment in the subahship, in which it is agreed, that the English shall carry on their trade by means of their own dustick, free from all duties, taxes, and impositions, in all parts of the country, excepting the article of salt, on which a duty of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. is to be levied on the Rowanna, or Houghley market-price; wherein it is further agreed, that the late perwannahs issued by Cossim Ali Khan, granting to all merchants the exemption of all duties for the space of two years, shall be reversed and called in, and the duties collected as before. These are terms which appear to be so very injurious to the nabob and the natives, that they cannot in the very nature of them tend to any thing but the producing general heart-burnings and dissatisfaction; and consequently there can be little reason to expect the tranquillity of the country can be permanent. The orders, therefore, in our said letter of the 8th of February, are to remain in force, until a more equitable and satisfactory plan can be formed and adopted, which, as it is impossible for us to frame here, destitute as we are of the information and lights necessary to guide us in settling such an important affair; you are therefore hereby ordered and directed, as soon



after the receipt of this as may be convenient, to consult the nabob, as to the manner of carrying on the inland trade in salt, betle-nut, and tobacco, and the other articles produced and consumed in the country, which may be most to his satisfaction and advantage, the interest of the company, and likewise of the company's servants. You are thereupon to form a proper and equitable plan for carrying on the same, and transmit the same to us, accompanied by such explanations, observations, and remarks, as may enable us to give our sentiments and directions thereupon in a full and explicit manner. In doing this, as before observed, you are to have a particular regard to the interest and entire satisfaction of the nabob, both with respect to his revenues, and the proper support of his government. In short, this plan must be settled with his free will and consent, and in such a manner as not to afford any just grounds for complaint. In the next place, the utmost care and attention must be bestowed in forming the said plan, that in some proper mode or shape, a just and equitable consideration be secured for the company."

On the authority of this letter, his lordship appealed to the house, whether, in *framing* a plan for carrying on the trade in salt, betle-nut, and tobacco, the select committee, of which his lordship was the head, acted in disobedience to the orders of the company? As to the objection which might possibly be urged, that the plan in question was not only framed, but executed, in direct opposition to the orders of the company, to whom it ought to have been referred, his lordship alleged, that "had they only formed their plan, and deferred the execution of it till the pleasure of the directors should have been known, all the gentlemen in their service must in the mean time have been left unprovided for." And in answer to a second objection, that conformably to the orders of the company, no plan should be settled without the free-will and consent of the nabob; his lordship replied, that the revenues of the country be-

ing now transferred to the company, the nabob was no longer to be considered as a party in this business.

The court of directors were however by no means satisfied with these reasons, and issued subsequent orders for the total relinquishment of this traffic. But his lordship affirmed, that their conduct in so doing was founded upon obstinacy and ignorance. Nevertheless, in a subsequent part of his speech, and in treating of the various causes which had occasioned the recent and alarming decrease in the revenues, his lordship thought fit thus to express himself: " Upon the inland trade depends in some degree the receipt of the revenues : upon the inland trade depend almost totally the happiness and prosperity of the people. Indeed the true cause of the distress in Bengal, as far as it relates to the inland trade, is this : the company's servants and their agents have taken into their own hands the whole of the trade, which they have carried on in a capacity before unknown, for they have traded not only as merchants, but as sovereigns, and by grasping at the whole of the inland trade, have taken the bread out of the mouths of thousands and thousands of merchants, who used formerly to carry on that trade, and who are now reduced to beggary." And in another part of his lordship's speech, he freely acknowledged " that the company's servants not only monopolized the salt, but by virtue of their influence and power, bought it at what price they pleased, and sold it at what price they pleased."

In regard to the accusation of rapacity and corruption, so far as it affected his personal character, his lordship stated, that in lieu of all other emoluments, he had proposed in council to accept the sum of 1 and 1-8th per cent. upon the revenues, excepting those arising from the company's own lands at Calcutta, Burdwan, Midnapoor, and Chittagong, as an establishment for himself, and for all future governors ; which regulation had been confirmed by the company. The profits which he derived as presi-

dent of the commercial association, from his share being 5-56ths of the whole of the inland trade, his lordship said, he had transferred to three friends who had accompanied him to India; and that he had expressed his absolute determination not to return to England a single rupee richer than when he left it.

In the concluding part of his speech, his lordship made some very just and impressive observations on the defective constitution of the company in a political view, and the tendency of the general system to abuse and corruption. By progressive steps, said his lordship, the company have become sovereigns of a country containing fifteen millions of inhabitants. Can it be supposed that their servants will refrain from advantages so obviously resulting from their situation? The acts of violence and oppression charged upon them, were however, as his lordship affirmed, chiefly perpetrated by the natives of the country, acting as their agents, and for the most part without their knowledge. Those agents, and the banyans, never desist till they have involved their employers in a participation of the guilt. The gentlemen who reside in India, are at their arrival solicitous to conduct themselves on principles of strict justice and honour; but the allurements held out to them are in the highest degree seductive. The banyan is the political seducer. He lays his bags of silver before the company's servant to day, gold to-morrow, jewels the next day, and if these fail, he then tempts him in the way of his profession, which is trade. He assures him that goods may be had cheap, and sold to great advantage up the country. In this manner is the attack carried on—in short, flesh and blood cannot endure it.

In regard to the political constitution of the company, his lordship shewed the great and manifold evils which resulted from the authority exercised by the general courts. "Their violent proceedings," said he, "have been subversive of the authority of the court of directors. The

agents abroad have known this; they have, therefore, never scrupled to set the orders of the court of directors at defiance, when it was their interest to disobey them: and they have escaped punishment by means of the over-awing interest of individuals at general courts. Thus have general courts co-operated with the court of directors in the mischiefs that have arisen in Bengal; whilst annual contested elections have in a manner deprived the directors of the power of establishing any authority over their servants. The first half of the year is employed in freeing themselves from the obligations contracted by their last elections, and the second half is wasted in incurring new obligations, and securing their election for the next year, by daily sacrifices of some interest of the company. The direction, notwithstanding all these manœuvres, has been so fluctuating and unsettled, that new and contradictory orders have been frequently sent out, and the servants of the company have in many instances followed their own opinion in opposition to their orders."

Instead of proceeding with the bill of regulation, the house voted on the 13th of April, 1772, that a select committee, consisting of thirty-one members, be chosen by ballot, to inquire into the nature, state, and condition, of the East India company, and of the British affairs in the East Indies; which committee were empowered to continue their sittings during the vacation of parliament.

On the 26th November, 1772, the session of the ensuing winter commenced; when the affairs of the East India company again became the grand subject of investigation. The king in his speech from the throne, declared it to be "impossible that he could look with indifference upon whatever concerned either the commerce and revenue of the kingdom at large, or the private rights and interests of considerable numbers among his people. Neither," continued his majesty, "can I be insensible how materially every one of these



great objects must be interested in the maintenance of the credit and prosperity of the East India company. When, therefore, I received information of the difficulty in which that company appear to be involved, I determined to give you an early opportunity of informing yourselves fully of the true state of their affairs, and of making such provisions for the common benefit and security of all the various interests concerned, as you shall find best adapted to the exigencies of the case."

This language was the certain and portentous forerunner of some great and decisive measure on the part of the government. In a short time, as the first step towards the development of the new system, lord North moved for the appointment of a committee of secrecy, consisting of thirteen persons, to be chosen by ballot. And immediately afterwards a bill was introduced under the sanction of this committee, restraining the East India company from sending any commission of supervision to India, which passed both houses by a prodigious majority; though a protest was entered against it in the journals of the lords, signed by the dukes of Richmond, Devonshire, and Portland, the earl of Cork, and viscount Torrington, exculpating themselves to the present age and to posterity, from contributing to the danger or the mischief which might arise from this arbitrary delay of a timely remedy.

In the appointment of the secret committee, the minister, lord North, affirmed, "that he had no intention to interfere with the functions, or impede the inquiries of the former select committee, which had his concurrence to proceed." But it was apparent to all, that the select committee were mere cyphers in the business, and that the secret committee alone possessed the confidence of the minister, who had taken care that the members, or at least the majority of them, should consist of persons wholly devoted to the interests of the crown—Lord Pal-



merston, Mr. Rigby, Mr. Stanley, Mr. Jenkinson, Mr. Harley, &c. being of the number.

A great alarm being excited at the proceedings now instituted, lord North declared it to be the wish of administration to make the East India company a great and glorious company, and settle it upon a permanent foundation; and affirmed that it was the duty of parliament to preserve them from ruin.

After a long and minute investigation of facts, and divers reports from the committee of secrecy, lord North, on the 9th March, 1773, moved the following resolutions:

I. That it is the opinion of this house, that the affairs of the East India company are in such a state as to require parliamentary assistance.

II. That a loan of a sum of money is necessary to reinstate the company's affairs.

III. That a supply of 1,400,000 *l.* be granted to the company, provided at the same time, that due care be taken that the necessary regulations be adopted to prevent the company's experiencing the like exigencies in future.

And on the 23d of March his lordship farther moved,

IV. That it is the opinion of this house, that the East India company be restrained from dividing more than six *per cent.* upon their capital, until the sum of 1,400,000 *l.* proposed to be lent to them by parliament be repaid.

V. That it is the opinion of this house, that the East India company be restrained from the dividing more than seven *per cent.* from the latter period till their bond debts be reduced to 1,500,000 *l.*; and no more than eight *per cent.* before the participation of profits between the public and the company should take place.

And on the 5th April ensuing his lordship farther moved,

VI. That it is the opinion of this house, that it will be

more beneficial to the public and the East India company, to let the territorial acquisitions remain in the possession of the company for a limited time, not exceeding the term of six years, to commence from the agreement between the public and the company.

VII. That no participation of proceeds shall take place between the public and the company until the re-payment of the 1,400,000 *l.* advanced to the company, and the reduction of the company's bond debt to 1,500,000 *l.*

VIII. That after the payment of the loan advanced to the company, and the reduction of their bond debt to the sum specified, three-fourths of the nett surplus of the territorial revenues of the company shall be paid into the exchequer, and the remaining one-fourth shall be set apart as a fund for the discharge of any contingent expenses the company may labour under.

These resolutions were severally agreed to, with scarcely a shadow of opposition; but Mr. Burke inveighed in terms of ridicule and reproach, on the tame and servile facility with which the house acceded to every proposition originating with the minister. And he charged the minister with political pusillanimity, in not daring to be open and explicit, although he had so vast a majority of the house at his devotion. "Let the noble lord," said he, "declare that right of the crown to the territorial acquisitions, on the strength of which he seizes with the hand of power three-fourths of the revenue. If he declares the right, the house will support him; if he gives it up, it will support him. Let him offer a purge or a vomit, an alterative or an astringent, an acid or an alkali, all one—down it goes. While the noble lord finds we have such a swallow, let him give the pill at once without gilding."

On the 8th April, 1773, general Burgoyne brought up a report from the select committee, of which he was chairman. After a long recapitulation of the events, which

he represented as beyond example atrocious, relating to the deposition of Surajah Dowla, and the advancement of Meer Jaffier to the musnud—transactions which had happened sixteen years before the present period—he concluded by moving,

I. That all acquisitions made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with foreign powers, do of right belong to the state.

II. That to appropriate acquisitions acquired under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with foreign powers, to the private emolument of persons entrusted with any civil or military powers of the state, is illegal.

III. That great sums of money, and other valuable property, have been obtained by such means from the sovereign princes in India.

These vague, obscure, and doubtful propositions having passed the house, general Burgoyne on the 3d of May farther moved,

IV. That the right honourable Robert lord Clive, baron of Plassey, in the kingdom of Ireland, about the time of deposing Surajah Dowla, nabob of Bengal, and the establishing Meer Jaffier on the musnud, did, through the influence of the powers with which he was entrusted as member of the select committee, and commander-in-chief of the British forces, obtain and possess himself of two lacks and 80,000 rupees, as a member of the select committee; a farther sum of two lacks of rupees as commander-in-chief; a farther sum of sixteen lacks of rupees or more, under the denomination of a private donation; which sums, amounting together to twenty lacks and 80,000 rupees, were of the value in English money of 234,000 *l.*; and that in so doing, the said Robert lord Clive abused the powers with which he was entrusted, to the evil example of the servants of the public.

Mr. Stanley moved that the question be divided, and

that the words conveying the censure, after the figures 234,000, to the end of the motion, be left out.

He was seconded by Mr. R. Fuller, who moved also another amendment, viz. to leave out the preceding words—"through the influence of the powers with which he was entrusted."

These proposed amendments occasioned a long debate, in the course of which lord Clive spoke very fully and ably in his own vindication. His lordship declared himself to be pleading for what was dearer to him than life—his reputation. Trained in the school of war and politics for twenty years, he was now exercised in the school of philosophy. "I have served," said this great man, "my country and the company faithfully, and it is with real concern that I find myself reduced to the sad necessity of being the herald of my own fame. The public records have been ransacked for proofs, in order to furnish support to a malevolent retrospect into my conduct for sixteen years past; not a stone has been left unturned, where the least probability could arise of discovering something of a criminal nature against me. I must beg leave to observe to this house, that presents have been allowed and received from the earliest time of the direction. They have continued to be received uninterruptedly for the space of 150 years; and men who have sat in the direction themselves have at several times received presents. This the direction must know. But I am firmly of opinion, that in honourable cases, presents are not improper to be received; but when for dishonourable purposes, then I hold them to be highly improper. In the early part of my life my labours were without emolument or laurels, and I hope the house cannot think but that I ought to be rewarded for my services to my country in the latter part of it. In a very critical situation of the company's affairs I was called forth, and it pleased God to make me



the instrument of their deliverance. In the various battles and attacks in which I was employed, I had the good fortune to succeed. After many important acquisitions gained for the company I returned home. Troubles breaking out again in India, I was requested once more to go to that country, in order to protect and secure their possessions. I was told that my presence alone would effect it; and they should rest satisfied, from the good opinion they had of me, that success would accompany me, and that I should be the means of putting their affairs again in a prosperous situation. I did not hesitate a moment to accept the offer. I went abroad resolving not to benefit myself one single shilling at my return, and I strictly and religiously adhered to that resolution. A late minister (the earl of Chatham), whose abilities were an honour to his country, and whom this house will ever revere, will, I am sure, come to your bar, and not only tell you how highly he thought of my services at that time, but also what his opinion is now. Upon my arrival in England a second time, the chairman of the court of directors, at a very full court, addressed me in terms of the most flattering congratulation and applause. These were circumstances certainly that gave me a full satisfaction, and a ground to think that my conduct in every instance was approved of. After such certificates as these, am I to be brought here like a criminal? Is this the reward held out to persons who have performed such important services to their country? To be called, after sixteen years have elapsed, to account for my conduct in this manner, and after so long and uninterrupted an enjoyment of my property, to be charged with having obtained it unwarrantably, is hard indeed, and a treatment I should not think the British senate capable of. I mean not this as my defence. My defence will be made at the bar; but before I sit down I have one request to make to the house, that



when they come to decide upon my honour, they will not forget their own."

The house, after this speech, agreed without a division, that the question should be divided. It being then moved that the words "through the influence of the powers with which he was entrusted," stand part of this question, the house divided at five o'clock in the morning, Ayes 95, Noes 155, and the words were left out of the first motion. These objectionable terms being struck out, and the question thus divided, the latter part, conveying the censure, was then put in the following words: "That the said Robert lord Clive, in so doing, abused the powers with which he was entrusted, to the evil example of the servants of the public." Mr. Stanley then rose, and moved the previous question, viz.—Whether that question should be then put? It passed in the negative without a division.

On the 10th of May, 1773, lord North presented his bill for the regulation of the East India company, framed on the resolutions already sanctioned by the successive votes of the house: and as the noble lord declared, framed in all its parts, with the view of placing the affairs of the company on a solid, clear, and decisive establishment. It was ordered to be read a second time on the 2d of June. In the mean time, the house proceeded to take into consideration the reports of the committees upon East India affairs. And general Burgoyne, after recapitulating the transactions of that remarkable period which terminated in the deposition and death of Surajah ul Dowla, affirmed the revolution in question to have been brought about by means which left a lasting infamy upon the English name. That prince was, as the general declared, dethroned and put to death, by means of bribing his confident, an infernal agent, called Omichund, a black merchant, who insisted on so extravagant a reward, that he was deceived by a fictitious treaty, to which admiral Watson's name was

affixed without his consent. The select committee of council then demanded of the new nabob twenty lacks of rupees for their own use, above what the fleet and army had bargained for : this was the origin of the successive revolutions, and the successive rapine. He asserted that the retrospective inquiry which had been so diligently conducted, would be useless, if it was not made the means in future of reformation : and in conclusion, the general intimated his purpose to move the following resolutions :

I. That the acquisitions which have been made by persons, by the influence of military power, belong of right to the state.

II. That persons supported by military or civil power, have made acquisitions, and are in possession of the same.

III. That persons having made such acquisitions, and being in possession of the same, is illegal.

The general observed, that these resolutions would be in themselves nugatory, if they were not followed by another, to force the persons so described, to retribution ; but that must be the business of another day.

In answer to general Burgoyne, the solicitor-general Wedderburne rose, to give his sentiments to the house upon East India affairs in general, which he declared to be totally adverse to the whole mode of conduct adopted by the two committees. "The select committee," said this able speaker, "has sat upon this business long, and with great attention ; and in their prosecution of this affair, they have now brought it to a general issue, and it proves to be nothing more or better than a narrow contracted invidious attention to the conduct of individuals, instead of an open, liberal, and manly endeavour to bring forward such regulations for the future as should prevent evils. I utterly disapprove of this conduct, and I have disapproved of it through the whole course of the business.

“ The honourable gentleman has entered into a long recapitulation of events which happened sixteen years ago, and from them he deduces his matter of charge. Upon the subject of the revolution of 1757, I shall observe, that it is a most narrow and illiberal idea, to suppose that great and striking events, revolutions, wars, conquests, and so forth, are to be carried through upon the direct and absolute principles of school philosophy and morality. Such a supposition would be idle ; it would be useless. I will venture to assert, that a revolution of such consequence never was so conducted, nor ever will be. Throughout the detail which the honourable gentleman has given of the transaction, I am astonished that we should not have heard a word of the character of Surajah ul Dowla ; not a syllable of the black hole affair ; not a word of that just desire of vengeance which the most cruel, black, and horrid piece of tyranny which stains the annals of human nature must have excited. Is this candid ? Are these the principles by which our inquiries ought to be guided, or our punishments to be regulated ? The real fact is this : a monster of tyranny who is an enemy, is to be dethroned ; he is dethroned by a conquering army, and put to death. This transaction, including a series of victories and successes, is so rapid, that every moment was action ; every instant filled with great events. The honourable gentleman tells us that this was the original of the oppression, and of the succeeding revolutions. Who doubts it ? This was the acquisition from which originated the great empire of the India company. These were the victories which gave to that company the splendid power of rewarding. Had it not been for that revolution, those countries would never have been gained, which have been the object of the crimes complained of. What, therefore, does the honourable member prove by this ? or, what useful fact is grounded upon it ?

“ The honourable gentleman has declaimed much on

the stain upon the British name, from the transactions in that revolution. I am of a very different opinion. When our feuds and animosities are forgotten; when our little envies and jealousies are, as they ought to be, buried in oblivion, the recording pen of a candid historian will relate these transactions as they were: and he will not fail to hold forth for the admiration of posterity, that in a revolution which acquired to the company a dominion larger, wealthier, and more populous, than ever Athens possessed, or than Rome itself when she had conquered the Italian states; larger than France, and in revenues superior to most of the powers of Europe—that in the career of such conquests, of such great events, so few actions are to be discovered by the most inquisitive examination (and a more prying one never was known), so few that reflect dishonour on individuals—none that tarnish the British name.

“A great revolution and a vast conquest were made, not in every circumstance upon the principles of strict morality. Very wonderful indeed! Let these persecutors of a great and eminent name, tell me of a revolution that was ever brought about with less attendant evil. Name it. I defy the whole range of History to shew one of equal importance, in which the actors have so little to answer for. As to the forgery of admiral Watson’s name, it is needless to analyse the evidence alleged to prove it; because the noble lord has declared, that had it been necessary, he actually would have done it; and certainly would have done right, in politics, to take that, or any other means, to destroy in an enemy so great a tyrant. Now then, what are we doing? Because in such a revolution as history can scarcely parallel, some large fortunes have been suddenly made, shall we determine them to be illegal, and talk of the restitution of money acquired sixteen years ago? For shame! Is this the national gratitude for actions which have been the admiration of the whole world,



the pride of Britain, the envy of Europe? Upon this slender evidence, upon such odious insinuations, upon such contemptible motives, are we to raise an envious hand against those laurels which flourish on the brows of men, to whose heroic bravery the country owes the acquisition of this immense empire? The honourable gentleman asks where any parallel to such oppressions and tyranny are to be found, as we have practised in Bengal? I will tell him. In the democratical tyranny of an Athenian mob, envious of every great and noble name, taking off one for his wealth, banishing another for his family, and a third for his fame. It is this detestable spirit which occasioned real tyranny, and we are now following the example. But the present motions are in themselves nugatory and ridiculous. The first part is, that all acquisitions made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with foreign princes, do of right belong to the state. To what times or places does this extend? And how indefinite the terms! Belong to the state! What is the state? The gentleman says that he does not decide what the state is, he leaves it for future discussion: it is impossible, therefore, you should vote it now. The next resolution says, that acquisitions so made are illegal. This means nothing more than that the possession of another's property is illegal. Did we want a committee to tell us this? We are farther told of retribution of these possessions, which certainly ought to be to the persons injured, and not to the state. But the whole is *an hodge-podge* of contradiction, and confusion, and too *undefined* and unlimited ever to pass this house. It reverses your former resolutions; it is founded on envy and illiberal principles; it is narrow, pointed at individuals, and neglects future reformation, which ought to be the only object. And above all, there is an indecision and want of evidence in your reports, that must render every thing you do arbitrary and illegal. In consequence of this, *I move the order of the day.*"



There was a period when the house, inflamed at the recital of the first reports of the select committee, would probably, in the true spirit of a democratic assembly, have proceeded with little hesitation to a vote of impeachment, had such a measure been proposed to them. But that time the leaders of the committee, unskilled in the knowledge of human nature, had suffered to elapse. No very forcible impression, unsupported by personal considerations, will ever be found durable. No man eagerly interests himself for any length of time in the concerns or sufferings of another. What was at first taken up with all the ardor of benevolence, is persisted in only from a sense of honour, consistency, or duty. And although vice is a monster of an odious mien, it is too true, that the disgust and horror we feel at the sight is not strengthened, but on the contrary, greatly weakened, by long and incessant contemplation.

After the original impression, therefore, made by the discoveries of the committee, had in some degree worn off, the house shewed a great willingness to hearken to the arguments urged in palliation, though not in vindication, of the offences committed in India. And upon calm reflection, it certainly did not appear that they were greater than might previously have been expected in such a state of things. Great allowances ought to be made for men in public stations, who were exposed to every species of temptation. Those who were competent to take an enlarged and philosophic view of the subject, would in such a case be far more solicitous to establish a system less liable to abuse and more favourable to the general protection and happiness, than to punish individuals who had acted no worse in their respective stations, perhaps much better, than the men who now affected to animadvert with such extreme severity upon their conduct. The character of general Burgoyne, the chairman of the select committee, was very ill calculated to give consistency and

propriety to the proceedings of the committee, and much less to elevate them into dignity. Pompous, opiniated, ostentatious, he was far from exhibiting that example of perfect and rigid virtue in his own person, which might in a sir John Clavering, or a sir George Saville, have justified the denunciation of parliamentary vengeance upon the Indian delinquents.

Every impartial observer, saw in lord Clive a man of great talents, a statesman, and a hero, who had rendered great and indisputable services to his country; but many parts of whose conduct were liable to great exception. It was impossible, while the shadow of consistency remained, for parliament to determine to punish such a man, and at the same time to suffer him to enjoy and retain the fruits of his delinquency. Was parliament then prepared to avow and act upon that pure, refined, and enlightened system of political morality, which would not hesitate to restore to the rightful proprietors, that wealth and those possessions, which had been acquired by means the most unjust and oppressive? No. It is certain that no government in any age or country has ever yet, and in all probability no government ever will, act in a manner which implies such a superiority to the common failings and imperfections of human nature. Then if this be the case, it is best at once to adopt a lower tone of morality, and to adapt our provisions and regulations to the actual state of human affairs, to the passions and prejudices of men. In this case, as in many others, nothing was done, because too much was attempted; and it was too evidently seen, that the select committee were misled by abstract speculations; that though some of the members might be actuated by the pure refinement of virtue, the majority, with the chairman conspicuous in the van, were clearly incited to attempt the lofty and arduous task appertaining to the high character assumed by them, of the reformers and avengers of India, by the secret suggestions of the grand deluder VANITY:

and it must be acknowledged, notwithstanding the contempt of all principle both moral and political, which characterizes the speech of Mr. Wedderburne, that it contains very important and weighty practical truths.

The business of retrospective investigation, with a view to punishment, was from this period dropped, and that of regulation alone attended to. But the bill of regulation introduced by lord North, was so feeble in its provisions, as to afford little relief to the natives of India, while it extended the basis of patronage so far, and reduced the power of the company so low, as to make, in its consequences, a most alarming addition to the already immensely preponderating influence of the crown.

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#### PETITION OF THE CLERGY.

A. D. 1772.

*To the Honourable the Commons of Great Britain in  
Parliament assembled.*

The humble Petition of certain of the Clergy of the Church of England, and of certain of the two professions of Civil Law and Physic, and others whose names are hereunto subscribed ;

SHEWETH,

THAT your petitioners apprehend themselves to have certain rights and privileges which they hold of God only, and which are subject to his authority alone. That of this kind is the free exercise of their own reason and judgment, whereby they have been brought to and confirmed in the belief of the christian religion, as it is contained in the holy scriptures. That they esteem it a great blessing to live under a constitution which, in its original

principles, ensures to them the full and free possession of their faith, having asserted the authority and sufficiency of the holy scriptures in all things necessary to salvation ; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation. That your petitioners do conceive that they have a natural right, and are also warranted by those original principles of the reformation from popery on which the church of England is constituted, to judge, in searching the scriptures, each man for himself, what may or may not be proved thereby. That they find themselves, however, in great measure precluded the enjoyment of this invaluable privilege, by the laws relating to subscription, whereby your petitioners are required to acknowledge certain articles and confession of faith, and doctrine, drawn up by fallible men, to be all and every of them agreeable to the said scriptures. Your petitioners therefore pray, that they may be relieved from such an imposition upon their judgment, and be restored to their undoubted right as protestants, of interpreting the scriptures for themselves, without being bound by any human explication thereof, or required to acknowledge, by subscription or declaration, the truth of any formulary of religious faith and doctrine whatsoever, beside the holy scripture itself.

That your petitioners not only are themselves aggrieved by subscription as now required (which they cannot but consider as an encroachment on their rights, competent to them both as men and as members of a protestant establishment), but with much grief and concern apprehend it to be a great hindrance to the spreading of Christ's true religion ; as it tends to preclude, at least to discourage further inquiry into the true sense of scripture, to divide communions, and cause mutual dislike between fellow-protestants ; as it gives a handle to unbelievers to re-



proach and vilify the clergy, by representing them (when they observe their diversity of opinion touching those very articles which were agreed upon for the sake of avoiding the diversities of opinion), as guilty of prevarication, and of accommodating their faith to lucrative views, or political consideration; as it affords to papists, and others disaffected to our religious establishment, occasion to reflect upon it as inconsistently framed, admitting and authorizing doubtful and precarious doctrines, at the same time that holy scripture alone is acknowledged to be certain and sufficient for salvation; as it tends, and the evil daily increases, unhappily to divide the clergy of the establishment themselves, subjecting one part thereof, who assert but their protestant privilege, to question every human doctrine, and bring it to the test of scripture, to be reviled, as well from the pulpit as the press, by another part, who seem to judge the articles they have subscribed to be of equal authority with the holy scripture itself. And lastly, as it occasions scruples and embarrassment of conscience to thoughtful and worthy persons, in regard to entrance into the ministry, or cheerful continuance in the exercise of it.

That the clerical part of your petitioners, upon whom it is peculiarly incumbent, and who are more immediately appointed by the state to maintain and defend the truth as it is in Jesus, do find themselves laid under a great restraint in their endeavours herein, by being obliged to join issue with the adversaries of revelation, in supposing the one true sense of scripture to be expressed in the present established system of faith, or else to incur the reproach of having departed from their subscriptions, the suspicion of insincerity, and the repute of being ill-affected to the church; whereby their comfort and usefulness among their respective flocks, as well as their success against the adversaries of our common christianity, are greatly obstructed,



That such of your petitioners as have been educated with a view to the several professions of civil law and physic, cannot but think it a great hardship to be obliged (as all are in one of the universities, even at their first admission or matriculation, and at an age so immature for disquisitions and decisions of such moment) to subscribe their unfeigned assent to a variety of theological propositions, concerning which their private opinions can be of no consequence to the public, in order to entitle them to academical degrees in those faculties, more especially as the course of their studies, and attention to their practice respectively, afford them neither the means nor the leisure to examine how far such propositions do agree with the word of God.

That certain of your petitioners have reason to lament not only their own, but the too probable misfortune of their sons, who at an age before the habit of reflection can be formed, or their judgment matured, must, if the present mode of subscription remain, be irrecoverably bound down, in points of the highest consequence, to the tenets of ages less informed than their own.

That whereas the first of the three articles enjoined by the thirty-sixth canon of the church of England to be subscribed, contains a recognition of his majesty's supremacy in all causes ecclesiastical and civil; your petitioners humbly presume, that every security proposed by subscription to the said article, is fully and effectually provided for by the oaths of allegiance and supremacy prescribed to be taken by every deacon and priest at their ordination, and by every graduate in both universities: your petitioners being, nevertheless, ready and willing to give any farther testimony which may be thought expedient, of their affection for his majesty's person and government, of their attachment and dutiful submission to the constitution in church and state, of their abhorrence

of the unchristian spirit of popery, and of all those maxims of the church of Rome which tend to enslave the consciences, or to undermine the civil or religious liberty of a free protestant people.

Your petitioners, in consideration of the premises, do now supplicate this honourable house, in hope of being relieved from an obligation so incongruous with the right of private judgment, so pregnant with danger to true religion, and so productive of distress to many pious and conscientious men and useful subjects of the state, and in that hope look up for redress; and humbly submit their cause, under God, to the wisdom and justice of a British parliament, and the piety of a protestant king.

And your petitioners shall ever pray, &c.

END OF VOL. V.

ERRATA.

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